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ABSTRACT
In moments of reflection, both management teachers and practitioners acknowledge that
choices are constrained by the availability of information, the ability to make sense of it, and
the ability to communicate it. This study of strategy practice in organisations shows that
choice is more than constrained; it is also socially constructed.
Everyday strategy is guided by 'taken for granted' practices rooted in social reality; an
objective reality that is the product of subjective processes. At the same time, practitioners
construct their social reality through practice; through, for example, shared meaning,
heritage, the patterning of experiences. These observations are based on a phenomenological
study of strategy and innovation in three unrelated organisations all of whom regard
innovation as essential for their survival: a bank, a telecommunications service provider, and
a business school.
The relationship between strategy practice and social reality is inclusive, one reflecting and at
the same time shaping the other unceasingly. However the indeterminacy of the shaping
process suggests that there is more than rule governed behaviour involved. Through
innovation practitioners both reinforce and elaborate their social reality. In interpreting and
expressing their social reality through practice, practitioners are necessarily creative; they are
interpreting and expressing their social reality through the application of their capabilities.
There are a limited number of social realities that practitioners might create; social reality is
not infinitely variable nor universally homogeneous. The ways that practitioners work
together and the degree of social control they experience gives rise to four possible
archetypical social realities or alternative worlds. Those aspects of reality that practitioners of
each socially constructed world take for granted varies qualitatively across an inexhaustive
list of factors, including attitudes to rationality and uncertainty, and how to compete and co¬
operate.
These findings suggest that attempts to manipulate social reality fail because organisational
designers do not appreciate the extent to which practice is socially constructed. Practitioners
may have more influence on their organisation's innovative performance through a better
understanding of how they construct social reality, and how strategic choice is embedded in
that reality.
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The motivation for pursuing this thesis emerged very gradually during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, and can be traced to two influences and a long standing desire. One influence
was my experience as a practitioner engaged in new business development, conceiving of
new products and applications. This work was exciting, perhaps because it carried a lot of
risk; but also as a disciple of Thatcher's enterprise culture of the 1980s I found the fiercely
competitive process very stimulating. Over time though attempts to manage the process of
creating new business opportunities seemed to be effective only at the margins. I began to
wonder why that was so. I looked to the popular management literature for help but that
seemed wanting in one way or another. The second influence came from my experience as a
tutor for the Open Business School. In this role I engaged in discussion with practitioners
from many different businesses who also seemed to be trying to make sense of their own
situations. Here too the literature while valuable seemed to raise as many questions as it tried
to answer. These two influences fuelled a long standing desire to make some kind of literary
contribution; to write a book that some section of society might find useful.
One common theme of these influences involve questions about how practitioners make
sense of their role within their organisation's strategy; how they interpret opportunities and
threats to the continued prosperity of their employing organisations; and why, despite formal
strategy making and meticulous planning, the future almost always turns out differently to
that intended. These issues seem to revolve around a belief shared by competing firms and
their customers that innovation is a necessary route to prosperity.
The first section of this chapter, 'personal encounters', explores some of the issues that I have
found to be problematic as a practitioner. 'The need for innovation' then establishes the
widespread concern among organisations for ways of being more innovative, and also helps
to locate the broad aims of this research. The last section outlines the chapters of the thesis.
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1.1 Personal encounters
There are a few concerns that shaped my early reading and the design of this research. First, I
have found that 'strategy' means different things to different people. It varies both in terms of
an abstract meaning and relative to an individual's role within the organisation. I have seen
this differentiation manifest itself as people talking past each other, or groups seem to agree
on strategy formulation yet implement those agreements in contradictory or incompatible
ways. The strategy concept is not the only thing on which practitioners believe they agree,
while their actions tell a different story. Despite the existence of mission statements and the
like, interest groups within and outwith the organisation have different and often conflicting
interpretations of what the organisation's expertise is, what its current competitive position
is, and in which markets and with what technologies it could or should be competing in the
future. The extent and nature of such diversity is seldom explored as part of the formal
strategy process, yet that diversity has significant implications for internal coherence amongst
other things.
My second concern, related to the first, is that contradiction, conflict and compromise seems
prevalent within formal strategy. Organisational performance is measured in terms of both
continual profit growth and the creation of new business. My experience is that if substantial
initiatives are set up within an established business, that is a recipe for death of the initiative.
If the initiative is set up as a separate entity the risks to its survival do not diminish, rather
they change in nature. From the perspective of those directly managing the initiative, their
relationship with the larger organisation is one where strategy making and outcomes tend
toward unstable coalitions between different interest groups within the overall organisation,
and at times unpredictable changes of direction. As a member of embryonic initiatives I have
felt a constant tension in relations with the main organisation. These usually revolve around
paradoxes; the need to generate cash and the need for investment; maintaining the status quo
and organisational change; predictability and flexibility; operational efficiency and pursuing
new technologies and markets; exploiting existing internal know-how and pursuing new
know-how through links with external bodies.
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Third, formal strategy seems insensitive to heterogeneity, spontaneity and intuitive
judgement, and yet decision outcomes often seem more akin to witchcraft than its public
image of logic and calculus. The practice of strategy appears as a collection of more or less
coherent guiding principles based on institutionalised beliefs, spurious cause-effect
relationships, articulated through 'rules of thumb', and justified through post hoc
rationalisation. Decisions about resource allocation, such as R&D spend, are often justified as
'normal for the industry', or 'we've always done it this way'. Logical arguments are then
marshalled to bolster such decisions. The traditional functional specialisation (Marketing,
Sales, R&D, Production, etc.) is itself an institutionalised 'rule of thumb' resulting in
strategic choices being forced to conform accordingly.
Fourth, almost all knowledge about 'how to compete in this business' is regarded as
objective knowledge, - whether this is current and required expertise, market requirements,
competitive position and sources of competitive advantage. As practitioners we often debate
the accuracy of such knowledge, but rarely question whether we are asking the right
questions, or whether there are fundamentally different ways of making sense of the world.
Further, practitioners often know what to do in any given situation but, beyond saying that it
is 'commonsense', cannot say how or why they know what is the appropriate action to take.
Polanyi (1966) in his study of knowledge accumulation in the natural sciences refers to this
phenomenon as 'knowing more than we can tell' or 'tacit knowledge'. The existence and
creation of tacit knowledge seems to have poorly understood links with formal strategy and
management control systems. For example, practitioners may formally aim to create
knowledge, such as that described by patents, yet I doubt whether they really understand the
extent and nature of such knowledge as it is created, nor the manner in which it is perceived
and organised collectively.
Fifth, my sense is that strategy involves spending a great deal of time negotiating and trading
support with colleagues informally. Strategy decisions and knowledge acquisition of all sorts
seem to owe more to informal social and political relations, and membership of small,
sometimes transitory key groups, than to any amount of formal planning. The way that
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strategy unfolds seems driven by one interest group using politics, knowledge and links with
informal networks more effectively than other interest groups. Formal plans, forecasts,
projections, and espoused strategy all seem to be post hoc rationalisations of backstage
activity. In my experience, formal strategy has little chance of success if it is not underpinned
by such backstage activity. Formal strategy is acknowledged yet seem only partially relevant
in informing actual outcomes.
The concerns listed here are not intended to suggest the existence of widespread conflict and
incompetence. Rather, it is to stress that organisations assume the reliability of formal
strategy, freedom of strategic choice, and the veracity of their own understanding. Further,
there seems to be great resistance to internal heterogeneity and change, and a tendency to
regard change as necessarily an upheaval.
More generally, strategy seems to be perceived as bringing order, implying a particular
pattern of work; it suggests restriction. From all possible technologies a particular selection
has been made, and from all possible market relations a particular set has developed.
Innovation, on the other hand, implies disorder, and a challenge to the existing order. At the
same time it is the material for creating new patterns. It implies a wider if not infinite range
of technologies and market relations to choose from. How can the apparent order of strategy
and the disorder of innovation be reconciled? Taken together these concerns and ideas have
implications for formal strategy, our understanding of it, our assumptions about its
effectiveness, and management teaching on the subject.
1.2 The need for innovation
The importance of innovation is widely recognised. The British government through the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) stresses its importance, defining it as:
The commercial application of knowledge or techniques in new ways or for new
purposes [and] is important in every business. It is not necessarily about thinking
up new things in the first place but about exploiting opportunities profitably and
ahead of competitors ('Innovation: Technology and Change', The Enterprise
Initiative, 2nd. ed., February 1992 ).
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Popular journals and newspapers regularly carry articles and case histories of how
companies' success depends on how they manage innovation. For example, Coats Viyella's
ability to maintain a competitive position is seen as dependent on innovation in quality and
design, and that more generally "western firms will hold on to the upper end of the market
only if they continue to innovate" ('Concentrating the mind', The Economist, February 18,
1995: 81).
There are many government sponsored initiatives to bring together industry and the research
community in the hunt for more effective ways of boosting the nation's wealth generating
capabilities. For example, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 'Innovation
Agenda' (1993), and the Innovation Advisory Board 'Action Programme' (1990). Some of
these programmes and projects produce guides and checklists for practitioners, such as the
National Economic Development Office (NEDO) Innovation Management Tool kit,
published jointly by HMSO and Barclays Bank in 1990. More recently (1996) the ESRC
published 'Innovation: A framework for innovation management training'. This material is
being provided free of charge to colleges and universities that provide courses in innovation.
These initiatives tell practitioners how to make their businesses more competitive by being
more innovative. In addition to training firms may draw directly on experts and funds. For
example, The DTI's Enterprise Initiative offers both expert help to firms and capital grants
for supporting innovation. The government is also urging firms to develop 'strategic' skills in
business planning, management information systems, as well as enhancing their competitive
skills in the traditional areas of R&D, manufacturing, and marketing.
This research is based on the assertion that firms must compete through innovation which
means that corporate leaders and their teams are continually exercised in managing strategic
change, making non-routine decisions, as they try to improve competitive performance and
build competitive advantage by bringing together technological possibilities and commercial
opportunities.
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The aim of this research is to provide practitioners with additional insight to the intractable
difficulties of managing innovations, where 'innovation' describes the process of profitably
anticipating and interpreting the needs of selection environments through technological
possibilities. Technological possibilities here refer to new ways of configuring technical
knowledge as artefacts and work processes. The selection environment refers to markets,
regulators, competitors, collaborators, and other stakeholder groups. In general innovative
technological configurations (that is novel products and processes) are successful if people
are willing to pay for them, but what does 'anticipating and interpreting' opportunities
involve? This is a question about the nature of strategy practice, of how these processes shape
strategic choice, and the scope for innovation therein. A better understanding of practice will
hopefully provide a frame of reference that practitioners find useful in evaluating their own
situation.
The approach adopted here to gain the desired insight to corporate innovation is not to trace
the progress of an individual innovation from initial idea through to a marketable product.
Instead the focus is on how the organisation's actors, with partial and differentiated
knowledge, make and execute strategy faced with the uncertainty and diversity surrounding
technological possibilities and selection environments.
1.3 Outline of thesis
Drawing on the concerns above I formulated a number of research questions. All of these
questions are concerned with making sense of the practice of strategy, with particular
emphases being reflected in the individual questions:
1. How do the differentiated perceptions of interest groups shape the practice of managing
innovation as a strategic process? How do networks and contacts, both formal and informal,
shape perceptions?
2. What are the barriers to achieving both innovation and efficiency, conformity and
originality? Is the simultaneous achievement of these positions a contradiction?
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3. What heuristics exist (eg., previous decisions, existing formal decision rules and informal
practices), and how do these shape (and get shaped by) the strategy process?
4. What is the nature and role of tacit knowledge in the strategy process?
5. What is the relationship between the formal and informal strategy process?
These questions were a starting point for the subsequent literature review and field work, but
as will become clear to the reader my immersion in the research lead to modified research
questions. My interests and interpretation of field work evidence developed in unanticipated
ways, resulting in a change in the research questions addressed in chapters 7 to 10:
1. To what extent is the practice of strategy socially constructed? That is, is strategy an
exercise in objectivity and detached rationality, or an exercise in subjectivity and
imagination?
2. What is the relationship between the practice of strategy and social reality? An
organisation's social reality, usually referred to as its culture, is typically seen as an element
that impacts on organisational life, as a backdrop, and as something that can be brought under
the yoke of strategy. To what extent is social reality under the control of the strategist?
3. Are there discernible and viable alternative socially constructed realities? Accepting that
reality is socially constructed does not mean that the possible constructions are infinitely
variable, that anything is possible. Is there scope for characterising alternative social
constructions?
The second group of questions differ from the original in terms of the assumptions and
theoretical framework employed. The original questions assumed a largely positivist
conception of strategy while the new questions were addressed using an interpretive
framework. The thesis is organised so as to show the reader both the content of the final
argument made in chapters 7 to 10, and the process of evolution in thinking that led to that
final argument. Chapter 2 represents my initial understanding of the issues relevant to the
original research questions. Chapters 7 to 10 represents a shift in my assessment of the
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important issues underpinning the practice of strategy; a shift brought about through
engaging in field work and its analysis.
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part I contains a literature review (chapter 2), and
describes the research design and method adopted (chapter 3). The literature review was
conducted early on in the study, to establish a platform of knowledge to guide the preparation
of research questions. This review explores the diverse perspectives on the meaning of
strategy and strategic management, the role of knowledge creation in innovation, and the
extent to which innovation is part of the strategy process. Chapter 3 describes the research
design and method used for investigating the diverse perspectives on the meaning of strategy
and the role of innovation. A central feature of the research design is case studies of three
organisations. This was done to provide material for an evaluation of both similarities and
differences across organisations in diverse competitive sectors. This chapter includes some
epistemological considerations. In particular it is argued that a phenomenological rather than
positivist research design is more appropriate for studying differentiated meanings of
strategy, and for making sense of the different ways that practitioners see the scope for
innovation. A personal reflection on the research process is included as a way of providing
further insight to how practical methodological challenges and the analytical process were
managed.
Part II reports the three case histories (chapters 4 to 6): a bank, a telecommunications
manufacturer and service provider, and a business school. These case histories have been
written from the interviews described in the 'research design and method' chapter. Each case
history documents the organisation's history and size, its work organisation arrangements
and strategic aims, and interviewees' accounts of their strategy processes and innovation
record. The three accounts are not presented here in terms of any particular analytical
framework, this being the focus of Part III, yet they give a sense of the variety of ways that
innovation is managed within the practice of strategy.
Part III contains four chapters of analysis (chapters 7 to 10), and the thesis conclusions
(chapter 11). Chapter 7 reviews the literature on social reality, a concept that underlines the
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whole analysis of the three cases. This review is in Part III rather than Part I so as to show the
process of development of my thinking: the notion of social reality became significant in the
course of the field work, not before. Chapter 8 draws on the case histories to show that
strategy practice is a process where practitioners construct their social reality, a reality that at
the same time shapes practice. The findings presented here are in contrast with the largely
rationalistic perspective of strategy that underpins the earlier literature review of chapter 2.
Chapter 9 explores the role of technological knowledge and capabilities in constructing
practitioners' social reality. Links are also made here between these findings and ideas
reviewed in chapter 2. Chapter 10 suggests that each of the three organisations studied can be
characterised as one of a limited number of possible social realities, and a framework for
comparing social realities is discussed.
The concluding chapter 11 draws together the main research findings, reflecting the thrust of
each analytical chapter, implications for practice, and possible further research. The
discussion takes in the 'personal encounters' discussed above, argue that practitioners need to
be more self-reflexive about their knowledge claims, strategic judgements and practice, and
the issues they should consider in the process. The chapter reflect on the nature of strategy
practice, its relationship with a socially constructed reality, and the difficulty of designing
organisations. The conclusions also highlight that in managing innovation practitioners'




Literature Review and Research Method
2
Corporate strategy and innovation: a literature review
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally for a thesis this chapter would review the whole of the relevant field, as a
precursor to gathering and analysing empirical evidence in light of the research questions.
This thesis breaks with that tradition in order to show the development of both the
substantive argument and the unfolding of the research process. To that end this chapter
surveys the strategy and innovation literatures that seemed relevant to the initial research
questions. In this sense it is a partial review of the nature of strategy. In the course of the
research there was a paradigmatic shift in my understanding of the nature of strategy. Some
literature that seemed irrelevant at the time of writing this review became central through
engagement with the fieldwork. This material is introduced and developed in the analytical
chapters 7 to 10. It is located there to reflect an intellectual development that came about
through writing chapter 2, collecting and making sense of field work (chs. 4, 5, 6), and
continued reading during and after the field work.
We may view organisational strategy as the context or social soup from which innovation
takes shape. This soup is a cocktail of social, political, cognitive, cultural influences and
perspectives. These ingredients are structured by practitioners' experiences, accumulated
knowledge, and capabilities. At any time the firm's strategy is a source of obsolete,
emerging, and currently dominant capabilities, as well as many novel product, service, and
process ideas. Most of these ideas are in continual competition with each other for financial
resources, and political interpretation and support.
This chapter, divided into six main sections, reviews both theoretical ideas and empirical
work on the nature of strategy, and the scope for innovation therein. In this chapter strategy is
presented as the framework for innovation. As a starting point section 2 looks for a definition
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of strategy in terms of 'ends and means' and finds both agreement and disagreement in the
literature. Section 3, 'metaphors of strategic management', then examines three models of
how strategy is managed: whether strategy reflects total managerial control, or is a chaotic
process, or is socially shaped. Total managerial control or 'determinate' strategy, may take
two forms: either the synoptic or grand plan approach, or a much more incremental process
where practitioners, still in full control of their relationship with their competitive
environment, continually adapt to that environment through learning what works.
The second model, strategy as a managed and chaotic process, highlights a number of
important issues not accommodated by the first two concepts of strategy. In particular the
managed chaos model helps to surface the difficulty of separating social values and means.
This model also acknowledges that there are limits to the amount of information and
knowledge that individuals may know and groups may share. The third model of strategy
suggests that an organisation's members see their competitive world in a particular way, and
that corporate leaders may seek to manage strategy by manipulating the organisation's
symbols, including the use of language, awards, and sanctions. Section four complements the
preceding discussion on the nature of strategy by considering the extent to which strategic
choice is governed by the external environment or is in the hands of the organisation's
leaders.
While the nature of innovation remains largely implicit in the previous exploration of the
strategy concept, the next two sections bring innovation to the fore. Section 5 explores the
relationship between innovation and strategy from five positions. First, 'the innovation in
strategy' considers whether innovation is a means to fulfilling strategy, under what
circumstances innovative activity is regarded as strategic, and the role of learning in making
strategic and non-strategic distinctions. Second, 'Innovation studies' acknowledges a number
of debates: whether innovation should be credited to the lone hero, the team, or the
environment; to what degree does 'demand pull' or 'technology push' provide adequate
accounts of the innovation process; and the insight to innovation offered by the evolutionary
economics metaphor. A third position considers how successful initiatives often emerge
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despite formal and possibly contrary strategic intentions. The fourth aspect 'the innovation in
strategy' is the extent to which firms must continually innovate to maintain competitive
performance over the short term, and build sustainable competitive advantage over the long
term.
Understanding how knowledge is created and exploited is critical to making sense of
innovation, and this is the focus of section 6. Explored here is the notion that knowledge
evolves and accumulates as a hierarchy of patterns, with 'design configurations' subsumed
under 'technological regimes' (Metcalfe and Gibbons, 1989), and evidence is introduced that
shows technological knowledge more than product knowledge is the critical source of
competitive advantage. The 'sociotechnical system' is introduced to show the
interdependence between the firm and its competitive environment. Also discussed is the
interaction between the firm's accumulating knowledge, its work organisation arrangements,
and the organisation membership's shared view of the world. An assessment of the nature of
this interaction is important since it contributes to the shaping of strategy. Finally, this
section argues that innovation is driven as much by environmental variety, including
heterogeneity among competing firms, as by individual entrepreneurial activity.
2.2 DEFINING STRATEGY
The word 'strategy' is used rather loosely and ambiguously by practitioners.1 Personal
experience and anecdotal evidence suggests that most practitioners and management teaching
assume the meaning of strategy to be common and therefore no need to define the obvious.
Chaffee, in reviewing the literature on strategy found that "no controversy surrounds the
question of its existence; no debate has arisen regarding the nature of its anchoring
concept"(1985: 89).
1 Practitioner' here describes a wide range of professional individuals within the firm rather than a reference to any
particular function or position.
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2.2.1 Ends and means
Perhaps the most common interpretation of strategy is in terms of means and ends. For some
strategy describes organisational ends only, and concerns what the organisation's leaders
want the organisation to be, its basic purpose. Strategy as 'ends' guide choices about which
products, services, markets, the allocation of resources and the identification of appropriate
capabilities. How the organisation achieves its basic purpose is an operational issue (Moore,
1992: 82).
Others regard strategy as the means while objectives describe the ends. They argue that
clearly defined objectives guide the firm into the future, rather than strategy. In this case the
relationship between strategy and objective is such that strategy making is iterative, trying to
match achievable objectives with realistic strategies. This might be seen for example when a
particular strategy fails to deliver against the objective, because strategy or objective or both
are not possible with the given resources, or environmental conditions have become
unfavourable (Moore, 1992: 21).
Within this framework some recognise that managers are operating with limited knowledge
of their competitive situation. Ansoff (1965) for example regards strategy as a 'decision rule'
or rule for making decisions under conditions of partial ignorance.
Still others see strategy as both means and ends (Chandler 1962; Andrews, 1987). Chandler
for example defines strategy as:
the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise,
and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for
carrying out these goals (1962: 13).
He was seeking to understand how companies in the United States managed the complex
situation of their own growth within the context of an expanding post-war US economy, with
a particular focus on innovations in organisational structure. Furthermore, his findings, that
strategy determines structure as much as existing structure influences strategy, suggest that
an organisation's growth may be comprehensively analysed in terms of these two axes.
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Andrews, like Chandler before, intends strategy to encompass both objective setting and
strategy formulation. He believes that goals should not be seen as separate from those
policies designed to attain them and sees corporate strategy as a
pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its objectives,
purposes, or goals, and defines the range of businesses the company is to pursue,
the kind of economic and human organisation it is or intends to be, and the nature
of the economic and non-economic contribution it intends to make to its
shareholders, employees, customers, and communities (1987: 18).
In this way according to Andrews, corporate strategy is the outcome of strategic management
and it is the degree of internal consistency and coherence of the firm's strategic decisions
which account for the strength of its competitive position. Similarly, Quinn offers strategy as
the "pattern or plan that integrates an organisation's major goals, policies, and action
sequences into a cohesive whole" (1980: 7).
There is some acknowledgement among these writers that managers do not and cannot have
perfect knowledge of their competitive situation, and are therefore uncertain about their
competitive situation. Nevertheless words like 'determines', 'intends' and phrases like
'integrates into a cohesive whole' suggest it to be an entirely rational process. In contrast to
the notion of strategy as a rational heuristic, others have explored interpretations that fall
outside of the 'means-ends' debate.
2.2.2 Differentiated meaning
Mintzberg's contribution (Quinn et. al., 1988: 14-18) is perhaps representative of the variety
and ambiguity of meaning attributed to strategy in the minds of practising managers. From
his perspective a single definition is not useful and does not reflect the variety of ways in
which it is used by practitioners, researchers and academics. He therefore offers a selection,
regarding all as valid depending on the context of application. Strategy may be any one or a
combination of: plan, pattern, position, perspective, or ploy.
These different descriptions complement each other, according to Mintzberg, such that plan
suggests intention, pattern is about consistency of actual behaviour, position describes the
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firm's location in a competitive context, and perspective underlines the sense that an
organisation's members share a common view of the world, such as 'the IBM way'. He
acknowledges that in some ways these alternatives compete with each other, but sees a
greater benefit in their complementarity as enriching our understanding of strategic
management.
Others regard the organisational culture as the place where strategy is defined and performed.
Van Cauwenberg and Cool define strategy as "calculated behaviour in non-programmed
situations", and is distinct from "administration" which is the management of routine (1982:
246). Strategy is an activity that all levels of management take part in, not just "top
management" (1982: 261). For them non-routine situations describe organisational reality as
a set of incoherent ideas and practices, and the task of "top management" is "motivating
adequate strategic behaviour" (1982: 255).
Huff sees strategy as a contested area where disagreement goes beyond differentiated
interests and multiple points of view. This disagreement "is not just analytic. It has the strong
symbolic content and rich subjective meanings which rise out of different world views and
experience" (1983: 167). Her view is based on a study of rhetorical devices used by the Dean
of a graduate school to argue and persuade his colleagues and staff that particular actions
were necessary to improve the position of the school.
Weick and Daft (1983) focuses on strategy as the expression of some form of unwritten
social contract between different subgroups holding different perceptions about their
organisation's and the subgroup's relationship with the environment. For them strategy is a
shared set of beliefs that guide action and help the membership to make sense of both the
internal and external environment.
Ideas such as these begin to introduce the possibility that there may be complexity and
disorder not just in the environment, but also within the organisation. There is a suggestion
that strategy is much more of a messy processual affair rather than logical and instrumental.
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These ideas represent a challenge to the means-ends debate where there is a presumption of
systematic and rational behaviour among the firm's managers.
Clearly there is no general consensus or agreed set of assumptions underpinning the
perception of strategy, or by implication its practice. Hambrick (1983) offers two reasons for
this: that strategy is multi-dimensional and that it is contextual, varying according to the
industry. Perhaps more importantly, the lack of consensus and variety of definitions also
reflect various and possibly competing assumptions about the nature of strategy.
Although there is such a variety of meaning associated with the strategy concept, Chaffee
(1985: 89) suggests that there is general agreement in some areas. First, the strategy concept
can be divided into two interdependent halves; the content (intent, actions), and the process
by which the content is thought through and acted upon. Second, that strategy is the process
through which practitioners deal with a changing environment. Indeed a changing
environment routinely produces many unanticipated situations, forcing practitioners to
rethink their strategy. This leads to the third area of agreement, that strategy making remains
unstructured and non routine.
Chaffee (1985) also notes that there seems to be general agreement on the existence of
multiple levels of strategy: corporate (what business to be in), business (how to compete in
this business), operational (how should R&D, marketing, information systems, etc. contribute
to the business strategy). Lastly, she suggests that writers,
concur that the making of strategy involves conceptual as well as analytical
exercises. Some authors stress the analytical dimension more than others, but
most affirm that the heart of strategy making is the conceptual work done by
leaders of the organization (1985: 90).
There is no doubt among researchers and practitioners alike that strategy is an activity of
fundamental importance to the well-being of the organisation. There is however room to
question the implication that strategy making is necessarily a top down process, especially
where access to, and control of knowledge and information, is regarded as a foundation for
effective strategy making. For example organisational 'gatekeepers' such as sales people
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clearly have considerable scope for filtering information into and out of their employing
organisation. Fincham et. al. (1994) in their study of the relationship between information
technology (IT) expertise and innovation in the financial services sector, found that IT
experts have considerable scope for shaping what senior executives know and therefore base
their decisions on. Staff of the Open Business School share a belief in open access to decision
making; to them top down strategy is anathema (ch. 6).
At its simplest strategy making may be viewed either as decisions made in advance of action
or a complex pattern or stream of decisions where intended goals and means of achieving
them are indistinguishable. The next section explores these issues by examining a number of
metaphors of strategy making.
2.3 METAPHORS OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
2.3.1 Introduction
Many writers have developed categories that characterise the differences and similarities they
see in these different views of the strategy process. The preceding discussion suggest three
categories that may be helpful in exploring the role of innovation in strategy. In the first case
strategy may be seen as a process that is determinate, with managers in full control of their
destiny. In the second strategy is likened to managed chaos, with managers having little
control of events in their environment. In the third strategy is a social construction, where the
language of control is inappropriate, because organisations and their environments shape
each other. These alternative processes may offer scope as contexts for examining the
innovation process.
There are other ways of categorising strategy. For example Whittington (1993: 3) suggests a
classification based on two dimensions: whether the process is deliberate or emergent, and
whether outcomes are "pluralistic" or "profit maximizing". His framework produces four
types of strategy: classical, evolutionary, processual, and systemic. The first type
approximates to strategy as 'determinate', involving deliberate processes seeking to
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maximise outcomes. However, strategy as determinate seems more useful because it allows
further division into strategy as the 'grand plan' (Fredrickson's 1983 synoptic approach), and
strategy as a rational but incremental approach as in Quinn's (1980) logical incrementalism.
The second type of strategy, 'evolutionary', is also about maximising outcomes, but more
through emergent than deliberate processes. Whittington's third type, 'processual' strategy,
like 'evolutionary' strategy, is emergent. However, its outcomes are pluralistic rather than
maximizing, for example allowing for both socially responsible behaviour and a return that
shareholders find acceptable. Evolutionary and processual metaphors and strategy as
'managed chaos' acknowledge the emergent more than deliberate quality of strategy.
However, strategy as 'managed chaos' suggests that maximising need not be economic, it
could be directed to some social objective. Further, whatever the 'big idea', realised
outcomes tend to be pluralistic, reflecting the role of social values, and the largely disjointed
and reactive behaviour by the organisation's practitioners. Lindblom (1959) describes such a
process as 'muddling through', based on his study of a USA public services department.
Whittington's fourth type of strategy is 'systemic', and results from deliberate processes and
pluralistic outcomes. Whittington suggests that strategic practices reflect a wider social
system, such as a national culture; an implicit acknowledgement that strategic practices are
socially shaped.
While Whittington's typology has merit, the preceding observations suggest various
limitations. It is possible therefore to think in terms of three generally distinct theoretical
constructs of strategy making. In the first metaphor strategy as 'determinate' is systematic,
purposive, and analytical. The process may be synoptic or incremental and involving
learning; either way there seems to be unbounded objectivity as practitioners pursue
economic goals. The second metaphor of 'managed chaos' conceives of an iterative process
shaped by social values; it is a process that is reactive, negotiated, satisficing, stumbling
forward. The third metaphor of strategy offers a very different dimension. Rather than
conceiving of either a proactive or reactive process as in the first two, the social construction
frame suggests that strategy making is rooted in the organisation's culture, evoking notions
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of organisational symbolism, symbolic mediation of environmental signals, and interpretive
frames shared among the organisation's membership.
2.3.2 Strategy as determinate
Strategy as determinate may be stylised as two types, although features of both types are
likely to be found in many, if not most, organisations. Distinguishing between 'synoptic
strategy' and 'logical incrementalism' is useful because it helps to highlight differences and
commonalities. The two types share the notion that strategic management involves managing
three elements: first analysis, then assessing strategic choices, followed by implementation.
The process is rational, objective, and choice is separable from analysis and implementation.
They also differ in important ways, as the following examination shows.
Synoptic strategy
The traditional description of strategy follows a machine or military metaphor, presuming
firstly that managing a well run enterprise is like conducting a military campaign,
manoeuvring resources (finances, human knowledge, capital equipment), with the aim of
gaining and maintaining competitive advantage. A second presumption is that those
responsible for the process monitor resource levels and environmental forces, constantly
manipulating organisational resources appropriately. The third presumption is that the
process is rational and under control, in the sense that the organisation's members follow a
formal plan.
This perspective of strategic management is seen as a systematic and continuous process,
consisting of a sequence of activities, starting with the setting of financial objective and
external/internal analysis, followed by strategy formulation, then implementation, review
then cycling back to the beginning. There is an assumption that environmental change is
predictable, and that managers should concern themselves with continuous improvements in
efficiency, tacking their course in line with shifts in market demand.
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This rational, comprehensive and linear approach has widespread support (Andrews, 1987;
Ansoff, 1965; Argenti, 1980), yet it is difficult to see how in practice such an approach can
deal effectively with managing the complexity and dynamics of change since it is based on a
strongly analytical perspective, taking little account of the "conceptual work" (Chaffee, 1985:
90) of the organisation's practitioners at all levels, involving intuitive leaps and judgements
in the face of incomplete knowledge. Indeed Simon (1957) in his study of administrative
processes coined the term 'bounded rationality' in recognition that practitioners individually
have cognitive limits, and collectively have limits in the way they share and communicate
information. The approach is not tolerant of ambiguity, assumes that practitioners have a
clear understanding of threats and opportunities, capabilities, and can reach agreement of all
critical factors in a systematic way.
The synoptic construct seems to accord with neo-classical economic theories of the firm,
where corporate leaders motivated by economic objectives, specifically profit maximisation,
systematically and analytically assess market demand and adjust supply as necessary.
Knowledge has no proprietary or tacit competitive value since all firms draw from a
commonly available pool. These theories, developed during the 18th century when almost all
firms were owner-managed, offering one or a narrow range of related products, tended to
ignore entrepreneurial behaviour in wealth creation. Indeed, observations of discrepancies
between the classical economic theory of the firm and present day realities have encouraged a
re-evaluation of the 'rational-economic man' perspective, as noted by Coombs and Richards
in their study of the relationship between firms' strategies and their technology strategies:
the historical increase in the size of firms relative to markets, coupled with the
separation of ownership and control of firms, has forced economists to take
seriously the scope of managerial action and its motivations (1991: 80).
The issue of managerial choice is discussed below (2.4) as part of a broader debate about the
scope for free choice.
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Logical incrementalism
Another explanation of strategic management, based on a metaphor of adaptation and open
systems theory, puts managers still very much in control of their destiny, pro-actively and
continually seeking to make sense of and adapt their organisation to complex environmental
forces.
In a study during the 1970s, involving about nine very large diversified companies, Quinn
(1980) like Lindblom (1959) before him, found that strategy practice in well managed
enterprises bore no relationship to the generally prescribed rational formal planning
approach. Quinn describes his firms' management of strategy as "logical incrementalism".
Strategies in these firms emerged through a consensus among their corporate leaders. The
nature of the process was fragmented, evolutionary, and intuitive, where functional
departments would actively seek to reduce discord between their own strategies and those of
the whole organisation. Managers in 'well-run' firms pro-actively develop strategies and
consciously pursue actions in managing the interface between the external environment and
internal conditions.
According to Quinn the result of the iterative process was an integrated organisational
strategy based on the incremental building of commitments, an ability to experiment and
learn, and the successful management of organisational politics and psychology. There seems
to be an implicit objectively rational programme able to resolve internal political conflict and
differentiated values between managers. Quinn argues that the inherent delays of an iterative
process is advantageous since it allows the accumulation of more and better information for
decision making, and allows a consensus to develop. However while this may be true it also
results in an organisation which is slow to respond to change and therefore has the increased
risk of loosing the competitive race. His concept also ignores the possible existence and
effects of the malady of 'groupthink' (Janis, 1972) within the enterprise; a situation where the
organisation's leaders uncritically follow a flawed strategy. Similarly, Johnson (1989) in his
exploration of organisational paradigms suggests that logical incrementalism could lead to
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'strategic drift', where the organisation gradually drifts out of touch with environmental
conditions.
There is support for the incremental metaphor. For example, Cyert and March sees the firm
as "an adaptively rational system rather than an omnisciently rational system" (1992: 117).
During the 1970s Mintzberg investigated how corporate leaders' intentions and plans over a
number of decades compared with what actually happened. He found strategy to be "a pattern
in a stream of decisions" (1978a: 935). Strategies may start as 'intended', but fail, becoming
'unrealized'. Equally, strategies may 'emerge' and become realized. Mintzberg and Waters
(1989) later developed these ideas into a comprehensive classification of types of strategies,
ranging from completely deliberate or planned to wholly emergent. Midway on this
continuum is the 'umbrella' strategy, where corporate leaders set the boundaries or guidelines
within which divisional or departmental strategies are allowed or encouraged to emerge
through the efforts of other actors. They suggest that the notion of emergent strategy
accommodates the role of 'strategic learning' or adaptation; that practitioners learn what
works, often finding out what they are good at through reflection.
There are many historical examples where innovations may be accounted for in terms of
Mintzberg and Waters (1989) classification. For example during the 1970s, Xerox Corp. was
particularly active in generating innovative ideas for the then fledgling personal computer
market, introducing the GUI (Graphical User Interface) and the mouse. These innovations
were rejected by the Xerox corporate leaders because as emergent innovations they did not fit
the then intended strategy and were therefore unrealised. Interestingly these particular
innovations were picked up by other firms, leading to significant claims to sources of
competitive advantage (Apple, Hewlett Packard) and long drawn out copyright claims and
counter claims (Apple and Microsoft).
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2.3.3 Managed chaos
In his study of how US public administrators actually make policy decisions Lindblom
(1959) found that the rational or 'scientific' method was wholly inadequate for dealing with
the complex problems which administrators encountered. He suggests that the rational-
comprehensive method is appropriate only for small scale problem-solving where variables
are few and unproblematic. He criticises the determinate or what he calls the 'root method'
(always building an edifice from scratch) because it
assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that administrators
simply do not posses, and is even more absurd as an approach to policy when the
time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always
the case (1959: 80).
He describes what administrators actually do in dealing with complex policy questions as
'successive limited comparisons' or 'branch method' and offers it as a realistic alternative to
the determinate prescription. His 'branch' metaphor describes a process of gradual additions
or changes to the existing circumstances.
Lindblom identified four core dimensions of the decision making process which could be
used to evaluate the relative merits of both the root and branch methods: the relationship
between competing ends, and between ends and means; the scope for analysis; deciding what
makes a good policy; and whether strategy progresses pragmatically or by design.
The tangle ofsocial values, and inseparable means
Under the prescribed root approach, objectives are clearly identified, and followed by
analysis of alternative policies or strategies. In other words ends and means are separated. In
practice (branch method) there is often disagreement about objectives and their relative
importance and in the absence of clear objectives administrators may apply their own, but
will still have difficulty deciding how to rank competing and overlapping objectives.
Decision making lacks consistency insofar as individuals may use their own value systems to
guide their choice of decision and collectively these may either clash or be incoherent.
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Additionally, individuals' values and sense of priorities vary over time and circumstances.
The ends and means are locked together and attempts at separating them result in arbitrary
distinctions and decisions.
While this may be the case in public sector management do private enterprise managers
experience such difficulties? Stakeholders in large firms do have different objectives.
Shareholders require dividend payments, corporate managers require funds for investment,
customers want lower prices and better quality, and pressure groups want a variety of things.
Marketing managers continually want new products and funding in order to grow sales in
pursuit of market share, while R&D managers also want additional funds to support existing
and new projects. Furthermore, managers of business units or profit centres must choose
between the need to report profit growth and the need to re-invest some of that profit. If profit
growth is poor over the short term managers may choose not to invest in order to show
satisfactory financial results yet it may be that under-investment is a significant contributor to
poor financial performance over the long term.
As in Lindblom's study, in private enterprise there is no clear separation of objectives.
Objectives are often clearly stated but the degree to which they will in practice be
compromised varies over time and circumstances as they compete both for priority and in
terms of means that cannot be isolated. Corporate leaders cannot rank investment objectives
over dividend payment objectives or vice versa, in all situations. It is not certain that firms
should apply the same investment rules during economic recessions and growth periods. It
depends on many factors. Particular preferences surface with the particular features of
different circumstances, so that objectives need "adjustment at the margin" (Lindblom, 1959:
82).
Given the conflict between objectives of profit growth and re-investment managers are forced
to choose directly between objectives that "offer different marginal combinations of values"
(Lindblom, 1959: 82). The risk of upsetting the shareholders by reducing or withholding
dividend temporarily in favour of increased capital investment, varies according to whether
the firm is seen as offering growth; which proportion of shareholders want capital growth and
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which proportion wants income; the investment alternatives open to shareholders; and the
general state of the economy. As Lindblom notes:
attempts to rank or order [objectives] in general and abstract terms so that they do
not shift from decision to decision end up by ignoring the relevant marginal
preferences (1959: 82).
Limited analysis
Lindblom notes that analysis in the rational method is comprehensive, every important factor
is considered. In administrative practice important alternative potential policies and outcomes
are neglected. Administrators will seek to build on existing experience by claiming insight to
the future and will minimise choices which carry unpredictable consequences. Marginal
analysis is further supported by the tendency to accept new ideas gradually, and even retards
the 'newness' in the process. Such forms of conservative behaviour can also be found in
private enterprise and is generally associated with very large firms operating within a very
stable competitive environment with little technological change. More generally, what might
be regarded as marginal analysis by some and as risk taking by others is relative to the
history of the firm, technical knowledge and capabilities, leadership style, competitive
environment, and the beliefs and aspirations of those in the particular enterprise.
Lindblom maintains that the neglect of possibly important policy options may seem random,
for example both long and short term policies and outcomes have an equal chance of being
neglected, but is still preferable to a prescription of impossible comprehensive analysis. The
administrator's decisions are therefore no less valid in the light of such neglect. Support for
Lindblom's view that administrators make strategic decisions based on choices at the margin
of existing alternatives comes from Simon who notes that:
administrative man [sic] ... is content to leave out of account those aspects of
reality - and that means most aspects - that are substantially irrelevant at a given
time. He [sic] makes his choices using a simple picture of the situation that takes
into account just a few of the factors that he regards as most relevant and crucial
(1957: xxv-xxvi).
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Simon also suggests that organisational decision processes are 'composite', rather than the
preserve of one individual typically at the top of the hierarchy.
In the end, the officer making the final negotiation or signing the contract, though
appearing to decide at least the major questions, is reduced almost to performing
a ministerial function. The major decisions were made neither by the board nor
by any officer, nor formally by any group; they evolved through the interaction of
many decisions both of individuals and by committees and boards. No one
[individual] is likely to be aware of all the decisions entering into the process or
of who made them, or of the interaction through a period of time that modified
decisions at one point and another. ... decision is almost always a composite
process of this sort (Simon, 1957: 222).
Simon's decision process as one of mutual adjustment or 'satisficing' seems to reinforce
Lindblom's central argument of 'muddling through'. Simon (1957) suggests that the process
of composite decision can be understood in terms of how much discretion individuals enjoy,
and what mechanisms the organisation uses to influence the individual's decision criteria,
such as authority, advice, and training.
In short Lindblom maintains that the rational-comprehensive method is no more rational than
the process of successive limited comparisons and that the former is impossible because
values, means, and ends are bound together. He proposes his branch method as a better
description of practice since it shows the administrator dealing with marginal differences
rather than a comprehensive array of all possible choices which can never be known and
which in any case is beyond administrators' individual cognitive capacities.
In the rational-comprehensive method a 'good' policy is one which can be shown to be the
most appropriate means to desired ends. Lindblom suggests that in practice the test of a good
policy is one that administrators can agree on, rather than its fitness for achieving ends.
Demonstrated fitness for purpose is a bonus. Furthermore administrators are able to agree on
a specific policy while holding different ideological positions. As an extreme example, any
attempt by the firm's leadership to redefine the pay scales for all staff is likely to lead to
significant and collective resistance. However, more small scale negotiations, even down to
an individual level, spread out over months is more likely to be successful. Comprehensive
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objectives are only valid if those having to achieve them agree with those objectives. The test
of a good policy in the root method is therefore in practice the same as in the branch method.
Comprehensive theory or 'learning by doing'
The root method is founded on practitioners' drive to organise specific experience into
general categories or theories about relationships. The assumption is that this provides an
effective means of applying rationalised experience and accumulated knowledge to specific
new problems. The difficulty is that our poor understanding of the multidimensional nature
of the social world means that theories about most relationships are at best tentative and
easily shown to be inadequate.
Far better, according to Lindblom for the policy maker to accept that policies and outcomes
can only achieve an approximate result. Therefore a step by step approach is preferred since
if most of what is intended for the future is similar to what was achieved in the past then few
serious long lasting errors are likely to result. Theory is unnecessary since the administrator
reduces the complexity of the task to one of comparing policy differences at the margin.
Where the rational-comprehensive method aims for accuracy guided by theory, 'learning by
doing' or 'successive limited comparison' describes a process where,
policy is not made once and for all; it is made and re-made endlessly. Policy¬
making is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in
which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration (Lindblom
1959: 86).
Lindblom's branch method seems descriptive of firms that develop through incremental
product changes and manufacturing process improvements, and firms which Freeman (1982)
might describe as following an 'imitative' strategy. These firms operate in established and
stable technologies, relying on more innovative firms to develop both the technological
improvements and markets.
Lindblom's analysis highlights the role of social values and the futility of a determinate
metaphor. However, his suggested 'successive limited comparison' approach risks producing
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completely arbitrary outcomes in the face of a fast changing and developing environment,
because he denies or significantly understates the scope for strategic intent shaping outcomes.
2.3.4 Social construction
An emerging set of ideas about strategy, "emphasizes the importance of symbol
manipulation, shared meaning, and co-operative actions of individuals" (Chaffee, 1985: 95).
This perspective posits a more sociological view of strategic management in that managers
operate on a reality which is socially constructed and manage the organisation by co¬
operative agreements or social contracts, "entered into by individuals with free will"
(Chaffee, 1985: 93).
Many writers both within and outwith the strategy field, equate organisations with
Boulding's (1956: 205) hierarchy of general systems, in which there are eight levels. The
lower levels are mechanical, moving up in complexity through the biological, with "symbolic
images in human behavior" at level eight, and 'transcendental systems' at level nine. The
variables determining the pattern include: language, discourse, laws, roles, ritual, custom,
ceremony, norms, folklore, stories, beliefs, myths. These patterns are symbolic constructions
and are the means by which organisational members make sense of their interrelationships.
The validity of conceiving of strategic implications as a social construction is implicitly
supported by Loveridge's study of the implementation of IT to improve services in banking,
retaining, and health care. Loveridge notes that managers' subsequent interpretation of IT as
having systemic significance is "shaped by earlier 'problem' applications and, often, by the
crises that triggered the search for earlier IT solutions"(1990: 341). The consequences of this,
as he points out, is that managers' creativity in terms of how IT may be used is guided and
informed by their previous learning. Similarly, Metcalfe and Gibbons (1989) in their
development of an evolutionary metaphor for technological innovation, note that firms'
development options are severely constrained by their knowledge base: existing
technological knowledge and ways of organisation. Moreover, Chaffee (1985: 96) notes that
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"organizations recovering from decline used adaptive strategy, but it was their use of
interpretive strategy that differentiated them from organizations unable to recover".
Within the interpretive strategy framework the notions of 'paradigm' and 'symbolism' seem
to have attracted considerable attention during the 1980s, as evidenced by the number of
management articles and books.
Paradigms
During the last decade, recognition of the interplay between the organisation's political
forces, cultural underpinning and cognitive processes has been growing. For example, a
longitudinal case study carried out by Johnson (1989) during the 1980s, traced the rise and
fall of Foster Brothers, a well known national retailer of, primarily, men's clothing. Johnson
found that the demise of the company could be explained by reference to a very strong
paradigm within the company, which he defined as:
a set of beliefs and assumptions, held relatively common through the
organisation, taken for granted, and discernible in the stories and explanations of
the managers [which played] a central role in the interpretation of environmental
stimuli and configuration of organizationally relevant strategic responses (1989:
45).
Certain environmental signals were ignored because they were out of harmony with the
paradigm. Threats to the paradigm, such as political challenges against those most associated
with the organisation's core values were strongly resisted. Managers, in seeking to make
sense of discordant signals, would either look for ways of re-organising the signals to fit with
core beliefs or make marginal adjustments to the paradigm.
As noted earlier, Johnson challenges the validity of Quinn's (1980) 'logical incrementalism',
suggesting that managers may think that they are keeping in touch with the real environment,
but in fact they are in touch with their own paradigm. The consequence of this 'strategic
drift' is that organisations progressively loose competitive advantage through failure to
maintain an adequate level of innovation, and market share. Others have accounted for
strategic drift through different explanations. For example, Chandler (1962) noted the
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resistance to changing established strategy and structure; Mintzberg (1978: 941) observed
that the organisation's "momentum of bureaucracy" constrains its ability to respond to
environmental change; and Miller and Friesen (1980) observed that managers needed strong
inducements before they would destroy the old comfortable 'gestalt'. Whatever the route to
strategic drift, most writers agree that managers do not recognise the need for, or are
unwilling to change, until the time when nothing but an internal revolution will put the
enterprise back on the rails. Current headline examples of companies experiencing this
include IBM, Siemens, Eastman Kodak, ICI, General Motors.
The observation that enterprises experience periods of evolutionary development and growth
interspersed with periods of upheaval and revolution has been accounted for by Hedberg and
Jonsson who conceive of strategy formulation as 'discontinuous' in that from time to time the
organisation's view of the world go through fundamental shifts which then occasion decision
makers "to re-evaluate the importance of their decision variables; and they develop strategies
that fit into the new mental frameworks" (1977: 89). They found that when organisations
change strategies, sometimes in normal state and always in times of crisis, such change is due
to a change in the organisation's world view. Hedberg and Jonsson (1977) further believe
that discontinuities are the result of the ongoing interaction between rational analysis and
fantasy, will and creativity, the rational analysis itself bounded by the organisation's set of
myths or 'metasystem'.
A fundamental belief of the interpretive school then, is that in order to understand the
decision making process, the necessary focus is not whatever form 'objective reality' may
take, but to recognise that decision makers work with realities as reconstructed in their minds.
If we add to this the notion that the human mind is in any case unable to fully comprehend
the complex and dynamic nature of reality, as described by Simon's 'bounded rationality',
then this seems to raise ontological and epistemological questions about who we are in terms
of our knowledge and understanding and how can we know what we do know!
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Symbolism
The manner in which organisational actors relate to each other can fundamentally affect
formal and informal processes and outcomes. In a study of the executive staff of a large US
insurance company Smircich (1983) found that the CEO's strong dislike for any form of
conflict or disagreement among his staff resulted in the staff using language and forms of
behaviour which reflected this. The CEO cultivated an ethos of keeping problems at bay;
staff could talk about 'challenges' but not 'problems'. He wanted his staff to see themselves
as a team, reflected in their slogan of 'wheeling together'. The Monday morning staff
meeting was a ritual that the CEO found useful, but the staff did not. The CEO was
eventually replaced but not until the company's financial situation was dire. The firm's
deterioration was accounted for by the collective fear of raising controversial issues, such as
questioning inadequate performance of departments.
Many organisations consciously try to create symbol systems as a way of signifying the
required behaviour among employees. WL Gore & Associates is an American developer and
manufacturer of high performance products for a diverse range of applications: medical
implants, microwave electronics, industrial filtration, sports wear. There are no employees
only Associates, each one being a shareholder.2 Each business unit could receive golden eggs
for patenting output, with the name of the responsible Associate etched on the surface of the
egg. The internal vocabulary - 'commitment', 'accountability', 'freedom', 'fairness', 'the
Gore graveyard is full of co-ordinators' - conveys very strong messages about 'the way we
do things around here', and is meant to encourage the risk taking associated with
technological innovation. New Associates are guided and taught the meaning and
significance of some symbols while other symbols remain hidden in the subconscious of
established Associates.
This opportunity for interpreting symbols differently can cause real difficulty and be
counterproductive by generating dysfunctional individual and sub-group interaction. For
The author is drawing on his personal experience of being an Associate of the company.
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example, Gore has offices in many countries, and 'the Gore way' seems to be interpreted in
subtly different ways in each country; interpreted in ways that seem to reflect something of
the national culture, or at least something of the national stereotype. While in principle there
is no hierarchy, only 'leaders' and 'followers', there seems to be a very strong and almost
formal hierarchy among Associates of the German office. There are also strong tensions
among the European Associates. The British group express concern about 'German
domination' and the German group question their British counterpart's general competence.
In general firms' leaders may seek to use symbolism to create some desired work ethos
among the staff including the pursuit of excellence, achievement, aggressiveness,
competitiveness, deep commitment to the organisation's values. While such behaviour may
be encouraged as legitimate and even necessary for recognition, the probability is that many
will respond differently to that intended by rebelling or retreating with a sense of inadequacy.
2.4 ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM AND MANAGERIAL CHOICE
The preceding review of the nature of strategy has focused on internal processes. Little has
been said about the nature of the environment, and the implications for managerial choice.
Traditionally strategic choice is largely seen as being imposed by the environment. Market
structure (barriers to entry, market concentration, integration) largely determines the conduct
of firms (objectives, competitive strategies, investment), which in turn determines industry
performance (profitability, growth, allocative efficiency). Firms have some influence, but
essentially causation flows from the industry structure (Bain, 1951; Porter, 1980). Some
industries are intrinsically more profitable than others, and firms should be guided by this
when deciding which markets to enter and how to position themselves. The successful
organisation will create competitive advantage by using technological change (seen as an
exogenous variable) to improve production efficiency. The innovative organisation will also
find ways of creating competitive advantage by changing industry structure, and erecting
market entry and exit barriers. Despite the scope for organisational success through
innovation, variation between financial and market performance, whether adverse or
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favourable, is due to industry structure, rather than the implementation of previously
formulated strategy.
Marris (1963) conceives of choice being divided between the firm and its environment. He
locates local strategic choice within the firm. Managers are seen as actively attempting to
manipulate the 'immediate' environment (barriers to entry and exit, costs, demand) in pursuit
of growth strategies. The motivation for growth strategies is managerial status, prestige, and
power. The main obstacles to growth are managerial limitations, demand and supply
constraints. While the firm is engaged in manipulating the immediate environment, the
'super' environment (customer commitments to particular products, resistance to advertising,
lack of information, industry structure, bounded rationality) remains constant.
The continued centrality in management teaching and practice of Porter's (1985) Competitive
Advantage testify to the continued dominance of this 'structure-conduct-performance' model
of competitive strategy. The implication is that individual firms are located within an external
environment, and firms' resources and capabilities are of limited strategic significance.
Child (1972) contests the idea that organisational structure and performance is imposed by
economic constraints of the environment, and locates 'strategic choice' within the firm. An
organisation's politically dominant coalition has considerable strategic choice over both the
organisation's internal arrangements, and environmental factors. From Child's perspective
strategic choice is a resolution of internal contesting political forces, involving some give and
take, and distortion of information. He ignores the extent to which internal practices, and the
actions and interactions of people generate shared meanings that shape choice. The
organisation remains located in an independent environment, and similarly technological
change is seen as a independent variable impinging on strategic choice.
Marris' managerial limitations noted above, is based on Penrose's (1959) proposition that
firm growth is constrained by limitations of managerial resources and capabilities. Growth
eventually calls for more managerial services, but is constrained by the time and managerial
resources needed to train and integrate new managers, time that cannot be spent on directly
34
growing the business. During the last decade Teece (1985) and other writers have been
stressing the idea that competitive success comes from how practitioners manage the firm's
resources and capabilities, rather than success being a function of industry structure. The role
of capabilities is explored later in chapter 9, and it is sufficient to note here that the
implication of a resource based theory of the firm, including Penrose's proposition, is that
managers enjoy hegemony over the environment.
The 'make or buy' theory of the firm also assumes managerial freedom to choose. In this
managers choose between market transactions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) and
managerial control as alternative ways of strategic development in an external environment
that is somehow passive. There remains the underlying assumption that managers retain free
choice in their dealings with their competitive environment. Other theories about whether
choice is motivated by economic, managerial, behavioural, or social responsibility objectives
are also underpinned by an assumed freedom to choose. As Coombs and Richards note:
managers can develop and implement 'strategies' that secure both quantitative
and qualitative growth for the firms they control. While these theories analyse a
variety of market and other forces that shape strategy, there is still an implied
space for managerial choice, with the continuing effect of uncertainty and
bounded rationality (1991: 80).
Taking the 'determinism versus free choice' debate as a whole, an organisation clearly does
not enjoy unfettered hegemony over its environment, because that environment is made up of
competing firms. In addition, the earlier exploration of the social constructivist view suggests
that choice is limited by the organisational paradigm, a position that Metcalfe and Gibbons
(1989) supports in their analysis of technological change and competition. Equally though,
the apparent success of many firms suggest that the environment limits rather than denies
scope for managerial choice. The issue of choice in terms of strategic intent is further
discussed in chapter 9 in relation to the social construction of reality.
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2.5 INNOVATION AND STRATEGY
2.5.1 The innovation in strategy
The various theories of strategy provide a useful backdrop against which to assess the
relationship between strategy and innovation. Innovation is a process where organisations
develop novel products or services, or novel ways of working, that prove useful to some
community, and for which that community is willing to pay the provider.
The individual project or innovation may be seen as a means or plan since it is commonly
argued that firms must innovate (means) in order to maintain competitiveness and growth
(ends). For example Freeman's (1982) study shows the importance of industrial innovation to
economic growth. While this rather narrow interpretation of 'innovation as means' seems
intuitively right, the preceding review of the variety of meanings associated with strategy
suggests that the innovation-strategy relationship is significantly more complex. Clearly the
means-ends explanation provides only a partial view of the role of innovation as it fails for
example to account for emergent or spontaneous innovation activity which fall outside of,
and sometimes compete with, intended strategies.
Firms may intend innovation as means to an end, such as the introduction of automation to
achieve greater efficiency, while for others the decision to introduce such equipment is an
end in itself, a strategic decision demonstrating to the outside world that they are progressive
and ready to embrace change. Further, the introduction of new technology to fulfil 'non-
strategic' aims may over time assume strategic significance for the firm. For example, the
decision to introduce IT within one part of the firm's operation will affect the existing level
of integration and therefore relations between the new users of the IT resource and its internal
and external customers. In trying to resolve the integration problem the firm's practitioners
slowly learn to appreciate the strategic complexity surrounding the assimilation of new
knowledge. Loveridge (1990) characterises the organisational learning process as two,
possibly three stages. He suggests that at first practitioners adopt new techniques piecemeal.
This is followed by a more coherent and wider adaptation of techniques as practitioners
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become more aware of the possibilities. In a possible third stage, IT may move from being
centrally controlled to being diffused and controlled by individual operating units of the
organisation.
Clearly organisational learning influences what practitioners regarded as strategic. In addition
firms that pursue the acquisition of new knowledge as a strategic rather than operational
opportunity are likely to have a different learning experience since practitioners' expectations
of outcomes will be different; the learning process will attract wider attention within the
organisation that labels new knowledge as strategic. Fincham et. al. (1994) found that not all
innovative activity is regarded as strategic. They found for example, that if a particular IT
innovation is directed at improving local efficiency and does not challenge the existing
political status quo or distribution of organisational expertise then it may not be regarded as
strategic and will therefore probably have to run the gauntlet of some narrow financial
justification, such as a payback evaluation.
A large part of strategy is concerned with the difficult task of balancing the day to day
demand for cash against the need to secure long term survival through investment. The
somewhat arbitrary distinction of strategic and non-strategic innovation and the attendant risk
of incoherence in strategic decisions undermines the ability of corporate leaders to effectively
manage that balance. Many studies have shown that not everyone in the organisation
considers their contribution in relation to the organisation's strategy; a finding that in itself is
a measure of the degree of internal coherence enjoyed by the organisation as a whole.
Within the hierarchy of different types of strategy (corporate, business, operational) specific
innovations may have differing significance. For example a specific innovation such as a
labour saving change in work organisation, may be perceived as strategic at an operational or
'local' level of the organisation where its impact is formed and felt by those closely involved
with its progress. The extent to which the same innovation may be regarded as strategic at
either the 'business' or more broad 'corporate' level will depend on the difference the
innovation makes to profitability, the degree of internal knowledge differentiation, and
conflict resolution and integration achieved within the organisation. It will also depend on
37
where managers are on the learning curve vis a vis the strategic significance of the
innovation, and how far the innovation fits the corporate or business leaders' preconceived
solutions for managing the organisation's relationship with its external environment.
While innovation readily conjures up images of firms introducing novelty or assimilating
new ways of working, it is probable that most individual innovations are so incremental that
they are often regarded as unremarkable events. Rosenberg in surveying the history of
technical change cites a number of studies that show innovation "as consisting of a steady
accretion of innumerable minor improvements and modifications, with only very infrequent
major innovations" (1982: 7). He quotes an example from petrochemical refining where the
cumulative effects of cost reductions due to incremental technical change far outweigh the
benefit of the initial technical development. Individual improvements, however minor, come
as a result of the application of expertise to both familiar and unfamiliar situations. Such
improvements are likely to attract attention when they can be shown as contributing to
profitability gains, through productivity or qualitative improvements, or their proponents
present them as 'strategic'.
2,5.2 Innovation studies
Many early theories of innovation have focused on the lone entrepreneur. McGuire in a
review of the relationship between innovation and culture observed "a hero theory of
innovations and progress" (1964: 233), exemplified by Schumpeter (1947) who credited
entrepreneurs as the driving force behind innovation and wealth creation. McGuire presented
Mitchell (1949) as representative of an opposing view that gave the external environment
precedence over the entrepreneur. In this 'environmental theory' the driving force is the "the
accumulation of knowledge and the 'times'" (McGuire, 1964: 233). Many others have since
countered the hero theory, saying that credit belongs to the team, that many people contribute
to the process.
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Attempts at understanding the process taking place within the firm come from a number of
directions, some taking an economics perspective while others adopt a more behavioural
approach. Nelson and Winter (1977) suggest that the classical economics production function
model is too limited as it takes innovation as a given in seeking to explain economic growth.
While it may be possible to show correlation between R&D spend and capital investment for
example, nonetheless it remains a fact that R&D is not an independent variable, nor is there a
clear chain of cause and effect between R&D and innovation.
Explanations of 'demand-pull' and 'technology-push' provide only a partial view. This has
been recognised by Freeman (1982) who coined the term of 'coupling' as a way of
explaining the key reason why firms in the SAPPHO study (SPRU 1972) were successful
innovators. The aim of that study was to identify the characteristics of success and failure of
innovating firms. The contribution of Freeman and project SAPPHO has been immense in
providing insight to the attributes necessary for successful innovation: effective in-house
professional R&D, patenting for commercial protection and negotiation, paying close
attention to the needs of the potential users and if necessary their early involvement and
education, sufficiently strong entrepreneurship to co-ordinate marketing, R&D, production,
good communication with the appropriate scientific community and with customers.
Surprisingly there was inconclusive evidence to support various 'common sense' notions. For
example, there seems to be little correlation between failure and attempts to innovate in
directions unfamiliar to the firm. Competitive pressures (external factor) and the associated
drive toward shorter lead-times (internal factor) may be necessary but neither factor alone is
sufficient to achieve success. Success depends on spotting and meeting user needs through
effective technical development, and internal communication (among R&D, manufacturing,
marketing). Further, Freeman notes that,
for those who believe in the amenability of innovation to planning techniques, no
relationship was found between success and the capacity to set and fulfil target
dates for particular stages for the project plan, nor in the general approach to
planning of the innovators (1982: 123).
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The implication of this observation is that synoptic strategic management, and possibly
logical incrementalism discussed earlier, either inhibit or are incidental to organisations'
innovation successes.
Such insight is valuable because it indicates what resources and processes are needed to make
a success of the individual innovation. In addition however, we need to know more about
how the activities of various key figures identified (technical innovator, business innovator,
chief executive, product champion) relate to the firm's unfolding strategy. For example, how
actors within the large firm generate, select, develop ideas into profitable innovations within
the context of competition between obsolete, current and new expertise, both technological
and managerial; the influence of professionalisation of particular bodies of expertise; the
pervasive effects of socio-political diversity and interdependence within the firm. We also
need explore these issues in the context of the firm's relations with other institutions.
Motivated by a desire to guide USA policy thinking on why some economic sectors seemed
to show greater productivity growth than others, Nelson and Winter (1977) proposed an
evolutionary theory of innovation. They believe that sectoral differences in technological
progress could be better understood in terms of the evolved relationships among institutions
within a particular sector. For example, there is a vast difference between agriculture and
aerospace, quite apart from their respective technologies, in terms of funding processes,
regulatory mechanisms, and the influence ofmarket and non-market actors.
Accepting that there are important sectoral differences, Nelson and Winter (1977) also seem
to say that regardless of sector, there is an essential character to innovation processes. It
seems that while it is generally driven by purposive investment, it is one of uncertainty in
different dimensions. Innovation takes place in a setting of organisational complexity and
diversity. It is a process transcending the organisational boundary and is,
stochastic, ... evolutionary, ... involving a continuing disequilibrium. At any
time there is coexistence of ideas that will evolve into successful innovations and
those that will not, and actual use of misjudged or obsolete technologies along
with profitable ones. Over time selection operates on the existing set of
technologies, but new ones continually are introduced to upset the movement
toward equilibrium (1977: 48).
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There is uncertainty in: choosing technologies; technical direction within a given technology
set; at the level of the individual project; and whether or not the market will accept the
product. In seeking to 'couple' technological possibility and environment selection,
practitioners achieve a state of continual competitive imbalance due to the constant
emergence of new technological platforms and shifting expectations of market and non-
market factors. Nelson and Winter regard the process as 'stochastic' because project choice
and outcome are surrounded by an almost infinite selection of alternatives; there is an
inability to reliably quantify cost and benefit; there are no reliable search mechanism to help
separate good and bad projects; and the selection environment has the power to accept or
reject projects.
2.5.3 Intended and emergent strategy
There is an assumption that in formulating and implementing strategy managers have already
analysed technological possibilities, commercial opportunities, and the organisational
resources and capabilities. Burns and Stalker, in their well known study of technological
innovation noted that changing environmental conditions and stable conditions require
different organisational forms. Moreover they suggest it is the task of managers to design the
appropriate form:
there is an overriding management task in first interpreting correctly the market
and technological situation, in terms of its instability or of the rate at which
conditions are changing, and then designing the management system appropriate
to the conditions, and making it work (1966: viii).
Underpinning this description is a sense of managing strategic change systematically. Also
implicit is that organisational development depends on leaders' ability to anticipate and
separate out in advance successful from unsuccessful initiatives. Langrish et. al. (1972) in
attempting to identify why some firms were more successful than others carried out a study
of winners of the Queen's Awards For Industry. In trying to move beyond the omniscient
practitioner they concluded that the successful 'coupling' of technical possibility and market
opportunity is an emergent process:
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Perhaps the highest level generalisation that it is safe to make about technological
innovation is that it must involve synthesis of some kind of need with some kind
of technical possibility. The ways in which this synthesis is effected and
exploited take widely differing forms and depend not only on systematic
planning and the 'state of the art' but also on individual motivations,
organizational pressures and outside influences of political, social and economic
kinds. Because the innovation process extends over time, it is important to retain
continuous sensitivity to changes in these factors and the flexibility to perceive
and respond to new opportunities (Langrish et. al., in Freeman 1982: 126, 127).
Mintzberg and McHugh in their analysis of Honda's post war growth observed that
"strategies grow initially like weeds in a garden" (1985: 195). Novel ideas may emerge
which were not anticipated but are a by-product of the organisation's strategy, some with
strategic implications, others mere blind alleys. Many weeds are supported and championed,
competing with approved projects for financial resource and political support. Further
clouding the straightforward formulation and implementation of strategy are various forms of
resistance, often due to a fear of the unknown implications of the new. Whether or not all the
analysis has been done, managers still have to make somewhat arbitrary decisions about
where to steer their resources and capabilities.
2.5.4 Sustaining competitive advantage
There is both interdependence and tension between the need to achieve continual
improvement in competitive performance while at the same time seeking and building
capabilities which provide sources of sustainable competitive advantage. This means that
corporate leaders must constantly balance the immediate demand for positive cash flow with
the critical need to invest in the building of a knowledge base and capabilities for which there
is believed to be a demand over the long term.
Regardless of this dilemma, many firms seem to face another; innovate or perish. In their
study of the post innovation performance of firms, Georghiou et. al. (1986) found that
innovating firms regarded imitation as a real threat to their benefiting from their own efforts
over the long term. Further, according to Georghiou et. al.,
42
the challenge to the innovating firm is to respond, but in doing so, it commits
itself to a sequence of post-innovation improvements which are a necessary
condition for it to retain or expand its market share (1986: 3).
Individual innovations are at risk from competitive action in two respects. One is what
Metcalfe and Gibbons calls "revealed performance", consisting of technological "product and
process attributes" (1989: 165). Competing products are selected for their performance
characteristics as well as the economic value attributed to that revealed performance by the
selection environment.
Less obvious yet a significant source of imitation and comparative improvement is the notion
of a knowledge base that transcends the organisational boundary. Fincham et. al. (1994)
observed that the introduction of IT based innovations in one bank was soon followed by
similar or improved IT innovations from competitors. Fincham et. al. found that the ability of
competitors to imitate or improve on each others revealed performance in very short time -
week of months - was largely due to the free movement of IT professionals within and
around the financial services sector. As a comparatively new and unique technology offering
a rich source of competitive advantage, IT is undermining attempts to build sustainable
advantage because of the rate of circulation of IT personnel across the organisation-
environment line. A similar dynamic may be observed in the American 'silicon valley' where
engineers are induced to move between companies frequently, or are encouraged to start their
own business. This must contribute to the rate of technological change and fierceness of
competition among microprocessor developers.
Mitigating against the threat of imitation is evidence that competitive performance is difficult
for potential competitors to replicate, partly due to 'causal ambiguity' (Lippman and Rumelt,
1982), including the invisibility of the innovator's tacit knowledge (Senker, 1993), and the
uncertainty surrounding a firm's source of competitive advantage, such as how it is making
efficiency gains. Rumelt (1984) similarly found that 'isolating mechanisms' such as
information asymmetries and property rights inhibit imitation.
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2.6 KNOWLEDGE AND INNOVATION
Strategy is a learning process creating new knowledge, changes in work organisation,
ambiguity and uncertainty in meaning. Researchers increasingly explain innovation in terms
of the creation and exploitation of a knowledge base (Teece, 1988; Metcalfe and Gibbons,
1989; Faulkner and Senker, 1993). What counts as valid strategy and knowledge may be
constrained and facilitated by previous knowledge, its political value, existing rules of thumb
about how to compete, and the capacity to absorb new knowledge. This section reviews
various ideas that seek to explain innovation as an evolving knowledge base, crystallising as
technological regimes, design configurations, products and services, and supported by an
organisational paradigm. This section also explores the extent to which knowledge bases are
both common and unique to firms, giving rise to diversity among firms and their innovation
opportunities.
2.6.1 Evolution and innovation
Metcalfe and Gibbons (1989) offer a theoretical sketch of the relationship between
technological change and the long term competitive performance of the firm and, in passing,
define knowledge as 'structured information'. They further suggest that while "information
may exist in data banks, knowledge can only exist in the mind of individuals" (1989: 167).
They seek to explain technological variety across firms, how the selection environment
operates, and the behaviour of firms.
They base their analysis on the evolution metaphor because, they argue, the elements of
variety, selection and heredity provide powerful insight to their notion that economic change
is due to economic variety which in turn is caused by the environment selecting between
different and competing technologies. Their discussion of technological change have the
characteristics of inevitability, akin to Nelson and Winter's (1977) 'natural trajectories'. This
is clear from their call for a shift in focus from treating innovations as discrete events to
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"treating innovations in terms of an evolving flow of developments within the confines of a
technological agenda" (Metcalfe and Gibbons, 1989: 161).
2.6.2 Technological regimes, configurations, and sociotechnical systems
The organisational knowledge base manifests itself as the 'revealed performance
characteristics' of the firm's products and processes. The selection environment chooses
between products and processes directly and knowledge indirectly. In many industries
competition operates directly on the firm's ability to manage knowledge. Noteworthy is the
service industry which accounts for at least 40% of GDP ofmost western nations'
economies. For example, in the air travel business, competitive advantage goes to firms that
can on demand, explicitly demonstrate knowledge about prices, connecting routes,
alternatives, etc. Information is the firm's product, but knowledge about how to manage that
information is their source of advantage. In addition, the more sophisticated the product the
more the vendor must bring knowledge to the fore in an overt way. Examples range from
consultancy, technical support, to the fast growing trend among firms who have large internal
telecomms facilities to delegate the management of their communication needs to one of the
telecomm equipment suppliers.
Furthermore, as selection environments evolve (for example, developments in IT and
telecommunications, user requirements, regulation) the continued success of many firms
requires the co-evolution of their technological knowledge and work organisation practices.
Included in that co-evolution is the development and maintenance of links with particular
elements of the selection environment, such as user led rather than manufacturer led
innovation (von Hippel, 1988), and industry-public sector knowledge flows (Faulkner and
Senker, 1993).
Metcalfe and Gibbons propose that competition between technologies operate in a hierarchy
of three levels. Fundamentally different technologies or 'technological regimes' may
compete, for example coax-cable versus optical fibre signal transmission. Within one
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technological regime, for example optical fibre, alternative 'design configurations' compete,
involving different combinations of signal transmission media, such as monomode or multi-
mode, and signal carrier source, such as laser or light emitting diode. The characteristics
which bind various design configurations together as a regime is a common knowledge base,
while the components of the design configuration include "facts, hypotheses, operating
procedures (know-how and know-what), and design parameters" (Metcalfe and Gibbons,
1989: 161).
Metcalfe and Gibbons argue that scope for firms to differentiate themselves is least when
their products compete within a design configuration, due to a largely common knowledge
base, and greater when their products compete between regimes. Relatedly, Coombs and
Richards' (1991) case studies suggest that technological rather than product knowledge is a
key source of competitive advantage. They argue that technology as "bodies of knowledge
and expertise" (1991: 171) influence product development in a variety of ways, at different
levels of aggregation, and may be more or less firm specific. First, knowledge and expertise
may aggregate around products or projects in different ways: individual products, product
groups of varying complexities, and experimental technologies. Product groups for example,
hold in common some aspect of their revealed performance, such as engine fuel efficiency, or
the processing speed of a microprocessor. Second, the notion that technical change follows a
broadly predictable pattern or trajectory suggests an industry level technological trajectory
encompassing the knowledge bases of groups of firms. Third, while firms within a sector
share certain capabilities, they also possess proprietary knowledge and expertise. In this way
firms may have individual trajectories of knowledge that manifest themselves in the revealed
performance of their products, and in the particular or idiosyncratic way that the firm's
capabilities and technologies develop.
Drawing on this distinction Coombs and Richards found that "there is a general tendency for
the required technology base of firms to expand at a faster rate than their product portfolio",
and that "systemic environmental forces" seem to account for this tendency (1991: 172).
They argue that firms need to understand the technologies of their suppliers and customers, at
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their own expense, in order to offer competitive products or services. As Coombs and
Richards observe, this differentiated development between a firm's technologies and its
products carry strategic implications:
firms come under increasing pressure to manage their access to a wide base of
public and semi-public knowledge, and to use the knowledge strategically. To
use it strategically, however, they need to increase the private, firm-specific
character of that knowledge, and this creates some tensions and problems (1991:
172).
One problem the firm faces is defining the nature of its knowledge base, and distinguishing
between different kinds of knowledge. Defining the categories is not straightforward as
evidenced by the different ways that Winter (1987) and Dosi (1988), and Fleck and Tierney
(1991) categorise knowledge. Coombs and Richards suggest that Whelan's categorisation
(1989, cited in Coombs and Richards, 1991: 83) of technologies is useful here: critical,
enabling, strategic. The first category is technology (ies) that is core to the firm's distinctive
capabilities; the second is less proprietary and may be common to a sector, such as IT; the
third is a source of new competitive advantage and may grow out and eventually become part
of either of the first two. Coombs and Richards do not address the profound difficulty and
danger of applying such a typology. Proprietary knowledge and expertise typically exists as a
distinctive mix of both critical and enabling technology, and to attempt a separation risks
destroying the source of advantage through arbitrary distinctions of technology. Practitioners
may like simple guides to action but it is clear that firms do not evolve by adding new
knowledge in a rational-analytical way. Rather, that which it is willing and able to assimilate
is circumscribed by its existing tacit and firm specific knowledge, by its organisational
structure, communication and decision making processes, by its ability to access and absorb
public knowledge, and by the cognitive limits of decision makers and information handlers.
Knowledge accumulation is further shaped by the informal social network which transcends
formal hierarchies and organisational boundaries, where knowledge is a currency used by and
against individuals and institutions.
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Nelson and Winter suggest that in a technological regime what matters is "technicians'
beliefs about what is feasible or at least worth attempting" (1977: 57). Similarly Metcalfe and
Gibbons note that,
the knowledge base of a business unit coalesces around a design configuration,
and that the organizational structure builds within it a growing commitment to
this design configuration, both limiting and shaping how the organization reacts
to external technological developments (1989: 168).
Metcalfe and Gibbons suggest that firms' choices are at the same time constrained by its
practitioners' socio-cognitive commitments as well as an independent 'technological agenda'.
These seem like opposite positions but elsewhere they note that "a great deal depends on a
firm's expectations of the agenda for change, and thus on the design configuration in which it
operates" (1989: 188). They seem to be suggesting that there is a technological agenda that is
independent of the firm, and that practitioners commit to this agenda through the
establishment of practices and learning what works. For them the firm resides within this
independent technological agenda. This is evident from their comments that
from a technology strategy viewpoint this evolutionary framework raises
interesting questions for any firm. Do management know the full extent of their
technology set, how it is currently partitioned, and where they stand within it?
Have they a correct perception of the characteristics which consumers value in
the product and of their relative valuations? Are they aware of the imminent
changes in this structure of economic valuations? (Metcalfe and Gibbons, 1989:
189-190).
Many firms do interpret market wants and needs by improvements within the constraints of a
design configuration, while others adapt by moving from one design configuration or
technological regime to another. However, many firms also seem to be redefining or
combining existing areas of knowledge to create entirely new regimes, building competitive
advantage by using their capabilities to distance themselves from each other. For example,
Sony's integration of electronic and mechanics to produce portable consumer (mecatronic)
goods. Sony and other innovative firms seem to have become increasingly aware that the
technological agenda is not given but open to definition. Organisations also seem to be more
self aware, recognising that their own socio-cognitive commitments and culture shape their
choices.
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The scope for redefining different areas of knowledge and creating new 'technological
configurations' (Fleck J., 1993) can also be seen where users attempt to adapt a technology to
their particular requirements. Drawing on examples from robotics, and computer aided
production management (CAPM) Fleck shows the 'looseness' or openness in the developing
state surrounding the implementation of a particular technology against user requirements.
The openness of a configuration exists because of the particular problems, capabilities,
historical development, and expectations of each user organisation. According to Fleck such
openness "offers great opportunities for innovation at the level of the whole configuration
itself, rather than only in terms of secondary or incremental innovations" (1993: 18). A
related concept is Pinch and Bijker's (1984) 'interpretive flexibility'. In their study of the
development of technological artefacts, they show that interested parties do attribute different
meanings to the same 'facts' and artefacts, and that there is more than one way of designing
an artefact.
Metcalfe and Gibbons provide a sense of the diversity both within and between technological
regimes and therefore the variety of ways in which knowledge and its appropriability may
unfold. They suggest that
regimes differ according to the proportion of knowledge which is discovered by
scientific or empirical means; they differ in the division of knowledge between
codifiable, publicly available, and tacit form, specific forms; and, they differ
according to their dependence on other knowledge bases that are generated
outside the industry (1989: 164).
The analysis of technological development as consisting of both continuity (regimes and
design configurations) and change (changing revealed performance characteristics of
artefacts) is useful because it does facilitate an analysis of innovation as an ongoing process
of generation, development, and mutation rather than as a process consisting of individual
self-contained events. Their insight further highlights the problems of rationalistic models of
neo-classical economics and determinate strategy, where creativity and variety in creativity is
not afforded a place in rationalistic analysis. Firms actively engage with the selection
environment seeking to identify and redefine segments in terms of their perceived
technological capabilities. Working against the firm - as noted earlier - is that room for
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competitive differentiation becomes more marginal across similar design configurations due
to greater overlap of knowledge bases. This engagement with the selection environment spurs
the concurrent development of new and hybrid design configurations and market
segmentation in the short term and new technological regimes in the long term.
The notion of a 'sociotechnical system' (Hughes, 1983) offers a way of representing how the
firm might engage with its selection environment. This concept usefully highlights that the
boundary between the firm and its environment is negotiated rather than given and
independent. Hughes' study of the development of national electric power networks between
1880-1930, in Britain, Germany, and the USA, shows that many influences - beyond
electrical engineering know-how - shared in the development of these national electrical
systems. National power networks did not come about through the heroic energies of some
lone inventor-entrepreneur, rather through a 'seamless web' of complex interactions between
institutions and technological artefacts: political preferences, load factor calculations,
capitalist economics, social values, competitors, and users. Indeed Hughes argues that
"electric power systems, like so much other technology, are both causes and effects of social
change" (1983: 2). Like the seamless web that binds Hughes' sociotechnical system together,
Fleck's 'technological configuration', and Pinch and Bijker's 'interpretive flexibility' also
suggests the impossibility of separating the definition of artefacts from their socio-economic
context and, by extension, the arbitrariness of drawing a boundary around the firm and its
artefacts.
2.6.3 Knowledge, work organisation, and 'world-view'
Metcalfe and Gibbons also studied the links between the variety in revealed performance and
how "organizations structure and articulate their knowledge base" (1989: 167). They suggest
that how knowledge is co-ordinated and divided within the firm determines how well such
knowledge is exploited. For example, while the development of specialisation has advantages
(learning economies, and ways of coping with human cognitive limits and partial ignorance)
there are also inherent disadvantages of reduced flexibility in both individual and
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organisation. It seems likely that firms to a greater or lesser extent do recognise that
specialisation is a source of competitive advantage in the short term. However, the passage of
time seems to dull the consciousness that loyalty to a narrowly defined technical base, such
as a particular design configuration, carries the risk of competitive disadvantage in the
medium and long term through substitute configurations and technologies.
According to Metcalfe and Gibbons the organisation co-ordinates knowledge through a
"structure to communicate, filter and pool knowledge ". In addition this structure
encompasses a "framework for thought, ... for distinguishing significant from insignificant
events; a framework which gives the organization a world view". Further, since knowledge
and theory are always incomplete there is room "for conflict... and hence for variety in
policy, strategy and behaviour" (1989: 167). They seem to regard the organisation structure
as an agent (an "operator") transforming individual knowledge into collective knowledge.
The effective use of knowledge should be a major determinant of structural form but there
are others. Politics and the organisation's history also tend to have a significant influence.
Also, as firms' knowledge evolves it is contestable whether the organisational structure keeps
pace or more importantly whether its members are able to interpret and anticipate a form of
structure which is effective. Creativity, which is another issue but is interdependent with
effectiveness, will be greatly influenced by such choices as the amount of centralisation
versus decentralisation, the amount of formal rules versus autonomy. All of these
considerations are based on the dubious assumption that firms are able to critically and self¬
consciously articulate their accumulated knowledge; that they know what they know.
Clearly the fusion of individual perspectives with different ways of organising and attendant
communication and decision making patterns, largely account for the diversity of ways in
which organisations both interpret and are interpreted by environmental agents, such as
competitors, markets, non-market institutions. It is reasonable therefore to conceive of the
organisation as synthesiser of a variety of individual knowledge, and to see why firms have
different knowledge bases and differing abilities to change those bases.
The importance of organisation, communication and decision making patterns is supported
by such studies as SAPPHO where innovating firms are said to owe their success to having
good communication links between R&D, marketing, production, and the role of product
champions and entrepreneurs. The prominence given to a leader pushing ahead heroically,
vision in hand, with the rest of the organisation generally in compliant mood, disguises much
of the collective decision making that supply individuals with their perspective on the world,
sharing of knowledge, mutual respect, and adjustments to accommodate differences of
perspective. This is especially true where specialist knowledge is able to influence strategic
decision making through command of sufficient organisational power, such as the role of IT
experts in banking (Fincham et. al., 1994).
Metcalfe and Gibbons (1989) note that the firm's uniqueness of capabilities that comes from
the mix of specialisation and the manner in which knowledge is organised can help explain
phenomena like 'not invented here'. New knowledge is also likely to be rejected or resisted
by various parts of the organisation if it is perceived as a negative change. Kotter and
Schlesinger (1989) in their analysis of organisational resistance note that such resistance may
take several forms: parochial self-interest, misunderstanding and lack of trust, low tolerance
for change, different assessments of the problem or opportunity. The mix of specialisation
and organisation of knowledge can also explain the difficulties experienced with joint
ventures and technology transfers though this is a more complex issue. For example, success
also depends on compatibility of 'world view', and the degree of preparatory exploration and
integration of expectations of the parties before attempting to access each other's knowledge
base.
The consequence of developing a strong and enduring commitment to 'the way we do things
around here', in areas of specialisation, communication and decision making, is that an
internal momentum along a particular path or design configuration is maintained. The
development of knowledge and revealed performance are unconsciously committed to a
particular range of options. This technological paradigm will tend to dismiss as irrelevant
emerging competitive design configurations. As Metcalfe and Gibbons note, over time the
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firm invests heavily in its organisation and knowledge base and "from this inheritance of the
past come the chief sources of delayed adaptation to changed circumstances" (1989: 168).
One manifestation of the paradigm is in the procedures and decision rules which a firm relies
on to manage the complexity of even a limited range of strategic options. Nelson and Winter
seem to share this view, referring to such decision rules or 'heuristics' as,
an activity that has a goal, and a set of procedures for identifying, screening, and
homing in on promising ways to get to that objective or close to it. The
procedures may be characterised in terms of the employment of proximate
targets, special attention to certain cues and clues, and various rules of thumb
(1977: 52-53).
While the use of decision rules help apply order to multifarious organisational, technological
and environmental directions, they also limit the assessment of possible important choices
(Lindblom, 1959: 84) and thus guide creative thinking. As noted earlier, in some cases
'groupthink' may develop as "people [become] deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when
the members' striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action" (Janis, 1972: 9). A focus on decision rules, mindset and
groupthink behaviour might lead to the impression that all firms are pathogenic. Rather, all
firms whose continued survival depends on co-operative behaviour between its individuals,
reflect the diversity of those attitudes to varying degrees. Furthermore, many organisations
are successful innovators precisely because they have a strong shared belief in and
anticipation of some future scenario. In any case competitive advantage comes from the
distinctiveness of the firm's knowledge base and how it uses that knowledge.
Recognising that the notion of a knowledge base is an abstraction, Metcalfe and Gibbons
propose a way of making its interpretation more concrete. Any given design configuration
may be described as consisting of knowledge elements which the firm brings together to
transform raw materials into products and processes. For example, what materials, what
processes, the order of assembly. They suggest three generic components; elements, level of
skill, and how the skills are employed. These three components are uniquely blended by each
firm to form a 'dominant competence'. It is the uniqueness of the way in which individual
firms combine these knowledge elements and skills which gives a firm its revealed
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technological performance and competitive advantage. Their attempt to make concrete the
notion of a knowledge base has multiplied the difficulty of assessment, not reduced it.
'Elements' and skills are contextual and difficult to frame as is the uniqueness of the blend.
Nevertheless, their use of 'elements' add further texture to the often referred to 'public, tacit
and proprietary knowledge'. For example, where design configurations overlap, resulting in
common elements these are public knowledge, although the possibility that it may be in the
public domain is of little use to firms who are unaware of its significance and therefore
cannot use it. Tacit elements are firm specific and proprietary.
The knowledge base of the firm also develops according to the way that its people interact
with other external knowledge bases in universities, government, customers, suppliers,
competitors, etc. A 'foreign' element may be absorbed by one firm and manifest as a new
skill while another firm may reject it. All other variables being held constant, the firm which
is able and willing to absorb new knowledge and adjust their dominant competence in line
with environmental stimuli, is more likely in the long term to lead its competitive sector.
2.6.4 Environmental variety and scope for firm creativity
Metcalfe and Gibbons'(1989) suggestion that because of their socio-cognitive commitments
firms experience great difficulty in trying to move between regimes or design configurations
seems intuitively right, yet one of the surprises from the SAPPHO studies, as mentioned
earlier, was that there was no correlation between failure and firms pursuing innovations in
unfamiliar areas. The extent to which the evidence conflicts with the theory does need closer
investigation. One argument might be that while Metcalfe and Gibbons' observation is true
for most firms, their view does not account for the characteristic of an innovative firm; its
creative talents and a willingness to engage in experimentation, to combine and redefine their
technological environment. Further, writers on entrepreneurship typically point out the
distinguishing characteristic of the entrepreneur as an ability to identify or create profit
opportunities and configure their resources to exploit that opportunity ahead of competition.
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There is a sense of the emphasis being on the lone entrepreneur looking for that gap in a
largely homogeneous landscape.
In exploiting the evolutionary metaphor Metcalfe and Gibbons (1989) define that landscape
as a selection environment that is heterogeneous in many respects. Although firms' choices
are bounded by their socio-cognitive commitments, this does not mean that all firms are the
same. Indeed scope for generating novel and economically useful solutions is inherent to the
diversity of members' knowledge bases within a selection environment. Each firm (including
competitors, collaborators and customers) carries different experiences, capabilities and
competitive advantages, and expectations. As Metcalfe and Gibbons observe:
unless firms have identical innovation opportunity sets they will not all end up
with the same trajectories of innovation. Nor can identical opportunity sets be
expected. Location in different design configurations, different perceptions of the
agenda for innovation, different resource bases, and different abilities to innovate
will all create variety of innovative response, even for firms within the same
selection environment. Variety in creativity ... shapes the selection set [and]
generates the possibility of selection (1989: 188).
In Peteraf's review of the literature on 'a resource based view' of the firm she notes four
"cornerstones of competitive advantage": "that the resource bundles and capabilities
underlying production are heterogeneous across firms"; the importance of creating barriers to
competition, through for example 'causal ambiguity' and 'isolating mechanisms' as noted
earlier; the existence of the 'imperfect mobility' of valuable assets such as key staff; and 'ex
ante barriers to competition', such as being able to identify an opportunity ahead of
competition (1993: 185). Peteraf's work reinforces the importance of variety in the selection
environment as a driver of opportunity. Her organisation of the literature into the four
cornerstones is also useful in thinking about the nature of the innovation process. Successful
firms have scope to be creative in a number of ways. From an innovation perspective her
cornerstones enrich Georghiou et. al. (1986) and Metcalfe and Gibbons' (1989) observations
that post innovation improvements are important. Her work offers a guide to where those
improvements may be made. For example, ex post and ex ante ways of anticipating and
blocking competitive action; and of enhancing the imperfect mobility of tradable resources
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and capabilities, by perhaps more or less dependence on 'cospecialized assets' (Teece, 1987)
of collaborative relationships.
Looked at this way the innovation process is much more than generating ideas, screening
them, eventually leading to the timely introduction of a novel and useful artefact, with
continuous performance improvements to the product or manufacturing process thereafter.
The innovation process is multifaceted, and is sustained by individual firm creativity and
environmental heterogeneity.
2.7 CONCLUSIONS
Strategy, whether determinate or chaotic and emergent, is the process whereby practitioners
manage the resources and capabilities of their enterprise, and the enterprise's relationship
with its competitive environment. For many organisations the price of continued membership
of that environment is the need for incessant efforts in creating and maintaining competitive
advantage. The key to competitive advantage is about changing the basis of competition in
the organisation's favour; of conceiving of new ways of competing that confer financial and
technological advantage. In short, managing innovation - in the broadest sense - is a central
and critical preoccupation of the managers of an organisation's strategy. However there is no
best way. As this review and the case studies in Part II show, the scope for innovation is
multifaceted, and the way that innovation is managed within the context of strategy varies,
not least because the context itself varies.
Managing innovation becomes increasingly complex as we acknowledge that the scope for
strategic choice is constrained by a host of factors: knowledge of all relevant facts about the
competitive environment remains incomplete, and in any case there is evidence that
practitioners cannot deal effectively with all the possible information if it were available.
Furthermore, practitioners' perception of the competitive world may be out of tune with the
actual nature of that world.
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Practitioners' capabilities in bringing together market opportunities and technological
possibilities are constrained. This constraint exists because organisations accumulate
knowledge in particular patterns, typically shaped by its work organisation arrangements and
its paradigmatic view of the competitive world. This does not mean that the development of
firms is constrained in a uniform way. Firms differentiate themselves from each other
through their efforts to create and apply proprietary knowledge. This results in a diversity
among firms' knowledge bases such that the innovation possibilities remain uncertain. The
variety of influences (environmental and internal), the diversity of outcomes of their
interrelationships, and the pattern and rate of change (both internally and externally), means
that there is always scope for novel couplings between technological possibilities and market
opportunities. This uncertainty of influences and outcomes also maintains a tension between
strategic intent and outcomes.
To reiterate, my view of strategy at this point in the research process, and leading up to the
fieldwork, is that it is a process of constrained rationality; practitioners are dealing with an
independent and largely hostile environment; technological knowledge has a solidity and
objectivity such that one may refer to its 'accumulation', like depositing more money in
one's bank account. Staying with the banking metaphor, firms may accumulate different
amounts of knowledge in different 'Whelan' accounts: critical, enabling, strategic. The
practitioner's task of managing innovation is complicated by the degree to which their view
of reality is misguided. This was my view of reality before embarking on the fieldwork.
The case studies of Part II support all three metaphors of strategy to some degree:
determinate, managed chaos, and social construction. The Bank of Scotland evidence seems
to support the determinate metaphor, and strategy in Ascom Timeplex could be described as
managed chaos, even though there is evidence of a corporate grand plan. However the social
construction metaphor proved most compelling as a framework for understanding all three
cases, and this observation led to a revision of the original research questions (1.3). Indeed as
noted earlier (1.3 and 2.1) this chapter is a partial review, with chapters 7 to 10 introducing
other material that addresses the new research questions noted in 1.3. This separation has
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been maintained to highlight that ideas held before the field work were overturned through
engagement with empirical data, the writing of this chapter, and continued reading during the
field work.
Although the social construction metaphor is addressed in this chapter it acquired greater
significance as I tried to make sense of the fieldwork evidence. As noted above the practice
of strategy in each of the three organisations seemed distinctive: strategy in each could be
said to consist of a unique mix of determinacy and chaos, but this raised the question of how
this uniqueness came about; and each could be said to have a different paradigm or
perspective on the world, but again the same question arose. The observation that practice in
each organisation was distinctive and taken for granted by the staff, and a curiosity about
why that was so prepared me for a new interpretation of strategy. In parallel with the
fieldwork I continued to read. One book, Berger and Luckmann's (1966) The Social
Construction ofReality, provided a key. Drawing on their account of the pattern of everyday
reality, I realised that one could see strategy as an everyday activity, patterned by
practitioners' social interactions; interactions that tend to be taken for granted and
unsurprising for those involved. Interestingly, not only did the evidence make sense in light
of their ideas, but their ideas also made sense in light of the evidence. The consequence of
this situation is that the analyses in Part III argues centrally that the practice of strategy is
socially constructed. A further consequence of embracing a social constructivist perspective
is captured in what, for me, emerged as an acceptable definition of strategy as practice (p.
231). That is, strategy choice ordinarily shapes, and is shaped by, practitioners' everyday and
shared understanding of their competitive situation; choice is structured by assumptions,
routinised behaviour as well as through experimenting and dealing with the unfamiliar, rather
than detached analysis and statements of intent.
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3
Research Design and Method
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section outlines the aim and scope of this
research as a precursor to arguing for a particular epistemological approach. The next two
sections describe my epistemological position, and a research design and method that seems
consistent with that position. I argue for a phenomenological rather than positivist
epistemological approach, based on a case study research method, and a grounded theory
analytical approach. The final two sections are a personal reflection on the process of
discovery which this research took, and a conclusion. The first covers aspects of the
fieldwork and its analysis, and is intended to help make the research process more
transparent.
3.2 RESEARCH AIM AND SCOPE
The aim is to assess the ways that strategic choice in the strategic management of
technological innovation is contested and constrained. More specifically the intention is to
examine the role of certain underlying and interrelated features of strategy practice:
differentiated meaning, paradoxes, heuristics, tacit knowledge, and informal networks.
Strategic management is commonly prescribed and analysed as a sequence of stages:
'strategic analysis', 'strategic choice', and 'strategy implementation'. The focus of this
research is to develop a better understanding of the notion 'strategic choice'. The traditional
view of strategy presents strategic choice as a component in a recursive process. This
research suggests that strategic choice is more fundamental, and in practice underpins both
'analysis' and 'implementation', and 'organisational change' more broadly.
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Strategic choice involves a 'contest' between interest groups, both within and between
organisations. Different interest groups often have different perspectives and assumptions, for
example about what constitutes strategy, or about the nature of the competitive environment.
They also have partially divergent interests with respect to strategy and so will behave
politically, using informal and formal means to secure their interests.
In any case, strategy itself involves dealing with paradoxes. Most obviously, there are the
apparently conflicting demands between short term profitability and survival, and long term
investment and growth. Also, organisations seem determined to increase control over their
environment in a situation of profound uncertainty. Such paradoxes are another reason why
strategy practice seems marked by contests.
It seems likely that the influence of each group is constrained in a variety of ways. The range
of options is not limitless but rather narrow. There are two reasons for this. First, firms'
decision making tend to be governed by heuristics; that is, previous decisions, existing formal
decision rules and informal practices guide or focus decisions. Second, knowledge seems to
accumulate in particular directions as organisations embrace new areas of innovation.
Moreover, much of the requisite knowledge is tacit and not articulated in a public form.
These factors, individually and collectively, may significantly influence what counts as valid
strategy and relevant knowledge (technological, organisational, commercial). Through these
considerations research questions and a schedule of interview questions (see appendix 1)
were developed to shed light on the nature of strategy and the role of innovation.
3.3 EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION
This research aims to make sense of strategy as a social phenomenon; to explain both the
variety in, and the meaning people attach to, their experiences and expectations. This aim is
not concerned with diagnosis; with identifying problems of social behaviour and proposing
solutions to them. Furthermore this research assumes that the social world is not as material
as the 'natural' world. Individuals and groups behave according to how they interpret their
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situation. This research does not conceive of human behaviour and relationships as concrete,
as objective phenomena that can be accurately measured.
The proposition here is that there is no law-like causal link between the behaviour of
individuals and groups, and some external or environmental stimuli. The organisation's
relationship with its external environment does not exist as some concrete, independent or
'natural' link. Any causal relationship, is grounded in a collective belief among competitors,
customers, and other interested parties. 'The best way to compete in this business...' cannot
be read off like instructions or imperatives from the material world. Competitors invest in
technology to gain competitive advantage because they believe there is a link between
technological expertise, artefacts, and competitive advantage.
This centrality of a collective belief is not to suggest that social relationships are somehow
ephemeral, or are divorced from the material world. Organisations do develop reputations
over time for being say, innovative, socially responsible, secretive, and so on. Companies do
develop technologies and products that customers find useful, and unregulated behaviour
among competitors and consumers can cause irreparable damage to the material environment.
The social and material worlds are bound together in other ways, through for example
symbolism. In the world of cosmetics, competitors with the help of their advertising agencies
promote their 'fine fragrances' and deodorants based on a shared belief that consumers attach
symbolic value to particular smells. The product is a material vehicle that helps customers
access 'femininity' or 'masculinity'. During the last year a British industry regulator, the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) gave their support to those cosmetics
suppliers who argue that the value of the product lay in its symbolic value.
Often the symbolism is attached not just to the product itself, but also to its name, packaging,
price, and the kind of retail outlet that makes it available. Consumers are willing to pay a
premium for branded fashion accessories because such products contribute to an image of
themselves that the purchaser wishes to cultivate. Business lunches are more than a
convenient way of saving time and re-fuelling the body. They are also rituals for establishing
and reaffirming social relationships.
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These examples show that the world is not simply divided into the social and the material.
One gives meaning to the other in context. Since the research task is to find out how
practitioners interpret their situation, then in-depth interviews with a wide cross-section of
practitioners and observations of their situations are more appropriate than surveys using
standard questions seeking 'yes or no' responses (Yin, 1984; Easterby-Smith et. al., 1991).
However, while interviews and observations may be appropriate techniques for soliciting
meaning, they do have limitations. Unavoidably the researcher makes many assumptions that
underpin the questions asked. Some of these assumptions are explicit, but many others are
hidden from the researcher.
The researcher's own assumptions, values, experience, and general anticipation of things to
come, will colour the questions asked and how the answers are interpreted. For example my
research questions reflect the assumption that firms are largely free to compete with each
other, compared to the situation of operating in a centrally planned economy. Again, the
researcher might formulate questions, and solicit answers in a way that assumes the practice
of strategy to be about managers being engaged in a calculative struggle to control an
external and independent environment. In another example, the degree to which the
researcher accepts or is sensitive to the gendered division of labour in organisations either
opens up or ignores avenues for investigation. While the researcher aims to remain aware that
s/he is guided by the 'taken for granted', 'radical humanists' or 'radical structuralists' might
say that the researcher is unavoidably imprisoned by their own perspectives on the nature of
organisations (Morgan, 1980).
The social interaction of the interview process generated its own symbolic relationships and
meanings. For example, some interviewees were suspicious of my stated aims, and responded
in terms that were consistent with what they thought I was really doing. In Timeplex a couple
of people admitted that initially they thought my story about doing academic research was
just a cover. They though I was either a consultant or someone from the company's head
office, tasked with investigating them. They were ready to see subterfuge because there was
already a climate of distrust and uncertainty within the organisation due to redundancies in
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the recent past. Other interviewees initiated actions as a direct result of issues raised during
some interview discussions. The Dean of the Open Business School said that as a result of
our discussions, he took steps to improve communication between the centre (Walton Hall)
and the Regional Offices.
I.
While the interviews had some (unintended) effects, these did not appear to cause any
significant changes in the way that interviewees or the organisation as a whole behaved. My
intervention as researcher was localised and temporary rather than substantial and long
lasting. The basis for this claim is that no one suggested that the research interviews caused
them to change the way they worked. Many people said that the questions made them think
about their situation, often in ways they had not considered before, and where the
organisation was going. However I am unaware of anything more substantial happening,
such as a re-organisation.
3.4 RESEARCH METHOD
3.4.1 The case study
The research method used was the case study. While some writers distinguish between
different types of case study (Yin, 1989; Hertog, 1994a), this research reflects elements of
those methods. Different options seem to characterise different stages in the process.
Hertog (1994a: 5) describes four alternative options: 1. the pure description of a social
phenomenon, 2. the solution of a definable social problem, 3. the development of a theory,
and 4. the testing of a theory.
The four alternatives seem to reflect two main epistemological positions and research
traditions. One tradition is Glaser and Strauss' (1967) notion of 'grounded theory', an
essentially inductive approach. The other is Yin's (1984, 1989) perspective, reflecting the
testing of a hypothesis, and a deductive approach. With the former method the researcher
63
tries to generalise from the particular, while with the latter s/he starts from a general
proposition and tries to apply it to the particular.
This research project formally began with the posing of a set of open ended research
questions. While they were not hypotheses, they did carry assumptions about the nature of
the social phenomena I wished to investigate. These assumptions were the product of
experience as a practitioner, and a more specific and selective study of the literature in and
around the research area. I therefore entered the research process with a 'unique' knowledge
base of the social phenomena of strategy and the management of innovation. This position is
some way from the unbiased open minded observer of Glaser and Strauss; a position that is
unattainable for any researcher given their particular baggage of assumptions and
experiences.
The resulting knowledge and expectations deployed in this research were arguably more akin
to the choosing of instruments by Yin's positivist experimenter. Later in the research process,
the post-fieldwork and analysis stage seemed to be a mixture induction and deduction;
juxtaposing old ideas that looked as if they might shed light on the new situation under
investigation, rather like Schon's (1963) description of the cognitive processes underlying the
creation of new ideas. In other words, I have mixed traditions within the case study method
as the research process unfolded. 'Reflections' below (3.5) give an account of how I moved
from expectations to observation then to 'theory'.
Although these issues highlight the epistemological difficulties of the case study method, it is
nevertheless an appropriate instrument in certain situations. In particular, for investigating
contemporary social phenomena in context, where the phenomena-context boundary is
blurred (Yin, 1989: 23), shifting and symbiotic. Importantly for the content of this research,
Hertog (1994a: 5) suggests that the case study approach should also acknowledge the role of
history as an influence on the future. Making sense of strategic options being pursued today
requires an appreciation of the historical events and situations that helped shape strategy
practice today.
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In this research project, organisational strategy making, the on-going relationship between
the organisation and its external environment, and the relationship between history and the
contemporary are central issues. In seeking to make sense of the nature of strategic choice in
the context of practice, the case study method provides an appropriate investigative
framework, because it takes account of these conceptual issues.
3.4.2 Sources of evidence
The main sources of evidence at the organisational level were semi-structured interviews and
direct observations. Additional evidence was collected from internal reports and plans, public
performance accounts, promotional literature and press cuttings, public industry reports.
Some archival evidence was also collected, going back one or two years. Despite the
limitations of interviewing and observation acknowledged earlier (3.3 'epistemological
position'), the use of interviews is recognised as appropriate for case study research, this type
of study usually being an enquiry into social affairs (Yin, 1984). It is appropriate where the
purpose of the research is to solicit the meanings that individuals attach to their situation, in
social contexts that have not been structured in advance by the researcher (Easterby-Smith et.
al.t 1991). Again direct observation is still recognised as a valuable way of enriching
understanding of both the material and social context, and the social phenomenon being
studied (Yin, 1984). Some of the following discussion is informed by such observational
evidence.
Organisations chosen
Initially I approached nine organisations that met my criteria; that is, large complex
organisations who regarded technological innovation as central to their future development.
This provided scope for initial screening to eliminate those organisations likely to be
problematic (for example, likely to drop out later on, or going through major internal
changes). In the event three organisations were studied for this research. Three rather than
65
one was chosen in the hope that such an arrangement would enable comparative analysis.
More than three would have demanded more time and effort than was available.
These three organisations were very different, using different technologies and serving
different markets. Furthermore, they had no transactional relationship, such as being part of a
common supply chain. They did hold in common a belief that their future survival depended
on innovation in and around their expertise or competence base. The three organisations were
Ascom Timeplex, the Bank of Scotland, and the Open Business School.
Ascom Timeplex (AT), a Division of Ascom, is a manufacturing enterprise, using expertise
or competences in telecommunications networking and management information
technologies. AT provides communication network products and technical services to
international organisations, particularly financial services companies. My initial contact was
a Director, with whom I had worked as a peer in a previous organisation. He agreed to co¬
operate but could not promise co-operation from his peers or subordinate managers. He
arranged introductions from which I negotiated interviews, and found little resistance except
for two refusals and one prevented from co-operating by his superior's tactics. From this case
there were eleven interviewees including: UK Managing Director, Directors of Sales,
Marketing, and Customer Support, and seven Customer Support managers and engineers.
The Bank of Scotland (BoS), part of Bank of Scotland Group pic, is a clearing bank, using
expertise or competences in IT and banking. BoS provides financial products and services to
individuals and organisations in Scotland and England. One of my supervisors, James Fleck,
along with a group of researchers had carried out research in the Bank a couple of years
previously (Fincham et. al., 1994). This experience, and a positive predisposition among a
few of the Bank's senior managers to my host institution, the University of Edinburgh,
facilitated my contact's willingness to co-operate. There were ten interviewees: The General
Managers of several Divisions: Management Services, International, Card Services,
Domestic UK Banking, Centrebank, Accounting and Finance. Within Management Services
three additional staff were interviewed, and one other within Card Services.
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The Open Business School (OBS), also called the Faculty of Management of the Open
University, is a business school, using competences in educational technology (distance
teaching and learning) and communication media. OBS provides products and services
(courses and associated support) to individuals and organisations, primarily in Britain but
also expanding in continental Europe. Having worked as a part-time tutor with the OBS for
the last five years I had already developed a good relationship with some members of staff.
Indeed, I had worked with the Dean before he took office, and his support no doubt
contributed to the ease of access. There were twenty four interviewees including: OBS
executive (Dean, External Relations, Course Production, Course Presentation, Research,
School Secretary), individual academics engaged in course writing, and administrative staff.
Representatives of Open University groups that OBS depended on were also interviewed:
The Institute of Educational Technology (IET/OU), Business Development Management
Organisation (BDMO/OU), Open University (Pro-Vice Chancellor for strategic planning),
and Regional Staff.
Interviews
Initially I met with my internal 'sponsor', the individual with sufficient authority to grant me
access to their organisation. The discussion started with the research aims and my expectation
that the sponsor would use the first meeting to fully satisfy themselves that the proposed
research was something that the organisation would co-operate with. However, in all three
cases this introductory meeting slipped imperceptibly into the researcher/interviewee
relationship. This initial discussion also helped identify which individuals should be
interviewed first (selection criteria listed below). Additional interviewees were similarly
identified during these first discussions.
In order to develop a picture of the observed performance of the three organisations, I
solicited individuals' experiences and views through semi-structured in-depth tape recorded
interviews. That is, in each interview we focused on single issues from various angles,
through a series of open ended questions (see appendix 1). For example interviewees were
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asked to discuss their understanding of the concepts of strategy and innovation, and the
relationship between the two. Interviewees were asked to give examples of innovation and
why these were chosen as examples, and they were also asked to explain the strategy of their
department and their organisation. The three organisations were interviewed sequentially,
with interviews spread over the first nine months of 1994. From the interviews in each
organisation, I prepared an account that aimed to reflect a collective perspective of each
organisation's interviewees. How this evidence was organised and analysed is discussed
below (3.4.3), Part II presents the evidence as coherent accounts, and Part III consists of
analyses of the accounts.
A total of forty five interviews were conducted, each one 60 to 90 minutes long. The
individuals interviewed were selected for a number of reasons, including:
1. They led departments directly responsible for the development, production, delivery, and
support of product and/or service to customers.
2. They were regarded as key staff (apart from Departmental heads) who took part in decision
making.
3. Their views were highly regarded by peers even though they might not have been a regular
or formal contributor to strategy making forums.
4. They were willing to be interviewed.
Identifying individuals on this basis resulted in a substantial difference in the number of
interviewees between the OBS (24 individuals) and the other two organisations, with 10 from
BoS and 11 from AT. Furthermore although BoS and AT produced similar numbers, the
formal positions of individuals were not comparable. This represents differences in authority
structures and work organisation, and in particular it shows differences in the way that
individuals have scope to influence organisational strategy processes. Some of these issues
are examined below. 'Reflection' below (3.5) explores whether this range of interviewees
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and their views are sufficient to contribute to an understanding of organisational strategy
practice.
Variety in organisational attitudes to access
Variation in the way that these organisations treated the researcher contributes to an
understanding of the differences in their strategy making processes. Having explained to my
Bank of Scotland sponsor the research aims, he identified immediately that I needed to see
five Divisional Managers in addition to himself. He then contacted them and suggested that
they make themselves available to me. Unlike the Ascom Timeplex managers, I did not have
to convince the Divisional Managers of the value ofmy research to them, as a precursor to
the interview. However, there were limits to my sponsor's co-operation. Speaking on behalf
of his colleagues, my sponsor said he was unable to grant me access to management
meetings, because clients' financial situations may be discussed and these were confidential.
Nor was he keen to arrange a meeting with the Bank's General manager, and suggested "that
it might be possible some time in the future", after I had spoken with the Divisional
Managers. My impression is that such access would be more likely if my relationship with
key Bank managers were closer, as in the other two cases.
In contrast, access to Ascom Timeplex staff was more negotiated. Directors were willing to
talk, and appeared to be quite open in sharing their opinions. More subordinate managers
were much more guarded initially, with their willingness to co-operate being dependent on a
certain amount of negotiation between us. For example, although my sponsor was a Director
in the organisation, I had to meet his subordinate managers en masse and convince them that
the research would be useful to them. Perhaps more critically, they wanted to satisfy
themselves that I was legitimate, that I had not been sent by Head Office to spy on them!
Their sense of suspicion and conspiracy was not saved up for me; it was endemic to the
organisation.
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A couple of AT people refused to be interviewed, perhaps because of the ambiguity
surrounding their department's role in the company, since at that time there was some doubt
about their future. I did not observe any internal meetings to discuss the direction and
performance of the business, because these were exceptional and accidental in AT. Such
meetings took place in the USA, although there was growing interest in having such meetings
in the UK.
Access within the third organisation, OBS, was very open. I could talk to anyone and attend
any meeting. I was even left alone to look through a filing cabinet of internal reports and
memos for relevant information. In addition, I was invited to observe a two-day internal
strategy review process, consisting of various workshops and discussions, and also observed
a School Board meeting. I attended a small presentation given by a working-party (the
electronic strand) who were tasked with recommending how the OBS should develop in view
of the burgeoning availability of new media, such as CD ROM, and trends in information
management.
The differences in access seem to be due to a number of factors, and provide a window on
organisational attitudes and strategy making. Some of the variation in attitudes to granting
me access, between OBS, AT, and BoS is probably due to the strength of personal
relationship between me as researcher and the organisation's 'gatekeeper'. It also seems
likely that the very senior people, particularly Directors, were more willing than subordinate
managers to discuss the organisation's business. Indeed Directors and senior managers
probably have more discretion and knowledge about the issues. This difference among staff
may also be due to Directors being more practised at defending and showing accountability
to shareholders and other public bodies.
Strategy issues affecting BoS are clearly the preserve of the Management Board: a group of
about ten individuals and largely consisting of the General Managers of the Bank's
Divisions. What individuals lower down the hierarchy learn about the Bank's strategy is
determined by the Management Board, and filters down through the hierarchy. Middle
managers and those below have a narrow and 'managed' knowledge of the Bank's strategy
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and outcomes, and the variety of views held by the very senior managers. Their knowledge is
managed in the sense that it is acquired second-hand through their superiors, typically
through notice boards, company reports, staff presentations.
In OBS power and influence is very widely dispersed, and there is scope for a wide variety of
individuals to directly influence strategy formulation and implementation. For example,
strategy issues affecting OBS is decided by open committee. Meetings of the Board of the
School ofManagement are attended by dozens of interested staff. Staff attend because they
wish to actively participate in strategy development. Most attendees say little or nothing, but
they want to know what is going on. Furthermore, by being there they are demonstrating a
right to be involved, or to be heard. Perhaps in the same way that ramblers in Britain 'police'
footpaths to maintain their right of way, many OBS staff attend meetings to reaffirm their
right of access to OBS's strategy making.
While there is a hierarchy in AT, power and influence is distributed in complex ways.
Individual managers and engineers routinely seek out opportunities to develop or exploit
power and influence. In the BoS formal power and influence is concentrated at the top of the
hierarchy. Although different part of BoS, could claim expertise and use it as a power lever,
such as Management Services and their IT expertise, respect for the Bank's hierarchy is
overwhelming.
Each organisation also took a different attitude over my freedom of movement. While on the
premises of OBS I was free to move about unsupervised. On occasions when the Dean was
out I used his office as my base. Security was clearly more important to both AT and OBS,
with all staff wearing identify cards and departmental doors being controlled by card access
devices. However, while AT staff initially escorted me everywhere, this was relaxed with
each subsequent visit. In contrast at the Bank I was never left to wander around on my own.
Not surprisingly these organisations have different attitudes and strategy making processes.
Perhaps less obvious is that these attitudes and processes are reflected in their treatment of
the researcher. I was provided with relatively open access in OBS, managed access in BoS,
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and a negotiated access in AT. The preceding discussion on the variation of treatment shows




Given the epistemological position outlined earlier, and the use of qualitative interviews to
gather empirical evidence, my preferred analytical approach is based on 'grounded theory'.
This enables a holistic, intuitive, and inductive process of discovery (Easterby-Smith et. al.,
1991: 106). Strauss and Corbin (1990) offer a comprehensive set of procedures and
techniques for analysing qualitative data. Easterby-Smith et. al. (1991) also offer a structured
approach to grounded theory, but their approach is more loose with much less detailed
prescription. While both approaches recognise that analysis or interpretation is an iterative
process (Easterby-Smith et. al., 1991: 108), and demands "openness and flexibility" (Strauss
and Corbin, 1990: 26, 144), Strauss and Corbin's procedures are so detailed that the
mechanics of analysis threaten to overshadow the possibilities for openness and intuition. I
have tried to remain true to the method, in terms of analytical process, theoretical sensitivity,
and "striking a balance between being creative, ... and doing 'good science'" (Strauss and
Corbin, 1990: 10), but have not applied, for example, a detailed axial coding to the data. I
found their approach useful as a guide rather than as a formal procedure to be adhered to in
moving between the main components they suggest.
Strauss and Corbin seem to regard creativity and good science as opposites, in relation to
which two points need clarification. First, good science as used here means being committed
to providing a faithful account and robust analysis of interviewees' meanings; respecting the
principles of validity, reliability, and generalisability. The notion of objectivity seems
inappropriate since the focus of the research is on making sense of people's understanding of
social processes, rather than for example establishing a statistical correlation between firms'
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net profits and total investment over time. Second, being creative can still be good science;
making novel connections between existing ideas and the new situation that shed new and
useful light on the phenomenon.
In the interests of doing 'good science' Easterby-Smith's et. al. (1991: 108) research
checklist has proved helpful because its structure is sufficiently loose to facilitate creativity:
7. Familiarisation with the empirical information. This was a function of two tasks. One was
trying to write an account (case study) of the organisation from the interviewees'
perspectives. The other came later, in trying to write an analytical account from my
perspective.
2. Evaluating the data in light ofprevious research, theoretical ideas, personal experience,
discussions with others. This meant revisiting many articles and books. Ideas that previously
seemed not relevant, often because they were discussed in a different context from this
research area, now seemed very relevant. Equally, some ideas that seemed initially to be
important were left undeveloped because they did not seem to further understanding of the
empirical evidence. Undoubtedly these change processes represent personal learning, both
about the research process and its content, an example of the latter being a growing
appreciation of the value of the social constructivist perspective and the sociology of
knowledge.
3. Identifying or otherwise forming coherent ideas through 1 and 2 above. During the
interview period I noted any ideas and themes that occured to me at the time. I re-visited this
list of ideas during the analysis, elaborating some, finding similarities between others, and
abandoning many.
4. Cataloguing and recording concepts identified in the transcripts. This was an extension of
3, but as noted earlier I did not apply the detailed coding procedure of Strauss and Corbin
(1990).
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5. Linking. I began trying to write coherent accounts around the emergent themes, and
sharing those themes through discussion with peers and supervisors. I have spent a lot of time
in this area, perhaps because it demanded greater emphasis on creativity: making numerous
links between empirical material and theory that as a whole seemed coherent. Writing case
study accounts without some conscious analytical structure resulted in confusing accounts.
This then gave way to drafting an analytical account. Thinking through the analytical
arguments helped in redrafting more coherent case studies. More coherent case studies in turn
exposed ideas for further developing the analysis. Through drafting, moving backwards and
forwards between case stories and analysis, and discussions with others, stronger arguments
and links developed between the case material and its analysis.
6. Re-evaluation and cycling through all of the above. Rather than following a structured
cycling through of the analysis process, my emphasis has slowly cycled from stage 1 through
to stage 5, but not in an ordered way. For example, in linking empirical material with general
models (stage 5), I have engaged in stage 2 activity, revisiting previous research and ideas.
Organisation ofevidence
Implicit in any process of analysis is the organising and interpretation of the evidence.
Initially, at the start of the fieldwork, the intention was to organise the evidence in three
categories, and then to compare and contrast them: espoused performance, revealed
performance as used by Metcalfe and Gibbons (1989), and observed performance. Evidence
for an espoused strategy could be drawn from published information and supporting
interview statements, including claims to financial performance, market position,
innovations, performance characteristics of technologies, products and services. However, as
the evidence seemed increasingly explicable in terms of a social constructivist perspective,
many espoused factors such as product and financial performance, seemed definable as
revealed performance (see for example 4.4.2 and 6.5.3). As MacKenzie shows in his
sociological analysis of technical change "economic phenomena such as prices, profits and
markets are not just 'there' - self-sustaining, self-explaining - but exist only to the extent that
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certain kinds of relations between people exist" (1992: 37-38). Similarly the particular
features of an artefact are not self evident; artefacts embody social preferences. These
examples form part of a wider analysis in chapter 9. This inseparability of revealed and
espoused performance meant that the former was no longer an appropriate category of
evidence.
Distinguishing between espoused and observed performance depended on assessing and
judging what the significance was of finding any inconsistency between documented
evidence and the interview statements and observations. When interviewees distinguished
between their understanding of how strategy worked and a formally declared strategy, this
distinction was regarded as observed. On other occasions observation supported an espoused
position, and this support or corroboration was also taken as observed evidence.
Evidence was also organised into that which described:
1. The decision making process, (espoused and observed),
2. The organisation-environment relationship (espoused and observed),
3. The relationship between the organisation's history and its contemporary strategy practice.
As noted above, these ways of organising the evidence have been influenced by my reading
of previous research and theoretical ideas. The evidence is organised this way to answer the
question 'Why and how does strategic choice constrain organisational development?' The
analyses in Part III of the thesis show that strategic choice as well as corporate intent are
shaped by practice and the organisation's ontological assumptions.
3.4.4 Evaluation
The sentiment embodied in Thorngate's "impostulate" (1976: 406) is a useful way of seeing
an inherent compromise in trying to achieve simultaneous generality, reliability, and validity.
In his assessment of the extent to which social behaviour is shaped by a given historical
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context, Thorngate suggests that "it is impossible for a theory of social behaviour to be
simultaneously general, simple or parsimonious, and accurate" (1976: 406). Drawing on
Thorngate's ideas, information is most relevant in its own context, what Thorngate might call
'accurate', becoming increasingly inaccurate as it is separated from its context. Here
'accurate' does not mean getting the facts of some objective and concrete reality. Instead it
means building an account that as far as possible reflects interviewees' meanings and
understanding of their situation.
With regard to generality, the three case studies could not be selected as statistical
representatives of a population. Indeed, trying to draw general conclusions from the three
cases might compromise individual accuracy. Furthermore, to achieve simplicity or
parsimony means making judgements about what information to include and exclude, and
deciding how to structure the case story is also part of this process. Achieving simplicity
could compromise generality and accuracy.
Thorngate's impostulate is a valuable way of articulating the constraints surrounding the
research process. Indeed the tensions between accuracy, parsimony, and generality highlights
the centrality of judgement making in the analytical process. Thorngate does not appear to
distinguish between statistical and theoretical generality. Interpreting Yin's ideas on
generalisation (1984: 39), the appropriate frame of reference for this research is how well the
cases support theory, rather than how representative they are of a population. "If the reality of
the case does not confirm the theory, then the theory must be adjusted ... the theory paves the
way to generalisation" (Hertog, 1994a: 12). Indeed Thorngate's (1976) own argument and
conclusion as presented are better described as generalising to theory than statistical
generalisation. Clearly, a consequence of distinguishing between statistical and theoretical
generalisation is that validity must also be seen as either statistical or theoretical.
There are strengths and weaknesses in studying multiple versus single case studies (Hertog,
1994a: 8). The triangulation of studying more than one organisation (Fox's {1990} space
triangulation, or Easterby-Smith et. al. {1991} data triangulation) improves robustness of the
research design, but does not offer a universal improvement of validity, reliability and
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generalisability. The variety of situations offers an opportunity to improve generalisability to
theory (Yin's external validity, 1984), but this variety also makes it more difficult to support
an argument that is consistent and coherent across all three cases (Yin's internal validity,
1984), which seems to echo Thorngate's proposition. The extent to which each organisation
may accept the account written from their perspective, as well as my analysis is perhaps
another measure of the validity of the research. Nevertheless space triangulation is useful
because it enables comparative analyses. It reveals diversity of social behaviour, and provides
scope for drawing similarities.
Triangulation of theory (Easterby-Smith et. al., 1991) has been very useful in shedding light
on various aspects of the research space. In particular, Douglas' (1982) 'group/grid' construct
developed from studying primitive communities has helped make sense of the differences in
organisational strategy practice in terms of alternative social realities. The analysis of
organisational social reality in chapter 10 is based on Douglas' social anthropological studies.
Similarly, studies from the sociology of knowledge has helped explain the socially
constructed nature of strategy practice and the uncertainty surrounding innovation processes,
and these concepts underpin the analyses in chapters 8 and 9.
Reliability is problematic since, as with an experiment, it implies that other researchers
should be able to replicate one's results by following the same procedures. It is questionable
how far such an expectation is appropriate in a phenomenological study where the researcher
has considerable scope to interpret the evidence; each researcher draws on a distinct range of
knowledge and capabilities. Furthermore the evidence itself - social relations and situations -
remains dynamic, as does its relation to the researcher. Perhaps because of these difficulties,
rather than inspite of them, the solution is to make the research procedures as transparent as
possible, accepting that both knowledge and the social context that gives meaning to that
knowledge are not static phenomena, and that there will always be a tacit element that defies
documenting. This is easier said than done. For example the periodic public arguments
between competing research teams about the feasibility of cold fusion is in part due to the
difficulty of replicating the first team's tacit knowledge. This is why I have chosen to
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describe the formal procedures followed, as well as reflect on that process. The reflections
represent additional markers along the journey that researchers may use to assess their
progress. This is further enhanced by examples of issues taken from the three cases.
3.5 REFLECTION
3.5.1 The research process
The choice of research questions reflect my personal experience as a practitioner, plus some
of the literature on strategy and innovation, and discussions I took part in during the first year
of the research.
Different aspects of my research questions seemed to be in danger of evaporating throughout
the fieldwork. For example, many of the issues around the research questions were not
important to interviewees. I continually had to balance forcing the discussion to comply with
my assumptions and biases, and allowing the interviewees to develop their accounts in their
own terms. Managing the interview in this semi-structured way was necessary since I was
trying to elicit the meanings interviewees attach to the notions of strategy and innovation. In
this respect my questions were a starting point and not an attempt to test any theories
(Hertog, 1994a).
At other times interviewees would try to give the kinds of answers that they thought I wanted
to hear. They wanted to get the answers right, or to demonstrate their knowledge. For
example, on more than one occasion when asked to explain what they thought strategy or
innovation meant, interviewees seemed to give a tentative answer and wait for some sign of
approval from the interviewer. This was usually countered by reassuring the interviewee that
there was no right answer, and that what really mattered was their understanding of such
terms.
The detailed research questions were to some extent always negotiable but I did not expect
the richness and variety of interviewees' answers; the variety in their interpretations of the
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questions. Over the nine month interview period, themes and patterns began to emerge,
although at times I felt saturated with information and ideas. As the interview programme
progressed to completion I felt that I had valuable material that did not conform with my
prior conceptual frame. Although I heard my supervisors when they suggested that many of
my underlying assumptions about the nature of strategy might be brought into question, I was
not prepared for the confusion that was emerging between my assumptions and the richness
of possible themes. Furthermore, there were more topics covered by the questions than could
be adequately addressed in a one or two hour interview. I began to appreciate that more than
one thesis lay in the answers to my list of questions!
Starting during the fieldwork I entered a period of intellectual struggle that has led to
significant changes in the way I conceive of strategy. The struggle was between trying to
remain open minded to empirical data on one hand, while on the other hand I was
unconsciously committed to particular epistemological and ontological assumptions. I began
to review my own assumptions about the nature of strategy and reality. I could not organise
the evidence without acknowledging some conceptual framework. At the same time pieces of
a conceptual framework were emerging but the overall shape was far from clear. The result
was a confusion that was evidenced in my attempts to write coherent accounts from the
perspective of interviewees. Writing an account without some intellectual framework meant
that separating relevant from irrelevant information was chaotic, and one could produce
accounts with differing emphases from the same material.
The confusion is clearing through discussion and the parallel writing of case study material,
analysis, and research design. This process appears to be a tangle involving both deduction
and induction. It is inductive in the sense that I am trying to generalise to theory from the
specific case studies, and am making sense of the fieldwork in terms that I had not conceived
of beforehand. The process is deductive in the sense that I am trying to adapt and construct
theory to the specific cases.
A common objection to induction is that there is no such thing as unbiased observation
(Phillips and Pugh, 1987). While accepting this principle, my experience in this study is that
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despite my consciously prepared conceptual filters, a different and unexpected picture did
emerge, and my conceptual filters are being reshaped. The analytical perspective taken in
Part III of the thesis represents a synthesis of empirical data and the re-visiting of various
ideas in light of that fieldwork evidence, and vice versa.
3.5.2 Have I done enough?
The intention in this study was to build a picture at the level of individual interest groups
within the organisation, for example the main departments of Sales, or R&D, and compare
their practice of strategy, and compare their perceptions of the whole organisation's strategy.
This would enable intra- and inter-organisational comparisons. In addition, I considered
supporting the interviews with the techniques of cognitive mapping and shadowing of some
interviewees, but these latter two techniques were abandoned before they were used, because
the reality of fieldwork proved quite different from my expectations. Indeed the gap between
what was desired and the reality of what was achievable showed a very poor understanding
of the resource implications of achieving the desired.
Firstly, it was clear that cognitive mapping and shadowing of three, or even one organisation,
would take more time and money than was available. A pilot exercise of cognitive mapping
showed that it was not a straightforward technique, and would demand considerable skill and
experience to exploit. I judged that this was not the occasion to start developing the requisite
skills. Shadowing required extensive periods on site (days at a time) and this was not
practical. In the case of AT this would have required much international travel, with major
cost implications. In other words, while the additional material would be useful, there were
also real resource limitations.
Second, the achievement of a quantitatively comprehensive coverage of all interest groups or
constituencies, would require a very large number of interviews because potentially many
interest groups come together at many levels of analysis. Apart from functional groupings,
there are other internal groups (working parties, task forces, committees); external groups
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(competitors, customers, suppliers); and groups that cross the organisational boundary
(standards committees, collaborative programmes, formal and informal relationships among
professional groups such as sales and engineering). Some of these groups are long standing
but change membership at irregular intervals, while other groups are temporary (Sluijs,
1994).
Many of the interviewees did belong to a number of groups, and it proved difficult or even
impossible for them to wear one hat only during the interview. Some interest groups were
loosely coupled networks (customers/sales/technical support), others tightly bound
hierarchies, for example physically close teams in BoS's Branch Staff support, and AT's
network monitoring room. Some interest groups are closer than others to particular strategy
issues, while the relative importance of issues change over time. This would happen during
new product introductions for example. In focusing on the 'elements' of the whole there is
also a danger of failing to see how the elements fit into the whole (Hertog, 1994b).
In dealing with this multiplicity and inseparability of groups the important issue was not to
find a way of representing their number, but to explore differences and similarities of
meaning, both within and across the three organisations. Since the interviews were semi-
structured using open ended questions, the nature of interviewees' relationships with others
in the organisation and their understanding of their organisation's strategy processes could be
examined. In exploring differentiated meaning I sought to do as Faulkner and Senker did in
the design of their study of linkages between public sector research and industry: "important
issues were addressed from ... different angles so that any inconsistencies or ambiguities
arising could be examined" (1994: 676).
Third, and related to the previous point, since it was impractical to separate out interest
groups, the question arises as to whether my range of interviewees is sufficient. I believe that
within the constraints of resource (time and money) and access (it varied), the interviewees
have qualitatively represented the views of enough constituencies to negate the potential
weakness of quantitative representation. This judgement is based on my observation that in
each organisation I reached a point where the interviewee would suggest speaking to an
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individual that I had already interviewed or planned to interview. Another sign that enough
evidence had been collected was my sense that additional interviewees were increasingly
confirming more than introducing new material to my understanding of their differentiated
views on their organisation's strategy.
Fourth, in all three organisations I aimed to get a fair representation of the views of those
with influence on strategy making. This resulted in a wide variation in the number of
interviewees per organisation, from ten to twenty four. This difference worried me for some
time. Should I find more people to talk to, or had the interview programme in the BoS
reached a 'natural' closure? Should I go to the USA and talk to the Engineering Design
people of AT, or would the views ofUK based staff suffice? Have I talked to too many
people in the OBS, in effect wasting effort?
Behind my concern was the assumption that I should speak with roughly the same number of
people in each organisation, to maintain the validity of the research design. I did eventually
conclude that this assumption was simplistic, and that the variety of numbers in itself was
evidence of the different approaches of the three organisations. For example, at BoS I studied
decision making at the level of the Bank of Scotland Clearing Bank. At this level the main
interest groups meant the Divisions reporting to the Bank, and in particular their General
Managers and Deputy General Managers. I also interviewed an additional three junior
managers within the Management Services Division (MSD). MSD is the Bank's R&D house,
responsible for applying IT expertise to meet the needs of the Bank's Operating Divisions. I
wanted to compare the views of more junior managers in MSD with the views of the Bank's
Divisional managers, seeing this as a way of combining some depth with breadth.
Power and influence (both formal and informal) in the Bank was concentrated in the
Management Board, constituted of the Divisional Managers. More junior staff had a very
narrow view of either their Division's or the Bank's approach to strategy development, and
deferred questions about the Bank's strategy up the hierarchy. All Divisional Managers had
previously been responsible for one of the other Divisions, and had been reshuffled during
the last twelve months. In most interviews these managers compared their current position
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with their previous responsibilities. Such reflections allowed limited comparison between
General Managers' views of each others positions. It showed that they held in common, or
had the opportunity to share, a range of different experiences of managing the various
Divisions. These Divisional General Managers had more in common with each other than
each had with their subordinate managers in their respective Divisions.
As mentioned earlier,1 access to strategy making in OBS was very open, while in BoS it was
concentrated among a few at the top of the hierarchy. It is this variety in approaches to
strategy making that results in the variety and numbers of interviews in each organisation.
Having said that, I am conscious that I have also made a judgement, in consort with the
organisation's interviewees, about where to draw the line that effectively includes and
excludes contributors to the interview programme.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
The research process as a whole is only linear as a rational reconstruction of history. In 'real
time' I experience it as a mixture of muddling through and cycling back, making intuitive
leaps between writing methodology and doing analysis, all within a broad framework of
accepted procedures called a research proposal, that is itself somewhat fuzzy to the new
researcher. Perhaps significantly, this also seems to describe the nature of strategy.
As noted earlier one important feature of this research is that the initial research questions
were supplanted by new questions that arose in thinking about the empirical data in light of
chapter 2 and vice versa. Chapter 2 remains an important marker for two reasons. First, it
identifies the mainstream thinking on strategy, and second, it provided me with the
opportunity to assess its analytical value in light of fieldwork. Keeping the arguments in
chapter 2 separate from those in chapters 7 to 10 seems an appropriate way of highlighting
the shift in my epistemological position, from a positivist to an interpretive perception. The
focal issues identified within the original research questions proved to be a starting point
1 3.4.2 Sources of evidence: variety in organisational attitudes to access.
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rather than a defining framework, for both the collection of evidence and its analysis. Part III
of this thesis gives an account of my subsequent understanding of the nature of strategy
practice. The account is not offered as the 'correct' way to make sense of strategy practice; it
is offered as my interpretation and expression of the relationships between events and
situations that make up the empirical evidence.
My intentions were ambitious for the limited resources available: one person, a few months,
no experience of the research process, and limited funds. The scope of the research questions
could without difficulty support more than one PhD; the range of questions could not be
adequately addressed in a one or two hour interview, and cognitive mapping and shadowing
were necessarily dropped. This represented a learning process in itself, about having to make
choices where the practical diverged from the ideal.
There were other areas where I have had to make choices in my research method, recognising
that there is often a gap between the "theoretically desirable ... and what is practically
possible" (Buchanan et. al., in Nelson (1990) unit 1: 18), and have been opportunistic. For
example, I wanted to gain access to organisations without using personal contacts, because I
felt this would add credibility. I could somehow claim greater objectivity through the absence
of familiarity with any of the organisation's members. In the event I gained access only to
those organisations where I had personal contacts. This also meant that interviewees who
knew me, whether directly or through my contact, were more inclined to be candid and open
in discussion.
Finally, to stress a point raised earlier about generalisability, the aim of this research is as
Van Maneen describes qualitative research: "to describe, decode, translate and otherwise
come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally




Introduction to Part II
Part II consists of the accounts of three organisations that form the basis ofmy fieldwork and
thesis. The three organisations are: Ascom Timeplex, the Bank of Scotland, and the Open
Business School. The purpose of these accounts is descriptive rather than explanatory or
exploratory (Yin, 1984), and this distinction defines the range of appropriate structures. An
'unsequenced' structure (Yin, 1984) is used here meaning that the order of the sections is not
critical. Each account is divided into six areas: history and size, work organisation, strategic
aims, strategy processes, innovation, and conclusions. While an unsequenced structure might
imply that the evidence is easily compartmentalised, personal judgement has played a
significant part in the composition of these accounts. Where an account could be made more
clear by respecting some chronological order between particular parts of the account, then
this has been done. While most material divides easily into separate areas, some evidence
seems to fit more than one area. For example, while innovation is described separately, it also
features in various other sections. Furthermore, not all of the evidence is included in each
composition where such evidence was judged to be repetitive or irrelevant; the account had to
be of readable length.
All three profiles in Part II show how managers think about and practice strategy and
innovation in their own organisation. These profiles have been built primarily from
individual in-depth interviews with staff from the main functional areas across each
organisation. Some of the picture has also come from direct observation, documents publicly
available, and from internal documents made available to me.
Access to the three organisations varied in important ways, and this experience in itself goes
toward understanding why these organisations differed. Access to the Open Business School
was unrestricted. I was able, if not encouraged, to talk to many people, and internal memos
and files were made available. Access to the Bank of Scotland was also good, but I was not
allowed to attend management meetings because of customer confidentiality, and probably
because of the Bank's general reluctance to allow outsiders into such fora. Access to Ascom
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Timeplex UK was good too, but time and expense prevented access to R&D and
manufacturing staff in the USA.
All organisations are in a state of transition, and these three are no exception. Timeplex is in
the process of evaluating its performance and work organisation, and implementing
fundamental changes to its structure and the range of technologies that it will draw on in the
future. The Bank of Scotland is in turn making radical changes. For example the role of the
Branch is being changed from a place to carry out financial transactions to a sort of financial
services shop, and more emphasis is being put on telephone and other remote access
technologies for financial transactions. The Open Business School is assessing the areas of
electronic communications and storage media, and experimenting with innovative ways to
deliver distance learning courses.
These are long term projects, intended to produce fundamental changes and improvements to
these organisations' competitive positions, and their exact nature will evolve as the projects
progress. This means that much of the detailed case material gathered and presented here has
a shelf life and the accuracy of some of it will gracefully degrade over time. Nevertheless,
there appear to be enduring features of the practice of strategy that are unlikely to disappear
with these fundamental changes, and these enduring features are drawn out in Part III. For
example, chapter 10 'plural social realities' presents a brief and different account of each
organisation, aiming at explanation and exploration rather than description. The reader is
encouraged to compare the accounts in Part II with those of chapter 10 as a way of assessing




The story focuses on strategy practice within Timeplex Inc., from the perspectives of eleven
UK based managers and engineers, interviewed during the summer of 1994. As discussed
earlier (3.4.2), these interviewees either manage or are regarded by their peers as playing a
key role in the performance of the main functions of General Management, Sales, Customer
Support, and Human Resource Management (HRM). The account also draws on publicly
available information, including newspapers and company brochures. Other information on
work organisation arrangements were provided by the interviewees. This account is divided
into six areas: history and size, work organisation, strategic aims, strategy process,
innovation, and conclusions.
The account highlights the extent to which the practice of strategy is shaped by an
individualistic and territorial view of the world. In this world embracing risks rather than
avoiding them, and a preoccupation with the use of power and influence is a way of life.
4.2 HISTORY AND SIZE
4.2.1 Ascom Group
The parent of Timeplex, the Ascom Group, is very young, being formed in 1987 from the
merger of three Swiss telecomms companies; Autophon AG, Hasler Holding AG, and
Zellweger Telecommunications AG. Initially the Group consisted of four business divisions
Corporate Networks, Public Networks and Mobile Radio, Terminals, and Diversified
Operations.
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Ascom is proud of its record of growth through technological innovation:
Targeted expansion and diversification have led to an impressive growth in sales
world-wide. Major strategic alliances have strengthened the group's capabilities
and competitive position.
At a time of rapid technological change, Ascom continues to invest a substantial
proportion of its turnover in research and development. This reinforces the
group's reputation for high quality products and service which has been built up
over many years (Ascom: A Company Profile, ref. AUK/4/93).
4.2.2 Group financial performance
Soon after its global launch Ascom began struggling to deliver on its promise of growth:
The directors admitted the group, a merger of three domestic suppliers, had make
a significant strategic mistake in trying to become internationally competitive in
too many product areas. The dash for growth detracted from the important task of
unifying management from the predecessor companies, so when in 1992 many
operations turned sour and liberalisation cut into sales to the Swiss PTT, Ascom
was slow to retrench ('Ascom slides deeper into the red', Financial Times,
26.4.94).
Due to mounting losses (in 1992 -SFr. 46.4m, 1993 -SFr. 336.7m), the Group reorganised
into three Divisions; Telecommunications, Enterprise Networks, Service Automation, and
took a minority stake in two joint ventures; Public Networks with Ericsson and Radiocom
with Bosch (Fig. 4.1). In addition the Group sold "peripheral activities, such as cable
television, hearing aids and microelectronics components". ('Statute change makes sale of
Ascom stake likely' Financial Times, 8.3.94).
As part of the Ascom reorganisation O'Connor was recruited to the position of President of
Timeplex, a self contained organisation within the Ascom group with global aspirations. The
business of Timeplex Inc., amounting to annual sales of about £300m in 1993, is the sale of
data communication equipment, telecomms networks, and supporting services. The USA
accounts for about 70% of product sales. Outside the USA, Europe is the next significant
territory, and within Europe the UK turnover of £35M accounts for about 70% of sales.


































All Officers except Kries and Emch are members of the
Corporate Management Committe.
Fig. 4.1 Ascom's re-organisedDivisions (April 1994).
Timeplex's main market is financial services organisations that have trading offices around
the world, such as banks, share trading houses, and insurance companies like TSB, Baring
Securities, and Hoare Govett. Timeplex also markets its services to the growing number of
organisations that are 'outsourcing' the management of their own telecommunications
networks, in particular, monitoring, maintaining, and upgrading their systems as necessary.
These organisations have internal national and international telecomms networks linking
their many offices around the world, and they are looking for ways of reducing the overhead
of a networks management department. National telecomms carriers like British Telecomm
also use Timeplex products as part of their own portfolio of products and services. Timeplex
claims that "25 of the top 100 companies in the UK, and over 2, 600 organisations world¬
wide ... rely on Timeplex solutions" (Ascom: A Company Profile, ref. AUK/4/93).
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4.2.3 Timeplex UK
Timeplex Inc. has offices around the world, of which Timeplex UK is the biggest outside of
the USA. The ambience of Timeplex UK is that of a modern American high technology
company, but without any American staff. The staff are young: secretaries, administrators,
technicians are in their twenties and thirties; senior managers are in their thirties and forties.
In keeping with the fashion among many 'hi-tech' American companies, everyone dresses
formally, except on Fridays when everyone 'dresses down' by wearing casual dress. The
offices in Langley, Berkshire are modern red brick and glass on four floors, and office space
is a mix of open plan and one-person offices for managers. The car park around the main
entrance is full of upmarket company cars. Furniture is modern upmarket work stations and
executive desks, and modern leather couches in reception. Managers have a good range of
executive toys in their offices, everyone carries a pager and, depending on position, a
notebook computer. All staff carry a 'smart card' for identification and access to the building.
There is no restaurant or other common eating place where staff may congregate informally.
Lunch means bringing your own sandwiches, or buying them from the vending machines
provided, or going to a local restaurant. A non-smoking policy has been imposed, with the
result that the smokers can often be seen congregating just outside the front door or, if it is
raining, huddled under cover outside the building.
4.2.4 The good and bad old days
Timeplex Inc., with headquarters in Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey, began as a private venture
in the USA around 1969, manufacturing and selling modems. None of the current staff have
been around for more than about 15 years, but a few remember how Timeplex entered the
market with one modem product called Link, providing Wide Area Network (WAN)
integration of voice, data, and image over a network. By current standards Link is regarded as
very basic, but when it entered the market in the early 1970s there was nothing else to
compare. It was so successful with financial houses that Timeplex could not make enough of
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them; "we were making so much money it was coming out of our ears" (Oattes, UK Field
Service Manager).
However, things began to change when UNISYS bought the company. Interviewees
remember that during the 1980s UNISYS was struggling financially, and acquired Timeplex
because it was a very good cash generator. UNISYS closed Timeplex's UK R&D facility in
Langley to "make sure that it squeezed every drop of revenue" from Timeplex's existing
product range. The company was eventually bought from UNISYS about five years ago
(1989), and became Ascom's Corporate Networks Division, renamed Enterprise Networks
under the reorganisation. Some say that UNISYS sold Timeplex because it was no longer
generating cash; that UNISYS had drained Timeplex and sold the empty carcass.
From having the only multiplex product in a new market, Timeplex today is far from being in
a commanding position, both in terms of market position and technological edge. Their
largest competitor, Newbridge Inc. made more profit in 1993 than Timeplex's turnover for
that year. Today many customers' engineers talk disparagingly about some of Timeplex's
products, describing them as 'steam driven'. Although Timeplex Inc. changed ownership,
and Ascom seems to be investing heavily in Timeplex, the UNISYS closure of the UK R&D
facility has so far not been reversed. Most UK managers and engineers regard a UK R&D
and manufacturing capability as necessary for a revival of the company's fortunes. They feel
that a UK based facility would give them more credibility with the UK and European market
and would allow them to respond more effectively to local market conditions.
4.3 WORK ORGANISATION
Timeplex Inc. has its own operational facilities in Sales, Customer Support, Manufacturing,
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Fig. 4.2 Timeplex Inc. organisation (April 1994).
4.3.1 Two empires
Timeplex Inc. derives income from a mix of product sales, customer technical support
contracts, and the sale of Professional Services. The last source is very small and represents a
hope for the future rather than a pillar of current income. Timeplex UK is essentially
responsible for Product Sales (Fig. 4.3). The Customer Support function while sharing the
UK offices is directly responsible to the International Assistant Vice President of Customer
Support, W. Richard (Fig. 4.2).
4.3.2 Product Sales Division
The UK Managing Director, Davis is responsible for sales, marketing, finance, and HR (Fig.
4.3), and reports to the Vice President of Sales who resides in the USA. The sales globe is
divided into a mixture of nationally based Timeplex sales offices (UK, Germany, France,
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Olivetti in Latin America. Customer Support are obliged to support the Sales organisation,
but it 'cross charges' Sales for any services provided. The two reporting lines above S.
Hammond show that she reports to the Financial Director for day to day operations, and to
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Fig. 4.3: Timeplex Inc. UK Sales organisation (April 1994).
4.3.3 Distributors and Affiliates
A small proportion of Timeplex's product sales is done through distributors. Distributors sell
Timeplex products but generally do not provide customers with any technical support.
Technical support is provided directly by Timeplex. Where Timeplex is not able to provide
that support, such as South America, Affiliates are contracted to support Timeplex products.
Customer Support managers feel that Timeplex's competitive advantage is that it sells and
supports most of its products directly, with distributors accounting for a small proportion of
business. They hold that this advantage will help Timeplex re-establish itself. Indeed,
Humphries, manager of the Customer Response Centre (Fig. 4.5) suggests that Timeplex's
weakness may be that it uses distributors to sell its products, because distributors are
generally not sufficiently competent to provide technical support. He thinks that "the
expectations created by the sales pitch is sometimes not met by the realities especially in the
multinational arena", where the customer is likely to have offices in parts of the world where




sending engineers at short notice half-way round the world is expensive. Instead, by
contracting with an Affiliate to cover say, all of South America, Timeplex can save money by
dealing with just one partner. Choosing a partner with complementary products and services,
for example Olivetti, could also mean that the Affiliate's engineers can fix Timeplex's
products.
While using distributors is viewed as a weakness by Customer Support, the Product Sales
Division see distributors as a potential opportunity. Shaw, UK Sales Director, notes that
competitors use distributors because of the high cost of dealing directly, especially the high
technical support costs. He aims to increase product sales, and he sees distributors as an
effective way of achieving that aim. He believes that Timeplex should make more use of
distributors, because direct selling by Timeplex personnel is not cost effective in the new low
value/high volume modem market. If Shaw's analysis of the new market that Timeplex faces
is correct, then this competitive advantage is really a disadvantage. Clearly the source of
Timeplex's competitive advantage is contested.
4.3.4 Customer Support Division
Customer Support is Timeplex's other main income source. Its head office is in Clearwater,
USA, and is divided into three geographic regions: the Americas; the Pacrim (Pacific Rim);
and Europe, the Middle East and Africa (Fig. 4.4). The markets in the Middle East and Africa
are very small so these regions are 'bundled' with Europe for geographical convenience.
Hurd, the Director responsible for Europe, Middle East and Africa, is based in the UK, and
manages a budget of about £22M. He reports to the Assistant Vice President of International
Services, Richard, who is based in Clearwater. The 'Europe, Middle East and Africa'
Customer Support Division consists of ten teams or departments (Fig. 4.5). Four of these are
national Field Service operations of which the UK represents the largest commitment of
resources. Three are business channels (distributors, multinational projects, European
Professional Services), though this latter is likely to be scrapped. The other three departments





















































Ian Braidwood is also Manager of Escalations for which he
reports to Patrick Hurd directly.
Phil Cecil 'shares' his reporting between Patrick Hurd and Gail
Neidinger, Director of Multinational Customer Support.
Fig. 4.5: Timeplex Inc. European Customer Support organisation (April 1994).
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Customer Response Centre
In about 1993 Richard introduced his vision (or strategy) described by Humphries as 'move
with the Sun'. It was to consist of three global remote Customer Response Centres at
Clearwater, USA; Langley, UK; and Hong Kong. The aim was to provide a full 24 hour
support service for customers who have operations in all comers of the globe. Humphries
thinks that Richard was advised by the external consultants, Booze, Allen, Hamilton to set up
the global response network. According to Humphries it is a tried and tested approach used
by others, and these consultants would have got the idea from talking to people in Timeplex
and its competitors.
Richard gave Humphries the freedom to achieve the 'move with the sun' vision as he saw fit.
Humphries reorganised his department at Langley, creating three task units, reflecting
increasingly sophisticated levels of technical support. The least technical is the Response
Centre where initial calls from customers are taken, and where the need for an engineer to
visit a customer site normally originates. The next level of technical sophistication is the
Technical Assistance Centre (TAC), which provides customer engineers with technical
support by telephone.
The third and quite embryonic task unit is the Enterprise Network Management Centre
(ENMC) which provides new services to customers. Before ENMC existed, technicians
rotated through a variety of tasks, of varying level of complexity. Richard's vision enabled
Humphries to group the tasks into TAC and ENMC. Humphries said that "the job became too
wide, so a strategic decision maybe was we need to do it in a different way, so we evolved in
that way". The technical problems being dealt with were perceived as sufficiently numerous
and different to warrant their separation.
Customers that manage their own networks will call on Timeplex for assistance from time to
time, and TAC staff support them. However customers increasingly were asking Timeplex to
take on the whole job of managing their networks on their behalf; from straightforward fault
management, to network performance measurement (failure rates, locations, nature of faults,
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etc.); to configuration management (say, adding to or changing the network to accommodate
new offices). This work involves engineers using electronic equipment to directly monitor
customers' networks with little or no telephone interface with a customer; this is the work of
ENMC. Sometimes customers, like Sun Alliance, manage their own network during office
hours, supported by TAC, and hand over to ENMC after office hours.
Humphries sees the core business of the Customer Response Centre as the three areas of fault
management, performance measurement, and configuration management. He thinks that his
three tier system is what is required to support the core business, but feels unable to staff the
TAC and ENMC units to the level that he feels is necessary for a good 'quality' service,
because he has been told that he "cannot have more heads"; he is expected to achieve
Richard's vision without extra resources.
In Humphries' view, achieving Richard's vision did require a change in the way that
certainly the Langley Customer Response Centre has operated. Historically a skeleton TAC
staff have been "at their desks" during the evening and night, which requires extra staff and
carries overtime payments. Under the new strategy, Humphries will concentrate his TAC
staff during the day shift, which is when their services will be in greatest demand, and will
not put any "expensive TAC engineers on night shift". Any calls after the day shift, requiring
TAC support will be diverted to either Clearwater or Hong Kong, whichever is in daytime
shift. Twenty four hour global TAC coverage will be maintained by seamless hand-overs
between the three centres.
In addition to responding to customer needs, Richard's vision can generate savings.
However, the implementation of Richard's strategy of moving with the Sun is going to take
some time according to Humphries. Many staff had misgivings about the strategy. They were
afraid that jobs at Langley would be lost if another centre were set up in Hong Kong.
Humphries argues that the threat is not that another centre will open, resulting in less work
overall, but that there will be a change in the mix of competencies required at Langley,
toward fewer TAC staff and more lower level qualified technicians to deal with the customer
initially. In Humphries' view this change cannot happen immediately. "I couldn't do that
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today, it wouldn't work, I mean I can't just get rid of history, well qualified people in here".
He prefers the longer term approach of recruiting less technically qualified people to replace
some of the expensive TAC people as they move on.
For historical and cultural reasons there is a small Customer Response Centre in Paris.
Humphries believes that in order to get French business, potential customers, say France
Telecomm, will want to see a local demonstration of capabilities. He thinks that "big plushy
offices in Paris are going to be more convincing and impressive than some outfit in England,
somewhere near London". Furthermore, Timeplex's ability to sell more services across
Europe will depend on being able to demonstrate capability locally as well as being able to
provide global coverage. Humphries is not sure how Richard intends to reconcile this need
for local Centres with his three hubs concept. As Humphries noted,
the story that Richard is selling to the world is that there are three centres; Hong
Kong, Clearwater, Langley. All the other centres like Paris may satisfy the local
cultural needs, but they don't form part of this shell, which should never be
replaced.
4.3.5 New product introductions
All R&D takes place in Engineering Design Centres in the USA. R&D facilities in the USA
are divided geographically (Acton, Massachusetts; Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey; Dallas,
Texas; Westwood, California). This geographical spread is the result of acquiring established
facilities, through buying small companies. Their location is not determined by Timeplex's
production arrangements, nor its markets which are in any case global.
UK staff seem to know little about what goes on in each Engineering Design Centre, except
Woodcliff Lake, which is the main contact for UK personnel for product development issues.
Nor do they know how these Centres fit into the rest of Timeplex. Each facility seems to
have a different reporting mechanism, and differing product development priorities.
Interviewees think that the extent to which the work of these centres overlap or diverge is
probably knowm only at the apex of Timeplex Inc.
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Woodcliff Lake has three Engineering Business Units, each focusing on one of three
'strategic communication technologies': LAN, WAN (or Transport), and Advanced
Technologies. UK managers and engineers perceive that products are designed with the US
market in mind, and then modified in varying degrees to meet European and other non US
market requirements. Davis feels handicapped by having to sell in the UK, products designed
for the US market.
All R&D and Manufacturing takes place in the USA. Perhaps new product development is
'market-led' for the local US market, and 'technology-pushed' with respect to Europe and the
rest of the world, insofar as European customers seem to have much less influence on product
design than US customers. However, the existence of differing communications technical
standards between the USA and other markets means that a certain minimum compliance
with local market requirements is necessary.
New products progress from Engineering Design to Manufacturing, then general release to
Sales. Before a new product is released in the market, technicians from Manufacturing,
Engineering Design, and Customer Support come together to form a 'staging process'. This
is a post-production activity to test and prepare a new product for the field. Here technicians
test whether the new product meets the intended performance specification, and try to
simulate field conditions.
Stubbs, as European Product Support Manager, ensures that the European Customer Support
engineers get sufficient training to support new products as they are taken up by customers.
He takes his steer from Marketing, where he learns of planned new product launches. This
triggers him into co-ordinating the necessary technical support. Stubbs starts by interpreting
product design information to establish what function the product will perform. He is
responsible for co-ordinating the European product release schedule, identifying any special
equipment and tools needed, produce technical documentation, training courses,
presentations, and lectures. He also "contributes to the installation and maintenance
philosophy", which describes how Timeplex staff must manage the process of product
support.
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Before a new product emerges in the market place, Stubbs "looks at the strategy of
supporting a new product, what the product does and how we intend to support it". He then
prepares a Customer Support Plan (or strategy) in conjunction with European country
managers. This plan is "The Bible", and is used to resolve customer support questions that
cannot be dealt with within the framework of the escalation log and procedure. The
escalation log is a prioritised list for dealing with customers' technical problems in an orderly
manner. The Bible also contains a product overview, a list of departments involved with pre-
sales installation, maintenance, and escalation paths, tools, logistics (identifying stock items
and stock levels), reference documents.
The Bible is published during a window of time between a new product leaving Engineering
and that product becoming generally available. During this window there is an internal
release process where all departments are asked to assess their state of readiness to sell and
service the new product. Any deficiencies in being able to support the new product must then
be put right, "at least in theory", qualifies Stubbs, before the new product is shipped. All
departments must then formally declare their "Ability to Support" the new product.
Another document, the Technical Service Guide, is also generated to accompany the new
product. The Product Support group in Clearwater, with input from Stubbs, carry out a
Serviceability and Maintainability Evaluation (SMA) where,
they take a product, strip it down to its basics and rebuild it, a bit like a Haynes
Manual for a car. We look at how long it takes, what's involved in loading new
software, in changing various parts of the box, things like that, and this is all
logged in a report. And that then goes to form the basis of a document called The
Technical Service Guide which we issue to engineers, which when used in
conjunction with the manuals helps them to install and service the kit, tells them
how to take it to bits, various useful commands for diagnostics, cable diagrams,
pin-outs, a listing of the hardware and software modules, revision levels, all that
sort of thing (Stubbs).
4.3.6 Accounting for revenue
Departments accountable for sales and profit are described as Business Units. Engineering
Design Centres, Manufacturing, Sales, and Customer Support are all Business Units, each
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having a profit and loss (P&L) responsibility. This arrangement generates its own inter¬
departmental tensions and idiosyncrasies. For example Shaw, UK Sales Director, described
the situation where if he were to ask Engineering Design for some particular feature to be
included in a product, UK Sales would then be presented with a quotation for doing the work.
Shaw finds this situation ridiculous. Shaw and Engineering Design are clearly working from
different assumptions about how internal relations should be managed. Shaw is looking into
the Timeplex hierarchy for a solution to his problem, while Engineering Design seems to be
treating the relationship as a market transaction proposition.
As noted earlier, Timeplex Inc. has two main sources of income, the main one being Product
Sales. Sales performance is measured in terms of 'sales order value'. The second income
source is Customer Support, whose performance is measured in terms of contribution to
overheads. That is, the price paid by the customer for technical support minus the cost of that
support. Quite often Sales will call on Customer Support to visit a customer, perhaps to help
secure some new business or keep some old business. Customer Support will 'cross charge'
Sales for the visit, and show it as part of the Customer Support revenue. The Sales Division's
'sales order value' is unaffected by the internal 'cross charge'. In this situation Customer
Support, and therefore Timeplex, appears to have generated additional income from an
internal transaction.
Most of the Customer Support income comes from support contracts held with customers
after the initial sale of products. This is recurring income with a life of five to ten years,
depending on if and when the customer decides to update their system. Unless a customer
replaces older equipment with Timeplex products, that recurring income is lost forever, or
until the next time the customer decides to update. The initial product sale then is critical to
any recurring revenue opportunities, and may go some way toward explaining the tension
between UK Sales and Customer Support, discussed later.
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4.3.7 Management information
Managers like Oattes, UK Field Services Manager, and Humphries, Customer Response
Centre Manager, feel frustrated by what they see as severe weaknesses in the provision of
accounting and management information. For example, apart from a few specific cases, they
have little knowledge about how much revenue is generated through their departments'
efforts. They also have little idea about the costs incurred because they leave the tracking of
everything, for example overtime payments, to the accounting function. Nevertheless, every
year as part of the budgeting cycle each manager has to project an expected annual increase
in throughput and associated costs. The former they get by relying on the judgement of other
departments, such as Marketing and Professional Services. The latter they get by periodically
raking through the regular print outs, but they have no way of checking the accuracy of the
information. Furthermore, managers regard getting sensible information from the reports as
generally not a cost effective use of their time.
Humphries feels "encouraged", by his boss Hurd, to think of his department as a profit
centre. He is pleased with this but the company's accounting conventions seem to be getting
in the way. For example, the cost of sending Oattes' Field Services engineers to site costs
about £8M p.a. and generates a healthy 54% margin. Humphries argues that his remote
service engineers reduce the need for site visits, saving about £0.5M p.a., but there is no
recognition of this, for example as some form of financial credit. Indeed the Financial
Director regards Humphries' department as a cost centre.
So far the account shows a company with a dynamic and turbulent history: rapid expansion
then a fight for survival caused by the relative decline in its capabilities, and exacerbated by
technological advances and market growth by competitors. The division of labour between
Sales and Customer Support, and its accounting practices and information management
system are sources of tension and conflict. The following sections focus on how staff
understand the company's strategy, and how they see the need and scope for innovation. Do
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the tensions and conflicts already noted get in the way of strategy, or are they an integral part
of the practice of strategy in Timeplex?
4.4 STRATEGIC AIMS
4.4.1 Ascom's aims
Timeplex does not appear to provide any separate public statements about its aims and
competitive position. Ascom's A Company Profile describes the aspirations of the Group as a
whole, and each company is identified in terms of its product offering. Timeplex is described
in terms of its technologies and markets served. The implication seems to be that the
Ascom's strategy applies equally to Timeplex.
Ascom's declared strategy seems multifaceted. One statement emphasises market growth:
"further progress and growth in its core markets continues to be the group's essential
business strategy around the world". Another statement in the same document emphasises
innovation and reliability: "Ascom group's focused strategy wherever it operates,
internationally, nationally, and locally" is to:
respond to customers' needs with speed, high-level technical expertise,
innovative flair, world-wide support services and - most importantly - with
outstanding dependability (Ascom: A Company Profile, ref AUK/4/93).
Clearly for Ascom market growth strategy and technological innovation, are inter-dependent.
4.4.2 Defining Timeplex's strategy
Shaw, UK Sales Director, is critical of Timeplex's corporate strategy. According to him, the
Ascom directive to O'Connor of "growth before profit" may be fine in the old high value
networks market place but not now. He questions the degree to which the USA corporate
management understand that strategies for local markets differ from the US view of the
world. In his view they are slow to recognise that high value contracts consisting of a few
high value backbone nodes, say three or four, few sites to visit, and high margin maintenance
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contracts, represent yesterday's market. Today's market is about connecting Local Area
Networks, and Branch Networks, consisting of hundreds or thousands of low cost nodes, and
scores of sites.
Shaw is also critical of other aspects of corporate strategy. In particular separate Service and
Sales organisations; a direct selling approach in the market; the UK subsidiary having to refer
back to an Engineering Business Unit for the price that may be charged in the UK's market
place; R&D or Engineering business units performance being measured against P&L; and
cross charging.
According to Shaw the new market requires new service skills (LAN, Advanced
Technologies, remote maintenance rather than site visits) which do not currently exist in the
Timeplex organisation. A growth strategy in the new low value/high volume market means
developing partnerships with the major Carriers (BT, AT&T, MCI, Sprint). Shaw feels that
locally he can influence strategy but this does not give him the leverage required to develop
partnerships with the major national Carriers. This is the task of Timeplex Corporate, and his
ability to influence their thinking is limited. He feels frustrated that his scope for managerial
judgement is constrained. He "can't even hire another salesperson without going to a higher
authority, to corporate HR or VPWorld-wide Sales". In his view,
private backbone networks are becoming history, virtual networks from Carriers
or managed services are establishing as the norm. Service revenue from the old
Link product is falling, therefore the service revenue is at risk because Timeplex
is a very small player in the new markets. Sales must be innovative in
overcoming limitations in the product and service, and we have to be creative to
manage the new market environment (Shaw).
Today's customers are planning the replacement of their network systems around a five year
equipment life. Being late with the next generation product, or offering a product which has
no backward integration, or no migration path to other technologies (i.e. open systems
architecture), means that competitors get the new business, both in terms of product and
recurring Service revenue. In fact although Timeplex is catching up technologically, and has
some new and very good products now, the market perception remains that Timeplex
products are 'steam driven'.
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Shaw sees the corporate strategy as being product driven, and Sales and Service following
different and inconsistent strategies. Although the rhetoric is about building a business on
Support, $50M is being spent on R&D, probably most of which is going on infrastructure
costs such as better integrating the Engineering Business Units given that their activities
seem to be uncoordinated, and very little on developing the company's Service capability. On
Shaw's account corporate strategy is overly driven by Engineering Design, and the key
departments of Engineering Design, Sales, and Customer Support, all seem to be operating
independently of each other.
Shaw challenges the view that Customer Support really is trying to develop a global
Customer Support network of Customer Response Centres. From his perspective the
Customer Support internal reorganisation and redundancies is due to a preoccupation with
reducing the cost of on-site visits, and being reactive rather than progressive.
Shaw's UK sales strategy is based on matching customer wants to Service backed up with
product, because he believes in the primacy of Service, and that he has a better grasp of what
that means than the Customer Support people. This sometimes means putting in a temporary
product patch because the promised new product is late. The work of patching and
substitution is done by Service engineers and cross charged to Sales as a 'cost of sale'. This,
for Shaw, is an example of how Service seems to be profitable while Sales margins look poor
in relation, and is often used by Customer Support as evidence to support the view that
Service is the way forward for the organisation.
Davis, UK Managing Director sees strategy as "a pragmatic way of describing to a customer
why he should do business with us; as a way of doing business". For example the strategy
dialogue should focus on issues that a customer will be concerned about, like having "an
upgrade path, flexibility in what system he [sic] buys, that the technology he is buying is not
going to become obsolete [within the next five years], that he can bridge from one platform
to another". Davis prefers to talk of 'philosophy' rather than 'strategy' and is a little
dismissive of 'business plans' in the context of his current job. His job of generating sales is
a numbers game and "you don't have to be a rocket scientist" to work them out. Business
106
plans are for when you have to control not just sales, but also product development, and
support services, and he has no control over the latter two.
Strategy for Humphries is
something that is planned, something that is public, and people understand it, and
I don't think unless you understand the concepts behind it you've really got a
strategy. So part of it is the communication of what you're trying to do. Making
pronouncements that go into marketing brochures is not strategy. Richard can say
that he has three Centres around the globe but in reality [Richard doesn't have a
strategy], unless people make it happen (Humphries).
Humphries reflects on how he went about interpreting Richard's 'move with the Sun' vision;
tries to rationalise the process; and generalises about how strategy is formulated and
implemented:
Maybe it meets in the middle, maybe its something like the message comes
down, reflects off the bottom of the organisation, and then they start asking
questions to make the changes. And actually it changes, doesn't actually end up
with what you'd originally planned, because people's ideas will change things
(Humphries).
4,5 STRATEGY PROCESS
4.5.1 Little value in formal forums
In common with his colleagues Braidwood, a Customer Support engineer, feels that
"unfortunately we don't collectively discuss 'where are we going and what are we doing'".
By contrast, Smith, who describes herself as the "multinational document control person" has
been with Timeplex for about two months, and her strongest image of how the company ticks
is that people seem to "have meetings for just about everything under the sun. Everybody
seems hell bent on meetings. Everywhere I look, people always seem to be in meetings,
[especially] the higher level managers and directors".
Interestingly, Smith also thinks that one of the company's big weaknesses, and one that needs
resolving, is a lack of communication among staff. People are left to get on with it, there is
no team-work, and there is a lot of "finger pointing". She sees discontentment among staff as
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a by-product of "their managers doing too much travelling, being away from their staff and
losing touch with what is going on locally". She reconciles this view with her other
observation about people always being in meetings by questioning the value of those
meetings. Smith wonders what these managers can be discussing since no actions ever seem
to spring from them.
Humphries feels that,
we tend to be quite discrete in the way that we operate. If we have a sticking
point it is that we don't communicate enough on group issues. There is a
protectionism in there. I'm making very much my own strategy [emphasis added],
I don't have the feedback [and] we don't have a forum that says 'right where are
we going'. I might have one, Tony might have one, its very much opportunity,
'go here, go there', oh there's some business lets get that.
During the Spring of 1994 for the first time, a few UK senior staff and key people started
meeting every Friday to discuss operational issues of the previous week. Topics seem to
revolve around internal issues: the company car policy, pay, working conditions, progress on
implementing a staff development scheme, and particular difficulties that individuals want to
discuss. It seems that the initiative to hold this weekly meeting came from Hammond, the
Personnel Manager, who needed to discuss a range of topics that had a common impact
within the UK office.
Hammond too is critical of the quantity and quality of communication within the company.
This is borne out as far as her own department goes. She has only a vague appreciation of
how her peers in the USA work, even in terms of what might be regarded as core HR
activities, like appraisal processes. She has never been to the USA offices to find out how
they work. Her impression is that the only forum for discussing strategy issues seems to be at
the very apex of Timeplex, and nowhere else.
Similarly from a European perspective, the mechanisms by which Engineering Design decide
what product development projects to pursue seem ad hoc. Individuals may make requests
directly, or through the European Product Support Manager who has a formal link with the
Woodcliff Lake Engineering Design Centre. Beyond this link there seems to be no formal
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mechanism, visible to UK personnel, for assessing and prioritising potential product
development projects. There is no formal forum where UK personnel can discuss and agree
with Engineering Design what products are required for Europe.
4.5.2 A premium on individual initiative and social networks
Davis, UK Managing Director, sees his job as creating the right environment for people to
feel comfortable to challenge the existing ways; an environment of fear is not conducive to
creative thinking. He is pleased to say that the current UK working environment is producing
a sales growth of 50% pa, with productivity growing at 30%-40% pa. Having to maintain this
without increasing "head count means that you must find ways to innovate, to do things
better". Davis does not control the Customer Support staff, with whom he shares a building.
Nevertheless within the whole Timeplex UK environment individuals seems to have
significant scope to interpret, exercise and develop strategy.
Humphries does not know whether his TAC/ENMC strategy, is consistent with Richard's
strategy of 'move with the Sun', or whether it would be acceptable to him. However, this has
not prevented him implementing his ideas. For Humphries his strategy is a natural
development for his department. Meanwhile he takes soundings on the acceptability of his
implementation plans by writing to his boss Hurd, the HR Manager, and the Finance
Director, outlining his plans and associated costs. It comes as no surprise to Humphries that
weeks have passed and still no one has responded to his plans.
Humphries' view on the need to create TAC and ENMC seems to have been shaped by
various forces, some internal and others outwith his department. As noted earlier, he and his
colleagues recognised that the range of tasks his department was handling seemed to be
expanding, and Humphries saw that a few of his engineers showed a particular talent either
for ENMC or TAC work. There was also pressure in the form of "encouragement" from his
boss to find new revenue streams. External pressure came from customers especially
financial trading houses, wanting seamless access to the financial markets in North America,
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Europe, and the Far East. They wanted global telecomms networks 24 hours every day.
According to Humphries, Richard's vision provided an "umbrella", a legitimate space for
him to realise his TAC/ENMC strategy.
Humphries recalls that the first he knew about the strategy of 'move with the Sun' was as at a
presentation and dinner for senior managers, at which Richard presented his vision. Within
the whole presentation was one slide about 'moving with the Sun'. This slide was interesting
for Humphries since it bore directly on his area of responsibility. Until that moment he knew
nothing about it. His response was to think,
that's interesting, I'll ask him about that. So it was at dinner that night, and I said
'well ..., you know ..., when, how ...'. And he said 'well ..., as soon as possible,
and you do the how'. ... I understood from our conversation how important it
was to him. It wasn't just one slide, there was a lot more behind it (Humphries).
According to Humphries, Richard did not present his 'move with the Sun' vision as a
directive, with names, dates and actions attached. It was left to individuals to take up and
interpret the vision. For his part Humphries thinks that Richard "is loose at the detail end, he
is saying 'everything', but I think he means TAC operation".
Richard's vision presented an opportunity for ambitious individuals to make an outstanding
contribution to Richard's vision and their own standing in the company. There is no intention
to construct a hierarchy of interlocking strategies and sub-strategies, all pointing to one
vision. Indeed Humphries' implementation of Richard's vision has implications that stretch
beyond Humphries' department. For example, ENMC is an innovative service that the
embryonic Professional Services might promote.
In pursuing individual initiatives, managers and engineers seem to give low priority to co¬
ordinating their actions. In setting up his department as TAC/ ENMC Humphries felt that it
"probably didn't mean any change to [my peers'] organisation". He therefore involved them
only as far as asking questions like "should [these changes] go up on the notice board?".
There seems to have been no discussion about for example: how Professional Services might
promote ENMC; how Professional Services and Sales relate since they could compete; or
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how site visits by Field Services engineers might be affected by more remote monitoring; or
whether he and his peers agreed on the significance of a TAC and ENMC split and therefore
the need for "more heads". Indeed Humphries' peers felt that he should just get on with it,
and not to seek their involvement.
While there seems to be little interest in co-ordination, individual initiative seems to draw
heavily on social networks. Cecil's job as Multinational Projects manager described later
rests on his adeptness at using social networks. Hammond acknowledges the utility of
networks as a way of working. She thinks that people thrive on networking in the informal
and unstructured Timeplex environment because rules are unclear and "they can dodge and
weave, they can dodge around the rules because the rules are hard to police, and you're trying
to police a lot of woolly rules".
There are also risks attached to networking. Hammond notes that Timeplex is full of
"constituency builders who network a lot with people and they will use that, and they will
often set rumours going because they want action". She gave as an example a mmour that
certain people were to lose their jobs. The person responsible for starting the rumour was
reported as saying that "rumours can become self-fulfilling". She would like to see more
formal processes because she believes they would reduce the scope for networking, and thus
bring more order to people's behaviour. Hammond's views are probably shaped by her
previous work experience with Marks and Spencer, which is commonly regarded as a well
organised business.
4.5.3 Flux is normal
Many interviewees describe their progress through the company as three months doing such
and such, then "Tony asked me if I would be interested in doing so and so". Six months later
another job, something else, and so on. Opportunities to display personal initiative are
everywhere, and one may change jobs two or three times in a year, progressing from
'technician' to 'manager', sometimes carrying both functions, one as 'engineer' and another
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as 'manager', as the next example shows. In Timeplex the title of manager appears to be a
negotiable part of the remuneration and reward system, more than an immovable part of the
organisational infrastructure and systems.
A new position, Escalations Manager, was recently created as a direct result of a customer
contacting the Timeplex President to complain about an on-going installation problem. The
UK Customer Support organisation does maintain a log of on-going installation problems,
but this complaint suggested that not enough was being done to progress installation
problems. Hurd as Director of European Customer Support wanted to act quickly and show
that something was being done to prevent a repeat. Over the next few days, and some brief
discussions with his managers and engineers, Hurd appointed Braidwood as Escalations
Manager, reporting directly to him. Braidwood will at the same time continue in his
designated engineering role within Multinational Projects. The escalation problem was
speedily fixed and everyone moved on. Timeplex's review resulted in the creation of another
individual responsibility, as opposed to say a rewriting of the established monitoring
procedures.
4.5.4 Local versus corporate control
During one round of cost cutting measures about two years ago, the HR function was reduced
to one person. Hammond, Personnel Manager, has been with Timeplex UK for two years,
and in her present post for the last year. She is re-introducing many of the functions of HR,
except that this time she is employing external agencies rather than employees. Agencies are
being used to manage the more "concrete" tasks of building maintenance and car fleet
management. She hopes to extend the same approach to those less easily measurable areas of
assessment and training programmes. In addition to outsourcing most of the HR function
Hammond is also trying to apply a unified corporate policy to the areas that departmental
managers currently control. Traditionally departmental managers enjoy a great deal of
autonomy across areas of training, pay scales and performance appraisal schedules, and car
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policy. She believes that by showing how she can "add value" she will win credibility from
the other managers.
Hammond's aim is "to put HR at the centre of strategy formulation and implementation", but
HR is seen by some key managers as very low status in Timeplex UK, and many regard her
as "interfering" in their areas. Her power base is regarded as unclear because she reports to
the UK Finance Director on day to day issues, and to the Vice President HR in the USA for
policy issues. The latter is known as "Atilla the Hun" for his 'hire and fire' approach, and this
seems to help business managers co-operate to some degree with Hammond. Compounding
the difficulty of her position, current pressures on resources means that she spends more time
doing mundane jobs, like booking cars in for valeting, and less time on taking part in what
she regards as more important, more strategic.
Her "personal strategy" has been to try to win little battles, like forging a unified car policy.
She thinks this is having the necessary confidence building effect and now she is trying for
bigger gains, pushing for support for an internal Investors In People (IIP) programme.1
Hammond believes that she is slowly but surely wresting control of HR tasks from the
managers. Some of her peers acknowledge her contribution, while others view her with even
more suspicion and resent her attempts to control or in any way influence their established
right to, for example, reward hard working and enterprising engineers as they see fit.
4.5.5 Inter divisional tensions and conflict
Most organisations have inter-departmental tensions and conflict, but of the three
organisations studied in this research, these tensions and conflicts seem most intense in
Timeplex; tensions seem to overshadow every discussion. Customer Support, Sales,
Manufacturing, and Engineering Design seem to come into conflict in various ways, and
there appears to be much covert political behaviour among managers. Many see their
' Investors In People is a certification programme .sponsored by the British government, to encourage companies to invest
more in staff training. Companies who pass the certification criteria may display the IIP logo.
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colleagues as being out to get as much as they can for themselves from a company that has
potential but is struggling - a struggle that in their view exists partly because of excessive self
interest. Manifestations of this exploitation include the high levels of overtime being claimed,
and the use of more expensive classes of air travel. At the same time many of the accusers
claim the same perks and benefits as a right for their hard work in helping shape the
company's survival and growth; and as an expression of their standing in the company. Many
question the competences of their peers and senior managers, citing as evidence that the
company has no long term strategy that they can see, and that the company is forever
reorganising. Others talk about leaving the company, taking their know-how with them to set
up businesses. Many of these tensions can be seen in the New Product Release process and in
the relationship between Sales and Customer Support.
New Product Release tensions
New product introductions is one area where conflict is evident. The cycle might start with
Sales making promises to customers about the availability of new products, perhaps because
sales people feel that customers want to hear that Timeplex can offer the latest solutions, and
is abreast of customers' wants. So there is pressure on Sales to make promises about new
product availability. In turn, Manufacturing and/or Engineering Design do not want to be
seen as failing in their contribution to rejuvenating the company. The pressure they
experience means that often they will release new products to the Sales organisation that the
Customer Support people regard as "half baked". Furthermore, Engineering Design are seen
by their European colleagues as designing products without listening to what the European
market requires.
The European customer may get a product which still has known software bugs, or is still in
the 'Beta' development stage,2 or appears to be designed for the American market. Customer
Support is then called on to fix any problems associated with the new product, and in the
2 Alpha and Beta are prototype stages in the company's product development procedure. The former describes in-house
product testing, and the latter is product testing done by and with the agreement of a selected customer.
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early days of a new product this can be mean heavy use of technician time on-site and
therefore high costs to Customer Support. If the initial installation problems become
protracted and the customer starts to demand that the product be removed, or wanting their
money back, or threatening to ring the President of Timeplex, then inter-departmental
accusations escalates.
Staff feel that because of Ascom's weak financial health, and Timeplex's own poor state,
there is severe pressure to get new products out and earning revenue. The recent introduction
of a new product, the TX3, highlights the pressure. New product release procedures call for
the Customer Support Group to evaluate the TX3 while it is being 'staged', meaning being
prepared for release from Manufacturing and Engineering Design. When early in 1994 two
engineers from Customer Support arrived they began to test the new product's robustness by
pulling out a couple of printed circuit boards from the back plane of the TX 3 product, while
powered up. The product specification demands that such action shall have no effect on the
product's performance. Unfortunately the product crashed as a result of the removal of the
boards. Engineering Design senior staff responded by accusing the Customer Support
engineers of being unhelpful and asked them to leave the site. No reason was given for
Engineering Design's reaction, but some speculate that Engineering Design do not want any
delays in getting the product out. Others suggest that Engineering Design and Customer
Support are working from different performance specifications.
From Hammond's perspective Timeplex is composed of "little empires" where,
People are very busy, involved in their own areas, and they don't believe in
giving out information. So Engineering go off and design these products, but
there's no two-way feedback [like] well what's the customers asking for at the
moment. This box comes out, its not even right for the European market, there's
no actual interface, there's no documentation that comes out with it, they're
allowed to just go off ..., they have their own Profit and Loss, they're not judged
on whether they talk to the Distributor or the Sales operation in the UK. They
produce the boxes that their objectives say they have to produce and out it goes
(Hammond).
Most interviewees share the view that the 'Profit and Loss' performance criteria for
Manufacturing and Engineering Design is a major source of conflict between departments
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and individuals. There is significant pressure on this group to get new products out of the
door and sales people are equally keen to see new products in the field. There appears to be a
high incidence of products leaving Manufacturing/Engineering with design faults, made
worse because new products still reach customers weeks or months late. Although there are
formal procedures for releasing new products (proto-typing, alpha, beta), these are being
compromised by the fierce financial performance criteria. Hurd believes that product
functionality and quality are not being subjected to an exhaustive range of conditions, due to
time pressure. As noted earlier, functionality is also biased to meeting the larger USA market
requirements.
The view of many staff is that since the company has been making heavy losses during the
past three or four years, making many people redundant in the process, no one wants to be
seen as responsible for holding back the company's attempts to turnaround its fortunes. There
is an ever present threat of being fired for appearing to be unhelpful. Recently the President
of Timeplex wrote to all employees reminding them that the company was not yet out of the
woods and that there was no room for complacency. Many people in the UK who felt that
they had put everything into Timeplex these last two or three years read this as "try harder or
be fired", and some of these people have left the company for other more tempting and less
threatening positions.
Product Sales versus Customer Support
Product Sales and Customer Support have separate command and control lines of
responsibility which 'meet' at the apex of the organisation under two Vice Presidents, one for
Sales and the other for Customer Support. The relationship between Sales and Support at the
local UK level means that Hurd's Support team must respond to the support requirements of
Davis' Sales team, while meeting financial performance targets guided by the world wide
Vice President of Support in the USA.
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The conflict between Sales and Customer Support seems to manifest itself in the areas of
performance measurement and managerial control. Sales performance is measured in terms
of sales value, and the commission structure appears to encourage discounting. This suggests
that remuneration rewards numbers sold and not the value of individual sales. It appears that
Sales has no responsibility for the quality of sales, for example, whether the product is fit for
purpose, and delivered on time. Sales persons' salaries have a bonus element, with many
taking home salaries where more than 30% of it is bonus. There is a very strong incentive to
sell and move on to the next sale as fast as possible, without looking back. Typically Sales
complain that Customer Support are too slow in responding, or take too long in solving
problems, or that Support fails to understand Sales' priorities.
Customer Support performance on the other hand is formally measured in terms of financial
contribution to company overheads. As noted earlier, some of Customer Support's income is
from cross charging internally for its services, for example charging Sales or Manufacturing
or Engineering for time and technical resources provided on site. Interviewees admit that
cross charging is not a value adding activity, the cost of administering the process is
unknown, and seems to be having a divisive effect. Support staff complain about the way that
Sales sell products which are not yet available and feel that Sales have a "hit and run"
approach to selling while Support always "have to come in to pick up the pieces".
Managerial control is another source of tension and conflict, certainly within the UK. The
independent hierarchies of Sales and Customer Support means that while Davis can and does
call on Customer Support, he has no control over the function, in particular its budget and
revenue generating capability. Both Sales and Customer Support managers find this
economic transactional rather than hierarchical relationship to be a strain. This does not mean
that Hurd would prefer to report to Davis. Hurd's career opportunities are better served from
the current relationship, however stressful it might be at times: the prospect of becoming the
Vice President for Customer Support is more valued than anything Davis could offer.
There is also tension surrounding the embryonic Professional Services group. This group
offers customers sophisticated remote monitoring and maintenance services. The Customer
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Support group see this as an innovative way for them to generate new revenue to boost their
income stream and "meet their numbers". Davis sees it slightly differently. He agrees on the
potential of Professional Services, but not its ownership:
one way of [generating new revenue] is Professional Services; to build added
value around what you're selling the customer, but that's got to be driven from
Sales, that's not a Service oriented ... I mean Service has got to deliver it in some
cases, but Sales are the people up front in there selling it, pitching it, and in fact
giving the customer the comfort factor ... and then that's all supported from
behind (Davis).
The three key people from Professional Services declined to be interviewed. No reason was
given, so the following observations are entirely based on comments made by staff from
other departments.
Most interviewees are able to refer to Professional Services, but few people seem able to
articulate coherently what work is done by that group. Humphries says that,
its an area that's been under a lot of criticism, because its never clear exactly
what they do. I mean I got some information I was reading last night on what
they actually do. Their function seems to be one of supporting Sales bids for new
business by packaging Timeplex's services against the requirements of a
particular customer. They feed the salesman the information he needs to do the
deal. (Humphries).
This new service seems to have emerged during the last two years as Customer Support staff,
conscious of the need to find new revenue streams, perceived an opportunity to sell
additional network management services to customers. To date Professional Services shows
promise but has yet to show profit. This department's current status seems to be in limbo, in
that there seems to be some doubt about its function and exactly where it sits in the
organisation, with Sales and Customer Support vying for control. As Braidwood noted,
there were a lot of political changes a little while ago. We used to have a
European Professional Services Manager, Willis. He reported directly into
Richard [AVP International Services], That then changed about four or five
months ago. Something broke down within the system, and Willis now reports
directly into the UK MD, Davis. So therefore the Professional Services group no
longer works outside of the UK (Braidwood).
Whatever "broke down within the system" Professional Services seems to have been broken
up geographically, with the UK element going to Davis, and the remainder staying in Hurd's
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Customer Support organisation: the mainland Europe part going to Cecil, Manager of
Multinational Projects, and the minor Distributor related element going to the Belgium based
Service Manager.
Davis is very critical of what he sees as the existence within Timeplex of two different
organisations with different motives and directions, a lack of common views about the way
forward for the organisation, what skills are required, and the way to use them, and
associated costs and investments. In his view a better arrangement would be where he as
Managing Director makes the "arbitrary decisions" than determine the actions of a combined
Product Sales and Customer Support organisation.
He is openly and actively trying to influence anyone who will listen, from the President
down, that Customer Support should be "tucked in behind Sales", rather than operating
independently. He feels that his scope for realising the full potential of the UK business
opportunity is being constrained by not being able to control Support, and to a lesser degree
having to make do with products designed more for the US market. As noted earlier, even
with this handicap he claims to be growing the UK business by 50% pa.
Davis sees his selling organisation as pushing at the frontiers of new applications, for
example in the combined WAN-LAN technology, but Service is still behind, working with
old technologies. He is critical of the perception that Service is more profitable than Sales,
because investment in R&D is being paid for by current product sales. Secondly, Service
revenue is based on products sold perhaps ten years ago, and they are barely growing their
income at 2% to 3% pa.
Some interviewees think that the division within the UK is not as serious as in the USA. For
example Stubbs, a Product Support engineer, sees the Service and Sales organisations
working together quite well in Europe, with the USA in the difficult position that the UK was
in five years ago:
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we're not too bad here in the UK, and I would say in Europe, but certainly in the
US there's the departmental towers where people don't talk. Sales is sales,
Service is service, and there's no bridges between the two. We've had that but
through a lot of hard work and talking, we now seem to work quite well. We've
got a good relationship between Sales and Service, which is the two biggest
organisations in the company (Stubbs).
The importance ofpolitical behaviour
During the period of this research there was a belief circulating that a new Marketing team,
based in Boston was being established, and that since being set up they had removed about
six Assistant Vice Presidents from the existing organisation. Hurd believed that they were
like a new broom sweeping out the old ways, that O'Connor was implementing a
reorganisation but no one, including himself, knew any details.
Given the difficulty of his position (i.e. the problem of serving two masters; one in the USA
and the other in the UK), Hurd felt that this chilling breeze was slowly coming his way.
Some months later while Hurd was on holiday with his family in Florida, he received a call
from his boss Richard (AVP International Services) summoning him to a "heart to heart"
meeting with some other senior executives. It seemed that "others in the UK" wanted Hurd
fired. He was not entirely surprised by the call, given his relationship with the UK and his
expectations of the Boston group. During a three day "heart to heart" meeting it transpired
that Davis felt frustrated at not being able to convince Timeplex's President and other senior
executives that the UK should control Customer Support. This being the situation the UK
leadership then turned to showing the Customer Support function as being ineffective,
employing various devices to undermine its credibility. Davis stressed that it was "not a
personal" attack on Hurd. It seems that by discrediting Customer Support Davis would be
able to invest in his own Customer Support team, perhaps building on his recently acquired
Professional Services team. One possible outcome of the meeting was that a new position of
Vice President Europe would be created for Davis, with Hurd reporting to him. For the time




External consultants, Booz, Allen, Hamilton carried out two studies over a six to nine month
period during late 1993 and early 1994, and thought by some to cost nearly $2M. They
surveyed customers for their views of Timeplex and its competitors, and looked across a
range of parameters, including quality of product, service, technological sophistication of
products, and price. Among other things the findings showed that customers thought
Timeplex's technology was getting out of date, service was reasonable but not outstanding,
and customers saw Product Sales and Customer Support as different organisations. Although
the Langley office has at least one copy of the full report describing Timeplex's competitive
position and recommendations for change, almost no one in the UK has seen it, though a few
have seen summary presentations of particular aspects. A few staff believe that O'Connor,
having accepted the findings of the consultants, asked them to implement its
recommendations, starting with the USA organisation. Many believe that the Boston group
referred to earlier was in fact the consultants reorganising the company.
Since about April 1994 Timeplex has been undergoing a "re-engineering" process to make
radical changes, to the services to be offered, and the way that internal departments interface
with each other, for example reforming the Product Sales and Customer Support split, more
European influence on the product design process, and a product design philosophy that
supports remote maintenance. According to Stubbs all departments will be affected as the
changes are instituted, starting with Customer Support. There are various teams or
committees co-ordinating change in specific areas. Within Customer Support for example,
there is a team consisting of five USA and three European members. Stubbs is one of the
European contingent; with Oattes representing Field Service management, and Humphries
representing the European Customer Response Centre. Stubbs is also on another team
looking at the Product Release Cycle. These representatives have been told by the USA
leadership not to discuss any of the planned changes with their work colleagues.
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One radical change will be the bringing together of Sales and Service, joined by a common
goal. Exactly how Service and Sales will be brought together is not clear; it still seems to be
evolving. One possibility is that Davis gets his way and takes control of a UK Customer
Support unit, or he might become Vice President European Sales. One planned change that is
intended to diffuse many of the conflicts between Service and Sales, is the creation of a
Central Processing Office (CPO) in the USA. The CPO team will comprise a mix of sales
and technical personnel, and will be the main interface with a customer, managing the whole
range of product sales, customer support, project management, customer education. The
activities of this new department will therefore replace the existing situation where Sales,
Service, and Professional Services each negotiate individually with the customer. Stubbs is
unsure whether there will be a CPO in Europe, but "this will be decided by the Americans in
time".
Braidwood, a colleague of Stubbs thinks that the changes are aimed at addressing those areas
where Timeplex is weak, as described in the Booz, Allen, Hamilton report. He is not a
member of the UK representative team but has no hesitation in explaining what he thinks the
changes are. Braidwood's knowledge is probably a mix of informal contact with
representatives, and a dash of his own imagination to fill in any perceived gaps. What
Braidwood does and does not know highlights the difficulty that senior executives have -
located remotely in their head office in the USA - of maintaining formal control over
information flows throughout the company. Braidwood notes that there are some
fundamental organisational changes brewing in the USA, and he imagines
this new strategy of changing all of our systems, changing our procedures to
work better for our customers is good. Its being kept fairly quiet until someone is
able to come over and give it to us, and tell us how it is, and what the
improvements have actually been in the States (Braidwood).
According to Hurd, the plan is to implement these changes first in the USA, by 1st August,
1994, followed by a European implementation that should be completed early in 1995. All
implementation meetings take place in the USA every few weeks. Stubbs feels that the output
of the initial meetings represented a good mix of ideas:
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there has been in the past a sort of them and us, the US and the world, and
through the process of re-engineering we're trying to break that down.
Traditionally in the past any organisational changes have been decided in the US,
and then forced upon you, 'this is how you'll do it', but this time round we've
been involved earlier on, we've had the chance to put in some of our ideas, and
we've got quite a few of the European ideas in (Stubbs).
After the first couple of meetings, the output of meetings seemed increasingly to reflect a bias
toward the USA. Stubbs feels that this is because the majority group is based in the USA, and
are in the larger home market, whereas the European team must return at intervals to catch up
with discussions and developments that have taken place in their absence. Interestingly,
although the team managing the formal implementation process is supposed to reflect
Timeplex's international status, the informal US network of staff seems to have substantial
influence in setting the pace and agenda for the formal process. According to Stubbs:
some [decisions] we can't do anything about because its gone beyond the end
stop, and its been decided, but the items that are on-going that we still have input
[to], then we can look at them constructively and provide input. And some of
those have actually been changed following the input provided by the Europeans,
and in other cases it hasn't. I would say in about 10-15% of them there's been no
additional input required, because they've got quite a good process in place just
through the American way of thinking (Stubbs).
Stubbs' account suggests that European contributions are not being ignored so much as being
framed within the USA members' "way of thinking". European decision choices are being
framed to some extent by American assumptions and priorities.
Accounts suggest a 'US-centric' view of the world. Braidwood and Stubbs talk about
"waiting for the Americans to decide, to give it to us" and about Europeans "having input".
Months went by before any UK staff questioned the need for the secretive nature of the
implementation process; there are no European meetings to discuss the probable changes;
there seems to be a belief that if it works in the USA it will work everywhere else; R&D will
continue to be located in the USA. During the summer of 1994 a delegation of senior US
executives, from Sales, Engineering, Manufacturing, Customer Support, visited Timeplex
UK to find out what new products they wanted. Some respondents saw this as a hollow
gesture, where the delegation would go through the motions of listening but nothing would
come of the visit. They remember similar visits in the past not producing any change.
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Writers that see the existence of groups as explained by functional theory (Fincham and
Rhodes, 1992) would expect the integration of Sales and Support to reduce conflict through
the creation of shared goals. This is certainly the expectation among interviewees. In contrast,
social identity theory (Fincham and Rhodes, 1992) suggests that such re-structuring may not
be enough because of the enduring nature of group based perceptions (the difference between
them and us), and a strong group history of conflict. Whether these changes will break down
the Sales and Customer Support divide, or diminish the individualistic and territorial
behaviour among managers and engineers, remains open to speculation.
4.5.7 Conspiracies
Most of the intended changes are known to only a few senior managers. Most UK personnel
are aware that two or three people keep disappearing off to the USA every few weeks, but
what these people talk about is unclear, a source of rumour. News about particular
organisational changes are published in the company newsletter, usually after the event.
News about forthcoming changes are shared selectively, usually with those whose jobs will
be immediately and directly affected.
It seems that attempts to keep tight control of the implementation process has resulted in
greater speculation and conspiracy theories. For example, the TAC staff in the USA and UK
have a very close working relationship and talk to each other daily in carrying out their tasks
of supporting trans-Atlantic telecommunications networks. They also share information and
speculation about what is going on within the company. In the USA some field engineers
have received phone calls offering them positions in the new order. This heightens the fear of
redundancy because as Hurd says "when field engineers meet as they do, questions like 'did
you get a call about so and so?' are bound to generate new questions and breed suspicion
when the response is negative".
Attempts to control information about the implementation of change in the UK office has
resulted in individuals having differing understanding about the changes, and this cuts across
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hierarchies. For example, Davis' understanding is that the most senior people in Timeplex
recognise that something needs to be done about integrating Sales and Customer Support. His
criticism is that the solution being implemented is restricted to the internal workings of
Customer Support, cutting cost out, rather than seeking any input from Sales. In his view the
company should be adopting the more fundamental course of merging Sales and Service.
Hammond knows nothing about the changes, but feels that "the fundamental problem is the
way we are structured, and I think there are going to be some changes from what I can pick
up". Individuals are looking for signs, speculation is rife, staff are suspicious of each other
and morale in general is lower. Apart from some specific changes already implemented, and
a common-sense notion that there is a reorganisation afoot, no one in the UK seems to know
the overall philosophy or thinking behind the re-engineering programme.
Stubbs' theory about the reason for the secrecy is that the responsible USA executives are
afraid that too much information will cause too many people to leave, many of whom will be
staff that they want to keep. According to Braidwood the USA leadership are restricting
information because they don't want people to worry. However, a scarcity of information
seems to have heightened the sense of conspiracy among staff. At all levels they seem to be
constantly looking over their shoulder, continually re-assessing their positions. Many have
heard that as part of the changes a few Assistant Vice Presidents were recently made
redundant, but no one knows the reasons surrounding the redundancies.
Some weeks into the interview schedule, Smith (technical author and document controller)
admitted that she thought this research was using the story of university research as a cover
for checking up on the Langley office. Here is someone, barely two months in the company
and already she is suspicious and sees a conspiracy.
The re-engineering programme is intended to improve Timeplex's competitive position. Part
of that improvement rests on extending the company's capabilities, as discussed below. In the
next section examples of enterprising behaviour by individuals seem to be an inherent feature




It is perhaps misleading to talk about Timeplex recovering lost market share or position. This
implies a static market and technology. Market expectations continue to move on as do
technological developments; financial services market developments continue apace and
information and communications technologies are ever changing. One seems to be shaping
the other, through a bond of spiralling market expectations and growing technological
possibilities. As noted earlier, potential customers today see Timeplex products as 'steam
driven', and possibly even a spent force in the Wide Area Networking (WAN) arena. They
are yet to establish themselves as a credible force in Local Area Networking (LAN) and
Advanced Technologies.
Corporate leaders in the USA see the future market opportunities as evolving and requiring a
fusion of WAN and LAN. Interviewees talk enthusiastically about a new product being
developed now that will again position Timeplex as a leader, but that it is not due for another
18 months. Meanwhile they must make do with Timeplex being just another competitor,
offering a range of products, some better, some worse than those of its competitors. Timeplex
UK managers recognise that the company needs to catch up and move ahead at the same
time. They think that Timeplex is probably spending significantly above the industry average
on R&D, and that such relatively high spending will depress profits or even generate losses
for the next few years until the new products emerge and are successful in the market. They
further recognise that Ascom is currently investing heavily in Timeplex, and are conscious
that that could come to a sudden end for a variety of reasons: impatience with Timeplex's
performance, continued poor Group results, or a good offer from another company for
Timeplex.
Timeplex staff would probably agree with Georghiou et. al., who observe that sustaining
competitive advantage requires continuous post-innovation improvements (see 2.5.4).
However, at the moment Timeplex managers and engineers believe that their ability to make
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a major technological leap underpins long term competitive advantage more than being able
to maintain incremental improvements. Although the original Link product has been updated
to Link Plus, the market for the Link product range and its associated recurring technical
support revenue is vanishing as it faces more sophisticated competitive solutions. The
incremental improvements of Link Plus is not seen as sufficient to put Timeplex back as
either market or technology leader. Failing to maintain investment in Timeplex's
competencies has left the company with a challenge: how to catch up in WAN technology,
and how to develop and extend its limited capabilities in LAN and Advanced Technologies.
Timeplex's managers and engineers recognise that extending their capabilities from a
familiar to an unfamiliar technology is problematic, but as something that must be embraced
to access future opportunities. So central is the need to extend capabilities that Hurd,
European Customer Support Director, has instituted a training programme with all engineers
gradually being trained in Advanced Technologies, while expertise in supporting the old Link
product is being managed out of the picture. One problem is that most sales people and
engineers are trained and experienced in eitherWAN or LAN, who according to Davis, UK
MD, "know instinctively through experience what to do with a problem". Cross training is on
going, but some people cannot make the transition. He notes that most people want to
change, but a proportion will not do so, and will leave.
The intention to develop Advanced Technologies as the way forward seems to have been
handed down from the USA executive. No one questions this as the right way ahead, but
there are mixed feelings about how the company's leadership arrived at the decision. Many
respondents believe that the management consultants advised the USA executive that the
technological way ahead was Advanced Technologies. Others say that the way ahead was
clear, and they didn't need consultants to tell them, and anyway the consultants are just
feeding back what they have learnt from Timeplex staff. The source of the initiative has
already become unclear, and so contested.
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4.6.2 Enterprise
There is a core product range, and a shared sense of what markets and technologies
Timeplex is committed to. However, in addition to this, there seems to be significant scope
for individuals or small groups to commit the company's resources to particular initiatives,
with little reference to any formal sanctioning mechanisms. This can be seen in the way
Multinational Projects work, and in particular individual initiatives.
Many companies' functions are distributed globally. For example, Head Office in France,
R&D in Italy, Production in Taiwan. Head Office, say in Paris, might request Timeplex to
carry out some work on their Taiwan offices. Multinational Projects was set up to deal with
such companies. It provides one point of contact for potential customers, and co-ordinates
Timeplex's internal communications. Multinational Projects consists of three people: a
projects co-ordinator, Braidwood as Team Leader, and Cecil as Multinational Projects
Manager.
Cecil finds ways of re configuring Timeplex's products and services to satisfy customer
requirements, or indeed to suggest a customer need. He gave an example of a recent triumph
against "the Timeplex system". A particular customer wanted some software that was not
generally available. Cecil came back into Timeplex, negotiated with Engineering,
Manufacturing, Sales, and Technical Services, to find a way of packaging a solution that
normally exists as a segment of software in one of Timeplex's products. His negotiations
involved finding new procedures for legitimising the new product, including costing,
manufacturing, technical support. According to Braidwood, Cecil's objectives are "to go
forward in creating new untapped revenue streams from Professional Services, or Network
Services as he would call them".
Another example of individual initiative discussed earlier is Humphries' development of the
ENMC unit. Humphries had complete freedom in interpreting Richard's 'move with the Sun'
vision. He sees his ENMC as both a strategy and as an innovation, and can see other areas
where ENMC can be extended. For example, diversifying into managing high volume low
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value networks, like Sainsbury's check-out stations, or as a way of enhancing a new Field
Management System.
Stubbs provides another example where the individual seems to have unfettered scope to
shape work organisation processes. He sees his job as the transfer of technical knowledge
from the Product Support groups in Clearwater to European Customer Support engineers. He
describes his role as "a funnel or channel " of two way communication between the
"knowledge base" of the Product Support groups and the Europe/Africa Service Managers.
He has no one reporting to him, nor does he share the job with anyone. Such a position seems
to ascribe to him a 'gatekeeper' role between Europe and the USA.
He sees the transfer of knowledge as more than the co-ordination and delivery of
information, as can be seen during the first time installation of a new product. For example
there are situations where something "does not seem obvious at the outset until we
experience the practical side of doing something". He adds that
we can read all the technical documentation, at that stage probably the training
courses are all new, if not non-existent. So the first couple of installations are
usually ad-hoc, we'll learn as we go along sort of thing. And then following that
installation we'd get all the points where we went wrong, what we shouldn't have
done, what we should have done, and from that we'll formulate a procedure for
the following installations. So there's a certain lack of knowledge at the outset
that's rapidly learnt (Stubbs).
He feels that in an ideal world there should be no need for the initial scramble to acquire
knowledge by trial and error. Timeplex is old enough at 25 years, with the right people,
processes and systems in place to ensure that the requisite knowledge is known in advance of
the first installation. He sees the problem of the initial scramble being due to people
accepting the situation over time, because that's the way its been for a long time. It is also
due to failed co-ordination, rather than an unavoidable part of the learning process, in his
view.
According to Stubbs, contributing to the failure to "get it right" is that Timeplex has
Engineering Centres that all work slightly differently, thereby making it impossible to attain
one standard product release process. He has taken the initiative to do something about it, and
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has "put together a few ideas, that some regard as radical" although he does not think they are
so special, and put them to a number of senior managers within the company. His aim is to
see that during the next year everyone will move to a common product release process, based
on the ISO standard. In pursuit of introducing change he has held various meetings with
managers and slowly they are beginning to see the benefit of operating to his proposed
standard procedure. This standard is now being implemented in Europe with the USA
following shortly. When these co-ordinating and procedural issues are ironed out, he believes
that the messiness of trial and error will drop out, "because the right documentation will be at
hand, and the training courses will be in place before the first installation".
In one further example, Braidwood, Customer Support engineer and Escalation Manager,
initiated and produced a Multinational Sales and Service Guide. In it he brought together in
one manual a global and comprehensive listing of all Timeplex offices, Distributors, the
products and technologies installed in their regions, contacts, and other useful information. It
took about nine months to complete. This was hailed by his colleagues as a great and useful
idea, and will be adopted by all Customer Support and Sales staff. Some customers will also
get copies. Stubbs sees this as forming the basis of a computer database using Lotus Notes.
Braidwood was not asked to create the manual, it was his own initiative. He was told that he
could do anything as long it did not cost much. In the context of Timeplex's established
practices, this work brought together, in a novel way, tacit and codified knowledge that
hitherto was held by many different people around the globe. Even before it was completed
and presented as a manual, it triggered other ideas from those who came into contact with
Braidwood's work. It has commercial impact, but one that is diffuse and difficult to measure.
It will help Customer Support and Sales staff by saving them the time previously needed to
hunt for information. Very often international telephone or fax calls requesting information
were not answered for 24 or 48 hours, or days later. It is also a useful directory of Timeplex
facilities for customers with international offices, and will encourage potential customers to
understand Timeplex's global scope. For his part Braidwood now has a more holistic and
comprehensive understanding of Timeplex's web of products, services, and support channels
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than anyone else in the company. His knowledge could have important leverage externally
with customers and internally with the development of the suggested computer database.
Indeed he is now being asked to take part in marketing presentations to potential customers.
4.7 CONCLUSIONS
This account has focused on how Ascom Timeplex's UK staff understand strategy and the
role of innovation, and what they make of their company's strategy and innovative
performance to date. What emerges is a strong sense of continual tension and often conflict
as individuals interpret and pursue their flavour of the company's strategy. Taken as a whole
the practice of strategy in Ascom Timeplex seems like 'managed chaos' (see 2.3.3). In this
company it is the personal values and preferences of individuals more than adherence to any
formally declared grand plan that shapes the practice of strategy. This differentiation of
objectives is particularly clear between Sales and Customer Support.
Everyone recognises the divide between Sales and Customer Support as a major source of
conflict, and a number of structural changes are in hand to try to remove that division and
with it the conflict. Nevertheless, the company's history is permeated with changes in
corporate ownership and reorganisations, and it remains an open question whether the current
round of restructuring will remove conflict or simply redefine it. Contributing to this sense of
continual change is an equally unstable industry. Entrepreneurial activity and technological
change within and across telecommunications, information technology, education,
entertainment, and other developing areas continue at such a pace that most people engaged
with these sectors take change for granted now.
The differentiation of values among managers and engineers in Ascom Timeplex is not due
to its leaders' inability to instil a common mission; individualist behaviour is a way of life in
this company, it is taken for granted by most staff. At all levels of the hierarchy people are
encouraged to take the initiative. Individuals seem more likely to be valued by superiors and
peers if they show a sense of enterprise rather than a readiness to look for precedent and
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follow procedure. Staff who have been with Ascom Timeplex a long time (a dozen years
seems to be a long time here!) regard the company's entrepreneurial beginnings fondly, and
most interviewees identify with that spirit. Understanding why the practice of strategy in this
company seems like managed chaos and why individualist behaviour is taken for granted





This account is drawn from interviews during the summer of 1994 with ten executives,
mostly senior, involved with shaping strategy in the Bank of Scotland. Interviewees represent
both the corporate body and the main Divisions of the Bank: Management Services, Branch
Banking, International, Card Services, Centrebank. Information was also taken from publicly
available Annual Reports and Accounts, plus notes provided by the Bank on its historical
achievements, including descriptions of its work organisation arrangements.
The story highlights the centrality of the Bank's heritage as a source of continuity; the
collective sense that strategy means 'stewardship', and the endless pursuit of efficiency gains.
It shows strategy as a largely top down affair, even though its managers commonly referred
to the Bank's way of being strategic as opportunistic and flexible.
5.2 HISTORY AND SIZE
The Bank of Scotland (BoS) can trace its roots back 300 years, to 1695, fifty years before
Bonnie Prince Charlie and his army attempted to regain the British Throne. It was the only
UK bank to be founded by an act of the Scottish Parliament, and "from these humble
beginnings grew the Scottish banking system which was to initiate much that is at the very
roots of modern banking practices today" (A BriefHistory OfScotland's First Bank, Public
Affairs Department, Form No. 1457).
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5.2.1 Size and performance
Today BoS Clearing Bank is the biggest company within the Bank of Scotland Group with
over 450 branches in Scotland, some 20 offices in the main cities of England, and offers retail
banking and clearing services to personal and business customers. Within the Group there is
also a merchant bank (British Linen Bank), a finance house (North West Securities), a
factoring company (Kellock), and a regional retail bank (Bank ofWales). The Bank also has
an international dimension. It wholly owns Countrywide Banking Corporation, New Zealand,
and in 1995 acquired 51% of the Bank of Western Australia. It is also represented in the
USA, Hong Kong, and Russia. The Group employs about 15,000 people world-wide.
The Group's profitability has shown a steady improvement since 1990. Group income is
measured in terms of interest and dividends, fees, and commissions. For 1994 the Net
Operating Income amounted to approximately £1.14bn, and a Profit Before Tax of about
£269m (1994 Report and Accounts). Pre-tax profits represent a 114% increase on 1993
(£125m), with most Divisions showing growth. In particular BoS has been a major factor in
the Group's growth. The Bank of Scotland's contribution to Group profits in 1994 rose from
£75m to £168m, amounting to about 62% of the Group's Profit Before Tax.
The focus of this account is the Bank of Scotland Clearing Bank, which comprises six
Divisions (Fig. 5.1). First is UK Banking, which is the biggest Division. It is divided into
three businesses: East Scotland, West Scotland, and England. The other Operating Divisions
are: Treasury Services (actually a wholly owned subsidiary), Card Services, Personal
Financial Services, Centrebank, International. Supporting these independent businesses are
four central organisations; Accounting & Finance, Compliance & Legal Services,























Fig. 5.1: Bank ofScotland Clearing Bank structure (June 1994)5
Personnel & Property
5.2.2 Tradition
The Bank's staff give the impression of feeling proud and respectful of its long history,
traditions, and conservative values. There is a sense of continuity with employees drawing
comfort and a sense of identity from the Bank's heritage. For example, for the last 300 years
the Group's Chairman has been known internally as the 'Governor'. Bank staff still
affectionately refers to the holder of this title, currently also the Group Chief Executive as
'the Governor'. Staff see themselves as stewards of the Bank, with responsibility for further
developing and strengthening an old and valuable heirloom to the next generation of staff. At
l In February 1996 the Governor and Group CEO positions were split, with the latter reporting to the Governor.
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the same time many managers share a belief in the Bank being at the frontier of banking
innovations, and that the Bank encourages and supports 'bottom up' innovative business
development proposals among employees.
The Bank's head office has always been in Edinburgh and quite early in its history the Bank
built its current head office on a prominent site in the centre of Edinburgh. These beautiful
offices seem to offer concrete evidence of the Bank's history and conservative values. While
many organisations' head offices are remote from their customers, the Bank's head office
continues to be operational through the provision of counter services on the ground floor, and
offices for the Bank's most senior executives above. Anyone entering the building cannot
help noticing the wood panelling decor; there is a feeling of entering a stately home.
Executives enjoy stately offices, surrounded by 18th and 19th century style decor and
antiques. Browning, General Manager of Accounting and Finance, and a senior executive of
the Bank is based here. His office is a very pleasant working environment, spacious,
tastefully furnished and decorated, and functional without seeming utilitarian. Browning's
visitors are treated with a certain amount of ceremony, with tea and biscuits served in fine
china tableware around an occasional table, away from his antique style desk.
Those working in the head office argue that such an environment gives customers a positive
image of the Bank. This building does embody so much that is the Bank: its longevity; its
sense of preservation and maturity; a sense that whatever else may change, the Bank has not
lost its roots, nor its close links with the community.
In contrast to the palatial surroundings of the head office, meetings with Project Managers in
the Management Services Division and many levels down the hierarchy take place in very
different surroundings. The atmosphere and facilities are very utilitarian with meetings being




5.3.1 Corporate governance and managerial control
The Bank's organisational structure and managerial control practices have developed in ways
that reflect its history, while meeting contemporary demands for more transparency and
accountability at the top layers of management. Indeed, since 1994 the Bank's Annual Report
and Accounts stresses that it has not only met but exceeds the recommendations of the
Cadbury code for Corporate Governance.
Unlike many companies across whole industries today, there has been no de-layering or
flattening of hierarchy here. Indeed, in 1981 the Bank introduced an additional layer of
control, by forming the Management Board directly beneath the Main Board. The 1993
Report and Accounts dedicate three pages to describing how the Bank's top two layers are
organised, and how its executive leaders make decisions. It notes that Directors' interests
have been published for many years; that "decisions are not taken hurriedly and all members
subject themselves to the discipline of cross-questioning by their peers" (Annual Report and
Accounts, 1993: 16).
The same Report gives the frequency ofManagement Board meetings (fortnightly), noting
that its detailed minutes are circulated, and to whom (the main Board). It further notes that
lending authority increases with seniority; that an important role of the Main Board is to
constantly check conclusions reached by the Management Board; and that "strategic
decisions are taken by the Main Board only after careful consideration, on the
recommendation of the Management Board" (Annual Report and Accounts, 1993: 16).
The spelling out of executive decision making procedures in this way, supported by
interviewees' descriptions, suggest various things. First, that public trust is very important to
the Bank, which is also reflected in its stated desire "to maintain its reputation for stability
and integrity" (Report and Accounts, 1994: Corporate Aims). Second, that the Bank's
executive wants very much to be seen to be in control of the Bank and its relationships with
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outside agencies. Third that it is scrupulously fair in its dealings with everyone, measuring its
performance against and exceeding legal requirements. Fourth, by publishing these details
the Bank hopes to provide transparency and legitimacy for its decision making at executive
levels.
The organisational structure provides a tiered and clearly defined career structure. Below the
Governor in descending rank are; two Deputy Governors, Group Chief Executive, Treasurer,
General Manager, Divisional General Manager, Assistant General Manager. This top tier is
the Executive. Below this tier are the Managers: Senior Manager, Manager, Project Manager.
Below this second group are Supervisors and Clerks. Staff are encouraged to pursue
professional banking and other qualifications, and more than 30% of staff are professionally
qualified having studied a five year course with the Chartered Institute of Bankers in
Scotland. This professionalisation process is common across the banking community and
probably leads to a high level of homogeneity of banking practices among competitors; it
goes some way to explaining why product differentiation is extremely difficult. The scope for
managerial control is prescribed by one's place within the formal hierarchy (Fig. 5.1), and is
shaped by professional banking practices. For example, as mentioned above, lending levels
rise with authority levels. Within the UK Banking Division, loans and credit, and deposit
taking, are managed as separate business units.
This hierarchy of control coexists with an espoused belief in "empowerment":
The word 'empowerment' neatly encapsulates many of the changes that we have
carried through in the past few years. Within the Clearing Bank this theme also
lies comfortably alongside our stated policy that wherever possible decisions
should be made locally in the community to which those decisions relate (Bruce
Pattullo, ChiefExecutive, 1994 Report and Accounts, pp.-10).
It may seem incongruous that the Bank has not only introduced another layer of managerial
decision making (The Management Board), but also claims to have empowered staff.
Browning argues that the Management Board, consisting of executives, was created "to
empower" the executives, whereas the main Board is largely non-executive. To what extent
more junior staff do regard themselves as being empowered is another question. The fashion
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of stripping out layers of managerial control, as part of the empowerment claims made by
many organisations is not embraced in the Bank's approach.
Inter Divisional comparison suggests that while individual Divisions have differing roles and
structures, they share the same overriding concern for creating competitive advantage
through continuous improvements in work organisation. This concern is common to UK
Banking, the Card Services Division, Centrebank, the International Division, and the
Management Services Division. Card Services Division is a good example of the extent of
concern for efficiency and process management. Management Services Division, the IT and
systems resource of the Bank, provides a good example of the layering of managerial control.
The Management Services example also shows the persistence of established work
organisation practices and the challenges that such practices present to new ways of working.
5.3.2 Card Services Division
Following the Bank's commitment to credit cards it had chosen to use Barclaycard's credit
card processing facility. When in the early 1980s Barclaycard announced that it no longer
wanted to process competitors' cards, the Bank was faced with another strategic choice:2 find
another card processing bureau; drop their credit card altogether; or create its own processing
capability. With only 300,000 of its own cards to process, investing in an in-house processing
operation at first seemed a non starter.
The Bank's executive not only decided to invest in a card processing technology, but went
further by committing itself to attracting additional card processing business from other card
operators. According to Brobbel, Divisional General Manager, the Bank wanted a card
processing operation that would be profitable. Perhaps another influence on the decision to
invest in card processing came from a learning experience during the 1970s, when the Bank
reversed its decision not to invest in Automated Teller Machines (ATM) technology. Brobbel
2 Some say that the Bank decided to pull out from the Barclaycard contract.
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started the Card Services Division (CSD) in 1985 with a clean sheet, invested in the latest
card processing technologies available, and pursued market share to pay for the investment.3
Over the next ten years CSD grew into a substantial business, with seven departments
covering three floors of a purpose built building, located in a business park in Dunfermline,
Fife. By 1994 CSD was processing 1.7M cards per annum, a five fold increase since its start
up almost ten years previously. McLean, the Deputy Manager of Administration estimates
that CSD processes approximately £9M per day in the form of cheques. CSD handles
accounts for the Halifax and National & Provincial (N&P), though the latter has just decided
to take its processing business to a competitor, FDR, and will manage some of the customer
services from its own Bradford Offices. Apparently N&P feels that they can manage the
processing of their own cards more cheaply than CSD. Card processing is a very competitive
business, where profitability is largely driven by processing efficiency. Brobbel is therefore
always looking for ways to increase throughput speed.
Approximately 16% of CSD's turnover is accounted for by the new (six months old in June
1994) automatic telephone payment system. Under this new payment system customers can
dial a number and be led through a menu of payment options by pressing various keys on
their telephone, the whole transaction being carried out without the intervention of any Bank
staff. CSD anticipates that this portion of its turnover will increase relative to other forms of
transaction.
Within CSD, Customer Services consists of about 40 women dealing with telephone
enquiries across all of the card accounts processed by CSD. Staff should aim to process a call
within 130 seconds. Calls which are too complex to process in this time are passed to a
separate group. When transactions with customers warrant written communication, Customer
Services staff initiate the letter by drawing on a database of 300 standard letters. Most other
non standard letters are created by terminal based editing and cutting and pasting of the
standard letters.
3 Fincham et. al., (1994: 85) give an account of those early days of setting up CSD.
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The database is located remotely on the Management Services Division's mainframe at
Sighthill, Edinburgh, and printed out locally within CSD. At present all printers within CSD
are located in a remote area from the initiator. It then has to be manually delivered by a post
person to the initiator. The remote printing network is being re-configured so that in the near
future such letters will be printed out near to the initiator, available for immediate checking
and forwarding. This change is intended to reduce the delay and labour involved between
letter generation and posting.
Another group deals with delinquent payments. Delinquent payments refer to credit card
minimum payments not being received by the Bank by the due date. Delinquent payments are
automatically put into a log for chasing the day after the due date. Trained staff generate
2,000-3,000 calls a day to card holders with delinquent payment problems, and the process is
very automated. Staff sit before a screen, the customer at the head of the delinquent log is
automatically dialled; account details are automatically displayed on screen ready for the
ensuing conversation; a conversation that is guided by a script. There is a score board for
measuring the performance of staff in dealing with these problems: for example, time taken
to extract a promise from a customer to send a payment, and payment promises kept each
day.
There is also a department of about three people whose job is to measure time taken to
process work. This department is tasked with looking for ways of reducing processing time
and therefore costs; there are various schemes in development and implementation. For
example, CSD currently use machines which enable customer payment cheques and payment
slips to be read and the amount paid keyed in, one at a time and at high speed. These
machines are to be replaced by optical character recognition (OCR) machines which read the
cheques and payment slips at high speed. Keying in will then be done separately.4 This
change will allow the cheque to be sent to the Bank for clearing immediately rather than
4 Evidently OCR technology has improved because Fincham et. al., (1994: 91) report that in the early days OCR was
considered, but rejected because of its poor reading capabilities.
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being held up in processing, sometimes overnight. CSD will therefore be able to realise the
cheque value more quickly.
Brobbel feels that the culture and work organisation practices of CSD is very different from
the other Operating Divisions of the Bank. CSD started from scratch just ten years ago,
developing a highly automated "white-collar" factory (Fincham et. al., 1994: 90), refining its
own recipes based on knowledge and expertise obtained from the Barclaycard operation,
FDR (the card processing software supplier) and other bureaux, with little operational
involvement from the Bank's other Divisions. At a different level CSD's aims and practices
are very consistent with those of the Bank as a whole. CSD's everyday practice is dominated
by the pursuit of efficiency gains. Its technology and work organisation was developed by
Management Services staff who while also being distinctive in their own way also carried the
Bank's values to CSD. CSD's career structure is also taken from the Bank.
5.3.3 Management Services Division
Management Services is the Division (MSD) responsible for providing computer services to
the Bank's Operating Divisions, including R&D and more routine technical services. The
view of all interviewees is that MSD strategy should and generally does support Bank
strategy. For example, the profitability of all banking services rely heavily on achieving low
transaction processing costs. Minimising human intervention and processing time is regarded
as key to realising payment receipts.
MSD comprises three main sub-divisions of about 800 staff: Research & Development,
Systems Development, and Systems Operations. R&D develops new services for the Bank,
such as TAPS. Systems Development implements new banking services, for example
improvements to links in the Branch network. Systems Operations maintains the Bank's IT
infrastructure. Each of these areas is sub-divided. For example, Systems Development is
further sub-divided into four units: Retail Banking Systems, Departmental Systems,
Development Services, Productivity Services. Each of these in turn is further sub-divided.
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As noted earlier, positions in the hierarchy carry ascribed roles. For example, lending limits
increase with seniority. This means that each layer of the hierarchy is to some extent self-
contained, with its own sub-divisions and specialisations. Delegation can take place within
the confines of the ascribed role of each layer without upsetting the whole structure. Duffy, is
a Project Manager responsible for the design and development of Branch IT systems
architecture within the Branch Delivery Team. This Branch Delivery Team consists of 50
people, and is led by a Senior Manager. Appendix 2 shows the nesting of this specialisation
and the depth of layering of managerial responsibilities. Duffy feels that many strategic
decisions are "bottom up"; he does not feel out of control, or that he is being controlled.
While scope for individual initiative is circumscribed by one's ascribed role, some other
decisions rest entirely with the top of the hierarchy. These range from decisions about capital
investment, to revenue budgets. All strategic and non-strategic projects go through a formal
screening and financial evaluation, before any significant resources are invested in a full
scale development project. Appendix 3 outlines the stages involved in selecting development
projects. Although most projects are initiated by the Operating Divisions, a few do also start
with MSD proposals. While such appraisal schemes are intended to support strategy by
assessing the viability of alternative developments in products and banking processes, the
appraisal has also the unintended capability to shape strategy. As noted above (5.3.2), the
Bank had initially rejected investing in ATM technology because a cost-benefit analysis
suggested it would be less cost effective than continuing with teller staff. The Bank soon
reversed that decision once they saw a competitor, the Royal Bank of Scotland, gaining
market share.
The supporting IT strategy has increasingly focused on a dual philosophy of centralised
transaction processing and distributed branch accounting. Centralised transaction processing
(processing money transactions, updating customer accounts, internal personnel records, and
managing internal accounts), has been developed and refined, as the appropriate
technological means for being a low cost provider of financial services. Transactions by all
Divisions are transferred for processing to a mainframe at the MSD Sighthill location. At the
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same time distributed branch accounting aims to enable a customer to visit any BoS branch
and for the staff to be able to call up, at a terminal, a complete record of that customer's
financial details, immediately. Browning and others believe that centralised transaction
processing is more appropriate than distributed transaction processing for a low cost
producer. Indeed in anticipation of the Bank's growth and ever increasing need to process
more transactions, the room that houses the mainframe was built to accommodate
increasingly bigger computers. In fact as Duffy noted, computer processing power has
increased but the size of hardware has reduced dramatically; the room is now far larger than
it needs to be for the mainframe. However, according to Browning, no one is wedded to
centralised transaction processing as traditionally developed. Many recognise that the
processing power of microchips has reduced the need for large mainframes, and local
transaction processing would be faster and less vulnerable to disruption than remote
processing.
Business Divisions' views of their scope for competitive advantage and technological
developments are now encouraging a shift in philosophy toward distributed processing. For
example, in the Branch network according to Duffy "the resources would be located on a
Wide Area Network (WAN) rather than on a mainframe". In addition, at least one of the
Bank's business Divisions feels that since they are accountable for their Division's
performance then they should have control of their own IT resources. Some believe that local
IT capabilities could increase Divisional flexibility in responding to competitive imperatives
and opportunities. CSD for example thinks that local processing could speed up some of its
own operations. At least one Division argues that some of its needs can be better met by
external MSD competitors, and feels uncomfortable with supporting MSD overhead costs
without some form of competitive bench mark that indicates whether MSD is giving them
value for money.
Within MSD there is a debate about the implications of a strategic shift from centralised to
distributed processing. For example Miller, a Senior Manager in MSD notes that many of
those trained and experienced in centralised processing technology will feel threatened by the
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emergence of distributed processing, perhaps regarding it as a "competing technology". She
notes too that the entire "administrative support philosophy" revolves around "centralised
thinking", and that there will have to be adjustments here too.
Attempts during the last five years to develop an "open systems network computing
paradigm have fallen at various hurdles" according to Duffy. For example, on a number of
occasions network projects have been raised but then put aside or make low priority in the
face of more pressing and clearly defined project commitments. He thinks this is due to two
things: first that no one is clear about what the "new paradigm should look like", and second
that there has not been a champion to drive the issue forward. It is not clear what direction
the Bank is moving in, and will no doubt evolve over the coming years.
Clearly IT strategy and its embodiment as MSD both reflects and shapes strategic choices
open to the Divisions. Browning feels that the Bank's strategic options are less constrained
by hardware possibilities than by the need to prioritise projects, based on their "inherent
profitability, legal requirements, and the Bank's long term strategy". Richardson Deputy
General Manager of Management Services is perhaps not surprisingly, adamant that MSD
supports rather than leads the Bank's businesses. In his view the Bank's strategy is more
about "setting directions", and
strategy is more important for us in IT because we're the people who see the need
for longer term infrastructural investment to support..., but its to support a
flexible strategy, it's to support almost the anti-strategy ..., its putting in place
the flexibility to support the entrepreneurialism that will happen out there and
won't comply with some great five year plan [that] just doesn't exist.
In saying that part of MSD's job is to interpret the future needs of the business Divisions,
Richardson is also, perhaps unwittingly, acknowledging that MSD's interpretation of the




The Bank's corporate aim is
to provide a range of distinctive financial services throughout the United
Kingdom and internationally; to maintain it reputation for stability and integrity
and its long record of growth in profits; to be professional, friendly, prompt and
imaginative in its dealings with customers; to train, develop, inform, respect and
encourage staff so that they can perform an effective and fulfilling role. Through
its branch network, the Clearing Bank aims to make a particular contribution to
the cultural and economic prosperity of Scotland. (Browning, 1993 paper: 3).
As noted earlier, the 1994 Report and Accounts also state that the Bank aims "to maintain its
reputation for stability and integrity" (Corporate Statement, p.2). This concern for stability
and prudence is evidenced by the growth aims for the Bank's expansion into England.
Browning in a paper prepared for City financiers described the Bank's aims as "the opening
of a further modest number of corporate offices [in England] at the rate of some two per
annum", while acknowledging that the Bank has only about 5.5% of the UK retail banking
market.5
In outlining the Bank's aims and strategy, Browning presents strategy as a multi-faceted
guiding principle. The Bank's strategy consists of "expanding in England ... through ...
regional corporate offices; the innovative use of technology; the provision of Banking
services from a centralised operation in Edinburgh; and joint ventures" (Browning 1993
paper: 3). He also talks about the Bank aiming to be "an efficient low cost provider of
financial services" (p. 3), one of only four 'generic strategies' open to the firm in Porter's
(1985) view. In writing on competitive strategy, Porter prescribes four options: low cost
producer or differentiator, and broad or narrow market focus. In Porter's view mixing generic
strategies is a recipe for mediocrity or below average performance.6 Browning also talks
5 By 1996 the Bank's share of the UK retail banking market had increased to 7.5%.
6Porter's (1985) view that firms trying to mix generic strategies achieve mediocrity, through being 'stuck in the middle', has
become increasingly controversial because of apparently contrary examples like Sainsbury supermarket where 'good food
costs less'.
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about the Bank remaining focused on "retail banking", "community banking", "relationship
banking", some of which seems like attempts at differentiation, although Browning feels that
these different terms mean the same thing. Brobbel, General Manager of CSD, sees his
Division's competitive advantage as resting on being the lowest cost card processor and
being able to differentiate itself from other card processing businesses. For the Bank strategy
appears to have a differentiated meaning, an observation Mintzberg (1987) made in other
studies (see 2.2.2).
5.4.2 'Opportunism' and 'stewardship'
Managers talk confidently about the Bank's aims. They do not need to refer to the written
word, indeed some of them are not even sure where it is written down. Campbell, General
Manager of International Division could not remember if there was one and had to check
through the Bank's latest Annual Report and Accounts.
Many managers see the Bank as being 'opportunistic' and 'flexible' in its aims. Richardson,
Deputy Divisional General Manager ofMSD feels that strategy is more a case of having "a
selection of things that we will prioritise and re-prioritise in response to markets and
opportunities as they come along". He talks about the Bank having "focus and direction",
perhaps expressed as "corporate lending", or "retail" rather than a formally articulated
business plan or strategy. By contrast, Duffy, Project Manager in MSD sees the Bank's
proclaimed strategy of "flexibility" as "meaningless and empty". He thinks that the real
strategy is about being a low cost producer, and differentiating on quality of service. Indeed
he thinks that this is a strategy that most financial institutions follow, imposed by the
economic recession of the last few years. Furthermore differentiating on product is almost
impossible to maintain, as competitors will sooner or later catch up and or pass you. He cites
telephone banking as an example.
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In addition to 'opportunism', employees, particularly managers, see their job as one of
'stewardship', of being entrusted with some very valuable assets, which must be passed on in
better shape and without blemish to their successors:
at the centre of our culture is the recognition that the current generation of
management is being entrusted with the financial health of the Bank for the
period of time they are in office and that they should use every endeavour to
ensure that at the end of their stewardship the organisation should be passed on to
their successors, in even better health (Browning 1993 Paper).
In some respects the notion of 'stewardship' seems similar to the way public sector managers
and administrators view their role. Bank staff share a sense of responsibility and
accountability for moneys which have been entrusted to them, and which they must use
carefully. There is a concern for long term growth in capital strength, fee income, and interest
margins, underpinned by prudence and stability. It is within this context of steady and
progressive growth that short term performance, namely incremental profitability
improvements are sought.
While stewardship provides everyone with a sense of orientation, managers still recognise
that many of their strategic aims contain dilemmas, for example a focus on the short-term can
compromise long-term aims, and vice versa. They see the task of dealing with these
dilemmas as an exercise in judgement. Bruce Pattullo, Governor and Chief Executive,
articulates some potentially inhibitive dilemmas facing the Bank:
It is the task of the Main Board ... the Management Board and ... senior officials
to strike the right balance at all times. [To] resolve the problems of the day but at
the same time not lose sight of longer-term objectives; contain the growth in
expenses but continue to invest in projects with a good return; look after the
interests of loyal staff without being inhibited about restructuring where this is
necessary; be prudent in our decisions [and] not take fright when the outcome of
past decisions is not always as anticipated; be sensitive to customers'
constructive comment and criticism but not be distracted by misinformed
rhetoric; [to] think for ourselves and not get caught up in the fashion of the day
(Report and Accounts, 1993; 17).
Pattullo's statement raises many questions: What is a good return, and how long is the Bank
willing to wait for it? How does the Bank distinguish between constructive criticism and
misinformed rhetoric? The Governor is able to articulate dilemmas, but how do practitioners
strike the right balance? In section 5.3.1 above there is a glimpse of how, through the
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ascription of roles and professional training, practitioners of the Bank negotiate and shape
future events and relationships. 'Strategy process' below (5.5) also shows aspects of this
process. Meanwhile Pattullo's statement shows that managers do find the time to indulge in
some reflection.
In managing its dilemmas managers of the Bank do not appear to be lurching from one
extreme to another, such as from long term to short term concerns. Indeed, as this account
shows, the Bank has had 300 years of developing and refining the art of stewardship, its
prudence with the Bank's affairs, a sense of duty to maintain public trust, and over the long
term a reasonably stable environment. How is this stewardship maintained, and can it
accommodate innovation? The next section reviews a range of processes that shape strategy,
processes that the Bank's managers either deploy consciously or believe to be inherent to the
Bank's way of working.
5.5 STRATEGY PROCESS
5.5.1 Formal forums
Strategic choices about the Clearing Bank's future are discussed within a limited number of
committee forums. Most senior is the main Board, which is chaired by the Governor,
Pattullo. Almost all main Board members are non-executive directors, the only executives
being the Governor and Group Chief Executive. According to Browning the Main Board
meets once a month to "consider policy matters recommended to it by the Executive:
business developments, large lending proposals and other relevant business". Also reporting
to the Main Board are various Local Boards (Aberdeen, East of Scotland, West of Scotland,
and London), and committees with specific functions (International, Remuneration, Audit).
As noted earlier, one level down from the main Board is the Management Board with
responsibility for "the day-to-day affairs of the [Clearing ] Bank and the on-going
development of its business" (Browning). Like the main Board, there are various committees
with specific responsibilities reporting to the Management Board, including Capital
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Expenditure and Automation Strategy. The Management Board is chaired by Masterton, the
Bank's Treasurer and Chief General Manager.
These formal arrangements suggest decision making to be very procedural and cumbersome,
causing slow progress and a brake on creativity. It suggests top-down decisions and bottom
up information flows. According to Browning this rigidity is countered at least among the
very senior people by a few consciously determined initiatives. First, all Management Board
members attend Main Board meetings. This facilitates communication and the free flow of
developments, thoughts and actions between these two bodies. In this way proposals or ideas
affecting the long term can be juxtaposed with day to day issues and ideas.
There is also an annual three day conference, attended by the Group's executive tier. This is
typically the Governor, Deputy Governors, General Managers of the Bank, and senior
executives of the principal subsidiaries. The event is for airing ideas, updating each other on
plans and current developments, and for discussing "the strategy and policy issues of the day,
and future directions" (Browning). Issues that might affect the Bank's future include: trends
in financial services and technological developments, and broader environmental changes
that seem to be growing in significance, like the possible impacts of a European currency.
Each attendee has two tasks: first, some weeks in advance to prepare a presentation on a
subject, and second, to chair a debate on a colleague's presentation. According to Browning,
Burt is adamant that this forum is not for making decisions; care is taken not to reach
agreement on what may be seen as hasty convergence on some issue.
5.5.2 Bottom-up
The Bank did have a central strategic planning function, when that was fashionable in the late
1970s, but this was scrapped in the early 1980s. Indeed according to Brobbel of CSD, the
Bank has always had "an aversion" to writing (long term) strategic plans. This seems
uncharacteristic of a large organisation where caution and deliberation in decision making is
stressed; where stewardship is the guiding principle. However, it may reflect and support the
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'opportunistic' culture that staff believe exits within the Bank. Many managers appear to
think that strategy in the Bank emerges 'bottom-up' fashion.
Divisions are expected to make their own strategic choices, but as Campbell, General
Manager of International, and Brobbel of CSD notes, proposals need to be approved by the
Management Board and Main Board. The Management Board's approach to dealing with
Divisional proposals is much more murky than the application of codified project selection
criteria and financial hurdles. A similar relationship exists within Divisions, where
suggestions from all levels are welcome, and channelled toward Divisional senior
management for consideration.
At Card Services Division the Divisional General Manager and the two Assistant General
Managers share the top floor. On the next floor down are the six Deputy Managers' offices.
These managers are in an area clearly separated from the rest of the staff. The allocation of
space and location of personnel within the building suggests that senior managers are set
apart from their subordinates. Senior managers have much more opportunity for informal
meetings among themselves than for meeting their respective staff. Contact with their
respective departments requires greater effort to leave their office area to go to the work area
of their staff, and the amount of contact depends on the time managers spend in those work
areas. According to Colin McLean, Deputy Manager of Administration, strategy is largely
the province of the Divisional General Manager and his two Assistant General Managers.
Deputy Managers and their subordinates contribute to strategy making through their
respective hierarchies to the appropriate Assistant General Manager.
The example of CSD suggests that the scope for individual contribution to the Bank's
strategic development becomes increasingly localised lower down the hierarchy. Such
contributions may reach senior management through one of the suggestion boxes, internal
public reports or other local incentive schemes, but the hierarchy acts as an information filter,
and perhaps 'bottom-up' means two different things. One meaning describes the input to
strategy making from Supervisory and Clerical staff, and seems to be focused on localised
productivity improvement schemes. Suggestions travelling from anyone within a Division,
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go through their chain of command to the leadership of their Division. These staff are a
mixture of junior career people, and part-time staff presumed not to be seeking a career, for
example CSD's "married ladies" (Fincham et. al., 1994: 87). The work force tend to have
clearly defined tasks that also define their scope for creative and useful ideas. Indeed as
Duffy of MSD admits, even project management in MSD tightly defines engineers' scope for
innovative excursions.
Another meaning of bottom-up relates to major capital investment proposals (automation,
acquisitions, joint ventures, etc.) that are discussed in the upper levels of the management
hierarchy where the 'worker bees' have very little influence if any at all. The influence of
middle management and junior staff is perhaps further bounded by what they take for granted
as the given top-down strategy, as well as not being practised at discussing what is currently
regarded by senior management as hot strategic topics.
In principle senior management, either at Board level or Divisional level retain full control of
formal strategy development, although as has been noted by other researchers, top
management often make decisions using information filtered or selected by those with
particular expertise or positions in the hierarchy. For example MSD can and do in varying
ways define the discussions on technological issues that business Divisions engage in. In the
pursuit of efficiency gains the Bank's leadership does not rely solely on bright ideas and
experience of staff doing the work. As noted earlier (5.3.2) within CSD there are staff whose
main function is to study and measure work processes, and provide information that forms
the basis for many changes in practice.
5.5.3 Musical chairs
In 1994 Pattullo, the Bank's Chief Executive reshuffled most of the Divisional General
Managers. For example, Campbell moved from Centrebank to International, and Mitchell
went from Treasury to Centrebank. Senior managers believe that such moves generate real
scope for personal development and promotion, and helps keep them on their toes. Mitchell
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believes that "reshuffles help build relationships, trust, a broader awareness of how the Bank
functions, and the movement of new ideas". He sees the reshuffle as a way of preventing the
General Managers from becoming stale. He noted that most people in senior positions were
quite young, typically under 50. Gone were the days when seniority meant you had to be 50
plus. He certainly did not look forward to spending another 10 - 20 years at Treasury, even
though he enjoyed the high pressure life that went with it.
The reshuffle does seem set to shake up the way the Bank's Divisions work. For example
Campbell has been given the objective of broadening International's business spread, away
from being UK dominated. He plans to improve the International Division's working
practices; he sees the need for a more structured approach to strategy making than currently
exists in that Division. Both Mitchell and Campbell are aware of having to reconcile their
experience and familiarity with running a different business for the last five years, with the
peculiarities of their new responsibilities; where there are very different working practices
and assumptions about how their new business should be run.
Mitchell for example sees a major difference between his old post in Treasury and the new
life as General Manager of Centrebank. When asked to compare Treasury with Centrebank
he agreed with my suggested analogies of a helicopter and an ocean tanker. In Treasury,
decisions taken at Monday morning's 10 am meeting could be overtaken by midday because
of movements in the financial markets. His job in Treasury was to be able to respond very
quickly to market changes. In Centrebank decisions taken this week or month were unlikely
to be overtaken by events this year, possibly not even next year. Mitchell's experience of
how to run Treasury seems to give him a heightened concern for responding quickly to
market conditions and trends. While recognising that Centrebank is a different business to
Treasury Mitchell feels that Centrebank is a little too slow and unresponsive. He is looking
for ways to shake up working practices, and is more eager to see new product ideas emerge.
For the foreseeable future he may be inclined to attach more significance to short-term
movements than his predecessor.
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Major reshuffles like this describe an orderly five yearly rearrangement of the top table.
General Managers approach their new tasks with different assumptions about the best way to
run a business, with different dos and don'ts, those invisible barriers to change, including the
tendency not to test boundaries that come with the embedding of routines over time. Any
number of the General Manager's precepts are also likely to contradict or conflict with
established practice in their new domain. This bringing together of old ways and new
situations creates space for innovation; it rings of Schon's (1963) analysis of the nature of
innovation, an issue that is further discussed in sections 7.2.5 and 9..2.5.
The personal career progression of some of these managers reinforces the sense that the Bank
actively engages in providing room for personal development and setting the conditions for
new ways of thinking to emerge. Richardson of MSD has been with the Bank for over 35
years. In that time he has worked in Branch banking, data processing, internal audit, and
systems analysis. Browning started his working life with the Bank, left and worked in
teaching for some years before rejoining the Bank, where he has held various senior
management positions. Movement is not the preserve of senior managers. Supervisors and
Clerks move around too. Branch staff from UK Branch banking have moved to a Branch
Support Team within CSD, and to PhoneLine, the new telephone based banking service
temporarily resident in MSD.
However, the Bank is more than a training ground for professional development. Careers
depend on how effectively managers assimilate new capabilities and create new opportunities
for the Bank.
[The promotion] of personnel, at all levels, across divisional boundaries [helps]
to identify and test "high flyers" as to their individual capacity to grasp the
principal features of their new roles in unfamiliar areas and consequently to
reaffirm their candidacy for promotion to the most senior echelons of the Bank
(Browning, 1993 paperfor City financiers, pp. 6).
"High flyers" are those pursuing a career with the Bank, and show their commitment to the
banking profession through professional training. All managers in the Bank's executive tier
are Members or Fellows of the Chartered Institute of Bankers in Scotland. The "high flyers"
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are those who demonstrate a "tacit ability"7 to synthesise new and assimilated expertise in
ways that reinforce the Bank's professed "instinct for innovation and professionalism"
(Browning, 1993 paper: 7).
The expectation of the Bank's leadership is that individual competences, and accumulated
competences of managers in new posts, whether through reshuffles or individual movement,
will contribute to the Bank's competitive advantage and performance by overseeing novel
and profitable ideas. These changes may invite ideas that push at the boundaries of
stewardship, but they seem unlikely to overthrow that guiding principle. The Bank's history,
the top down approach to strategy, and Campbell's account of strategy development
described later, together reinforce the sense that stewardship remains a strategic point of
reference for all innovative behaviour.
5.5.4 Politics and shaping boundaries
The Boards and Executives of each company have relatively autonomous
authorities although each operates within the non-egotistical culture of the
organisation and within broad policy guidelines relative to business areas, capital
structure, dividend policy etc. (Browning, 1993 paper: 6).
In saying that the Bank has a "non-egotistical culture" Browning seems to be saying that staff
are not engaged in political games in pursuit of what he calls "self-grandiosity"; that there are
more than enough interesting opportunities for personal development without coming into
conflict with others. In Browning's view staff do not have the interest or time to spend on
"serious and destructive" in-fighting. Nevertheless, the conditions for political behaviour do
exist, and its existence is acknowledged by others. I found two situations where political
behaviour is evident.
The first, at the individual level, is connected with the reshuffle. It seems reasonable to
imagine that comparisons between individual characters would be made in private both
7 Faulkner and Senker, in their research on links between public sector research and industrial innovation found that
"research directors [see] formal qualifications as evidence of researchers' tacit ability to acquire and use knowledge in a
meaningful way, and regard this attitude of mind as a most important contribution to innovative RD&D" (1995: 202).
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before and after a reshuffle. In selecting which General Manager should manage which
Division the Bank's top three (Governor, Group Chief Executive, and Treasurer) have the
most influence. Evaluating an individual's personality and past performance at managing
interpersonal relations in itself involves making subjective judgements about an individual's
strengths and weaknesses. Once installed, peers and other colleagues are very likely to
compare the new General Manager with the outgoing one. This is evident just from
interviews with managers, some of whom jokingly asked what others had said about them.
One even ventured a very mild criticism of his predecessor's management of his Division,
but retracted it quickly as "unfair". Power and influence appears to broadly reflect the
authority structure. Any deal making or pursuit of personal interests seem to be subordinate
to a respect for the established pecking order.
The second form of political behaviour revolves around the drawing of Divisional
boundaries. Spowart, Divisional General Manager, Branch Banking, East Scotland, does
acknowledge that politics is inherent and plays an important role in a large and complex
organisation like the Bank. He suggests that the juxtaposition of Divisions with potentially
overlapping scope for development leads to "jockeying for position" and that politics "can
curtail development" of the Bank.
In particular Spowart noted that Centrebank is tasked with concentrating on developing
remote banking in England, but that it could spread its operation to Scotland, where there is a
need for telebanking. This however would lead to cannibalisation of the Scottish market as
Centrebank and the Scottish Branches would compete with each other. For this reason
Centrebank is under orders to keep its focus on England where it is doing well in any case,
and leave the domestic Branch Banking Division to develop Scotland. With this in mind
PhoneLine was being introduced as a 24 hour available extension to the Scottish Branch
network. It is configured as an extended service to Branch customers, rather than an as
extension to the existing remote banking infrastructure of Centrebank. The PhoneLine
initiative has been forced by both competitive action and internal political developments.
Externally, remote banking is well established with First Direct, Centrebank and other
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competitors, and the sector continues to grow. Indeed the Bank's domestic Branch Banking
risks losing customers to this segment of the market. Internally, there is a threat to Scottish
domestic Branch Banking as existing customers of Branch Banking could transfer their
banking arrangements to Centrebank.
PhoneLine would be interpreted and adapted differently by Centrebank and Branch Banking.
Both Spowart and his boss Masterton want PhoneLine to be a part of the Branch Banking
Division rather than see it become part of Centrebank. Spowart's view is that the Bank is first
and foremost a Scottish Branch Banking business, and Scotland is still its main market.
Developing the Scottish market should grow out of the Bank's existing Scottish
infrastructure, that is its domestic Branch Banking network. According to Spowart,
Masterton who is "the third man in the Bank" being the Deputy Treasurer, is a key player in
the Management Board's decision making, and Masterton was determined to see PhoneLine
installed as an extension to Scottish Branch Banking. The scope for interpreting the openness
of a technology, discussed in 2.6.2, suggests that Masterton is intent on adapting the
PhoneLine technology to reaffirm and redefine the boundary between Scottish domestic
Branch Banking and Centrebank. Spowart and Masterton want to have PhoneLine up and
running as soon as possible. The suitability of CSD as a location for PhoneLine was presently
being assessed by Brobbel, General Manager of CSD on behalf of the Management Board.
Spowart and Masterton want it located in CSD, not as part of CSD but to "piggy-back" on
CSD's expertise in telephone based banking services.
The Bank does not appear to be a nest of cut-throat individualists, but neither is everyone
politely giving way to everyone else. There is political behaviour, and one of its
manifestations is the reaffirmation of territorial claims between Divisions. With an eye on the
horizon Spowart also offered a personal view that CSD, Centrebank, and now PhoneLine
were sufficiently similar to consider reducing the need for three General Managers. They
could be brought together, perhaps as one remote banking Division.
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5.5.5 Probing 'policy guidelines' and 'opportunism'
Campbell's remit to develop the International Division's business presents him with the
problem of deciding what constitutes a business that fits within the Bank's broad "policy
guidelines". He knows that some of his alternatives could generate inter-Divisional tension or
conflict as with PhoneLine above. More fundamentally, developing his ideas involve the
probing of both his and his colleagues' understanding of the Bank's policy guidelines on
business development. Campbell's experience in the Bank tells him that interpreting his
scope for growing the International Division is an experience that he must share with his
colleagues. In thinking about ways to develop his business he knows that in addition to the
Bank's "guidelines" there are other unstated limits. For example, while some options fall
within 'financial services' they may still be unacceptable to the Management Board. One
guideline states that a potential acquisition should not be so big as to weaken the Bank's
financial security, nor should it be so small as to make little difference to the Bank's income
stream. Campbell's interpretation of this guideline is that there is an acquisition window of
between £100m and £500m, but adds that other managers would apply different numbers,
though probably not far away from his own.
Campbell talks of "flushing out" these unstated limits, of pushing at the invisible boundary.
He will float an idea with individual colleagues and with the Management Board team. He
then interprets the responses: unfavourable, favourable, not sure, not now, maybe next year,
and so on. In this way he develops a tacit understanding of where the acceptable avenues of
business development are.
Managers of other Divisions, in observing the progress of CSD and Centrebank, see lessons
for the development of their own businesses. The Branch Banking Division for example is
reorganising various functions of its Branches and is following CSD's automation of paper
handling. Brobbel believes that the Bank's executive sees CSD as fundamental to the Bank's
long term survival in the sense that 'distance banking' is here to stay. First Direct (phone
banking) continues to grow, and the Royal Bank's Direct Line (insurance and mortgage
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sales) is growing fast. In shaping strategy, individual Divisions seem to be learning from
each other and competitors, by reinterpreting each other's technologies and work
organisation practices in light of their own situation. Nevertheless, this juxtaposition of new
ideas in old situations, and vice versa remain guided by the principle of stewardship.
Each year the Report and Accounts present a picture of well thought out and implemented
strategy, yet interviewees talk about 'opportunism'. Their accounts suggest that both the
process and content of strategy making is shaped through discourse, practice, and is always
open to revision within the bounds of what Campbell calls "ground rules [and] unstated
prejudices". One reason for this seems to be that no matter how many procedures and
guidelines, or how well defined the role of individuals, there is still huge scope for multiple
interpretations of possible futures, such as deciding whether a particular acquisition target is
too big, too small, or in the right or wrong sector, or whether some technology is strategic or
not. In presenting, arguing, and testing particular views of the future the Bank's managers
take ownership of parts of the strategy, and indeed derive a sense of identity from their part in
shaping its process and content.
In taking control of part of the Bank's strategy Campbell sees opportunism as something of a
pretence, and an "inefficient way" to develop strategy. Campbell considers his options for
generating new earnings, and being new to the job his idea of the range of options is probably
different to his predecessor's. In reflecting on the vast range of possibilities he concluded that
in his "judgement opportunism is too inefficient" because there are more options than he
could ever assess, and anyway the Executive would veto many of those options. For example,
mortgage swaps with US banks would deplete the UK risk and increase non UK income in
one go, and so "would be a bloody good solution" Campbell thinks. Alas, he predicts that the
Branch Banking Division would take a dim view of reducing UK mortgage income.
This section has explored the Bank's strategy process, in particular the importance of formal
forums, periodic reshuffles, and opportunism. For this bank being innovative is not at odds
with good stewardship. Indeed managers are confident that their periodic reshuffling, annual
conferences, opportunism, and bottom-up processes serve to blend conservative values with
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creativity. The next section explores those managers' views about two innovation successes
(HOBS and TAPS), and some of the issues surrounding the possibility of exploiting the
concept of Affinity cards.
5.6 INNOVATION
The Bank's heritage and aims describe a frame of traditional values, a sense of hierarchy
being the natural order, and a concern for taking care of the details of today in the interests of
long term aims. It is within this context that many managers talk about the Bank as being
innovative, even the most innovative bank in the UK, although a few managers see the Bank
as no longer being at the forefront of banking innovation. Mitchell, the new General Manager
of Centrebank suggests that the Home Banking innovation (HOBS) was a one-off, an
accident, and that some people in the Bank are "still dining out on it". Interestingly,
Browning disagrees strongly with this assessment of HOBS.
In addition to HOBS and TAPS discussed below the Bank cites many innovations in its more
recent history:8 The first UK bank to introduce centralised electronic accounting in 1956, and
partnerships with the then Nottingham Building Society produced the banking innovation
'Homelink' in 1983. In the same year the Money Market Cheque Account (the first high
interest cheque account from a joint-stock clearing bank) was launched, and in 1984 the
BankSave Account.
5.6.1 HOBS
Many managers have said that the Bank's reputation for being innovative stems from HOBS
(Home and Office Banking System). Home Banking was launched in 1984 and in the
following year the Office element was added to produce HOBS. Until the late 1970s there
was an unwritten agreement between the English and Scottish banks, that neither would cross
the border. The booming North Sea oil business attracted English banks who started moving
8 Bank of Scotland Fact Sheet on Innovation, December 1989.
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north, thereby breaking the 'no competition' agreement. The Bank's reaction was to look for
ways of getting into the English market quickly. Senior managers looked around at their
resources, found a budding technology which could be used to tackle the English market
without the huge costs of setting up branches, and HOBS was thrust forward as an innovation
ahead of its time.
Given the prevailing industry view that banks need to open branches if they are serious about
a particular market, some suggested that HOBS could be seen as a low cost, low risk attempt
at getting into England. Indeed HOBS addressed two concerns of the Bank. First, the Bank
did not want to compromise its public trust, reputation for reliability and predictability, and
did not want to detach itself from good stewardship. Against this, the Bank's leadership
thought that the Bank was in danger of losing control of its competitive position in Scotland,
if some action was not taken. HOBS was an attempt to accommodate a threatening situation.
Industry commentators hailed the Bank's innovativeness, and staff and managers thought of
themselves as being part of an innovative Bank. However, this feeling seems to be wearing
off. Richardson ofManagement Services, is a little disappointed that the Bank's claim to be
the first to introduce remote banking seems to have gone from the public's memory, who
erroneously credit First Direct with that achievement.
Today very few people realise that Centrebank was seven years ahead of First Direct.
Perhaps part of the failure to recognise HOBS' place in history is that, like many radical
innovations, it was, with hindsight, initially technically crude. Accessing one's account was
more than a telephone call. One also had to connect the telephone line and a keyboard to a
television, thus turning the whole arrangement into a crude remote terminal. Remote banking
had arrived but new entrants immediately sought to differentiate themselves through
commitment to alternative 'design configurations' (Metcalfe and Gibbons, 1989): remote
telephone banking, as offered by First Direct; and remote terminal based banking, as offered
by the Bank of Scotland. The technological agenda is not given but open to competitive
interpretation and action (see 2.6.2). There have been many post innovation improvements to
HOBS. For example, the Bank now offers what looks like a normal video phone.
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Alternatively, if one has a computer and modem, the Bank can provide, or advise on, a
suitable software programme for interrogating one's designated bank accounts. Browning
says that HOBS became profitable by its third year of operation, and suspects that other
banks have been slow to copy it because it is a radical departure from conventional banking,
with all the attendant risks of failure.
5.6.2 TAPS
The Bank's managers recognise that financial success (growth in market share and asset
value, and profitability) goes to the organisation that creates or spots an opportunity; and
responds to it creatively, through the management of innovations in technology and work
organisation. Richardson of Management Services sees innovation as "a business led issue,
[involving] ... a bit of vision and lateral thinking in the business". He quotes as an example
the development of the Bank's Transcontinental Automated Payment Service (TAPS)
business, which involves the international transfer of low value payments. This business
grew out of someone in the Bank spotting an opportunity. The UK Department of Social
Security (DSS) was looking for ways to reduce the high cost of administering hundreds of
thousands of pension payments to UK citizens all over the world, where each payment was
very small. Meanwhile someone in the International Division asked MSD if there was some
way that the Bank could exploit this, perhaps by handling the distribution and administration
of these low payments, on behalf of the DSS.
The result was that in 1987 the Bank developed a payment system, and won the contract from
the DSS to deliver these low value payments world-wide. In 1989 International Division was
processing over 200,000 transactions per month, and the number continues to rise. Everyone
was a winner. The Bank found a new source of income, the DSS substantially reduced its
costs, pensioners got their money faster, and all at a lower transaction cost. The Bank has
learnt from its experience of developing a niche opportunity and has found a way to broaden
this concept. It now offers the same service to companies with similar needs. In Richardson's
view MSD's role in this example was as a technological enabler, a facilitator. In
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Richardson's terms innovation is about having "reasonably good ideas which [the Bank] has
been able to take to the market".
This example presents the Bank as being entrepreneurial, as being the first to see the
opportunity and develop the market. With HOBS the Bank perceived a competitive anomaly
rather than an opportunity, and reacted to it in an innovative and serendipitous fashion, thus
creating a new market. The 'technological' in the HOBS and TAPS 'configurations' seem to
have grown out of assimilated technological capabilities following the birth of MSD, itself
the product of the Bank reversing an earlier decision not to develop ATM technology
(Scarborough and Corbett, 1992: 148).
The examples of HOBS and TAPS suggest that technological innovation is much more than
the TAPS computer programme, or some telecommunication network. TAPS for example, is
a competitive innovation and its usefulness does not just rest with the software, but depends
on a tangle of hardware and software (computer and telecommunication systems), payment
recipients, operating institutional partners (the Bank and the DSS), operational rules
(financial transaction and data processing), and held together by the expertise needed to make
the whole sociotechnical system work. This expertise is not centrally held and managed as
some sort of grand plan but is distributed among the co-operating institutions. The
interrelationship and inseparability between the social and the technical in these examples
seem comparable to Hughes' (1983) analysis of the influences shaping the development of
national electric power networks as 'sociotechnical systems' joined as a 'seamless web' of
interactions (see 2.6.2).
5.6.3 Affinity Cards
The constant drive to improve profitability and remain competitive translates into a never
ending hunt for efficiency gains, often involving technologies and work organisation
practices that take competition to ever increasing levels of sophistication.
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Chris Brobbel, General Manager of CSD, sees 'the best way to compete in this business' as
an issue of doing something differently and better than the competition. In Brobbel's view
CSD offers a quality service, but doing something different is now an important issue
because there is very little to distinguish between the many card services available from the
various financial institutions. They may vary by £2 in terms of the annual fee or a couple of
percentage points on the interest rate but that's about it. Brobbel sees this as a position that is
unacceptable for CSD to be in.
The trend towards 'affinity cards' is seen both as a significant threat and an opportunity.
Affinity cards come into being where a financial house and a commercial organisation jointly
issue a credit card, for example, General Motors (GM) and Household Financial Corporation
(HFC), an American bank. The benefit to GM is that it lowers the barrier to the purchase of a
GM vehicle because holding a GM credit card removes the time consuming need for setting
up a financing agreement, and checking of credit ratings. GM is further able to benefit from
the professional and automated credit payment processing facilities of the financial partner.
The financial partner also expects to share the profit generated by the purchase of say a GM
vehicle, perhaps through a loan to buy the vehicle, and a charge to GM for processing each
card transaction. The financial partner further benefits from increased transaction throughput
which helps to lower unit costs, and increased market share of card transactions. CSD and
GM had been in negotiation to issue an affinity card, but GM chose to tie up with HFC.
Although CSD successfully demonstrated their credentials to GM, HFC was probably chosen
because GM (USA) are familiar with and have some form of satisfactory relationship with
HFC (USA), even though HFC is a smaller player in the UK.9
The CSD story highlights that in a competitive context organisations are not only competing
for customers. Financial success may also depend on having partners, as is suggested by the
setting up of CSD on the basis of getting third party processing contracts, and now the search
for an affinity partner. The story also reinforces that ever increasingly sophisticated
automation equipment is but one actor in a continual process of competitive innovation,
9 HFC UK has an arrangement with Living Design and possibly others.
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involving a shifting pattern of relations between hardware, the Bank staff working with the
equipment and systems (routinely raising initiatives to reduce costs/improve productivity),
the Bank's managers, customers, partners, and competitors. Competitors are an integral part
of this network both in terms of co-operative relations, and in terms of competitive pressures.
Even when the competitor is a customer the pressures remain. As mentioned earlier (5.3.2), at
least one processing account was lost because the third part decided that they would handle
their own customer enquiries, and they found a competitor to the Bank that would process
cards more cheaply.
These set backs do not make CSD managers question their strategy, rather such experiences
help to make them redouble their efforts, and to find new ways of improving productivity and
being more competitive. For them these experiences reaffirm the criticality of market share
and productivity. The search for ways to reduce processing time continues unremittingly:
reducing cheque processing and other paper handling time; reducing the time taken to
process telephone based customer enquiries; reducing the time that money is in transit.
The CSD strategy is a mixture of pursuing productivity levels and growth of market share.
Brobbel believes that there is a trade off between the two, and this can be seen in most of the
CSD competitive innovations. For example increasing throughput and increased automation
will improve productivity, and enable CSD to offer competitive processing rates to potential
users. Equally, competitive rates depend on keeping customers, and pursuit of market share
by lowering price will compromise growth in profitability. This situation is not unusual, but
the example of CSD does bring out the virtuous and vicious circle qualities of competition.
CSD manages the trade-off by extensive use of computer modelling by the planning
department where price and demand elasticities are assessed.
"Hopefully", says Richardson of MSD, "we'll keep those [good ideas] coming, good
business initiatives, and hopefully we'll find the technologies to help support them".
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5.7 CONCLUSIONS
Strategy in the Bank seems purposive yet incremental (see 2.3.2). This is not at odds with the
claims by some interviewees that the Bank's strategy is based on 'opportunism', because
logical incrementalism involves a readiness to experiment and learn, as HOBS, TAPS, and
other innovations show. Consistent with logical incrementalism senior managers in the Bank
tend to look for consensus among with their peers, though this does not normally extend to
lower ranks.
The Bank of Scotland's managers share a strong sense of stewardship, the continual pursuit
of efficiency gains reinforced over three centuries of operation. They seem to put their
concern for the Bank's well-being before self-interest, and desire that as far as possible their
actions should be above criticism from their public. These concerns add up to a way of life
for the Bank's managers, and the practice of strategy is an embodiment of these influences.
Managers also believe in the Bank's innovative capability, seeing no conflict between the
two positions of stewardship and innovative behaviour. For them conservative and prudent
financial management, and creative use of technology can and do complement each other,
and can show a long list of innovations to support this view.
Underlying the feeling of stewardship that managers share, is an assumption that they do
have control in managing the Bank's relationship with its external environment. Perhaps
critically for the Bank, the financial services environment seems sufficiently stable to allow
the Bank, its competitors, and other stakeholder groups, to take a measured approach in
assessing their options for development, and the room to change their minds if necessary. At
the same time that external environment is sufficiently unstable to remind the Bank that it
must continually hunt for efficiency improvements as well as look for novel and useful ways
of delivering financial services.
This account suggests that the practice of strategy seems to be the embodiment of an
organisation's way of life, or social reality, incorporating a range of 'taken for granted' ideas
and assumptions. Chapters 7 to 10 explores the ideas and assumptions that shape the practice
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of strategy and the scope for innovation, including why strategy may be characterised as





This chapter describes strategy practice in the Open Business School, and its relationship
with the Open University. It draws on interviews with twenty four staff, carried out during
the spring of 1994. The account is based on the views of academics and administrators both
within the Open Business School and from other units of the wider Open University. Other
sources include internal memos, plans, and public documents.
The case shows how strategy practice is shaped more through social relations among
individuals as equals than among individuals with ascribed roles within a hierarchy. The
practice of strategy is distributed among key individuals and numerous committees; a process
that is underpinned by its values of open access and equal opportunities. It also highlights the
common practice of testing as many strategic options as possible, whether through scenario
plays, or a myriad of working groups and sub-committees, before committing to a particular
course of action.
6.2 HISTORY AND SIZE
6.2.1 Size and performance
The Open Business School (OBS) is one of the Open University's Faculties and is sometimes
referred to as the School of Management, or the Business School.1 The OBS is in the
business of distance learning. It develops and delivers courses in management to students
studying at home. Teaching is done 'at a distance' via printed course material, video and
audio tapes, and assignments which students must write and be assessed on, plus some
' Some time after this study the business school changed its name to the Open University Business School.
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television programmes although these are now rare. These media are supported by some face
to face teaching which is organised on a regional basis. Regions appoint tutors who lead a
group of about fifteen students through the course; meeting with them at a local study centre
for a couple of hours every six weeks; marking their assignments at predetermined intervals
during the course, and generally being accessible to their students by telephone. Most courses
also require students to attend an intensive weekend or week long Summer School.
There are about 150 full time staff at the centre (Walton Hall), under the leadership of an
elected Dean, organised as various grades of academics, administrative staff, managers, and
business development people essentially responsible for sales and marketing. Academics,
who may be centrally or regionally based, contribute to both research and course production.
Administrators including secretaries and managers are organised around the school's main
activity of course production and delivery, including: draft preparation, editing, design,
liaison with audio visual providers, summer school planning, and examinations.
Some staff are permanently based in the Open University's (OU) 13 UK Regions. Typically
each region has a Regional Director whose team is responsible for managing the interface
between the OU's Faculties and the student body. Within this regional structure each Faculty,
except OBS, is represented by a Staff Tutor who may also contribute to course development
at the centre. The OBS is represented by a Management Education Co-ordinator
(subsequently renamed Regional Manager), one or two sales people (called Management
Development Advisors), and perhaps a promotions assistant. Across all regions there are
about 1000 part-time OBS staff, mostly tutors and student counsellors, providing local
academic support to the student population. Tutors are not permanent members of staff; they
work under short term contracts, typically one year at a time.
Turnover or fee income for 1993 was about £17m and comes from two sources. One income
stream comes directly from students or from employing organisations sponsoring their staff
on various courses. The second comes from the Higher Education Funding Council (HEFC)
which grants the OBS about £800 for each student registered each year. About 70% of the fee
income comes from sponsoring organisations. There are about 10, 000 students enrolled, and
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the school estimates its market share of all UK MBA students to be 12%, and 40% of all UK
based distance learning programmes in management education. Its growth projections
suggest that within the next two years the OBS will account for about 20% of all new UK
MBA graduates, which would make the OBS the largest producer ofMBAs in Britain after
only about ten years of operation (Source: The Open Business School In Scotland, Tutor
Newsletter, September, 1994).
Such rapid growth and market domination has been accompanied by a general growth in
demand for management education, as well as increasing competition. The higher education
sector in general has also been spurred on by government initiatives to improve the quality of
education and the range of professional development channels available to individuals. The
degree of competition that OBS is experiencing now, has never been experienced by the
other Faculties of the OU who together cater for about 70%-80% of the UK part-time
undergraduate population.
6.2.2 The scramble of the early days
The OBS grew out of an ad hoc Open University unit, the Centre for Continuing Education
(CCE). Although the school formally became a faculty in 1988, it had already been operating
for about four years, experimenting and producing short courses, under the leadership of
Lund, an ex RAF management development expert. According to Masterton, School
Secretary (like a Company Secretary), the Open University Senate gave political support to
the development of courses as long as the Continuing Education team could find financial
support from outside the University. The CCE were able to raise enough sponsorship money
and the first course, The Effective Manager was produced in 1983.
When the school formally achieved status as the Faculty of Management a new post of Dean
was created, and Professor Thomson was recruited from Glasgow University. According to
Salaman, a central academic who chaired the first course on personnel management and
training, Thomson's primary goal for OBS was "to locate it institutionally". This involved
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cementing links with the many bodies "out there" like Management Charter Initiative (MCI),
NVQ, HEFC, and representatives of the professions like the British Institute of Management
(BIM). At the same time Thomson worked within OBS to rapidly expand both new courses
and student numbers. The OBS seemed to be pushing at a market that was expanding as fast
as they could push. Even more courses had to be produced to make sure that there were
options available for those already in the system. As Salaman commented, "there was a war
out there, we had to get the stuff out, we weren't too worried about how efficient we were".
Staff recruitment had less to do with building academic excellence and more to do with
building market position. One had a better chance of being recruited to OBS on the claim of
expertise in teaching and management experience than publications record or the capacity to
do research. Within this "customer is king" culture, management research was a luxury.
These priorities were very much in keeping with Thomson's view that management
professionalism and competencies in Britain were very poor at all levels. He felt that the OBS
was very well placed to address those weaknesses. As a leading public figure in some of the
institutions with which he sought to cement links (he was Chairman of the Management
Charter Initiative and Chairman of The British Academy of Management), he wasted no
opportunity in spreading the word about the low level of management education and the
OBS's ability to make an impact there. Staff spoke of the OBS organisation being stretched
to breaking point as more courses were demanded, student numbers escalated, and more
writers recruited. Along with this growth in the UK, the OBS moved into continental Europe,
promoting its courses from Portugal to Russia.
All interviewees expressed the view that, under Thomson, OBS staff experienced such a
whirlwind of change and activity, that systems and individuals were fast approaching a crisis.
Masterton, the School Secretary, recalls that "organisationally the place was in a mess.
Records were not being kept, not even people's holidays were being recorded". On the other
hand there is a general consensus that under Thomson the OBS went from being a minor
player to being the biggest UK business school almost overnight. Others suggest that given
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the Open University's profile, the overall rise in demand for management education and
general economic growth, the OBS's destiny was predictable.
Thomson is credited with establishing the OBS as a legitimate force in distance management
education, indeed a few like Henderson, a central academic and Deputy Director of OBS,
regard him and his predecessor Lund as "one of the few strategic thinkers in the School".
However, as Thompson approached the end of his term in office it seemed that staff were
saying 'enough is enough' and there was now a desire for change. In accordance with Open
University rules, after five years the post of Dean was put up for internal election. Asch, a
senior academic within OBS, won this election on the promise to restore order to the OBS.
Asch, was one of two challengers for the post, and had been with the OBS for about seven
years during which he successfully chaired the introduction of a new course to add to the
MBA portfolio. Salaman recalls that the election carried overtones of a fight between "the
forces of good and evil, the dark days of old and the promise of light in the future".
Thomson's term came to an end and Asch became Dean around April 1993.
6.3 WORK ORGANISATION
6.3.1 Bringing order
Following his election to the position of Dean, Asch initiated changes to the OBS
management structure as a first step to keeping his election promises: to make decision
making more transparent and democratic; to curb the existing expansionist strategy; to put
more emphasis on building up the OBS research rating; and to do something to accommodate
the career aspirations of academics.
During the first few months of Asch's term of office, the senior management structure was
reorganised into two parallel and interwoven decision making tracks, one based on
committees (see appendix 4) and the other on a management hierarchy (see appendix 5). The
committee structure consists of five formal reporting Boards, all reporting to a School Board
which the Dean chairs: the Academic Board, Business Development Board, Finance, Staffing
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& Resources Board, Presentation Board, OBS Management Committee. The second decision
making track, reporting directly to the Dean consisted of five main functions under
management control; Course Presentation, External Affairs, Company Administration,
Centres, and Research.
According to Cameron, Director of Course Presentation, the biggest changes were in "the
governance structure" with the introduction of a Presentation Board with equal status to the
Academic Board". The rationale for the elevation of Course Presentation was in recognition
of the need to explicitly create some space for the Regional staff "out there" to influence
decision making at the centre. As Cameron observes:
logically you probably don't need [both a Presentation Board and an Academic
Board] because an Academic Board ought by rights to be considering both
aspects. But because of the way this institution is structured, and the fact that the
Regions are out of sight and therefore out of mind you get a wonderfully isolated
view of the world from your ivory tower here. We felt that at least until we
changed peoples' perceptions sufficiently, we needed to have a Board with that
status; that would have to approve course proposals; that would actually be
charged with looking at all these presentation aspects specifically so that they
don't fall off the bottom of the agenda of the other Board (Cameron).
Many of these changes at the Centre rippled throughout the OU and its Regions. For
example, OBS took full responsibility for its own marketing, rather than continue to use the
central OU resource of Business Development and Marketing (BDMO). With the creation of
External Affairs (a sales and marketing function), Management Education Co-ordinators
(MEC) moved from BDMO to OBS. Later another layer of management was introduced
between MECs and the centre.
6.3.2 More research and career planning
Asch thinks the OBS has a severe imbalance between teaching and research which needs to
be corrected, and that the reputation of the school rests on being excellent in both course
production (teaching) and research. Consequently five new posts were created and filled by
new academics with a strong research background. At the same time, under the leadership of
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the Director of Research, Professor Pugh,2 seven research groups were created: International
Management Research, Strategic Management, Human Resource and Change Management,
Distance Learning in Management Education, Finance and Accounting, Small and Medium-
sized Enterprise, Voluntary Sector Management, Information Management, Management
History.
The Research Groups are expected to contribute to OBS teaching activities. Indeed Pugh sees
ample scope for developing links between research and distance teaching:
because of the nature of the Open University distance learning methods, research
results can readily be incorporated in the written material which forms the basis
of our teaching. This is an important output of our research work (BAM News,
No. 1, 1994).
Also initiated at about the time that Asch took office was a career development structure
considered to be appropriate to the peculiar nature of the OBS academic collegiate
environment. The problem was that in the hustle and bustle of course writing and research,
academics' contributions were not being formally acknowledged, and this could affect their
career development. Academics did not want to surrender their ability to pursue independent
interests, but at the same time wanted to feel that there was a mechanism for career review
and promotion.
Thus five 'Centres' were created, each electing its own Centre head or manager, covering a
number of broad churches: Comparative Management, Development and Financial
Management of Organisations, Human Resources and Change Management, Information and
Innovation, and Strategy and Policy. Individual academics and administrators were strongly
encouraged by Asch to choose one of the Centres as a home where like minded people could
share ideas, publish papers, hold seminars, and generally treat their Centre as a resource. At
regular periods the Centre head would sit down with each academic to discuss career aims,
including planned or proposed research activity, and course writing commitments.
2 At the time of this research, Professor Derek Pugh was in the process of retiring. He has been with the school since 1988
and there is some concern internally that Derek Pugh's reputation as a sort of Elder Statesman of organisational research will




At the heart of the OU and the OBS is a belief in 'open access' and equal opportunity for all;
a belief that it has a mandate to enrich the lives of ordinary people. Staff see the OU as being
eminently qualified to bring higher education to the populace. The Open University Strategic
Planning and Resources Committee (SPRC) Academic Board, Plans for Change, 1994-2003
opens with a statement of the Open University's "vision":
The Open University's ideals and impact have captured the imagination of the
20th century world. Its ideas and innovations will now lead higher education into
the 21st century. Academic vitality and quality teaching will harness evolving
information technology to provide convenient and cost-effective courses that will
empower an increasing diversity of people to lead fuller lives.
The SPRC goes on to describe the Open University's "philosophy and values". At the core of
this philosophy are a number themes: openness, supported open learning, research, quality in
teaching and research, breadth of course choice, equal opportunities, and co-operation for
mutual benefit. "Openness" is described in some detail, and defined in relation to a variety of
issues: people, places, methods, ideas.
Within this broad direction the Open Business School's mission include the provision of
"high quality management education and development education to large numbers of
managers" (School ofManagement mission statement 1994-98). Appendix 6 shows the OBS
mission and priorities. OBS differentiates itself from its competitors through claims of open
access, practical relevance, and the quality of its teaching material. OBS is also beginning to
tell multinational companies that the OBS is accessible internationally, and at a uniformly
high standard.
6.4.2 Promoting strategic thinking
Peters, OU Pro Vice Chancellor for Strategic Planning sees his job as being to "promote
strategic thinking and the articulation of our strategy". His aim is to get the University to be
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more aware of its own implicit strategy, and to articulate that. To this end he produced the
University's first Strategic Plan, consisting of a mission and eight "strategic aims" in which
he "tried to get everyone in the University to come to some agreement about what it was that
we held in common, what our values were, what our philosophy was, to try and get
something that everybody signed up to" (see appendix 7).
He is the first to admit that being able to articulate a Strategic Plan does not mean you have a
strategy, but feels that the process of putting one together makes those involved more aware
and more clear about "working to a common script". He also noted that the process brings
together people who probably do not meet normally, and which highlighted how little
individuals know about other parts of the University.
According to Peters the production of this plan has encouraged other parts of the University
to put together local Strategic Plans that fit within the University's overarching Strategic
Plan. He also facilitated the production of a Development Plan in which the University's
"Senior Team" and budget holders contributed their views about the key issues, themes for
change within the University, and priorities for the next five years.
6.4.3 Defining the OBS strategy
Asch describes the OBS strategy as "positioning", achieving a position that reflects "quality
in both teaching and research". Others describe the OBS strategy as "consolidation":
stopping Thomson's expansionist scramble and "taking time out" to put in place organisation
systems and decision making processes; of replacing chaotic growth with ordered
development. Yet others see the OBS strategy as expanding across Europe. They see a
strategy of ordered expansion across the whole of Europe, involving a carefully considered
plan for each country. Whether consolidation or an ordered expansion into Europe, the OBS
did start to rethink its approach to continental Europe, especially where low student numbers
did not appear to justify the high cost of support, such as Greece and Italy. In re-evaluating
its position vis-a-vis some of these markets the OBS leadership began to appreciate that
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many of the assumptions that underpin distance learning in the UK are not necessarily
appropriate in other European countries. The OBS would have to tailor its approach for each
national market.
Some staff within and outwith the OBS see the strategy debate swinging between two poles.
Thomson's rein represented one pole, defined in terms of 'the customer is always right'. Thus
strategy was about giving the customer what they want. The other pole, perhaps represented
by the OU undergraduate programme, takes the view that people don't know what they want
or need, and that it is the role of the OU and the OBS to teach them. Salaman, a central
academic sees Asch's rein as attempting to strike a balance between the two; between
developing courses that managers want, and at the same time guiding the development of
those managers.
Yet other staff see the OBS developing in an ad hoc way. Those holding this view believe
that strategy should not only be about infrastructure issues, or market development plans
within Europe. Strategy should also include critical debates on course profile and content.
One element of Asch's election manifesto was to remove unprofitable courses. Many
academic teams were asked, and agreed to, select and drop those courses from their portfolio
that seemed uneconomic. Salaman recalls that many people were shouting for the elimination
of courses with small numbers. By mid 1994, some twelve months later, no courses had been
cut. According to Salaman those demanding the elimination of courses were making the
questionable assumption that small courses were less profitable than large ones. It was quite
possible in his view that large courses could more easily find savings. This example
highlights the OBS operating on a 'recipe' that prescribes the need for large volumes to
justify courses.
Henderson, ex-Chair of the OU Institute of Educational Technology (IET), thinks that
"happenstance and personal interest" better characterises what is really going on in OBS
strategy.3 Indeed he believes that OBS is similar to the other Faculties in having
3 The Institute of Educational Technology (IET) is a unit within the Open University that supports the Faculties. Its mission
is "to improve the quality of student learning in the University" (Tim O'Shea, Chair of IET).
177
no strategy at all in the sense that you would recognise a strategy from a
commercial organisation say. I mean we've got a mission statement but I don't
think anybody really could quote it to you, or even the essence of it to you, other
than we're supposed to be the best in the business (Henderson).
Henderson is not suggesting that this situation is a failing of management, rather it reflects
how academics are "opportunistic". Henderson perceives a struggle between "wayward
academics" and those managers who want to apply order to the range and relationship
between management courses. Although Thomson managed to oversee some coherence to
the MBA and Certificate programmes, he never managed it with the Diploma in
Management, which many are still struggling to bring to order.
Strategy is about academics "falling into" a particular topic through a chance meeting, as
describes Henderson's own entry to management development in the Health Service.
I didn't plan, and the School didn't plan on my behalf to get involved with the
Health Service. I personally fell into it by accident and therefore the School got
connected to it almost for better or worse (Henderson).
In addition to being opportunistic academics are "obsessive". Henderson believes that
academics do not give up commitments even when it is clear to everyone else that the time to
move on is well past, either because the market opportunity has evaporated or was never
there. He recalls that during the late 1980s, shortly after OBS won some funding to write a
course on retail management, the British economy slumped and with it the market for the
course that he was about to write. Despite this the course was written, printed and delivered
to the warehouse. In another example,
Asch in his very early days with the School fell into the Small Business
programme. Probably Colin Grey is the only person who doesn't believe that was
a disaster, because David and I appointed him to take it on after David, because
of personal contacts with Cranfield, in particular the Professor of Small Business
at Cranfield, [managed to sell the programme to Cranfield] (Henderson).
The "obsessiveness" or strong commitment to a particular topic often helps to create a
desirable expertise that, for example, the Health Service leadership want to tap into through
some collaborative relationship. On the other hand, obsessiveness can also cause one to
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ignore the growing signs that continued investment of time and effort in, say retail
management training, is not going to be recovered because "there is no money around".
The term 'strategy' is commonly used as part of the day to day vocabulary of work. In such
discourse its content is often assumed yet staff find difficulty in articulating that content. For
example, Cameron, Director of Course Presentations, says that her responsibilities include
"anything to do with teaching strategy", but she was unable to elaborate on what that strategy
consists of "because I don't think very many courses are all that clear about it and they never
talk to each other about it anyway". However, she does recognise it when she sees it:
If for example, '883 and '885 are deciding that they don't want to have
residential schools anymore, they want to use day schools, then I think it would
be perfectly proper for me to be involved in that transition. Making sure that what
they are proposing to replace the residential with is something that the Regions
can decently deliver, and something that will be at least as effective as the
existing system (Cameron).
Clearly an inability to articulate strategic intent, or an absence of an explicit strategy, is no
barrier to strategy practice. Cameron's example also shows that although she is responsible
for Course Presentations, she shares the development and implementation of teaching
strategy with course teams.
6.5 STRATEGY PROCESS
6.5.1 Informal forums and networks
The OBS Management Committee mentioned earlier (6.3) is an informal body, consisting of
the Heads of the Academic Board, Business Development Board, Finance, Staffing &
Resources Board, and Presentation Board. The Management Committee has no decision
making function. Its members meet fortnightly and is a forum for airing ideas and discussion:
for example, we're thinking at the moment of restructuring the MBA programme,
not in terms of whether we move away from say half credits but whether we
should have more elements of the MBA as compulsory. Now, that's being
discussed in a number of other forums, in MBA committee, in School Board, ....
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School Board is a body you see that represents all parts of the school and in our
sort of business, because after all we are a business, its important that we carry
the bodies with us. (Asch).
Many questioned the role and need for a Management Committee, remembering the previous
"Dean's Team" under Thomson. While the informality of the Dean's Team meant that
decisions of any magnitude or significance could be taken quickly and 'on the hoof', the
downside was that communication with the Dean's Team was sporadic and its membership
was unclear, with consequent feelings of insecurity and frustration among those not in the
Deans "kitchen cabinet". Such a loose arrangement made it difficult for many to contribute to
decision making. It was in response to this situation that various formal decision making
committees were put in place, to reduce any abuse of power by any Dean. With the election
of Asch and the disbanding of the Dean's Team, the perceived need for formal control
mechanisms around the Dean seemed less acute, nevertheless the notion of an informal
committee did bring back bad memories.
While the Management Committee's role appears to be clear, that it is a forum for discussion
and not decision, its potential for influence is significant yet poorly understood, as Asch
freely admits. He has come to see its importance as a communicating medium to the rest of
the OBS:
I believe in getting the information out because we then get very good feedback
in. I'm not saying that we got it right, indeed we still have communication
problems, evidenced by the confusion of the role of the management committee. I
have to say I'm not always clear what the role of the management committee is
myself. I see it in very broad terms as a key communication device (Asch).
Even the notion of a "communication device" seems to carry ambiguity, as not all members
of the committee interpret the communicating opportunity in the same way, often resulting in
patchy feedback:
the second day we then held a session on competences with the differing staff
groups within the school, and what became clear then was that the
communication process from the Management Committee to all the constituent
elements of the Management Committee if you like, so the Centres, the Course
Managers, the Training Advisors, and so on and so forth, had not been consistent.
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We found some groups had spent quite a bit of time working on competences and
key result areas and so on, while other groups this was the first time they'd
discussed .... So that actually made it very clear that these processes were not
working as I'd imagined. Now, part of that is down to me, I think because of the
woolliness with which I was approaching the Management Committee (Asch).
The role of Management Committee seems to be evolving, through use and feedback. Its role
was slowly becoming more clear in the minds of staff both within and outwith the committee;
a role that was being shaped through action and interaction. Asch sees it not so much as a
"talking shop" anymore, but more as an advisory group, as a facilitator. Having reflected on
the evolving process ofManagement Committee Asch thinks that describing it as an advising
body on decision making processes also reflects his personal style of leadership. Captured in
the following quotation is a glimpse of how this advisory body helps shape strategy:
what we are trying to do now, for example, is to say OK, (Management
Committee doesn't necessarily make decisions per se, I mean it will do on
occasion because the people who are there chair Boards, School Boards consult
with Management Committee, for example.) 'OK this is what we're going to do'
having had that consultation. Now, the point is that we then target someone. So,
for example, if we are looking at say restructuring the MBA, well obviously
that's the MBA Director, who would need to address that.
So what Management Committee often does is, say, advise on a process. Now,
that's a clarification of what we've done before, and now I'm trying as chairman
of that Management Committee to say that this is actually very important, please
make sure that the Centres, the Course Managers know about it. So that
communication starts to work as a methodology for getting stuff, for example,
out to the Centres, and so at our last meeting a Centre was feeding back that it
wasn't entirely happy with some aspects of our current recruitment process,
induction into the school for instance (Asch).
Most interviewees agree that although decision making in the OU is formalised through
committees, in order to get proposals through committees it is necessary to work around
them, getting support from key players at each stage. Also "mavericks", according to Peters
Pro Vice Chancellor for Strategic Planning, recognise that "it is easier to apologise
afterwards than to get permission before hand". Another tried and tested approach is for the
project champion to bypass most of the formal process and jump in at the last stage by
lobbying, say, the Vice Chancellor to put some proposal forward. Peters takes some comfort
in noting that "system manipulators" don't always get their way, and are likely to be slowed
down by legal or financial considerations.
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6.5.2 Formal forums
Formal strategy formulation in the Open University dates back only about three years from
around 1991, when the Open University created the post of Pro Vice Chancellor for Strategic
Planning. Peters sees the Strategic Planning process evolving; integrating and locating a five
year Development Plan within a 10 year Strategic Plan at the next opportunity; and adding
ways of measuring performance of achieving the Strategic Plan. Peters sees his job as two
fold, one looking outward the other looking inward. Looking outward, he liaises with
statutory funding bodies: National UK Funding Councils and central government
departments, European Union Commission and national European funding councils.
Looking inward and like Asch, Peters also sees his role as a facilitator, working with
individuals and groups within the University to encourage people and to further develop their
thinking about what the University's future may be like. For example he initiated a range of
workshops called New Directions Workshops, where he takes a cross section of about 30
staff from the University and tries to get them to
do some visioning about what the University will be like in 10 years time, and
then to map that back to what we need to be doing in the shorter term in order to
move in that direction (Peters).
For Peters these workshops hopefully achieve two aims. One is that a wide range of staff get
to contribute to the debate about the University's future, and the other is that participants go
back into their everyday work environment with a more clear idea about the "University's
agenda", and to be able to influence at a "grass roots" level what actually changes.
In parallel with this but not driven by any OU strategic planning cycles, formal strategy
formulation in the Open Business School takes place during annual 'away days' and follow
up meetings which consolidate and generate actions. During the 1994 'away days' strategy
meeting about twenty four OBS academics, managers, sales people, and administrators
converged on the GEC Management Centre in Rugby to pour over strategic issues. During
the following two days the group divided, came together, and divided again, into different
discussion groups, covering for example strengths and weaknesses, threats and opportunities,
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sources of competitive advantage. A large part of the time was taken up discussing and
evaluating possible scenarios of the future. A lot of flip chart paper, tea and coffee was
consumed during these days, culminating in a few issues for particular individuals to go away
and investigate further. The articulation of these activities did eventually lead to a School
Plan, covering OBS mission, presentation implementation plans, marketing strategies, and
course production plans. Significantly, there seemed to be a general feeling among the
participants that the coming together to explore and share ideas in this fashion was where the
value of formal strategy formulation lay, rather than the production of a plan.
School Board meets about three times a year, and is yet another forum where individuals or
groups from anywhere in the OU may raise issues they consider to be significant either for a
Faculty or for the University. The separate Boards put forward recommendations from their
informal and formal sub-committees. Perhaps more importantly, School Board represents the
breadth of the University's interests, rather than more narrow sectional interests, and is the
final arbiter. From Asch's experience, attendancies of 80 plus is normal, although the vast
majority tend to listen and say nothing. If all staff did turn up there would be no room for
them.4
There is an obvious question about the effectiveness of such a large decision making body.
The general response from staff is that having the forum and opportunity to state one's case is
fundamental to the OU way of life. Asch and others believe that even if OBS is not on the
agenda, a representative from the Business School must be seen to be there. Sometimes there
are initiatives being considered by a group or Faculty that the whole OU body needs to be
aware of. The occasion of the OBS's involvement with the RAF was an issue that the whole
OU body needed to be made aware of:
so people would ask questions like 'do we want to be involved with the Defence
establishment?', for example. Because if we win the RAF project or tender, then
it does open the door to other work of a similar nature for management training,
with say the Navy or the Army, or other parts of that establishment. And that
does raise interesting philosophical ethical questions about whether or not the
4 The Open University has about 3500 full time staff, and 7500 part time tutors.
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School wants to do that, and of course whether or not the University wants to do
it as well!
Even if we said we did, the University might say ... I don't know, but the
University might say that maybe that's something that we don't really want to do.
So in terms of a decision as to whether or not to do the RAP, we not only had to
share what we knew with the school, but we also had to play it to the wider
University, to ensure that the Vice Chancellor, the University Secretary, other
Faculties, were aware of what was going on. Just in very broad terms for them
obviously (Asch).
Committees, as already noted, are used extensively to air, discuss, and decide on a wide
range of issues. This decision making process is public, consensual, and democratic. While
committees have veto over most decisions, in practice they lack detailed knowledge of
individual issues and this is reflected in questions being superficial or significant issues not
being raised at all. For example, at one OBS School Board meeting, lasting about two and a
half hours, much time was taken up discussing credit transfer proposals, and projected
student numbers. Little or no time was taken up discussing broad strategic issues, like the
implications for the OBS of the developments taking place within the Open University's
'resource flow model' debate, discussed below.
6.5.3 Inter group relations
Peters, Pro Vice Chancellor for OU Strategy, regards the OBS as "a force for change" and
believes that the rest of the OU will benefit "as long as the OBS can be kept within the
family". Some of the tensions between the OBS and the rest of the University are being
brought to the surface through the University's attempt to develop resource flow models; one
for teaching and one for research.
The design of resource flow models is at the centre of an internal and ongoing discourse
within the OU family about what accounting models best reflect income generation and
expenses among the University's Faculties. More fundamentally the debate is about what
internal behaviour the OU Senate would like to see being fostered, for example in attitudes to
change. There are various external forces driving the need for change, but also making any
new arrangements full of potential conflict. Externally, the government no longer funds the
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Open University directly. The OU now finds itself in competition with all the other
universities for government funding. The new Higher Education Funding Council (HEFC)
gives financial incentives to higher education bodies like OBS to take more students. This
represents income to the OBS which it wants to retain control of. Furthermore, the HEFC is
also auditing the quality of teaching of higher education establishments, and their assessment
will have an impact on funding levels for individual universities. HEFC will be assessing the
quality of OBS research provision in 1996, and a rating of at least 3 is required to attract
funds. Success in raising the OBS research rating also determines its attractiveness to other
academics, and additional sources of funds, for example from professional bodies.
O'Shea, a senior academic within the Institute of Educational Technology (IET) and member
of the OU Strategic Planning and Resources Committee, readily acknowledges that deciding
on appropriate resource flow models unavoidably draws in 'facts' and arguments to which
individual groups attach differing values. As O'Shea says "the whole area of resource flow
modelling is riven with tensions, ... and there are a lot of open questions". For example, how
should the OU fund the setting up of a new Faculty? Should there be a tax on all income
generating parts of the OU to pay for new directions, say modern languages? How much
financial slack should each Faculty be allowed so that they can experiment?
The Open University wants OBS to make a "full contribution" to the cost of corporate
facilities, such as the library, examination processing, summer school administration,
marketing support, and educational technology support. Apart from the support of a well
established administrative bureaucracy, there is also the question of assessing what economic
benefit OBS derives from the reputation of the Open University. The OBS for its part argues
that it is the only Faculty that is self financing, and which makes a positive financial
contribution to the corporate whole. While OBS controls its own direct costs, such as tutor
payments, it has little control over indirect costs. These indirect corporate expenses are a
source of tension because OBS managers believe that the OU accounting system is
antiquated and distorts "real costs", resulting in unacceptably high overhead claims against
OBS. Although OBS controls direct costs, even these can be a source of tension. For
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example, in making ad hoc payments to tutors, OBS is sensitive to complaints from other
Faculties that it is setting a dangerous precedent that the rest of the OU cannot follow.
This tension between OBS and the parent and other Faculties, also reflects the very different
markets for management development and undergraduate education. In the former, courses
sell for three times more than any undergraduate course. Relatedly, most tutors and
administrators have experienced complaining managers who expect a feel of 4-star quality at
study centres and summer schools; an expectation fuelled by their experience on short
executive courses and other business meetings, typically held in 4-star hotels or purpose built
management development centres.
While the positioning of the OBS product is competitive externally, its "market driven"
approach sits uncomfortably among the other Faculties' approach. Where OBS is run as a
business, the other Faculties take a more altruistic and missionary view, attaching much more
importance to providing high quality education at minimum cost to all comers. Not
surprisingly this translates into day to day tensions between OBS staff and regional staff, OU
support departments at Walton Hall like BDMO (Business Development and Marketing), and
student administration services.
The tension between OBS and regional staff manifests itself in local arguments, typically
revolving around questions about resources, like "who is going to pay for this temp's time?".
Many regional staff also feel that OBS has no strategy, does not know what is going on in
their region, and that these tensions are clear evidence of those failings. Until recently
BDMO was a source of tension because, according to OBS staff, it was not entirely
accountable to OBS, but this tension seems to have diminished since OBS created its own
sales and marketing function. BDMO staff for their part, attribute any misunderstanding to
OBS failing to have a clear understanding of what they wanted BDMO to do for them.
BDMO say that this weakness was evident when they were discussing projects like market
research for OBS.
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The more diffuse OU administrative systems and procedures and OBS also bump into each
other in various ways. A common source of tension is in the area of general student
administration. In this respect Asch sees the OU as failing to take account of the unique
needs of OBS:
where that buts up against us with some difficulty is that things are generally
undergraduate driven in the University, and so we have to continually remind
them that 'by the way', (because with Health and Social Work they have a
student profile similar to ours, and a course profile that in its own way is similar),
'something like a third of the Open University students are not undergraduate
students in the conventional undergraduate way' (Asch).
There are also tensions born of the autonomy that Faculties enjoy within the OU family. OBS
and the Technology Faculty are competitors; one Faculty having a bias toward technology
and the other toward general management. A certain amount of sabre rattling took place
when the Technology faculty introduced an 'MBA Technology' because OBS saw this as a
direct threat to their own MBA. While the Technology Faculty's MBA proposal followed the
correct procedures and was passed by the University Senate, Asch suggests that they got
away with this because Thomson, who was Dean at the time, did not know how to operate
the University's informal network, and was also more concerned with a different, external
issue, that of expanding into Europe. In Asch's view if that 'MBA Technology' threat were
to arise now:
the Dean of Technology would ring me up and say 'Dave, we're thinking about
this, can we talk about it?', and we'd talk about it, and I'd try and convince him
informally that its actually a bad idea. If he decided to pursue it, then you move
into something of a quasi-political mode, of flagging concerns in other parts of
the University, trying to build support against it, and one would keep the dialogue
open with Technology, because if you like, we win the debate in as much as the
MBA Technology doesn't happen that's OK, but the fact is Technology has more
votes that OBS; its a bigger faculty. One would have to keep the doors open if we
lost that. You want to create a win-win in the best way that you can, because I
don't want to lose (Asch).
Neither OBS nor the Technology Faculty want to see any overarching OU grand plan
resolving or preventing such clashes. They see the development of their respective groups as
being guided by a shared philosophy and values. How they interpret those values is a matter
for individual Faculties more than the OU Senate. Nevertheless, in general, OBS staff often
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see the OU body as a brake on their own creative output, while the more established OU
groups outside OBS, often feel that OBS is getting away with murder.
6.5.4 Intra group relations
While OBS relations with other groups produce most tension, there are also a few internal
difficulties. There is a tension between course production and course presentation. As noted
earlier, production refers to the writing and printing of course material, and presentation is its
delivery through regionally organised tutoring. Course production and presentation are
different management structures within OBS. One area of tension concerns tutor quality, a
critical area for both the OBS and the OU. OBS course teams are responsible for monitoring
tutor performance, but feel they have little influence in translating that monitoring into taking
action to either reward or remove tutors; they feel blocked by Course Presentation leadership
and its Regional Managers.
There is also some tension between regionally based OBS staff and the OBS centre. All
committee meetings are held at the centre and regional staff are entitled to attend. However
the geographical spread of regions tend to produce regular attendancies from staff near to
Walton Hall in Milton Keynes, such as from Oxford or Birmingham, while staff from
Scotland or south west England rarely attend. Some of these more remote staff feel
disenfranchised because as one MEC remarked "a lot of opportunities come up but you have
to be walking past the door of the Dean at the time". This is not a reference to Asch as Dean,
nor to Thomson's informal "tap on the shoulder" approach to making appointments. It is a
reference to the feeling that distance from the centre has a real impact on one's opportunities,
and scope for contributing to decision making within OBS.
There is also some tension between course teams and course management. While as
Cameron (Director of Presentation) says "course teams are king in the OU", Course Chairs
do not have financial control over course development or presentation. They are responsible
for its academic content, while its administration, including financing, is the responsibility of
188
Course Managers and OU administrators. This tension can show up in unexpected places, for
example over travel expenses. There is also tension due to academics' obligations to write for
course teams, and the exercising of their right to pursue individual research interests,
including taking study leave.
The existence of so many inter- and intra-group tensions does not suggest the absence of
some form of government, or that anarchy is about to break out. Rather these tensions are a
way of life that supports diversity of perspectives, roles, research interests, teaching, and
various other activities. The OU philosophy of open access and equal opportunities is felt to
be a guide to internal behaviour as well as a metric for dealing with the educational needs of
the world. At times there is friction when the OBS wants to do something that is vetoed by
the OU. At other times it is useful for the OBS to be doing things differently because
according to Peters, "they're paving the way and that can create opportunities for other
people". Interestingly Peters feels more concern about the rest of the OU family not being
sufficiently proactive in taking initiatives, than about the OBS "wanting to plough its own
furrow".
6.6 INNOVATION
6.6.1 Models of success: looking back and looking forward
According to Masterton, Secretary to the OBS, most of the Open University's innovations
have come from the Centre for Continuing Education (CCE). The CCE was a way of dealing
with initiatives that did not fit into the university's undergraduate programme. It was here
that a number of now well established Schools first saw the light of day: 'in service education
for teachers' went toward the School of Education, 'health and social welfare', led to the
School of Health, Social welfare and Community Education', 'science and technology', led
to Masters degrees, and 'management education', developed into the Open Business School.
In Masterton's view a number of external and internal environmental factors fostered these
success stories. The first was "top down sponsorship" of innovation, because the Open
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University was put in the hands of risk takers, especially Walter Perry, the first Vice
Chancellor (now Lord Perry). During the early years of the OU, projects that were clearly
outwith the traditional understanding of 'undergraduate', and labelled as 'pilot' or
'experimental' were either encouraged or met with little internal resistance.5 Most initiatives
were based on market research according to Masterton, although some interpreted the market
research to justify the development of a course. For example, the two Masters degrees in
computing and manufacturing management are only now beginning to generate viable
student numbers. In retrospect he thinks that these two courses came five years too early, and
that the evidence in the mid 1980s of a need for these courses was flimsy. In Masterton's
view these courses were not developed because of any market potential, but came about
through the convergence of two other factors. First, the SERC (Science and Engineering
Research Council) had funds available and a government remit to raise manufacturing and
computing competences in industry. Second, a number of OU academics wanted to do
something in this area.
While the two courses in computing and manufacturing seemed to come into being with no
internal resistance and little market support, Masterton presents the emergence of the OBS as
a struggle against vested interests. The market research evidence of a need for management
education was clear, however academics from the undergraduate world were against the
initiative on two counts. They questioned the legitimacy of 'management' as a discipline in
the same way that for example economics is. They also objected to seeing resources being
channelled into what many regarded as the low priority area of CCE. Perhaps some of the
resistance was also due to 'management' not being perceived as a sufficiently different area
to the undergraduate world, and therefore funds were perceived as being misused. It was
within this climate of resistance that the first OBS course, The Effective Manager emerged.
Supported by a small internal 'loan' that had to be repaid within three years, and a large
5 An example of the extent of this experimentation is in the development of two short courses: The Pre-School Child and
The First Years of Life. A small group of academics, and experts in the production of magazine style publications developed
these courses with the aim of presenting complex ideas for a reading age of about 12 years. The idea was to produce
something useful for the socially disadvantaged, such as low income and one parent families. The approach broke with the
academic tradition of presenting complex ideas as complex; and in the words of Masterton exploited the "Sun headlines"
approach to saying something meaningful. These courses continue to sell well nearly ten years later.
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external grant, the course was launched. It proved to be "hugely successful" according to
Masterton, "repaying all of its costs within the first year". Other courses followed, as did a lot
of positive cash flow that gave the barely emerging OBS substantial political independence
within the OU family.
As the OBS and the other Schools grew so the CCE seemed to fade away. At the time of this
research the CCE no longer existed. Some suggest that the diversity of Schools within the
OU is now a better source of innovation, and makes the need for CCE redundant. However,
others still talk about a need for something like CCE to foster innovation anew and new ways
of thinking. According to O'Shea of LET, the OU is very bad at learning from its own history.
Beyond personal experiences of working in CCE, no systematic observations and
documented analyses were ever made to explain why or how successes and failures came
about. O'Shea's observation seems to undermine any notion that the knowledge bases of
organisations automatically grow in some kind of cumulative and rationalistic way.
While CCE is lost in history, the OU remains self-conscious about its ability to innovate, for
example its ability to continually find more effective ways of improving the learning
experience of students. The OU Senate wants to develop resource flow models that facilitate
change, but one of the biggest constraints according to O'Shea is the OU's success; it has
become the "IBM of higher education". In thinking about what kind of future is desirable, the
OU Senate is exploring possible scenarios through computer modelling, based on parameters
from the Planning and Budgeting committee and the OU strategic aims as documented for
example under Peters' Plans for Change.
A concern for improving students' learning experiences means being able to assess quality,
particularly through student feedback. While the OU was aware of the general applause for
its distance learning philosophy, it did not have any specific mechanisms for assessing
student feedback until the late 1980s. Cowan, Scottish Regional Director brought his
expertise in the assessment of quality to the University. As Chair of the University's Working
Group on Quality Tuition, Cowan is keen to see quality maintained or improved, especially
in innovative curricula:
191
to me the systematic design and redesign of especially innovative curricula is
about identifying the nature of the learning, and building on the nature of the
learning and the learning experience into the next iteration. So I would go for a
formative identification of quality during the iterative process of refinement and
improvement even before you come into the summative one (Cowan).
The issue of quality continues to gather pace, and is making an explicit appearance in many
areas, including: student feedback on tutor quality, residential school learning experience, the
quality of the printed material, and end of course evaluations.
6.6.2 Curiosity, creativity, and recipes
Much of the OU and OBS success is attributed by Henderson, a Deputy Director of OBS, to
the teaching style of the written course material. Apart from a number of voluntary
workshops offered by IET a few years ago, on how to write distance learning material, new
authors do not go through any formal induction writing process. Even though individual
authors, whether new or not, do have particular approaches when writing course material,
there remains an OU flavour to all written material, regardless of who is writing. For
example, OU material is well know for its 'activities' (practical student centred tasks), and
secondary reading and audio visual media used to break up and supplement the main text.
Henderson believes that long standing OU authors are "imbued with the processes" of
writing distance learning material; that "the way we do things around here" has influenced all
authors from the beginning of the OBS, and continues to do so. In the early days, he, Lund,
Henry, and other IET academics would have been part of the few course teams around at that
time. New authors leam the OU way through "osmotic" processes; by being in course teams
and trying to make sense of the OU writing style. Henderson qualifies this by saying that the
process is not some sort of "Adam and Eve process at work, where everything can be tracked
back to one source". The influences are varied and many, yet there is continuity in all OU
material.
While the OU distance learning style is distinctive, Henderson believes that it is not static,
but "provides a cultural base from which to develop, be creative, and have new ideas about
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how to do things". "Academic curiosity and creativity" contribute to the way that particular
courses and market opportunities unfold. For example,
a typical academic who sees our texts are laced with activities of various kinds is
not content to sit down and write a similar text similarly laced with activities. The
curiosity element tends to come in to say to other people (in conversation, over a
cup of coffee, or in the bar, or in the course team for that matter) 'why are we
doing this, what is the rationale, how many [activities] do we put in, why do we
put them in, are these the best kinds?' The curiosity of academics helps them to
explore the rationale behind things as well as just the slavish doing of them.
The creativity of many academics will also lead them out of those conversations
into a situation where they then say 'but I can see a better way of doing this. I
understand why we're doing it but I don't think this is very good, so we ought to
do things slightly differently. When you compare different courses, or even
different authors who are writing across different courses, you can see
considerable differences in the learning technologies they use, as well as in things
like their writing style (Henderson).
6.6.3 Constraints on creativity
As noted earlier many staff identify the OU and the OBS success as a block to developing
novel and useful ways of improving students' learning experiences. O'Shea of LET says that
he can think "of hundreds of ways to improve learning experiences", some incremental and
others radical. One of the taken for granted blocks to change he believes is that the OU's
capacity to offer full time education is not even a considered option. O'Shea says that there is
nothing in the OU Charter to prevent it setting up, say, a smaller full time facility.
A number of other concepts have become reified over the years of successful growth.
Henderson of OBS for example believes that fifteen years ago the Course Team was a very
useful innovation, a melting pot; blending subject knowledge with learning technologies; all
members meeting frequently, everybody reading and commenting on each other's drafts.
Today there are so many courses to be maintained and created that the whole team rarely
meet, and less interaction takes place. Indeed the Course Team according to Henderson is
now more a constraint than a source of creativity.
Other ingrained practices that some now see as constraints, yet whose continual refinement
have contributed to the University's success include: student enrolment practices, the concept
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of the Tutor Marked Assignment, the mix of delivery media (mostly print, and a little audio
visual), and the linear course production and publishing process. The University's
membership are conscious of these issues and many of them do worry about the constraining
influences and continuance of these practices, such as having to commit to minimum print
runs for new courses measured in thousands of copies. Critically and usefully according to
O'Shea, the University culture is one that facilitates and learns through experimentation by
individuals and groups.
Peters sees great difficulty in trying to bring ideas into the organisation from beyond the OU
boundaries. In a sense the original concept of delivering distance education back in 1970 was
too successful. The OU has flourished, the fundamental methods of course production and
delivery have changed little, and people believe that the OU way is the best, that there is little
that other organisations can teach the OU.
Peters notes that it is very difficult to get anyone to investigate whether there are any lessons
to be learnt from, for example, how First Direct manages its remote banking business, or to
pay serious attention to the London Business School approach to speeding up the tutor-
student assessment and feedback cycle. There is an equivalent to the OU in every European
country and 30 other such institutions outside Europe. Some of these institutions have used
OU material, but the OU has never taken a course from other distance learning institutions
and adapted it.
6.6.4 Managing the inertia of success
In trying to generate new ways of thinking, Peters sees his mission as,
releasing innovation which is pent up within the organisation, the individuals
who can see how we could be operating using a different model, who could see
ways in which we could act differently, and be more responsive, or achieve some
aims more readily (Peters).
Some of his Strategic Development activities have been geared toward achieving the
liberation of such ideas. Peters' approach to breaking down existing "recipes" is to pick on
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people "who are ripe for change" in the sense that either they are experiencing pressure of
some kind and therefore must change, and also picking on those who have "a bit of flexibility
that comes from success". He would then suggest alternative approaches to them. This
approach is not having much success and therefore he feels that his next step is to add "some
real incentives to go to some other models". Even taking this additional step into account, he
is unhappy with the whole approach because it relies on "a top down view of what these
other models are, rather than bottom up, giving them a chance to experiment".
The fact that many people particularly those in senior positions within the OU have been
around for 20 years plus, is as an inhibitor to innovation, according to Peters. He tries to deal
with this through his Strategic Development activities. He has also set aside £lm per year as
a Strategic Investment Fund and people are encouraged to apply for money to fund projects
that "might change the way in which we do things or might create a new opportunity".
Other initiatives that are potential sources of innovation include a comprehensive overhaul of
the student record system, estimated to cost £10m and likely to take five years to complete.
The scheme involves a whole spectrum of activities: defining long term needs, current short
comings, looking at how other organisations manage. Neither Asch of the OBS nor Hughes
of the Technology Faculty seem to have much patience for such long term grand schemes.
They want changes now, and in any case everything will probably have changed again within
the next five years.
While Peters is working for change through 'top down' initiatives and incentives, individual
Faculties are also experimenting. Hughes of the Technology Faculty for example has decided
that he cannot wait any longer for the slow OU machinery to come up with a comprehensive
and faster course production system. Technology courses will now be increasingly produced
in loose leaf binders, with frequent updates. These will be printed or photo copied using
equipment designed for producing high quality low volume print. Hughes knows that the OU
corporate leaders are aware of his initiative. Indeed he hinted as much to them. Rather than
seeing this as deviant behaviour that must be stopped, those interested are watching and using
the event as a learning opportunity.
195
6.6.5 Pedagogy and technology
Historically the practice of teaching for the OU in common with most educational institutions
has been based on the delivery of 'facts' to students. Peters feels that the OU is aiming to
move more and more to a position of giving students the skills that will enable them to "learn
to learn", and providing opportunities for them to leam, rather than the delivery of facts to be
learnt. He sees one way into this new way of thinking as being through the introduction of
new technologies like CD ROMs and networks. These technologies require more emphasis
on showing students how to effectively access the knowledge that they carry. Developing
people's skills on 'how to leam' will probably also develop their ability to draw on the tacit
knowledge and skills of others.
Others, such as O'Shea of IET are more up beat about the University's performance on
developing a 'learning to learn' teaching philosophy. As examples O'Shea cites the gradual
increase of project and portfolio based assessment as apposed to examinations. He admits
that there is scope for further development here, for example developing group assessment
models.
Open University staff are very concerned about the rapid changes in the development of
technologies that seem relevant to educational technology and distance learning. This
concern has been expressed as numerous committees looking at various dimensions of
information and communication technologies, and from different perspectives: CIRCE, the
Media Development Committee, the Academic Computing Committee, the Delivery
Mechanisms Subgroup, the Information Systems and Information Technology Strategy
Committee (ISIT). ISIT is responsible for co-ordinating various investigative projects,
including one named the Electronic Strand. While most OBS staff regard themselves as the
unchallenged best in the distance learning game, many think that the OBS and the OU must
grasp without further delay the emerging opportunities "in learning media, delivery systems
and communication networks" (A Preliminary Report from the Advisory Group on a strategy
for the Electronic Strand of the University, delivered to the School Board March 15, 1994).
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The myriad of committees and working groups reflects the OU desire for a comprehensive
understanding of all options. However, this comes at a price. These working groups, some of
which have overlapping interests, are all producing vast amounts of data and information. In
addition to a potential information overload many feel that a significant number of people do
not know what committees exist, nor what they are all doing, nor how they relate to each
other.
The Electronic Strand's preliminary report of March 15, 1994, recognises the need for its
work and for the output of the various other committees to be co-ordinated and linked to the
University Communications Strategy, but it is unclear how this can be done given the
problems of: information overload and poor internal communication; the rich variety of
views about how the OBS and the OU should position itself in the coming decade; mixed
feelings about whether technology is driving or being driven by the school; and the inertia of
multiple committees joined to a large administrative bureaucracy.
The OU has not been afraid to take time to gather, evaluate, and deliberate on its response to
the information and communications technological developments. When the response did
come, perhaps two years after the first committees went into action, it was substantial and
comprehensive (see appendix 8). "Open Business" the OBS MBA Alumni newspaper
reported that
The INSTILL Project, standing for Integrating New Systems and Technologies
into Lifelong Learning, was proposed by Sir John Daniel, Vice Chancellor of the
OU, in January 1995. The project involves a commitment of £10M of University
funds over 3-5 years, to ensure the University takes rapid advantage of new
communications media and maintains its leadership in the application of
educational technology (Open Business, Issue 4, Autumn/Winter 1995).
6.7 CONCLUSIONS
This account has examined how staff in OBS and the OU organise themselves, their
understanding of OBS strategy and the role of innovation therein. A few themes seem to
stand out. In one sense strategy seems to be synoptic (see 2.3.2), and involving a striving for
consent in all quarters of the organisation in advance of action. The OU has a function
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dedicated to strategic planning, including the co-ordination of five and ten year plans;
numerous committees spent more than one year analysing the strengths and weaknesses of a
range technologies that might help the OU maintain its lead in distance education; Asch's
annual 'away days' play an important part in preparing the OBS Business Plan. There is a
sense that all strategic options are fully considered before committing to a particular
direction.
At the same time the way of life in the OU and the OBS seems to foster diversity. Individuals
are encouraged to pursue their research interests, course variety continues to expand,
academics continually experiment with new ways of producing and teaching courses,
sometimes like Henderson developing their own niche in the management education market.
Individuals jealously guard their individual freedom and their collective right to influence
OBS strategy, and are proud of their open access and equal opportunity philosophy that
underpins the OU relationship with the external environment. In this climate innovation is
both carefully planned and open to individual initiative. Major projects like INSTILL provide
a framework for innovation, but many initiatives will continue to emerge regardless of
overarching frameworks.
To some extent OBS strategy is both determinate and managed chaos (see 2.3), but why is it
so? Staff are aware of the many tensions that constitute life in OBS, particularly as and when
they feel that their freedom, or their ability to function effectively, is being constrained. For
them such considerations are irritations; an inherent part of the best of all possible worlds.
Chapters 7 to 10 explores a range of factors that shape the practice of strategy, helping to
explain why strategy practice tends toward a process that may be determinate, managed
chaos, or both. Perhaps more fundamentally the following analyses shows that more than
being a detached instrument in the hands of practitioners, the practice of strategy is shaped by





Empirical and theoretical bases of social reality
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The earlier literature review presented three conceptions of strategy: determinate, managed
chaos, and socially constructed (ch. 2). The determinate conception presents strategy as
calculative and linear, regardless of how comprehensive or incremental it may be. In this
process practitioners are continually seeking to control their competitive environment. In the
managed chaos conception, strategy is broadly reactive with practitioners adapting to their
environment as best they can. The managed chaos metaphor differs from the determinate
conception by highlighting the constraints on the collective rationality of practitioners:
rational and purposive strategy is constrained by individual cognitive limits to absorb
information, and there are limits to the collective's ability to organise and communicate
knowledge and information. The social construction metaphor differs from the other two by
acknowledging that practitioners act on their interpretation of their competitive environment.
In this conception environmental signals are not read off as self evident but are mediated by
the organisation's paradigm. The notion of an organisational paradigm is seen as enriching
our understanding of the constrained rationality of strategy, suggesting that managers
perceive the environment in ways that approximate to the real environment. Within this
perspective strategic choice is constrained by managers' socio-cognitive limits of
comprehending environmental reality; and contested because of differentiated understanding
of the nature of that reality, and political satisficing born of competing interests.
Three assumptions are embedded in these conceptions of strategy that remain largely
unstated. First, that strategists do to varying degrees control the process and content of
strategy. Like overseers, they remain detached from the process, however successful or
unsuccessful they are in managing their organisation's relationship with its competitive
environment. Second, that knowledge accumulation, and any inseparability of facts and
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values, are due to limits of time and knowledge available to gather additional knowledge, and
practitioners' capacity to separate facts from values. The third assumption is that strategy as
an interpretive process can be manipulated by an organisation's leaders just as control
systems and structures are open to design.
Lengthy and detailed discussions with practitioners about how they practice strategy, in
parallel with continual reading and revisiting of the literature on strategy, innovation, and
research epistemology has led me to a different conception of strategy. This conception is
based on an understanding of the social construction of reality, which diverges markedly
from that presumed in the literature review (see 2.7). While chapter 2 assumed reality to be
'out there' and culture 'in here' (within the organisation), the fieldwork evidence points to
reality as constructed by practitioners' social interactions; reality is no longer 'out there'
waiting to be perceived, it is at the heart of practice. Whatever is out there is put there by
practitioners who at the same time perceive and negotiate about what is out there. Facts and
values remain inseparable, but for different reasons now. That inseparability is due to the
social construction of facts, rather than to limits of knowledge and time.
The conception presented here is not meant to overturn the determinate or managed chaos
conceptions as somehow wrong. Rather the aim is to suggest that everyday strategy practice,
whether determinate or managed chaos, is a process where practitioners routinely engage in
seeking and applying patterns to their experiences, rather like the researcher who, in seeking
to make sense of the practice of strategy, constructs a particular story from the data available.
In this view strategic choice is still contested and constrained, but more than that, it is
socially constructed through the differentiated understanding of, and collective commitments
to, a discernible yet indeterminate reality. We might pick out particular features of this
reality, but these are suggestive rather than definitive, and there are always exceptions.
While many writers (Mintzberg, 1978; Smircich and Stubbart, 1985; Child and Smith, 1990)
recognise that strategy is socially constructed, they differ in the extent to which they regard
the environment as material and independent, or see it as a product of human imagination, a
perceptual phenomenon (Child and Smith, 1990: 315). Others recognise that people and
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organisations construct their collective reality, but without framing the process of
construction in terms of the practice of strategy (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Weick, 1979).
None to my knowledge have tried to describe the links between: the nature of constructed
reality; how practitioners construct strategy practice; the role of capabilities; the interpretive
flexibility of technology; and the possibility of plural realities. These omissions in the
literature offer scope for accounts that enrich our understanding of practice and the
management of innovation in the context of competitive strategy. The notion of social reality
and its construction is central to this thesis and permeates the whole analysis of my empirical
material. This chapter aims to prepare some of the ground for chapters 8 to 10 by introducing
and exploring the nature of constructed reality. Before describing how practice is socially
constructed (chapter 8) there needs to be some clarification of what social reality is, and its
relationship with everyday practice; this is the task of this chapter.
The main section of this chapter is divided into five sections (7.2). In the first, social reality is
defined as that which is 'taken for granted' in our everyday lives; practices that go
unchallenged by those around us because they are shared and 'that is how we do things
around here'. Discussions about the 'taken for granted' are really discussions about shared
assumptions involving an inexhaustible range of factors: right and wrong ways of co¬
operating and competing; ways of dealing with uncertainty; ways of understanding our place
in the world. Section two reviews empirical evidence and theoretical ideas that different
communities around the world take different things for granted, and shows that the same
community can change its view of the world over time. This review draws on different
intellectual disciplines: studies of culture from social anthropology; ideas about culture from
organisational studies; studies of paradigms and thought styles from the sociology of
scientific knowledge claims; and ideas about recipes from interpretive sociology. While these
studies have different intellectual emphases, they all contribute to the notion that whole
communities make sense of their world in distinctive ways, through their collective
'thinking' styles; what they regard as right and wrong ways of living; what they regard as
truth and falsity. The 'psychology of the individual' metaphor of 'thinking' seems
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appropriate because it gives a sense that the social reality of a whole community is
discernible as an entity in its own right, and is to some extent unique to that community.
While the previous two sections establish the existence of social reality, the third section
argues that the social reality of a community gives meaning to the practice of strategy,
reinforcing and extending everyday practice. At the same time practice reinforces and
elaborates the community's social reality. Thus we cannot discuss practice without invoking
social reality, and vice versa, because one embodies the other. Having said that the 'thinking'
metaphor is useful, there are difficulties with it. The fourth section considers to what extent
the individual is the group writ small, or the group is the individual writ large. Relatedly, the
fifth section asks whether it is meaningful to conceive of an organisation that can unlearn.
Before engaging in these topics a few opening remarks about the value of a socially
constructed approach, and the relationship between subjective and objective reality seem
appropriate.
7.1.1 The value of a social constructivist analysis
The works of Burger and Luckmann (1966) on the sociology of knowledge, Schutz (1964) on
interpretive sociology, and Weick (1979) on the social psychology of organising have
influenced a number of writers on strategy. Sociologically informed writers on strategy
recognise that practitioners construct their social reality; however they remain a group apart
from mainstream management teaching and practice. Even where social construction ideas do
feature in mainstream management thinking it remains implicit, as in Mintzberg's (1978) or
Pettigrew's (1977) work. By remaining implicit, practitioners are denied any understanding
of the assumptions and implications of a social construction perspective.
Indeed by presenting business management as a set of rational imperatives, mainstream
business teaching is itself constructing practice. For example, Knights (1992: 525) shows that
Porter (1985) teaches competitive strategy by representing "the business corporation ... as a
set of activities and value chains that are detached from those managers, workers, and
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consumers who constitute them". Insofar as practitioners accept Porter's or anyone else's
prescriptions, namely these representations of reality, they internalise these ideas, which then
guide everyday practice. The socially constructed roots of these representations, their
subjectivity, becomes lost, and practitioners take their understanding of reality, and their
identity, from "the rational imperatives for controlling uncertainty implicit in [these
representations] of competitive strategy" (Knights, 1992: 525).
The value of a social construction approach to thinking about strategy is that it makes explicit
the sense that strategy making is a social rather than computational process. The approach
shines a new light on the dynamics of strategy practice generally, and in particular offers a
more fine grained analysis of strategy making where many fuzzy aspects human behaviour
interact to shape the scope for innovation. The thesis shows the inevitability of trial and error
at all levels of strategy, and that the inescapable heterogeneity of capabilities both within the
firm, and between competing firms, contributes to technological change and competitive
advantage. Further, these ideas suggest that a significant proportion of any agreement
between claims about organisational competitive performance and strategic intent is not
necessarily due to that intent.
Schon found in his analysis of how professionals decide (drawing on examples from
medicine, law, engineering, education, business, and others), that practice is rooted in
"technical rationality" (1983: 21). He argued for practitioners to be more reflective about
their professional knowledge. The perspective offered in this analysis encourages
practitioners to question and reflect on their assumptions about various features of strategy
practice, for example: preferred ways of handling uncertainty and risk, and of organising
work; the meaning that practitioners attach to each others' views and positions; why they see
events, and situations in this way or that; the material and symbolic consequences of those
interpretations; the basis of judgements about what might or might not work in a given
competitive situation.
In arguing for a socially constructed conception of strategy, Smircich and Stubbart suggests
that strategists "should learn to act ambivalently about what they know so that they do not
204
become strait-jacketed by what they know" (1985: 732). This is good advice if it is a call to
be self-reflexive. However, it also opens up the danger that strategists think themselves to be
outside, and as independent to, a process that exists only as long as they remain central to it.
The human subjectivity that creates knowledge also makes that knowledge unstable.
7.1.2 Subjective and objective reality
Strategy is a process of social construction or 'enactment'1, by an organisation of its
environment in blind co-operation with other organisations. Social reality is constituted of the
unceasing interaction between the subjective and objective: interactions between our
subjective processes of giving meaning to, and drawing identity from, our everyday
experiences, and an objectified world. I interpret the subjective processes of others as
objectively meaningful, attaching meaning to my interpretation and acting on it whether or
not such meaning was intended by the other subjects.
Smircich and Stubbart (1985) argue that practitioners should become more aware of the
scope for enacting their competitive environment. However, in replacing the objective and
independent world with an enacted one, Smircich and Stubbart seem also to throw out the
possibility that our objectified reality shapes choice. They suggest that "there are no threats
or opportunities out there in an environment, just material and symbolic records of action.
But a strategist - determined to find meaning - makes relationships by bringing connections
and patterns to the action" (1985: 726).
Conceiving of a socially constructed environment does change our understanding of the
nature and source of threats and opportunities. However, we objectify and legitimise reality
by attaching meaning and value to streams of events and situations; an objective reality that
we then interpret as massively real and possibly threatening. Within the socially constructed
competitive environment, a major customer demanding a price cut as a condition for
continuing to be a customer, or a competitor attempting to take away a rival's key customers,
' 1 Weick (1979: 165) coined 'enactment', to emphasise that people actively create that which they then perceive as real.
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or technological change within the industry, are all products of people interacting and
communicating with each other, of human intersubjectivity, yet the objectified existence of
such events also present very real threats and opportunities to a firm's future.
Berger and Luckmann (1966) in their thesis on the sociology of knowledge show that
'symbolic records of action' do become massively real, 'objectified' through for example
legitimation or institutionalised commitments. The often cited statement of the purchasing
executive who bought IBM equipment for his company because 'no one ever got fired for
buying IBM' is an example of the force of that legitimation. Of course competitive and
regulatory action can break or erode such commitments. IBM no longer has the dominant
competitive position it once enjoyed, but that does not take away the force of legitimation
and commitments in shaping choice. Threats and opportunities may not be "out there in the
environment" but neither are customers and competitors "a projection of human imagination"
as Morgan and Smircich (1980: 492) describes the extreme subjectivist approach to social
science.
7.2 CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL REALITY
7.2.1 The 'taken for granted'
Social reality is that which is taken for granted, and guides everyday strategy practice. Berger
and Luckmann in their analysis of social reality explain that:
the reality of everyday life is taken for granted as reality. It does not require
additional verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply there, as
self-evident and compelling. I know that it is real. While I am capable of
engaging in doubt about its reality, I am obliged to suspend such doubt as I
routinely exist in everyday life. This suspension of doubt is so firm that to
abandon it, as I might want to do, say, in theoretical or religious contemplation, I
have to make an extreme transition (1966: 37).
Different terms have been used to define broadly the same concept, but in different contexts
and reflecting different intellectual heritages. In Anglo-American sociological tradition "the
total set of beliefs, customs or way of life of particular groups" defines 'culture' (Dictionary
ofSociology, Penguin). Loveridge (1990: 96), in writing about 'strategies in context' and the
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management of innovation, refers to 'strategic frame' as "the existence of a stable set of
personally held values and orientations by which individual behaviour is structured and,
therefore, predictable for others". Hedberg and Jonsson (1977: 90), in discussing the nature
of strategy, describes a 'myth' as "a theory of the world ... from which an organisation
derives its strategies during a certain time interval". There are many such terms, but in
essence they describe the notion of culture as shared meaning and understanding.2 Further, as
Morgan (1986: 128) notes "in talking about culture we are really talking about a process of
reality construction". 'Social reality' rather than 'culture' or other terms more clearly
captures the sense that human actions are grounded in particular epistemologies and
ontologies.
Practitioners rarely indulge in reflections or discussions about the epistemological certainty
of what they know, and on those brief occasions when they do so, they see themselves as
stepping out of reality. Taken for granted knowledge routinely guides assumptions and
decisions even before rule making sets in. Just as macro societies like nations take a set of
ideas for granted, for example, the value of institutional competition versus common
ownership of resources, so too smaller societies such as organisations, have different
realities. Moreover, social reality, while discernible, is also indeterminate. It is always only
partially available to our apprehension, typically through symbols.3
As discussed earlier practitioners use symbols to make sense of, and manage, their
relationships with each other and the external environment (see 2.3.4). Nevertheless writers
and consultants commonly overstate the extent to which practitioners or their advisers can
manipulate their social reality. Smircich and Stubbart for example, urge managers to exploit
the role of dramas like
2 Writers use differentiating labels to stress a particular perspective, including 'culture', 'belief system', 'system of values',
'ideology', 'life-worlds', 'paradigm', 'recipe', 'cosmology', 'theories of action'. Which term is used also depends on the
writers intellectual heritage. Further, while many writers refer to 'culture' in differing contexts, its meaning in that context is
often not defined. Perhaps for this reason it seems to have lost its meaning through use and abuse, as a 'catch all' label.
3 It is these symbols that consultants and practitioners try to manipulate in the hope of changing an organisation's culture:
introducing mission statements, encouraging empowerment, introducing a formal grape-vine such as the top-down 'cascade'
of information, business re-engineering, restructuring, etc. Checklists for the task abound: Johnson's 'cultural web' (1989),
Kakabadse et. al. 's 'power levers' (1987), McKinsey 7-S Framework in Peters and Waterman (1982), Leavitt's 'diamond'
(1978), Harrison's questionaire (1972).
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socialization and training, the Christmas party, campaigns, big meetings, etc.
Strategic managers should realize that they exercise wide discretion in defining
what the dramas are and when and how they will occur. Wise strategic managers
take advantage of language, metaphors, and stories to convey their messages
(1985: 730, 731).
Ascom Timeplex staff take for granted the importance of individual success through
individual initiative in an internally and externally competitive and territorial environment.
The Bank of Scotland staff take for granted the sense of order delivered by history and their
hierarchy. When they discuss strategy in terms of 'stewardship' and 'bottom-up and top-
down', it is for them a natural framework. The Open Business School staff take for granted
their right of equal access to decision making of the whole Business School. These realities
are reinforced by taken for granted practices. In Timeplex the relative ease with which staff
are made redundant or re-employed reinforces the reality of competition at both the
individual and organisation level. In the Bank the reality of order and prudence is reinforced
by the emphasis put on continuous improvement in efficiency, and reflected in cautious
recruitment, continuous training, and regular performance evaluation of individuals and
operating divisions of the organisation.
Over time rules of behaviour become unconscious, taken for granted, and form part of the
organisation's heritage. In this sense we can also say that organisations are rule governed. If
the Bank were starting out today, would it develop the twelve layers of managerial
responsibility that it currently carries? It seems unlikely given current social fashions.
Timeplex's individualist practices are ingrained, as evidenced by the existence of its
'escalation log', a register of problem installations awaiting resolution (see 4.3.5). It is a by¬
product of the 'get the order and move on' approach to strategy. The possibility of life
without such a mechanism does not enter the consciousness of Timeplex staff. This has
always been the way to compete, and would require a different way of thinking to be
otherwise. The accepted way of dealing with these consequential installation problems also
reflects its practitioners' individualistic approach to business. Although the register is
prioritised according to various factors, rearranging the order of dealing with problems is not
unusual. The customer that shouts loudest gets priority.
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As these examples show, "existing practice does guide future practice, ... without logical
determination" (Bijker, 1995: 252). Bijker was writing about the social shaping of
technological systems, but the point applies equally to strategy practice. Such guidance is a
mixture of dealing with the exigencies of the day, and the unconscious influence of heritage.
How practitioners deal with the 'day to day' is guided by their constructed social reality.
Social realities can at any time be threatened or lost, to the individual and the collective alike.
In the Open Business School the taken for granted belief in equal access to shared decision
making was felt by most staff to have been lost, on account of the leadership style of their
first Dean (see 6.2.2). Formal structures and procedures were subsequently installed to
protect and maintain that right of shared access.
Moreover, in each organisation there is a sense of continuity between heritage and everyday
practice. Engaging in new experiences like electing a new Dean (and by implication ousting
the current holder), can be traumatic, but still serves to enrich practice. Such major changes
do not necessarily mean dumping the heritage. Although the Bank of Scotland's innovative
engagement with remote banking in the form of Home Banking was a major new dimension,
this did not undermine its managers' commitment to 'stewardship'. These differing social
realities assimilate and structure knowledge in context specific ways, and both the content
and process of knowledge assimilation becomes taken for granted.
7.2.2 Conceptions of social reality
The notion of social reality is supported from a variety of different intellectual perspectives:
studies of culture in social anthropology and organisational behaviour; the examination of
scientific knowledge claims within the sociology of knowledge; and philosophical accounts
about the relationship between the individual and society.
At a common sense level it is recognised that organisations differ culturally. For example, the
apparent informality and innovativeness of Microsoft is commonly contrasted with the
formality and bureaucracy of IBM. Similarly, banks are stereotyped as very conservative,
209
risk averse, steady, whereas the image of telecommunication service providers, such as
Timeplex, is that they are adventurous, risk taking, surviving in a very turbulent industry.
The stereotype of academic institutions, perhaps less so for Business Schools, is of a place
full of ideas, but out of touch with the real (competitive) world. These images grow out of
people's experiences over time of dealing with these organisations, generalisations of
industry comparisons, and attempts at conscious image management by the organisations
through for example, the way they promote new products and services. These impressionistic
stereotypes show something of the variety of ways that organisations are perceived, but is
clearly not the basis for making judgements about what factors give rise to social reality, or
why there is variety.
Existing empirical research on culture is a valuable source of inspiration for this study. A
particular stream comes from social anthropology, and starts with Benedict's (1935) analysis
of certain tribal communities. She argued that analysis of societies should be based on the
wholeness of their cultures, rather than comparing isolated features, such as puberty rites or
wedding ceremonies. These two events are social processes in their own right, but they are
also features of a wider social institution. Similarly, in the context of this study, each
organisation has its own rituals that punctuate strategy practice, whether it is product
selection, the budgeting and planning process, or deciding who gets what grade of company
car. These processes take their meaning from, and give meaning to, a wider social institution.
Understanding how organisations make choices therefore requires presenting these rituals in
context.
Benedict made a valuable contribution in providing detailed descriptions of three different
cultures: Appollonian, Dionysiac, Paranoiac. Very crudely, an Appollonian culture describes
a very ordered society "whose delight is in formality and whose way of life is the way of
measure and of sobriety" (1935: 93). A Dionysiac culture describes a society where the
'value of existence' lies in breaking out of the ordinary, to reach for the extraordinary
through excess. Members of the Paranoiac society see existence "as a cut-throat struggle
[where] suspicion and cruelty" are the norms (1935: 124). How Benedict arrived at these
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archetypes is not clear; she did not offer any underlying rules that helped her to construct
them. We may say that the Bank of Scotland seems to have an Appollonian culture, or that
practitioner behaviour in Timeplex rings of a Paranoiac culture, but why it is like that cannot
be told within this framework.
The plurality of organisational culture is acknowledged among management writers;
Harrison's (1972) work is probably the most widely quoted.4 For example, Charles Handy's
(1976) third edition of his popular paperback Understanding Organisations uses this
framework to discuss culture, while some writers use Harrison's work as a context for
discussing power (Kakabadse et. al., 1987). Harrison's 'organisation ideologies' suggest four
cultural types and matching structures: people culture/web structure, role culture/temple
structure, task culture/ net structure, person culture/cluster structure. The key variables that
determine which culture best describes an organisation are: history and ownership, size,
technology, goals and objectives, the environment, and the staff.
Harrison's ideas unconsciously reflect preceding studies in varying respects: Burns and
Stalker's (1966) matching of management control and structure to environment; Woodward's
(1965) effective organisations using structures appropriate to their technology; Lawrence and
Lorsch's (1967) observation of a link between differentiated cultures and work organisation.
Essentially Harrison's work suggests that organisational success is contingent on an
appropriate mix of cultures. For example, R&D should be 'task', while administration should
be 'role', the former encouraging innovation and the latter supporting efficiency. The
executive task is then to integrate these differentiated cultures, using an appropriate
management style, structure, and control system. Here culture takes its place alongside
control systems and structure, as variables that the rational manager manipulates in pursuit of
effective organisational performance. As with Benedict's descriptions, it is unclear how
Harrison arrived at these archetypes of culture. There are no rules, no underlying analytical
framework.
4 Roger Harrison (1972) described 'organisation ideologies', which is commonly interpreted as 'culture'.
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The history and philosophy of science also contributes to the notion of social reality. Kuhn
(1970a) describes the history of science as long periods of 'normal science' punctuated by
revolutions in thinking. These revolutions replace a scientific community's world view or
'paradigm' with another more 'roomy' version (1970b); a version that offers a more
encompassing account of how the world works. He suggests that scientists' thinking coalesce
around particular theories as they seek to account for the behaviour of physical phenomena,
and that these theories are a composite of rational and non-rational intellectual commitments,
or beliefs. Scientists spend their lives defending and extending their theories, sometimes
loosing to rival theories.
Kuhn's ideas seem substantially similar to the work of Fleck L. (1979), an earlier and little
known scientist.5 Fleck analysed the development of syphilis and the Wassermann Reaction,
using them as vehicles for his account of the historical development of scientific knowledge.
Fleck (1979: 42) shows how different 'thought styles' of succeeding 'thought collectives'
through the centuries accounted for syphilis. During the middle ages it was 'a carnal scourge'
reflecting the centrality of astrology and Christianity at the time; later it was defined in terms
of its treatability by pharmaceutical means, most notably mercury; now in modern times
syphilis is defined in terms of the theory of disease. Kuhn's scientific community of
practitioners sharing intellectual commitments seems like Fleck's 'thought collective', and
Kuhn's 'paradigm' is very similar to Fleck's 'thought style'.
We may usefully equate Kuhn's scientific community or Fleck's 'thought collective' with the
shared experiences and expectations of an organisation and its network of customers,
competitors, regulators and other stakeholders: for example, 'the banking world' or 'the
world of higher education'. Kuhn's and Fleck's questioning of the sequential and rational
process of discovery in science is directly relevant to the assumption of managerial
rationality. Formal accounts of successes in technological innovation, growth in market
share, or profitability are often rational reconstructions of history rather than the achievement
5 Although Kuhn acknowledges Fleck's influence on his thinking the latter remains little known. Perhaps, as Fleck observed
in his own analysis, the world was not ready for his ideas.
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of purposive strategy processes. Pascale's (1983) well known management case studies of
Honda (A) and Honda (B) juxtapose this rational model with a model of strategy as 'gut feel'
and learning-by-doing. Pascale shows that Honda (A) is an 'after the fact' rationalised
account of the company's success in the USA, while Honda (B) is an account from Honda's
managers about how they went about developing Honda USA.
Kuhn's ideas have influenced management research and teaching. It is fashionable to refer to
the 'paradigm' of an organisation, often in a pejorative sense, as a mindset, a set of cultural
blinkers preventing the organisation from seeing the real world. Based on his study of Foster
Brothers, Johnson suggests that many organisations go through the motions of matching
resources to the environmental challenge, believing that they are doing the right things, yet
fail (see 2.3.4). Johnson concluded that organisational beliefs and practices act as 'cognitive
filters'. Slowly and imperceptibly over time these cognitive filters prevent the organisation
from seeing what the environment really needs. On the other hand, taking a positive view,
Grinyer and Spender (1979) suggests that whole industries use 'recipes', patterns of
managerial belief that help them manage. Recipes provide a way of circumscribing the
unnecessary cognitive strain of always having to identify and consciously choose between
alternatives. In either case change involves some kind of leap from one set of beliefs to
another.
Writers on organisation theory, Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Morgan (1980), found value
in Kuhn's approach, arguing that social theory can be analysed in terms of four paradigms or
world views on social reality: functionalist, interpretive, radical-humanist, radical-
structuralist. They also offered the rules that support these alternative social realities,
showing that a particular reality depends on two dimensions. One concerns the degree to
which society may be regarded as material and objective, or is the subjective and
intersubjective experience of individuals. The other is a sociological continuum from
'regulation' to 'radical change'. On this second dimension individuals may regard social
order and concepts like capitalism as useful and as something to be preserved, or they may
regard such concepts as ideological prisons and alienating devices to escape from.
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Briefly, the functionalist reality assumes that society has a material existence, and the
interpretive reality assumes a socially constructed reality. Both functionalist and interpretive
schools believe in an ordered and regulated reality, albeit the former sees such order as
objective and the latter sees reality as subjectively ordered. The radical-humanist reality, like
the interpretive school, sees a socially constructed reality but sees any patterning or order as
constraints of our minds, 'glass ceilings' put in place by human minds, self imposed limits
that lead to us being alienated from our potential. The radical structuralist shares this sense
of humans existing within 'psychic prisons' but like the functionalist sees the social world as
material and objectively independent.
Like most individuals, practitioners in the three organisations of this study interpret society
as largely material, and their social order as something natural; they live in afunctionalist
reality. Timeplex practitioners see their competitive world, however unpredictable and
unforgiving, as imposing a social order. Their competitive world is a source of freedom for
those who are enterprising and are willing to pursue individual recognition and material gain
through competitive action. In the Open Business School there is perhaps a more obvious
tension within their view of the world, between seeing the social order as useful, and at the
same time seeing it as alienating; a tension inherent in radical structuralism. Competition
reminds them of the need to satisfy customers efficiently, but capitalism and social privilege
are also seen as overwhelming ideologies, causing people to impute limits to their own
potential. Overcoming this alienation is at the centre of the Open University's philosophy of
open access and equal opportunity; a mission to help people achieve their full potential.
Morgan's (1980) framework is useful as a guide to alternative ontologies, but is less helpful
for comparing and contrasting alternative constructed realities.
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7.2.3 Inclusiveness: Social reality and strategy practice
While Kuhn's paradigm has enriched the study of organisation and other fields, its use has
also introduced problems. There seems to be some confusion, at least in the management
literature and among writers on evolutionary economics, in the use of language to describe
socio-cognitive frameworks. Masterman (1970) noted Kuhn's ambiguous use of 'paradigm'
in his first edition (1962), citing twenty one different meanings, which she categorises as:
metaphysical, sociological, and material. Kuhn (1970b) responded to Masterman's
observation by acknowledging that his use of the metaphor is "badly confused ... which has
handicapped me as well as my critics" (1970b: 234). In a postscript to his second edition
(1970a) Kuhn, "clarifies" the confusion by stating that "a paradigm is what members of a
scientific community share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of
[practitioners] who share a paradigm" (1970a: 176). This community share a paradigm both
as the "constellation of group commitments" or "disciplinary matrix", and as "shared
examples" of practice (1970a: 181, 187). Although Kuhn regards the relationship of learning
by doing and learning how the world behaves as "a double role [where] the two cannot be
separated"( 1970b: 274), the nature of this interdependence remains obscure.
Approaching the field from a sociological perspective, Schutz's (1964: 73) notion of "recipe
knowledge" seems to encompass both metaphysical and material aspects of reality. Berger
and Luckmann take recipe from Schutz and uses it in both a sociological and a practical
sense:
on the pre-theoretical level, however, every institution has a body of transmitted
recipe knowledge, that is, knowledge that supplies the institutionally appropriate
rules of conduct. Such knowledge constitutes the motivating dynamics of
institutionalised conduct. ... and constructs the roles to be played in the context
of the institutions in question (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 83).
recipe knowledge does not concern anything except what I have to know for my
present and possible future pragmatic purposes. ... a large part of the social stock
of knowledge consists of recipes for the mastery of routine problems. ... I have
little interest in going beyond this pragmatically necessary knowledge as long as
the problems can indeed be mastered thereby (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 57).
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As in 'paradigm', the nature of the interdependence between the metaphysical and practice
remains implicit in 'recipe'. Perhaps this has contributed to a flowering of different emphases
and uses of 'paradigm' or 'recipe'. Grinyer and Spender acknowledges Schutz's recipe as a
"pattern of managerial belief' (1979: 116), then give examples that seem more akin to
Kuhn's (1972) 'shared examples'. Fincham et. al. use 'recipe' in a way that suggests a
sociological interpretation: "dominant recipes were gaining currency at a broader level -
involving precepts about new services, technologies, and organisational practices" [emphasis
added] (1994: 301).
Many writers seem to have been inspired by Kuhn's and Schutz's work and introduced their
own terms in a particular context: exemplar, pattern, regime, heuristics, model. Where writers
assume Kuhn's 'shared examples', they refer to different aspects of that research space. For
example, Nelson and Winter's (1977) 'regime' emphasises technicians' beliefs, while
Georghiou et. al. (1986) take the same term for design configuration. Dosi (1982) writing on
the economics of technological change, seems to use paradigm in a way that reflects Kuhn's
multiple meanings, referring to exemplars and heuristics, the whole being guided by the
invisible hand of engineers' blinkered imagination. For Dosi there is a sense of theory
shaping practice, either continuously along a trajectory or through discontinuous change, but
no sense of practice in turn shaping theory, or of theory shaping engineers' imagination. It
might be that many of these writers intend to blur any distinction between the metaphysical,
the sociological and the practical, but they do not make this explicit. Alternatively, it may be
that despite Kuhn's clarification there remains a confusion about the use of concepts. Either
way, the 'paradigm' has developed a life of its own. Grinyer and Spender seem to imply that
one can read off in a direct way managerial beliefs by examining practice: "the pattern of
diverse beliefs can be visualized as a multiplicity of constraints defining a feasible solution
space within which the firm's strategy must be located" (1979: 130).
Mintzberg (1978b) and Morgan (1979) see the variety of use of paradigm as an abuse and
confusion of meaning. However while the former calls for its abandonment, the latter
emphasises its value. Morgan (1980) uses Masterman's (1970) critique to suggest a hierarchy
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for organisation theory building in social science. He regards 'paradigm' as the metaphysical
level at the top, within which there are "metaphors" or "schools of thought, ... those
communities of theorists subscribing to relatively coherent perspectives ... based upon the
acceptance and use of different kinds of metaphor as a foundation for enquiry" (Morgan,
1980: 607); within metaphors are 'puzzle solving activities'.
In this hierarchy social reality shapes everyday practice. At the same time the routine and
taken for granted nature of practice reinforces and elaborates social reality. The notion of
inclusivity and inseparability between practice and social reality, and its importance is
recognised by Schon (1963) in his discussion on the role of metaphor in facilitating
technological change. Schon observes that we draw on metaphors embedded in our culture
and language to explain or give meaning to new situations. Furthermore in the process of
application the metaphor might also be developed (elaborated, transformed) as it
encompasses one more new situation.
Our culture provides the materials from which our metaphors are made. Our
technology, our social system, and, in the informal sense of the term, our theories
of the world, provide us with concepts for displacement. They are our 'given'. ...
The new metaphor emerges out of the interaction of the cultural gifts with the
demands of the situation (Schon, 1963: 65, 73).
Similarly Pondy in his study of the role of myth and metaphor in organisation notes that
"metaphor simultaneously facilitates change and reinforces traditional values. ... This
capacity of metaphor to carry several meanings at once suits it ideally to express the
simultaneous facilitation of change and continuity" (1983: 164, 165). Bourdieu in his
analysis of practice and drawing on examples from anthropology, observes that theories of
how the world works are implicit in practice:
practical logic is able to organize all thoughts, perceptions and actions by means
of a few generative principles, which are closely interrelated and constitute a
practically integrated whole .... In other words, symbolic systems owe their
practical coherence ... to the fact that they are the product of practices (1990:
86).
Recognition of this reciprocal relationship between the metaphysical and the practical is
important for understanding the nature of practice. Notions like 'best practice' embody
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shared beliefs about the nature of the organisation's competitive position. Inclusiveness
emphasises the "continuity and consistency in behaviour and expressions of belief'
(Loveridge and Pitt, 1990: 96). The relationship is one of inclusivity rather than duality; in
accounting for how the world behaves they are not independent and distinct principles like
good and evil. Taken for granted theories about how to compete in the banking community
(eg opening more branches), or how experiences should be ordered (hierarchy), or a belief in
the inalienable equality of individuals' access to education, do not guide practice as some
mysterious force. Practice is imbued with those theories of how the world behaves; practice
is the embodiment of social reality. This relationship does not mean that the metaphysical
and practice form some kind of closed system. Practitioners' social reality is not fossilised,
and their practice is not trapped by their shared reality.
The inclusivity of practice and social reality is a source of ambiguity and provides for the
unceasing development (elaboration, transformation) of both practice and social reality.
Neither social reality nor practice can be read off like instructions. This ambiguity includes
Bourdieu's "practical coherence", consisting of "on the one hand, their unity and their
regularities, and on the other, their 'fuzziness' and their irregularities and even incoherences"
(1990: 86). This sense of practice being stable, guided and at the same time always
provisional is explored in chapter 8. Inclusivity allows us to acknowledge that strategy
practice constitutes, and is constituted by, practitioners' social reality. Such an inclusive
relationship goes some way toward explaining the profound difficulty, if not futility, of
attempts to design organisational culture; and trying to impute a causal relationship between
strategic intent and competitive performance (see 9.4).
7.2.4 Individual and group psychology
While these ideas about culture, paradigms and recipes are difficult to compare directly,
nevertheless they are useful in throwing light on the social processes underlying social reality
and strategy practice, albeit from different intellectual perspectives. These ideas also show
the difficulty of bounding the indeterminate and provisional character of social processes.
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Many have tried to make sense of these socio-cognitive processes by investing hegemony in
either the psyche of society and social structure, or in the psychology of the individual.6
For example, Durkheim (1976) in his analysis of religious forms introduced the 'social
group' as "a mysterious, super organic group mind" (Douglas, 1987: 14). Fleck L. introduced
the 'thought collective', to describe the shared practices, experience, expectations of a social
network or community of practitioners: The "insistent clamour of public opinion, ... the
gathering of collective experience, ... laboratory practice, ... continuous co-operation and
mutual interaction among the members achieved the collective experience ... in communal
anonymity" (1979: 77,78).
Although Fleck's 'thought collective' is made up of individuals, the critical focus is their
shared experiences and exchanges. Indeed Douglas, (1987: 16) suggests that 'thought world'
better captures this meaning of Fleck's 'denkkollectiv' than 'thought collective'. This
meaning of shared experiences and expectations of a thought collective very usefully
reinforces the sense that an organisation is bounded less by its legal definition, and more by
its social network of stakeholders, it customers, suppliers, competitors, regulators and others
that together construct their shared reality.
The members of a 'thought collective' share a particular 'style' of thinking, and it performs
different roles at the group and the individual level. At the level of the group this 'thought
style' is "the special carrier for the historical development of any field of thought, as well as
for the given stock of knowledge and level of culture" (Fleck L., 1979: 39). For the
individual the 'thought style' is "the readiness for directed perception, with corresponding
mental and objective assimilation of what has been so perceived" (Fleck L., 179: 159).
However, there are problems with these ideas. For example, Fleck L. (1979: n. 7, 179)
acknowledges that the notion of 'thought collective' is problematic because it invites a view
of a collective psyche that is somehow material. Against this he argues that if scientists can
6 The 'structure-performance-conduct' versus the 'resources based' model of strategy rings of this tension.
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attach value and meaning to statistical data, then why not the concept of thought collective if
it helps to increase understanding:
the boundary line between that which is thought and that which is taken to exist
is too narrowly drawn. Thinking must be accorded a certain power to create
objects, and objects must be construed as originating in thinking; but, of course,
only if it is the style-permeated thinking of a collective (Fleck L., 1979: n. 7,
181).
Kuhn is much more ambivalent about Fleck's work because he regards Fleck's whole
language as suggesting that the group is the individual writ large. (Fleck L., 1979: x;
Douglas, 1987: 9). In contrast Durkheim thought of the individual as society writ small:
classifications, logical operations, and guiding metaphors are given to the
individual by society. Above all, the sense of a priori Tightness of some ideas and
the nonsensicality of others are handed out as part of the social environment ...
the reaction of outrage when entrenched judgements are challenged is a gut
response directly due to commitment to a social group (Douglas, 1987: 10).
Debates about the processes and direction of causality of socio-cognitive processes continues.
For example, questions remain about the relationship between a thought style as "a latent
dispositional state giving an enduring character to thought collectives, and thought style as an
active expression of a thought collective" (Fleck L., 1979: 158). Douglas also asks whether
the collective comes before style or vice versa? If style leads then how does that come about?
(Douglas, 1987: 18).
It seems inappropriate to ask whether individual or group psychology is the more meaningful
metaphor for examining strategy practice and shared reality. The picture is much more
complex, involving interactions between individuals as individuals with distinctive
experiences and expectations, and individuals as representatives of groups.
7.2.5 Does innovation require "unlearning"?
While encouraging practitioners to remain self-reflexive (see 7.1.1), Smircich and Stubbart
recommend that practitioners develop the art of "unlearning": "learning compels forgetting.
In fact, organizational wisdom may require continuous unlearning" (1985: 732). They
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suggest that 'behavior programs' or recipes get in the way of enacting and testing "one's
physical, informational, imaginative, and emotional resources. Without sufficient resources
(or without the ability to think imaginatively about what might constitute resources), one
simply cannot support many conceivable enactments" (1985: 732).
While they acknowledge the constraining influence of recipes, the metaphor of unlearning
seems to equate companies with computers; it suggests that, as with computers, companies
can erase their history and institutional commitments. Berger and Luckmann show that habit
formation is an inescapable part of everyday practice, and that it beneficially provides a
background that "opens up a foreground for deliberation and innovation" (1966: 71). Industry
recipes help managers to cope with the endless variety of ways of competing by narrowing
choice (Grinyer and Spender, 1979). Further, organisational routines play a critical role in
facilitating efficiency gains. As routines become established they enable managerial
resources to be released over time, resources that may create further capabilities.
All three companies studied here, and many everyday examples, show that innovation
involves a never ending stream of, and fusion between, deliberate and serendipitous aspects
of assimilated knowledge into new configurations of knowledge, capabilities, artefacts, and
work organisation. As Schon shows innovation involves interpreting the new situation in
light of an old theory or metaphor:
when we are intelligent in dealing with the new we deal with it as, on the basis
of, through, or in terms of the old, still without reducing it to the old. But what
does it mean to do this? We are figurative rather than literal. We are approximate
rather than exact. We use analogy (Schon, 1963: 23).
Technological change managed in this way, consciously or unconsciously, always enriches
our intellectual resource. Furthermore, as argued earlier, the inclusiveness of social reality
and strategy practice renders the possibility of unlearning untenable. For a community of
practitioners or 'thought collective' to selectively forget aspects of practice requires some




This chapter has explored the constructed nature of social reality from various angles. There
are a range of concepts (culture, paradigm, recipe, thought style) that shed light on the notion
that communities can be identified in terms of 'taken for granted' and shared beliefs, what
counts as knowledge, and practices. Social reality is not static; a community can change its
view of how the world works, both incrementally over centuries and through infrequent
major intellectual leaps. The review has emphasised the inclusivity between social reality and
practice to reinforce the sense that practice reflects a shared theory of how work should be
organised; the Bank's guiding principle of stewardship and its practice of looking for
efficiency gains in every quarter of its operations, are inclusive; one reinforcing the other (ch.
5). There is a dynamic and developmental quality to this inclusiveness, due to practitioners'
differentiated understanding of what constitutes stewardship and what constitutes an
opportunity for efficiency gains.
Indeed, the inclusiveness of practice and shared reality have implications for how
practitioners work together, affecting for example, what is regarded as rational behaviour,
work organisation styles and practices, collective decision making styles, attitudes to
uncertainty and risk, and preferred styles of economic transaction. Collectively unconscious
and uncritical acceptance of metaphysical ideas; ideas that shape how practitioners learn and
deal with anomalies thrown up by the exigencies of the day, are reflected in the practice of
strategy. The ambiguities and inconsistencies of inclusiveness unavoidably provide
practitioners with scope for novel reinterpretations of their world, expressed as innovative
artefacts and ways of working.
Chapters 8 to 10 stand back from the detailed descriptions of each case study presented in
part II, and offers a single coherent account that embraces all three cases. The case study
evidence is interpreted in ways that offer an alternative explanation for the complexities of
strategic choice and organisational context. It is argued that this alternative explanation
provides a richer guide to understanding strategic choice and organisational context by
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analysing the practice of strategy. Case evidence is mobilised to show both a profound
similarity, and important differences between the organisations. In particular the analyses
show: that the practice of strategy is socially constructed (chapter 8); the role of capabilities
and the interpretive flexibility of technology in shaping reality (chapter 9); the possibility of
plural social realities (chapter 10). This argument is supported by comparing and contrasting
case study evidence, as well as drawing on publicly available examples where appropriate.
The overall aim is to show that in all three organisations the practice of strategy is socially
constructed, and that the socially constructed reality of each organisation is different. The
analyses also show that innovative behaviour is inherent to the construction, the character of
which varies with alternative realities.
Chapter 8 suggests that the practice of strategy has both a spatial and temporal dimension.
Whereas determinate strategy unfolds in time, moving synchronously from formulation to
implementation, practice acknowledges that practitioners deal with the immediate future by
assuming the continuity of the immediate past, drawing on their taken for granted and shared
meaning. Practitioners rarely interrupt their commitments to the past, and expectations of the
immediate future, and they rarely engage in detached contemplation and assessment of all
theoretically possible futures. Specific sections examine how practitioners construct strategy,
by examining the influence of various features of a shared reality within everyday practice,
such as the influence of heritage, shared meaning, politics, and how anomalies are managed;
features of everyday reality that practitioners do not normally focus on as they go about their
daily practice.
Chapter 9 focuses on three areas of deliberate strategy that contribute to the social
construction of reality: capabilities, technology, and strategic intent. First, in acquiring and
applying their knowledge practitioners have limited conscious access or control over their
social reality, nevertheless they contribute to its maintenance and development through dimly
conscious recipes of behaviour and the creative interpretation of those recipes, as well as the
continuous development of new recipes. Second, despite the guiding influence of recipe
knowledge, the interpretive flexibility of technology-practice contributes to technological
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innovation, through for example the inseparability of facts and values, and serendipity. Third,
the assumption that, through strategic intent practitioners control revealed performance,
remains unproven. For example revealed performance may be manipulated to reflect intent
(9.4).
In contrast to chapters 8 and 9, chapter 10 shows that important differences between the
organisations suggest that each organisation is host to a limited number of partially
discernible constructed social realities; practice in each organisation reflects one of only a
few distinctive social realities. Just as different communities, whether primitive or scientific,
may have distinctive social realities, fieldwork evidence suggests that organisations have
distinctive social realities. The very heterogeneity of individuals' and collective experiences
is not infinitely variable, rather such variety tends to coalesce as discernible features of a
limited number of social realities. Practice among individual organisations' members reflect
distinctive social arrangements, assumptions, and ideas of how the world works and how to
behave within it; how to co-operate and how to compete. Chapter 10 explores a framework
for comparing alternative and equally viable realities. Strategic choice, or more appropriately
'social choice', and what counts as innovative behaviour, is an integral part of these
constructed realities.
Accepting that the practice of strategic is constructed, and understanding an organisation as
generating the social reality that gives meaning to strategy practice, enriches our
understanding of the management of innovation. The meaning and value of innovation and
innovative practice is given by practitioners' shared reality. Such insights have implications
for practitioners and invite further research into, for example the development of analytical
tools that are sensitive to a social construction epistemology. Some of these implications will
be developed as part of the conclusions in chapter 11.
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8
The social construction of strategy
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The accounts of the three organisations presented in part II seem to support the notions of
strategy as determinate and as managed chaos, concepts discussed earlier in chapter 2 (see
also 4.7, 5.7, 6.7). Ascom Timeplex managers and engineers are caught up in the cut and
thrust of personal survival; there is no room for strategising. Bank of Scotland managers
seem to spend much more time contemplating their options and looking to the long term;
action is guided by analysis and deliberation in advance. The Open Business School seems to
reflect both deliberate and managed chaos metaphors: much time is invested in strategic
planning and scenario testing, but at the same time individual freedom among managers and
academics is jealously guarded. In all three organisations there is also a sense that
practitioners are not sitting outside of the practice of strategy, pushing the organisation this
way or that in some dispassionate way, but are very much part of their strategy. Their
practice seems framed by their assumptions about what is feasible; they seem to have a
collective view of how to co-operate and compete. Their practice, shared experiences, and
expectations about how their organisation should develop seem to reflect a collective and
taken for granted view of the world (ch. 7).
While chapter 7 explored what social reality is, this chapter focuses on how practitioners
construct that reality. It explores the socio-cognitive processes that practitioners are
immersed in, and the shared assumptions that guide practice. Sections two and three paint a
broad picture of the process of social construction, by considering its spatial and temporal
dimensions. Section two sketches the spatial dimension by describing how players in the
game of charades go about agreeing on its outcome. It shows the importance of interaction
and negotiation among the players; the importance and difficulty of achieving a shared
understanding of each other's meanings. Section three then outlines the temporal dimension
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of organisations constructing their social reality by selecting a slice of the Bank of Scotland's
historical development; how the International Division has grown from being an oil financing
speciality within the Bank to being an organisation with substantial international interests and
autonomy from the Bank. This example shows that the practice of strategy is a never-ending
process of practitioners drawing legitimacy for present and future action from their heritage,
interpreting the Bank's way of working (recipes) in light of the exigencies of the day, and
applying their capabilities in ways that reinforce, and at the same time extend, the Bank's
recipes.
At a more detailed level of analysis, and taking examples from all three cases, section four
discusses a variety of socio-cognitive processes that practitioners are engaged in as they
shape everyday strategy practice. Some of these processes give stability and direction to
practice: 'shared meaning' (8.4.1); 'enacting intersubjective reality' (8.4.2) hinted at in
'charades' in terms of social interaction and negotiation; 'heritage and the ordering of social
reality' (8.4.4), an issue introduced in 7.2.1. While attention to more immediate operational
problems contributes to stability through routinised behaviour, practitioners do at the same
time remain aware of the need to deal with more remote strategic issues, and is the focus of
the 'here and now' (8.4.3).
Other socio-cognitive processes infuse practice with instability: 'politics' (8.4.5) examines
how political behaviour among practitioners shape practice; 'order and disorder' (8.4.6)
shows how information flow can contribute to competing constructions of reality within the
organisation, sometimes leading to conflict. Practice both solves problems and generates
unexpected situations and events, and 'anomalies' (8.4.7) looks at how practitioners'
continually solve but at the same time generate problems. The sense that strategy practice is
both stable and provisional at the same time is reinforced by looking at how practitioners
make sense of their competitive reality through 'applying patterns' (8.4.8) and 'constructing
boundaries' (8.4.9). Suggesting that practice is both stable and provisional at the same time
does not mean that practitioners are confused, rather that guided behaviour and novelty are
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inherent to the practice of strategy; practice reflects the ambiguity that constitutes the
inclusivity between social reality and practice (see 7.2.3).
8.2 CHARADES
The idea that practitioners construct a reality seems difficult to communicate, especially to
those who claim to be realists, and only deal in 'reality'! A simple device is needed to help
get the essence of the idea across, or what Benedict calls a "detour" (1935: 39). To help
understand the process this section shows how actors construct meaning in the present, and
the next section changes focus to sketch that construction as never ending and provisional.
The game 'charades' is often played at parties (Weick, 1979). It involves an actor or actress
standing before a small audience. The person standing before the audience thinks of a well
known title, and then tries to communicate that name to the audience, using action and mime,
but not speech. To make the game manageable and interesting they all agree on a theme of
say films, games or books.
The performer has a clear idea in their mind as they try to act it out. The audience on the
other hand sees a mixture of confusing signals and possible interpretations. The performer in
turn tries to make sense of the audience's expression of its understanding of the acted-out-
title, and adjusts their performance accordingly. At the same time the audience continually
try to make sense of the performer's adjusted signals, taking into consideration past
selections and rejections. It is an interactive and constructive process, with both performer
and audience encouraging some interpretations and ignoring or discouraging others. The
performer is co-operating with the audience, busily constructing a shared understanding of
the subject. As the game progresses sections of the audience may start to find difficulty in
suspending judgement. Slowly they become increasingly committed to thinking about a
particular book or narrow range of options. They may become quiet, or pursue their beliefs
more noisily, or seek clarification. The point is that the audience may begin to fragment.
Now imagine two or three performers vying for the audience's attention ....
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Replace performer with organisation, and audience with competitive environment.
Organisations impose meanings on their environment, most obviously during the introduction
of a new product. The organisation then uses the environment's responses to organise further
responses. At the same time the environment develops its own expectations of what the new
product or service should achieve, expectations that the innovating organisation routinely
tries to make sense of. Unlike the performer in charades, the organisation may not have a
clear idea of what it is offering, or what is the most appropriate strategy for delivering their
novel product or service. Thus they are keen to make modifications in light of customers'
developing expectations, and to differentiate it in light of competitive developments.
The interactive and constructive process is further entangled because the organisation, like
the performer, finds difficulty in selecting clues against the noise of competing
interpretations and requests for clarification. Further, cumulative experience among
customers and competitors and other stakeholders leads to differentiated expectations and
variety, and more regulation. This multi-node dialogue between "relevant social groups"
(Bijker, 1987: 4) routinely constructs reality, organised as internal and external environments.
Notions of 'strategic learning' focus on the organisation's ability to interpret signals from an
objective environment, (i.e. an environment, internal and external, whose material existence
is not questioned), and the development of strategy that incorporates this learning. However
strategic learning ignores the subjective construction of this reality, the interpretive flexibility
of signals, and the fragility of the internal/external distinction.
8.3 THE NEVER ENDING CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: FROM NORTH SEA
PETROCHEMICAL FINANCING TO GLOBAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS
This brief story of the development of the Bank of Scotland's (BoS) International Division is
used to show the temporal dimension of constructing social reality. A similar account could
have been presented about the emergence and growth of BoS's Centrebank, or Timeplex, or
OBS. The value of the example is in showing that there is temporal continuity of the
organisation's social reality, that social reality is not static but developmental, provisional
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and uncertain. The example shows that an organisation's socially constructed existence is
maintained by its links with its heritage and aspirations for the future, and the interplay of
subjective and objective reality over time. It also highlights that the never ending exercise
and development of the organisation's capabilities demands creative interpretation of
decision rules, an issue further developed in 9.2.
The BoS International Division currently enjoys social and economic relations with oil and
gas multinationals, UK corporate financing, and more recently the British government's
Department of Social Security (DSS). These diverse relations are based on capabilities in
financial risk assessment in exploration and production of oil and gas, and more recently
capabilities in managing the international transfer of large volumes of low value payments to
British pensioners around the world. These socio-economic relations and capabilities have
emerged and developed over the last 20 years and the Bank's executive is keen to explore
and create new ones.
8.3.1 Early beginnings
The International Division grew out of BoS' development of its capabilities in North Sea oil
and gas financing during the early 1970s. The Bank's engagement with North Sea oil and gas
project financing was a natural extension of its Scottish financial services operations because
this new sector fell within their home market, Scotland. Although the oil and gas sector was
new to the Bank, there were common features such as risk assessment, between the
peculiarities of oil and gas project financing and the existing project financing capabilities of
the Bank. These commonalities meant that in the early days the International Division
operational practice drew heavily on the Bank's existing practice, centred on other industrial
and commercial project financing capabilities.
The Bank's entry to this new sector was also driven by an imperative. The Bank regarded the
prospect of foreign banks, especially English banks, prospecting for oil related financing
opportunities in its own back yard, as massively real (see 5.6.1). The Bank's successes lead
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to greater involvement in this sector, exposing BoS to the wider financial needs of
multinational energy companies. BoS increasing became a part of the objective reality of
these international energy companies, quickly becoming institutionalised in the eyes of
potential customers, competitors and the government as the UK's first "oil bank".1
Acquiring the status and reputation of "oil bank" marked the Bank as a legitimate provider of
project financing in the energy sector. In other words, its executive and other operating
companies and regulators within the sector believed that the Bank had some distinctive
capabilities that were useful and justified its position in that sector. The Bank's positive
(subjective) experience and (objectified) success in this new sector, encouraged its executive
to pursue a greater role in shaping the broader sector of international banking, setting up
offices first in the USA, then Hong Kong, and Moscow. The International Division was
emerging as a distinctive entity; part of, yet differentiated from, the Bank of Scotland.
8.3.2 Recent developments
During the last 20 years BoS has been largely successful in assimilating new project
financing capabilities; creatively exercising its existing capabilities and developing new ones
in new situations. The International Division is one objectification of those capabilities, and
Centrebank is another. Centrebank emerged in the mid 1980s as a subjective response by the
Bank's executive to the actions of English banks during the 1970s (5.6.1). That response
crystallised as Home Banking, and a new concept of 'remote banking' was born.
The International Division has also begun to develop other distinctive capabilities, not based
on project financing but on international electronic fund transfer capabilities, emerging in the
late 1980s with TAPS (Transcontinental Automated Payment Service) (see 5.6.2). It was an
innovation, using technological capabilities that the Bank had been elaborating and applying
over the years in its existing business areas. These existing capabilities were now being
1 From "A brief history of Scotland's first bank", published by the Bank in 1995 to commemorate its 300th centenary.
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reinterpreted in a new application; what Abernathy and Clark (1985) might call a 'niche'
innovation, and Schon (1963) a 'displacement of concept'.
The profitability of the TAPS scheme depends on the Bank's capabilities in managing low
value, high volume fund transfers at low cost. This is a task the Bank's executive feel fully
able to manage; they have been honing such capabilities for centuries. The International
Division continues to shape TAPS, continually monitoring the process, looking for ways of
reducing cost, including improvements to the technology and work organisation. The
International Division, as manager of TAPS, has established credibility with the DSS as
evidenced by the renewal of its contract with the DSS every year since 1987.
In this example the capabilities and competitive environments of both BoS and its
International Division have been shaped and reshaped throughout the last two decades. This
shaping has been due to social and economic relations between the Bank and many other
relevant social groups over the period, including oil and gas multinationals and DSS, co¬
operating banks around the world, and British citizens depending on regular fund transfers.
8.3.3 Options for growth
Over the last two decades the International Division has created, developed, and established a
robust and legitimate role for itself, both in the subjective reality of the Bank's executive, and
within the objectified reality of international banking. This is evidenced by the Bank's
executive deciding that the International Division needs to increase the proportion of non-UK
income relative to UK income. They see the International Division as having a larger role to
play in international financial services, in its own right. Furthermore, the Bank's executive
does not want the Bank to be left behind in the general trend among companies to become
global, and there is also the threat of competition from a wider more open European Union.
The expectations of the Bank's executive continues to elaborate in light of its achievements
to date, and against anticipations of things to come, in particular the perceived opportunities
of the international financing sector.
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Regardless of the growth of the International Division, a dominant but not unanimous view
among the Bank's senior managers is that BoS is first and foremost a Scottish bank, whose
home market is Scotland. The Bank's early beginnings in North Sea oil and gas financing is
consistent with this subjectivity, and is reflected in the International Division's competitive
performance, where 20 years later the majority of its income is still largely from UK
opportunities. Although the shared reality among the Bank's senior managers remains stable
around the importance of the Scottish market it is a differentiated rather than a homogeneous
view of the Bank's competitive world. The managers of the International Division and
Centrebank have ideas about how their divisions should develop that conflict with the aims
of the Branch Banking Division. This differentiated subjectivity provides scope for
interpreting and acting upon opportunities in different ways; and for the continued creation of
differentiated capabilities among the Bank's divisions.
When Campbell became General Manager of the International Division in 1994, he was
tasked with growing the non-UK proportion of the Division's business (see 5.5.3). He
recognises that in principle his choices are infinite, he has the authority to do whatever he
desires within the confines of financial services; he can be as "opportunistic" as he likes.
I could be looking for acquisitions, I could be looking for start-ups, I could be
looking for sharing in syndicated deals, ... I could just go to American banks and
say 'lets do asset swaps. You give me your mortgages and I'll give you some of
ours'.
Each of Campbell's options are subjective realities that carry different consequences for the
Bank's objective reality should any of them be realised. For example, Campbell's preferred
solution to engage in asset swaps with American banks would be the easiest and fastest way
of achieving his aims. However, he also recognises that his preference would undermine the
reality that the domestic Branch Banking Division has helped shape over the last 300 years.
The Branch Banking Division's range of strategic options do not include depletion of
domestic mortgages (see 5.5.5).
This brief account shows the Bank's future reality is being shaped by various factors:
negotiation and compromise among its managers (Cyert and March, 1992), institutions
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already in place, and attempts by the Bank's managers to take action that seems consistent
with their understanding of the Bank's past.
The earlier description of the game of charades highlights the spatial dimension of practice:
people working together; making 'on the spot' decisions in the heat of the game; applying
meaning to gestures, signs, ambiguity; sometimes hesitating, at other times making intuitive
leaps. Charades gives a sense of people shaping practice through differentiated
understanding, interaction, and negotiation. The account of the development of the
International Division highlights a temporal dimension: the influence of history; expectations
for the future; situations demanding urgent action interspersed with time for more deliberate
and detached decision. The temporal dimension shapes practice, and gives meaning to
strategy in the present. The preceding discussion of the spatial and temporal is an analytical
convenience to explain in broad terms the socio-economic processes that shape practice.
There can be no separation of the spatial and temporal since charades unfolds in time, and the
International Division is party to numerous socio-economic relations at any moment. The
following sections explore in greater detail the socio-cognitive processes that shape practice;
processes from which participants draw their identity.
8.4 EVERYDAY PRACTICE
Strategy is a social institution, constituted of "practices that are regularly and continuously
repeated, are sanctioned and maintained by social norms, and have a major significance in the
social structure" (Penguin Dictionary of Sociology, 2nd ed. 1988: 124). Strategy as practice
is distinct from strategy as determinate (synoptic and rational anticipations determining co¬
ordinated action) because the former, according to Bourdieu
unfolds in time and it has all the correlative properties, such as irreversibility, that
synchronization destroys. Its temporal structure, that is, its rhythm, its tempo, and
above all its directionality, is constitutive of its meaning. ... In short, because it is
entirely immersed in the current of time, practice is inseparable from temporality,
not only because it is played out in time, but also because it plays strategically
with time and especially with tempo (1990: 81).
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Everyday practice constructs, and reflects, social reality as objectified and taken-for-granted
experiences. Although its outcomes and processes are perceived as objectively real and
overarching, it is produced by collective human enterprise. In this, strategy embodies beliefs
about both the internal organisational world and the competitive environment, and their
relationship. It is a process that is guided by a pattern of ideas, including assumptions about
the best way to compete, and social interactions drawn from both sides of the 'internal-
external boundary'.
Strategy choice shapes, and is shaped by, everyday knowledge, routines, experiential and
reflective learning, and an implicit shared understanding, more than formal overarching
theories about how the world works. Strategy as 'prescribed practice' (e.g. corporate
planning models, mission statements) punctuates rather than describes practice. It is their
shared understanding that determine the beliefs and values that bind practitioners together
into organisational wholes. Although a few staffmay be attempting to manage the
organisation according to some grand design or fashionable theory (e.g. total quality,
empowerment), everyone that works for or is otherwise attached to that organisation
constitutes the social reality of that organisation; a reality from which those individuals in
turn draw their own identities. That reality comes from taken for granted social prescriptions
about how they should co-operate and compete; it cannot be read off from organisation
designers' blue-prints.
What follows is an attempt to sketch out some of the main features of strategy as everyday
practice. In this sketch strategy practice is the collective interpretation and expression of
shared meaning; where strategy is both routinely guided by and contributes to a more or less
coherent social reality. Strategy practice is a mixture of making sense of the immediate past,
and engaging with the urgency of the immediate future; a process full of "equivocations,
innuendoes and unspoken implications of gestural or verbal symbolism" (Bourdieu, 1990:
81). It is at once a routinised and a creative process, ordered and disordered, reinforcing and
elaborating yet being constrained by rules of behaviour of the social reality.
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8.4.1 Shared meaning
Strategy practice is a socio-cognitive framework of shared meaning. Both managers and their
staff in BoS, collectively subscribe to a common framework of 'stewardship'. In this game
everyone has a designated role in the lifelong task of pursuing efficiency, the legitimacy of
which is recognised by all.
The senior management of the Bank can be seen performing their allocated role, continually
measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of their Divisions and business units. Charts on
internal notice boards give regular feedback on the Bank's monthly productivity
performance. Managers of the Card Services Division are engaged in an on-going attempt to
automate human intervention processes. Similarly in the Branch Banking Division, 'front
office' (counter services generally) and 'back office' tasks are being changed. The front
office will focus on selling the Bank's services, with the back office managing all paper
transactions (cheques, cash, etc.). Here the Bank's executive is also restructuring its
relationship with customers, through the encouragement to use cash machines and telephone
or computer links for financial transactions, and to use counter services for financial advice
and purchasing financial products. The managers of Divisions are following each other's
moves carefully in the hunt for ways to improve efficiency of internal processes and relations
with customers.
In performing their role the Bank's managers consciously and unconsciously draw on
influences outside the Bank. For example suppliers of the Bank's specialised paper
processing technologies keep the Bank's managers up to date on developments in
automation. As part of being responsible stewards, managers must pay attention to regulatory
standards and market pressures. For example, some of the above changes reflect the need for
more financial advice and financial transaction security. The robustness of its lending
processes - for example, how adventurous or conservative it may be - is always of interest to
that regulator, the Bank of England.
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Staff at all levels work within attributed roles, and contribute by being reflective about their
own work processes and how it could be improved. Individuals are singled out for praise
when their suggestions are instrumental in these improvements. Perhaps the Bank's senior
managers are dominating the staff, but the staff seem happy with the arrangement, as
evidenced by the low turnover of staff. It may be that everyone takes for granted that
efficiency is the natural standard that they must work toward. It may also be that financial
imperatives have been shaping everyone's reality, giving rise to a shared understanding that
financial efficiency is the right priority, determining how the Bank should behave. It is less a
question of domination through managerial preferences, and more a general consensus that
the pursuit of efficiency is in everyone's interests. Individual gain lies in the proper respect
for an established authority consisting of bounded responsibilities. Everyone knows their
place in relation to the authority structure, and "stewardship" is the watchword.
Competitive pressures and practices reinforce the Bank's ideas on the best way to compete,
and many of these ideas are shared by its rivals and clients who are equally preoccupied with
efficiency. At least one credit card processing account was lost during 1994 because the
customer thought it could process its own cards more cheaply than using the Bank's Card
Services Division (5.3.2). Managers and staff alike interpret such events as proof that the
search for efficiency is natural, and of paramount importance.
The Bank's view of the best way to compete is about prudent management of its resources
and the relentless pursuit of cost efficiency. This is reflected in its internal arrangements and
its relationship with the external environment, and is constructed or accomplished through
'practice and discourse' (Knight and Morgan, 1990) among staff, with customers, suppliers,
and regulators. The Bank's staff share generalised expectations about what stewardship
means, and these expectations help them to express and interpret their relationships internally
and with others. This shared meaning, the social reality of the Bank, is expressed through
everyday practice as an ensemble of distinctive capabilities and rules of behaviour. These
capabilities and rules are only dimly available to the collective consciousness of the Bank's
staff, they are pervasive and taken-for-granted.
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The Bank's decision rules are conditioned by, but also condition, its social reality; one
reinforcing yet elaborating the other through continual refinement of decision rules: through
the creative interpretation and expression of taken-for-granted practices; drawing on the
staff's ability to invoke appropriate tacit knowledge and behaviour to match the social
circumstances they perceive themselves to be in. The Bank's orderly progression over the
centuries, involving interaction with its customers, regulatory authorities, and its continual
improvement of work organisation practices, increasingly based on IT, is succinctly captured
by the existence of over 300 'standard letters', covering mail shots, courtesy letters, warning
letters to loan defaulters using increasingly strong language, and so on. In its discourse with
the outside world, staff may choose from any of these, or 'cut and paste' to make a
customised letter. This accumulation of letter formats over the decades is a crystallisation of
the Bank's routine refinement of its recipe. As a routine practice this form of discourse
reflects an interpretation of a very ordered world.
While 'stewardship' or financial prudence underpins the practice of strategy in the Bank,
Timeplex managers and engineers are focused on the monthly or quarterly 'bottom line'.
Timeplex's small size means that it lacks the financial power to make itself heard above the
competitive clamour. Theirs is a similar story for many companies in the fast developing
telecommunications industry. Apart from competing on output (products and services),
Timeplex and its competitors are also competing for investment, often becoming hostage to
the fickleness of financial markets. This environment, created by the competitive drive of
Timeplex and its competitors and financial markets, is imposing a reality where competition
is a scramble for financing, market share, and profitability. It is a jungle compared to the
relatively cordial behaviour among the Bank and its competitors, supported by professional
and governmental regulatory mechanisms. The effect on Timeplex's internal activities is an
overriding concern with the colour of 'the bottom line', whether the ink is black or red. While
Timeplex is trying to impose meaning on the environment through new products and
services, it remains exposed to surprises from its investing community, who are major social
constructors of the same environment. A loss of confidence in the financial markets can very
quickly translate into a loss of value in Timeplex's parent, Ascom.
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In Timeplex everyone is aware and critical of the short-term perspective of the industry, the
financial markets, and the company's leadership. Nevertheless, monthly and quarterly sales
and profit presentations are imperatives, trials of strength, and key milestones in the calendar.
Everyone tries to show how well they did, smashing the sales record for this month, or
working well within budget for the second month in a row. The practice and discourse in
Timeplex is all about getting orders, as many of them as quickly as possible. They have to do
well against stiff competition, and Ascom's share price is under continuous pressure, a
pressure that bears down on Timeplex to generate more profit. Bending the rules, by perhaps
promising an unrealistic delivery, or promising a product that is still in the 'field-trials' stage
of development, may cause friction but getting the order is everything. How to satisfy the
unrealistic promise is a headache for someone else, who in turn is practised at finding ad-hoc
fixes. Many established and formal mechanisms are thus bypassed. This individualism
promotes a social reality of unbridled entrepreneurialism, which at the same time reinforces
individualistic behaviour.
8.4,2 Enacting intersubjective reality
Berger and Luckmann usefully capture the centrality of interaction and communication
between practitioners in the shaping of their reality:
the reality of everyday life further presents itself to me as an intersubjective
world, a world that I share with others, ... I cannot exist in everyday life without
continually interacting and communicating with others, ... I know that I live with
them in a common world, ... Most importantly, I know that there is an ongoing
correspondence between my meaning and their meaning in this world, that we
share a common sense about its reality (1966: 37).
Although the Bank's history constrains choice by erasing some and facilitating other
opportunities, the social construction and precariousness of knowledge means that history
may still "be reinterpreted without necessarily upsetting the institutional order as a result"
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 87). We get a glimpse of how Campbell, General Manager of
the International Division, goes about looking for ways to reinterpret the Bank's history as he
explores his own subjectivity and that of his colleagues, through the way he presents various
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alternative options for growth for the consideration of the executive. There are three aspects
of Campbell's account of how he goes about deciding what to do that show this search for a
way forward (see 5.5.5).
The first is that he engages his executive colleagues in making strategic choices, rather than
deciding alone and presenting his decision. He seeks out his colleagues to share the decision
process with them, and they expect him to do this. His colleagues are managers who each
have responsibility for a BoS Division, and collectively share responsibility for the Bank's
overall development. Campbell takes it for granted that while the developmental choices
open to the International Division is formally his, practically those choices are inter
subjectively shared with his colleagues. As Campbell says:
one of the jobs that I see I've got to do over the coming months is to try and force
my senior colleagues to ... recognise that the canvas they've given me to paint on
is far too big, and unless I get some consensus and closer direction ... we're
going to be stumbling around all over the place for a long time .... I'm not just
saying 'hey guys tell me what to do. I'm saying here are the objectives you've
given me. Here are a number of different ways of going about it'.
In looking for consensus Campbell is seeking to shape the subjectivity of his colleagues, and
at the same time inform his own subjectivity. From a vast number of strategic possibilities,
too big for Campbell to contemplate, he organises information around him (events, perceived
constraints and opportunities, market data, objectives) into a few strategic options by
applying meaning to them in light of his personal experience, what he thinks his colleagues
might expect, and what they might reject. When he formally presents his subjective reality as
a proposal, it is a proposal that will already have been shaped through informal discussions
with his peers. Their inter subjective reality will be further shaped through formal discussion
of the proposal, a discussion that is guided by what Campbell calls the "prejudices and
subliminal strategies" of his colleagues, as well as those of Campbell himself.
The second aspect of Campbell's account that shows him struggling for a meaningful and
legitimate way forward involves constructing experience - his and his peers - through
continual probing and sense making on his part, and talking with others about what they see
and are doing. Campbell is groping and testing for the boundaries of socially acceptable and
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unacceptable strategy; sensing "where the constraints and barriers that make action
'impossible' and [looking] for self imposed restrictions on the options that [his colleagues]
consider and exercise when confronted with problems" (Weick, 1979: 150); at other times
building into proposals his anticipation of his peers reactions to his suggestions; being guided
by spoken and unspoken rules of right and wrong ways for the Bank to behave internally and
compete externally. Campbell reflects on his experience of finding an acceptable way ahead,
and says that
in a sense I'm already going through the process of - almost without them
realising it, shall we say - of forcing my Bank Chief Executive and the Group
Chief Executive to focus more on these issues by throwing up specific
opportunities ... of the 'opportunistic' type.
Campbell referred to a proposal that he put forward recently. Through contacts in merchant
banking, he came across the option of buying a continental European bank. In presenting this
as an acquisition option for the International Division, Campbell learned a little more about
where the boundaries of acceptable strategy lay when the executive came back and said "we
don't like this for the following five reasons". He finds probing the boundaries of accepted
strategy "very effective in flushing out... subliminal strategies". However for his part, he is
also increasingly internalising those boundaries, making them part of his own subjectivity, as
his anticipation of his peers' reaction shows: "I will be putting up next week this asset swap
idea, and I know already in a sense what ...".
The third aspect is that through the process of deciding what to do Campbell is constructing a
heuristic to help him make sense of the boundaries. In the words of Garfinkel (1967)
Campbell is 'accomplishing' a subjective reality by creating new interpretations and
expressions of possible future realities for the International Division's, through applying
meaning to his colleagues' preferences discussed above, and his own tacit knowledge and
experience. He intends to share this heuristic with his colleagues, as a way of making the
Bank's written guidelines for acquisition more explicit, in the belief that this will reduce the
ambiguity of those guide lines, and thereby make decision making more efficient.
240
8.4.3 The 'here and now'
Practitioners' attention is dominated by tasks in the 'here and now', while some spatially and
temporally remote sources of experience are of less pragmatic interest and urgency (Berger
and Luckmann, 1966: 36). Managers spend most of their time avoiding uncertainty, attending
to operational detail, sequential conflict reduction, and often being reactive to events (Cyert
and March, 1992; Lindblom, 1959).
Timeplex's managers routinely criticise themselves for not taking the time to meet and
discuss the company's direction. They feel that strategy meetings are desirable, but in the
face of the daily pressures of dealing with customers, both externally and internally, it was a
luxury that had to wait. There was the additional problem of not being familiar with what was
involved in such meetings, the procedures and content, and whether it would be a legitimate
use of their time. They had enough to do without adding a talking shop that might not
enhance their existing individual performance or status. The absence of a forum and
supportive culture for airing strategy topics seems to facilitate the existing status quo of
internal competition and distrust.
OBS academics are under continual pressure to produce research, because the Business
School's research funding each year depends on the volume of publications. Most academics
within Higher Education fear that quality will suffer as a result of this emphasis on quantity.
Nevertheless academics recognise that they must maintain their standing within their
institution and its aspirations for future research performance ratings, and this pressure drives
them to publish more. At the same time, the OBS's research reputation over the long term,
and its ability to attract superior research staff and funds will depend on the quality more than
quantity of its research output.
The overriding attention to the 'day to day' might imply that practitioners hide behind the
unproblematic, fearing to venture beyond routine, or taking action in some mechanistic way.
Routine is critical because it gives order, without which BoS, OBS, and Timeplex would
cease to exist. The Bank's relentless pursuit of efficiency and cost reduction is more than
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simply rule following. It may be ritualised but it is not mechanical. It has always been
important to both the Bank and its customers. The Bank's focus reflects accumulated tacit
and codified knowledge about achieving efficiency in banking, and how to compete in an
ordered and regulated environment. Driven by unanticipated competitive pressures from
English banks that burst into its cosy 'here and now' world, yet still consistent with its
concern for good stewardship, the Bank has played a significant role in the early
development of remote banking as a distinct sector (see 5.6.1). The Bank's staff believe that
its customers expect it to behave in a financially accountable way, and actively works at
fulfilling and protecting these perceived expectations.
The demands of 'the immediate' might suggest that managers are preoccupied with
exploiting existing capabilities, and are unlikely to divert time and effort to developing new
capabilities for future growth, which in any case may be difficult to create. There is a further
drain on managerial effort where new people have to be trained (Penrose, 1959), and guided
so that they learn and accept unequivocally the Bank's way of doing things, including
developing a strong respect for its long history. In short the socialisation of new staff is an
uncertain process, expensive, and offers only limited return in the short term. The evidence
does not support this view however.
While practitioners may feel buffeted by the demands of the immediate, they do recognise
the interdependence between the 'here and now' and their more remote aspirations. All three
organisations have routinised ways of developing new capabilities into everyday strategy
practice. Customers, competitors, and regulators have for some time been assessing the
legitimacy of suppliers' claims to performance standards, for example by measuring their
quality procedures, commitment to personnel development, and social responsibility
contributions. Part of the competitive performance claims ofmost suppliers consists of
displaying certificates of achievement in many of these areas of remote experience, including
ISO 9000, HEFC (quality), Investors In People, and the Institute of Banking professional
training.
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8.4.4 Heritage and the ordering of social reality
Strategy practice then is the practical articulation of an organisation's social reality. It is an
ordered reality, and one that is not limited to the here and now but informed by more remote
aspirations and the organisation's heritage. Strategy practice is ordered to the extent that
artefacts and taken-for-granted practices are arranged in meaningful patterns. In long
established organisations these practices pre-date most present practitioners.
Until the 1970s, the accepted way of British banks enlarging their business was to open more
branches. It was accepted practice to run cheque accounts without paying interest to the
holder. There was a sense in which a bank's hierarchy was paternalistic, starting with the
'Governor' at the top, extending down to its children, the customers. The Bank Manager
(always imagined to be a middle aged man), was held in high esteem, having power over
ordinary lives. The Bank Manager was probably a member of the local Rotary Club, and
might have a seat on the Boards of local companies. Individuals gave their loyalty to a
particular bank, depositing their savings there, and in return for their association with that
bank received a sense of financial security. The banks' role as provider of financial security
required having large reserves, and showing prudent behaviour, particularly in its investment
attitude. Going back a little further, say thirty years ago, individuals would consider their
status as elevated if they had a bank account.
In this example the Bank of Scotland's practices are intimately tied up with beliefs about its
role in society, about the natural order of things, and shared by customers and bankers alike.
In the following example, it is possible to see how beliefs and assumptions about how the
world should be, produces that world.
Until the 1970s the British education system reflected the broad class divisions in British
society, less so in Scotland. Education practice reflected these divisions, from primary to
Higher Education. To put it crudely, if you had to work for a living, and had the 'right'
background, then a degree (preferably a good one) from Oxbridge would get you into The
City where a lot of money could be made without getting dirty. If you had to go to a
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polytechnic, then something more lowly would be on offer, like engineering. A succession of
Labour governments during the 1960s and 1970s saw a different social order, a vision of the
world where Grammar Schools had no place, and where anyone could follow a degree
course, regardless of income and background.
The Open University was founded in 1969, on the political and ideological principle of
providing open access and equal opportunity to higher education, for everyone in Britain.
Potential students did not need previous educational qualifications, nor the ability to pay, nor
the need to sacrifice the day job. You only had to be over 21 years old. The Open University
is an innovation and a realisation of that alternative social reality.
The two models of Higher Education have co-existed for the last 25 years. Co-existence is
the right adjective because, until about 1994 they were funded differently, the student
population of the Open University tends to be much older or 'mature students', and the
methods of teaching are very different with one model relying on face to face forums and the
other relying on packaged programmes delivered remotely. Students moving between
traditional universities have their academic credits routinely evaluated by the receiving
institution, but for many years traditional institutions viewed the value of Open University
academic credits with scepticism.
The current (Conservative) Government is reforming education, in particular the introduction
of a national curriculum for primary and secondary education, and is attempting to make
Higher Education institutions more accountable. It is not impossible to imagine the
government developing a model of Higher Education where universities are required to
deliver standardised courses like a national curriculum. In other words the extension of The
Open University model to the whole of Higher Education.
8.4.5 Politics
Power is a key force in the construction of social relationships (Knights and Morgan, 1990)
and of the social realities from which individuals and groups draw meaning and identity
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(Knights and Murray, 1992). Power may come from formal authority, control of capabilities,
alliances and informal networks, control over decision processes, gender, boundary
management, and other sources (Morgan, 1986). The observation that organisational strategy
is a political process, where for example those with greater power dominate others, is
common place. Knights and Morgan (1990) suggest that actors construct internal social
relations through 'discourse and practice', from which everyone derives meaning and
identity. Most Timeplex managers and engineers unashamedly devote much time and effort
to thinking up strategies and taking action that will enhance their status, and routinely take
soundings to identify potential opportunities and personal threats. One new employee
wondered why managers always seemed to be in meetings in each other's offices; meetings
that rarely produced an output that was broadcast to others. It is unlikely that they met to
discuss organisational strategy since by their own admission strategy was something they
should be discussing but were not (see 4.5.1).
In a longitudinal study of the management of IT in an insurance company, Knights and
Murray show that while practitioners appeal to the needs of markets and the capabilities of
technology in their strategy arguments, such 'externalities' and negotiated 'internalities' are
rather constructed "by the power and practices of key personnel within the organisation"
(1992: 225). Nevertheless, practitioners do see constructed externalities as real, albeit
shrouded in uncertainty, and beyond their control. Internal decisions and preferred options
are mediated by their subjectivity, not hard-wired to environmental change; practitioners
reduce the ambiguity of externalities by applying structure and meaning to them. In their
study of IT within the financial services sector, Fincham et. al. concluded that externalities
are interpreted according to "the distribution of knowledge and the aspirations and self-
images of particular groups [within the organisation]" (1994: 300).
The constructive and interpretive process is further complicated by the organisation's
division of labour, vertically and horizontally. Sales and Marketing, Customer Services, and
Information Services construct competing realities, based on different assumptions (Knights
and Murray, 1992). As Fincham et. al. note, many top-down decisions are based on bottom-
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up information gatekeepers, where for example "top managers may be free to 'choose'
technology, but their choice will be dependent on expert advisers and subject to political
influence and control by such groups" (1994: 10). Who then is constructing whose reality?
These findings are supported by evidence in all three organisations studied in this research.
There is the conflict between Timeplex's Customer Support Division and the Sales Division
over control of Customer Support (see 4.5.5). One side claims that customers needs are best
met by existing arrangements, and the other argues that a fundamental change in Timeplex's
organisation is essential in order to better meet those needs. This conflict can be seen as "an
attempt to legitimise specific divisional and career interests by couching them in projects
which are claimed to be coincident with the corporate objectives" (Knights and Morgan,
1992: 218).
Some of the Bank of Scotland's Operating Divisions want control of IT, while not
surprisingly its Management Services Division (MSD) defends its role as provider of
centralised IT resources (see 5.3.3). The distribution of knowledge in the Open Business
School was so wide that some individuals connected to one committee may not know the
findings of another (see 6.6.5). The flows of power in this environment were based on a
mixture of social networks and local influence, in contrast with the concentration of power at
senior management level in the Bank of Scotland or in Knights and Murray's (1992)
insurance company.
8,4.6 Order and disorder
The practice of strategy is both ordered and muddled at the same time, yet is still a
consciously and collectively directed process. We have seen that practitioners live a world
ordered by their shared meanings and experiences. On the other hand, we have also seen that
politics is endemic in everyday strategy practice, whether through individuals and interest
groups vying with each other for control of relationships and resources, or as an unavoidable
consequence of distributed expertise and decision making. In addition, individuals and
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groups within the organisation have a differentiated understanding of their organisation's
strategy in practice, and differing views on how the organisation should compete.
Timeplex's corporate leaders in the USA sought to ensure a successful implementation of
their rejuvenation of the company by keeping the whole change process under tight control,
through a very ordered unfolding of its implementation (see 4.5.6). They believed that the
• less staff knew the less they would worry, and the less disruption there would be generally. It
is a vision of corporate leaders assuming that they enjoy total control, moving dumb pieces
around, or out of, the company.
Probably due to the tight control of information, the Customer Support group in the UK and
the UK Sales leadership had different views about what these changes were meant to achieve,
as well as how the changes were to be effected. Sales saw the reorganisation as internal to
Customer Support, while Customer Support saw themselves as the first in a company wide
reorganisation (see 4.5.7). Apart from this differentiated understanding of what Timeplex's
rejuvenation strategy was, as noted above the UK Sales leadership's vision for Timeplex was
in conflict with that of Customer Support (8.4.5).
Customer Support and Sales live within a differentiated understanding of Timeplex's strategy
in practice, and of what Timeplex's strategy should be. This differentiation has existed for
many years, pre-dating the issues surrounding the particular re-organisation mentioned. Their
differences are ingrained and sustained by their separated structures within Timeplex.
Knights'2 observation of strategy seems very pertinent:
the exercise of strategic power [by the organisation's leadership] is not a
monolith, and the relations in which it is exercised are not necessarily co¬
ordinated and coherent, one with another. There are gaps, contradictions, and
discontinuities, and these can be exploited by members of an organization....
[Equally] subjectivity is not a unified and an integrated whole; individuals are
very often as divided within themselves as they are from one another. Their
subjectivity is composed of a complex web of complementary and conflicting as
well as coherent and inconsistent meanings, purposes and identities, all of which
generate as much tension as stability (1992: 529).
2 Knights was criticising the positivist epistemology supporting management studies for treating knowledge as inherently
certain and knowable, and for ignoring the political processes that shape strategy.
247
While the differentiated exercise of power and differentiated subjectivity contributes
significantly to the disorder of strategy practice, such disorder is also an important spur to
internal competition, creativity and innovation. For example, there is also a differentiated
understanding of what working for Timeplex means, between the UK senior managers and
their USA leaders. UK managers of varying levels criticise their high salaried leaders for
being 'in the company for themselves, for what they can get out of it', and hold the view that
a large proportion of that leadership is of poor quality. This critical assessment of Timeplex's
leaders contributed to the feeling among UK engineers and managers that if you are good
(i.e. entrepreneurial) you can go places in this company; a belief that there is a serious
weakness in Timeplex's leadership that anyone with some talent and commitment could
remedy.
The bond of order and disorder in strategy practice is inherent in Timeplex's social reality.
Inspite of this the company has not disintegrated, internal differentiation does not get in the
way of a shared understanding of their reality, nor does it confuse the sense of a collectively
directed process. However, the scope for differentiated subjective interpretation and
expression of the organisation's social reality goes some way toward explaining why
Mintzberg's (1978) unintended strategies emerge while intended ones are often unrealised.
8.4.7 Anomalies
Practitioners try to make sense of unexpected and problematic (i.e. anomalous) experiences
in terms of their recipe knowledge or paradigm (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 38; Kuhn,
1970: 52). In the search for effective solutions, individual organisations are likely to interpret
and express recipes in novel ways. Indeed, the way that anomalies are handled varies among
the three organisations. A sense of what these different strategies might be is suggested by
Bloor's description of knowledge creation in mathematics. He suggests that "in the search for
plausible explanations, [people] are likely to employ different ways of dealing with
anomalies: opportunism, exclusion, accommodation, indifference" (1983: 139). Practitioners
do not choose consciously in some detached way, whether to accommodate or behave
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indifferently to anomalies; they do not leave their everyday reality and its recipes in their
approach to solving problems. Chapter 10 characterises and contrasts how practitioners
within different social realities deal with everyday challenges and opportunities.
While the environment is an obvious source of the unexpected, many anomalies can emerge
from within. For example 'bottlenecks' (Rosenberg, 1982) may emerge in one area as a result
of efficiency improvements elsewhere. Hunting out and removing bottlenecks is routine to
the Bank, and is part of its recipe of continuous efficiency improvement. Relative to
Timeplex, the Bank's division of labour is much more extensive. Each division and sub¬
division is equipped with a myriad of heuristics, routines and recipes for dealing with
possible situations. Operating in a social reality where order transcends formal organisational
boundaries gives rise to an expectation that anomalies can be anticipated. The Card Services
Division's 300 'standard letters' is an example of the Bank's arsenal of ways for dealing with
anomalies (see 5.3.2). Occasionally anomalies cannot be anticipated, but can be a powerful
source of innovation through forcing the creation of new capabilities, as evidenced by the
Bank's Home Banking innovation in retaliation to the English banks' unanticipated
incursion.
In suggesting that anomalies may come from outside or inside there is an inference that
anomalies are independent entities, disconnected from the social construction of reality. More
than simply emerging from outside or inside, anomalies are an inherent feature of an
industry's 'thought collective' and its attendant 'thought style' (Fleck L., 1979), whether its
banking, telecommunications services, or distance learning. Anomalies come with the
organisation's socio-economic and technological relations and strategy practice, contributing
to the provisional nature of those relations and practices.
As an inherent feature of an organisation's social reality, anomalies exist through: the
organisation's distinctive heritage; the differentiated and changing expectations among
stakeholder groups (for example among competitors and customers); the versatility of an
organisation's capabilities (further examined in 9.2); and the heterogeneity of inter
organisational resources and capabilities, among competitors, collaborators, customers, and
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regulators (2.6.4). This dynamic character of anomalies underlines the fragility of the socially
constructed networks that constitute an organisation's competitive relations.
We get a glimpse of this dynamic with the following example from the OBS. Over the last
ten years the Open University has experienced an unrelenting generation of anomalous
situations and events brought about by: changing students' expectations; growing internal
dissatisfaction from OBS staff with the Open University's administrative machinery;3 the
recommendations and experience of an HEFC quality assessment exercise during the more
recent past, and a growing internally felt sense that there was a danger of technological
change leaving the University behind. The on-going generation of anomalies are in continual
tension with the Open University's sedimented practices; practices that are legitimised by the
broad respect for its accomplishments to date. Indeed, over the years the Open University has
developed very robust administrative processes for dealing with the variety of demands made
of it, from students, competitors, regulators, and staff, and its teaching material has been
incorporated into the courses of many well respected universities and other educational
establishments.
During the last three to four years the University has been stretching and straining its existing
capabilities and creating new ones, attempting to accommodate new situations and events as
yet to emerge, including: the introduction of a comprehensive Information System to replace
existing and incompatible systems; the opening up of the student conferencing system
(CoSy) to all students, sensitive to the rapidly expanding development of the internet; and the
implementation of INSTILL (Integrating New Systems and Technologies in Life-long
Learning), the University's initiative to create new capabilities and give it competitive
advantage for the coming millennium (see 6.6.5).4
3 In meeting changing customer expectations and OBS requirements the Open University has had to develop new
capabilities in administration, particularly in work organisation practices and information systems: the facility for students to
pay for courses by credit card, including staged payments; more flexibility in the eligibility of students for fee refunds; and
more customer oriented behaviour (rather than student oriented) from the University's student support machinery. In
addition, as the OBS has sought to create new linkages with non UK markets, all new courses are being written to reflect
that wider environment, through for example, European case studies and practical examples. Local tutorial facilities and
tutors fluent in other European languages, have also become necessary.
4 The Open University has budgeted £10M and recruited 33 new academic staff to implement INSTILL.
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Anomalies then are social constructs. In addition to being a feature of a constructed
environment anomalies are also inherent to strategy practice, and are typically the product of
practice. For example, Timeplex Customer Support engineers and Salespeople are engaged in
the single-minded pursuit of new business, and it is taken for granted that a significant
customer support machinery is needed to make new installations work, fixing bugs and other
problems that emerge as a result of the initial installation design, or during installation. This
technical support machinery is a direct result of the overriding socio-cognitive commitment
within Timeplex to 'sales at any cost'. Problem generation is built into the company's
strategy practice.5 Further, while the accounting philosophy of Timeplex regards this large
technical support machinery as a necessary overhead, most managers and engineers see it as
an additional resource for generating additional business through the sale of sophisticated
customer support contracts. As Knights and Morgan says "strategy as a discourse ... also
constitutes the problems which it then claims to have an exclusive expertise in solving"
(1991: 267).
8.4.8 Applying patterns
Practitioners also routinely apply patterns to their relationships with customers, competitors,
regulators, and other potential stakeholders. Professional market research constructs market
segments; they apply patterns on the premise that groups of people share certain
characteristics, or hold similar views. Plans and activities are built on the strength of those
'resemblances' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Thus the everyday practice of strategy is
ordered not only by shared meaning, recipes and routines, but also by patterns. Ascribed
patterns develop over time, sometimes gradually, at other times radically.
Banking was for centuries a much more homogeneous industry than the last decade, insulated
from insurance and Building Societies. Regulatory interventions in the form of various
5 Fundamentally different ways of competing are not recognised as valid. For example, selling only robust product designs,
taking greater care over customer requirements in designing networks, including installation time scales and costs. In effect
the concept of designing quality in at the beginning rather than fitting it at the end, something that Toyota is regarded as
having developed into a fine art, and sets it apart from its competitors. The development of such a concept would reduce
sales volume, but would also reduce the need for technical fixes that result from the current sales philosophy.
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Financial Services Acts during the 1980s, and constant lobbying of the British government
by consumer groups has produced a shake up of the traditional patterns. New competitive
recipes are emerging in anticipation of new consumer patterns and in response to patterns
continually being experienced by organisations, based on changing relationships with
customers, and new competitors. For example, as a result of government encouragement for
individual pension schemes, a number of insurance companies and banks introduced new
products during the 1980s that subsequently had to be modified or withdrawn. These new
products were aimed at particular high income groups, whose needs competitors defined in
terms of exploiting an ambiguity in the tax laws. Recognising that this could mean substantial
lost revenue, the Inland Revenue subsequently and successfully lobbied the government to
close a number of 'loop holes' in the tax laws.
Perhaps because of a shared internal commitment that is also strong, organisations are often
not aware that they are in turn being 'made sense of or apprehended in terms of expectations
and perceptions about their capabilities and social relations. For example, customers and
stakeholders evaluate telecommunication network systems providers, like Timeplex, against
expectations of what a good provider should be like, expectations that have come about
through their own experiential learning and socio-economic relations with providers, other
customers, and regulators. Critically, many organisations routinely fail to recognise the
implications of others applying patterns to their behaviour. Some organisations fail to
recognise that they are slowly painting themselves out of the landscape, even those that
constitute a major part of the landscape, like IBM. Janis describes many organisations in this
situation as suffering from 'groupthink', a malady where there is a collective "illusion of
invulnerability, [and] self-censorship of deviations from the apparent group consensus".
Looking on the bright side, many innovations would not materialise without groupthink
(1972: 197).
There seem to be three mechanisms whereby the enacted external world intervenes in the
shared commitments of the organisation's practitioners to their strategy-in-practice. One
involves the periodic global soundings that organisations take. For example, Timeplex, BoS,
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and OBS have all commissioned research during the last three years to find out what various
parts of the outside world think of them. The weakness of this mechanism is that the
organisation may be asking the wrong questions, potentially missing a lot of valuable
feedback. The second is at a more localised level, for example the dialogue between
Salesperson and Buyer. Thirdly, those stakeholders constituting the organisation's
competitive world may dramatically remodel that organisation's competitive performance,
for example when customers stop buying products and services from the organisation, either
suddenly or slowly.
When the President of one of Timeplex's customers, in a state of desperation, telephoned the
President of Timeplex, demanding financial compensation and the removal of Timeplex's
products, he was exercising his capacity to redefine his company's social relations with
Timeplex (see 4.5.3). This example also suggests that "the key distinction is not between
'inside' and 'outside' organisations, or between 'subjective' and 'objective' relationships, but
between the networks of interaction which are more or less amenable to local negotiation by
players" (Fincham et al., 1994: 13). Drawing on their study of 'sectoral influences on
strategy' in financial services they suggest that individuals, groups, and organisations have
more or less scope for modifying their own behaviour, or influencing those with whom they
interact. One constraint on such scope is the extent to which behaviour is routinised, both
within the organisation and within the sector. Such routine behaviour then acts as an
impersonal or objective constraint.
8.4.9 Constructing boundaries
The internal/external distinction of organisations and their environments is a convention that
practitioners use to organise their experiences. The distinction is itself a social construction, a
product of social relations among practitioners. The building and maintenance of social
networks based on professional training, membership of industry technical standards
committees, knowledge flows between organisations and academia, joint ventures and
alliances, all undermine any boundary building and further reinforce the socially constructed
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nature of an organisation's boundaries. Many boundaries exist through political and
economic definition; boundaries that often change through a change in government or
national trading relations. For example there are attempts to regulate the boundaries between
terrestrial and satellite broadcast, and what kinds of services cable network operators may
legally engage in. Technological change is also shaping and being shaped by potential
stakeholders redefining industry boundaries, for example 'edutainment' and 'multimedia'.
Further evidence of the enacted nature of boundaries can be seen when contemporaries
within and around, say, the IT industry attempt to define it.
The Bank of Scotland's IT staff probably have more allegiance to their profession than to the
Bank, especially while there is a general shortage of IT capabilities and banks have to
compete for access to that pool of capabilities. The mobility of staff within Timeplex's
environment seems even more exaggerated, with it high turnover of employees. Arguably,
while Timeplex and its competitors may be competing for skilled labour, the critical issue is
not a general shortage of that labour but an environment where key skills are under continual
redefinition, and where all kinds of boundaries are in constant re-definition, such as result
from attempts to merge Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN)
technologies.
The general tendency to recruit people with 'relevant industrial experience' is based on the
existence of industry wide strategies and practices (Huff, 1982; Grinyer and Spender, 1979)
and further challenges the substance of a distinction between the organisation and its
'external' environment. The Institute of Banking qualifications and banking regulations
develop common knowledge, capabilities, and practices among banks, further helping to
break-down individuality between banks. Individual mobility may to a significant degree be
motivated by the scope to exercise power and "the pursuit of identity" (Knights and Morgan,
1992: 222), in which case formal organisational boundaries are incidental. Managers and
technicians of Timeplex seem to take a utilitarian approach to employment opportunities, so
that Timeplex is as good a place to practice their craft as any another company. Their peers in
the Bank and the Business School on the other hand seem more attached to the norms and
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values of their organisation. Nevertheless, in all cases career opportunities and prestige (as
well as the uncertainty of success or failure) extends beyond the formal organisational
boundary.
As noted above, organisational boundaries are also shaped through collaborative ventures,
and localised social networks. The Bank's collaboration with its customer NCR to develop
the next generation of cash machines, is for the Bank an innovation in management practice.
Since the nine month experiment in 1993 was regarded as a success, the form of that
particular venture will become increasingly routinised as both parties try to work out some
commonly acceptable routines and heuristics, and develop a common sense of where the
boundaries of co-operation lie. For example, the Bank's representative may not visit with
NCR to another UK bank, but visiting a foreign bank is acceptable. Richardson, the Bank's
'entrepreneurial broker' in this project, noted what an eye opener it was to see NCR's
corporate planning process, and how formal it all was compared to his Bank's. He noted that
he picked up a few ideas from NCR's planning process that he intends to share with his
colleagues in the Bank.
The collaborative learning experience has shown both parties a novel way for them to
significantly influence their competitive environment through local social networks. It is an
innovation in management practice that both parties recognise as creating scope for
considerable competitive advantage.
Talking in terms of 'boundaries' might suggest that the organisation has a hard core that is
not socially constructed. This is not the case. Even the Board of Directors is a social
construction. Indeed the NCR/BoS collaboration came about because NCR's Chief Executive
and his non executive director from BoS discussed the idea.
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8.5 CONCLUSIONS
The practice of strategy is socially constructed through socio-economic relations; relations
that are distributed spatially and temporally. Practice is a stable pattern of relationships
between practitioners, and between the organisation and its competitive environment. This
stability comes from: an organisation's heritage; shared meanings; the enacting of an
intersubjective reality among practitioners. At the same time the pattern of relationships is
provisional due to: political behaviour; distributed expertise and decision making; a
differentiated understanding of what the organisation's strategy is and how to go about it; the
heterogeneity among organisations in a sector. The practice of strategy is further constituted
of a tension between dealing with the immediate and more remote issues, and between order
and disorder.
Socially stable patterns also remain more or less provisional because they are constituted of
anomalous situations and events. Practitioners deal with anomalies in terms of their recipes,
often resulting in the elaboration and creation of new capabilities and yet more anomalies.
Chapter 9 explores the role of capabilities and recipes in reinforcing yet at the same time
elaborating everyday practice and reality. The stable yet provisional processes that is practice
constitutes practitioners' 'taken for granted' reality, their social reality. Indeed, it is this
social reality that shapes the practice of strategy, a practice that at the same time reinforces
and elaborates a shared reality.
The tensions inherent in the guided yet provisional nature of everyday practice suggests why
whole industries may be overturned or fade into obscurity in just a few years, or change only
imperceptibly over generations. In exploring how practitioners shape practice there is a
suggestion that the everyday reality of each organisation in this study is different. For
example in discussing shared meaning the notions of 'stewardship' in BoS and
'individualism' in Timeplex emerged. The extent to which each organisation may be




Accomplishing social reality: applying capabilities,
interpreting technology-practice, imputing strategic intent
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The general introduction to Part III (7.1), noted three assumptions made in the earlier
literature review of chapter 2: strategists enjoy more or less control over the content and
process of strategy; practitioners interpret a real world with more or less accuracy;
knowledge and values can be separated given enough time and previous knowledge. Chapters
7 and 8 argue against the first two assumptions by suggesting that far from being
dispassionate overseers of their future, practitioners are bound up with the situations and
events they seek to manage. This chapter argues against the third assumption by showing that
knowledge is socially conditioned; facts and values are inseparable. This different
interpretation of knowledge came about during the fieldwork. There were instances where it
was very clear that the reported financial performance of the organisation was socially
constructed. Facts were being defined through political negotiation and work organisation
preferences, for example a share of the declared profitability of the Customer Support
Division, and by extension the whole of Ascom Timeplex, depended on cross charging the
Sales Division for any technical support provided (4.4.2). Senior managers of the Open
University were struggling to agree on a 'resource flow model', recognising that their choice
of model would define the future relative financial performance of Faculties (6.5.3).
Practitioners were acutely aware that published results carried implications for their
department's or organisation's future prospects.
It became clear that this observation of the subjectivity of knowledge underpinned more
generally how practitioners use knowledge in their practice of strategy. In managing
innovation practitioners use knowledge to apply and develop capabilities; interpret
technology in different and novel ways; define revealed performance and construct its links
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with strategic intent. The strategic significance of these three areas is widely accepted: as
technological innovation is seen as critical to wealth creation (1.2); capabilities are widely
regarded as areas where organisations must invest to remain competitive (introduced in 2.4);
strategy teaching stresses the importance of defining clear targets in advance of investment.
This chapter explores the roles of these three distinct yet related dimensions of strategy
practice in creating social and material reality. Each topic is treated separately to examine its
distinctive role.
In assessing the role of capabilities the analysis draws on the socially constructed nature of
knowledge, the importance of legitimation and tradability of capabilities, and examines the
extent to which the exercise and development of capabilities involves rule following,
creativity, and taken for granted knowledge (9.2). Section 9.3 takes a broad interpretation of
technology and examines three aspects that contribute to the interpretive flexibility of
technology-practice: the indeterminacy of facts and human values; whether technology has a
hard core, or is configurable and meaningful only in light of the exigencies of the immediate;
the commitment to heritage and practitioners' anticipation of the future. In examining
strategic intent section 9.4 considers the degree to which practice is guided by goal seeking or
goal setting, and the centrality of heuristics to practice. The extent to which revealed
performance is the product of control through strategic intent, or is the result of differentiated
assessments and politics, and self-fulfilling processes is also assessed in 9.4. Clearly while
these three strategic areas are distinct they have in common the social condition of
knowledge. Practitioners and their organisations shape social and material reality through
their engagement with applying capabilities, interpreting technology, and imputing strategic
intent.
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9.2 EXERCISING AND CREATING CAPABILITIES
9.2.1 The rise of firm capabilities at the expense of industry structure
This section shows that practitioners construct their reality through the exercise and creation
of capabilities, building on the notion that knowledge is a social construction; that such
knowledge exists within and as socio-cognitive structures. While such structures give rise to
rules of behaviour, organisational capabilities describe the creative interpretation, expression
and unceasing development of those rules of behaviour.1
As noted earlier writers on strategy increasingly identify resources and capabilities as central
to competitive advantage (resource based theory of the firm), representing a shift away from
the 'structure-conduct-performance' traditional theory of the firm as popularised by Porter
(1980, 1985) (see 2.4). Teece for example argues that "the production and utilizations of
technological and organisational knowledge is a central economic activity" giving managers
scope for "some degree of innovative improvement in existing ways of doing things" (1985:
37). Further, Teece et. al. (1994) argue that in the dynamics of a competitive environment
firms need to be preoccupied with the creation of new capabilities, more than the exploitation
of existing ones. Similarly, Hamel and Prahalad (1993) suggest that the strategic concepts of
'fit' and 'resource allocation' are too static, and argue instead for a perspective that stresses
'stretch' and 'leverage' of resources.2
While the focus on capabilities is important, it risks ignoring that subjective and objective
reality are interlocking processes; one shaping the other in a context of their own making (see
7.1.2). Individual organisational capabilities and industry structure, which includes the
1 Many writers on management studies and innovation refer variously to 'skills', 'capabilities', 'competences', 'expertise',
and 'know-how'. Any differences are not regarded as critical to this analysis, and so the convention used here will regard
these terms as largely interchangeable.
2 Organisational capabilities is not a homogeneous whole, more a basket of individual capabilities of varying kinds and
levels. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) define differing levels of skill acquisition: novice, advanced beginner, competent,
proficient, expert. While recognising the possibility of differing levels of capability such distinctions are not directly relevant
to the thrust of this analysis. Further, this analysis assumes organisational capabilities to be more than the sum of its
individual skills.
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heterogeneity of organisations' capabilities, should be regarded as inclusive rather than as
alternative views of the competitive dynamic, a view shared by Coombs et. al. (1992: ll).3
9.2.2 The subjectivity of knowledge
It is generally taken for granted that capabilities involve the application of knowledge. If
knowledge is socially constructed then so are capabilities. Knowledge is constructed through
socio-cognitive relations rather than acquired as a stock of inherent 'truths' or certainties. For
example, in tracing the changing definition over the centuries of syphilis as a recognisable
and treatable disease, Fleck L. observed that "the socio-psychological and historical
foundation [of syphilis as a carnal scourge] was so strong that it took four centuries before
scientific advances in other fields were important enough to establish a definitive distinction
among these various diseases" (1979: 3) (see also 7.2.2). From his analysis of the process of
development of our knowledge of syphilis Fleck concluded that "cognition is the most
socially-conditioned activity of man, and knowledge is the paramount social creation" (1979:
42).
Relatedly Kaufmann (1944) and Garfinkel (1967) suggests that 'facts' about events owe their
validity to unstated social rules rather than any ontological characteristics of the event. Again
in a study of scientific controversies Collins (1981a, 1981b) noted the 'interpretive
flexibility' of scientific knowledge claims. Collins' observation suggests that scientific 'facts'
are socio-cognitive commitments rather than any inherent quality of the scientific event.
People the world over are currently locked into a controversy about whether BSE (mad cow
disease) can or cannot transfer to humans. The British Government's 'facts' say that there is
minimal risk and that 'hard evidence' of a link is a prerequisite for action. Consumer groups
and other national governments define their 'facts' differently, arguing that proof of no link
be the appropriate test for determining whether or not we may safely eat beef.
3 Metcalf and Gibbons (1989) and Peteraf (1993) highlight the importance of firm heterogeneity as a source of competitive
advantage.
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These studies and observations show that knowledge is a socio-cognitive construct, having
no ontological status. Organisational or institutional knowledge develops through its
unceasing assimilation and legitimation, within and as socio-cognitive structures. As Berger
and Luckmann note,
knowledge about society is ... a realization [in two senses]. In the sense of
apprehending the objectivated social reality, and in the sense of ongoingly
producing this reality. For example, in the course of the division of labour a body
of knowledge is developed that refers to the particular activities involved. In its
linguistic basis, this knowledge is already indispensable to the institutional
'programming' of these economic activities. There will be, say, a vocabulary
designating the various modes of hunting, the weapons to be employed, the
animals that serve as prey, and so on. There will further be a collection of recipes
that must be learnt if one is to hunt correctly (1966: 84).
Berger and Luckmann's example shows the two interdependent strands of knowledge;
language, as part of a community's socio-cognitive structure, and capabilities, as the
interpretation and expression of institutional knowledge. In the same way we can make sense
of the worlds of banking, telecommunications, and higher education. Knowledge in each of
these worlds or societies is structured by their own language, of which jargon is one obvious
manifestation, and a shared view of 'the best way to compete in this business'.
Knowledge and capabilities are also socially distributed (Schutz, 1964), where different types
of knowledge (e.g., tacit, and formal) and capabilities are held by different stakeholders with
different expertise and interests (Fleck and Tierney 1991). Campbell, as the new General
Manager of BoS International Division has only limited knowledge and experience of, and
thereby limited appreciation of, that division's capabilities and heritage. He brings his own
experience and expectations, and actively engages his colleagues as a socially distributed
resource of knowledge of the Bank's heritage and capabilities, in order to assess the
suitability of his strategic options; an assessment informed by his colleagues expectations of
things to come. He is not just discussing theoretical and possible futures with them, but also
inviting them to commit to firm proposals for action. They are engaged in a process of
attributing meaning to the Bank's resources; the ongoing interpretation and expression of
capabilities in light of the exigencies of their competitive options, in pursuit of undefined yet
anticipated new horizons.
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Socio-cognitive structures and knowledge distribution come about through 'practice and
discourse' (Knights, 1990). In this process practitioners of all three organisations are engaged
in "mutual agreement and mutual misunderstanding, mutual concessions and mutual
incitement to obstinacy" (Fleck L., 179: 120). Notable examples include the co-operation and
conflict between Timeplex's Customer Support Division and Sales Division; the friction and
tensions surrounding Thomson and his informal 'Dean's Team' and the value of that team to
him as he sought to establish the OBS. Even where there appears to be political harmony,
knowledge and capabilities are shaped in similar ways as the next example shows.
Through the 'practice and discourse' (Knights, 1990) of strategy Campbell plays an
increasingly critical role in the shaping and distribution of knowledge as he learns what his
colleagues expect of him, and as he develops his own ideas. The International Division's
practitioners' early experiences of financing North Sea oil exploration and dealing with
multinationals' requirements have been assimilated over the last twenty years with the
Bank's other banking expertise. However, while the "oil bank" label is valuable, Campbell
and his peers do not want the International Division's identity and capabilities to be
circumscribed by that now narrow label. Indeed to that end the 'International' Division's
expertise is broadening - as for example through the TAPS business on behalf of the British
Government's DSS (see 8.3).
As a product of human subjectivity and social relations, knowledge and capabilities remain
provisional. Practitioners' subjectivity finds expression in the interpretive flexibility of
technology and "philosophical, political, economic, and social dimensions [of reality], which
are always in some degree of flux" (Knights, 1992: 520). It is this provisional character of
knowledge and its expression through application that gives an organisation its distinctive
capabilities. This is not to say that the social nature of knowledge makes it somehow
imaginary and thereby worthless, or that its provisional quality makes it unreliable as a basis
for action. Rather we need to remain critical and reflexive about all 'truth' claims (Bloor,
1976), such as those claims surrounding management studies and practice. Knowledge is
sufficiently stable to lend legitimacy to capabilities, in the form of social and economic
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value, as evidenced by companies that develop reputations for particular capabilities.
Knowledge is not trapped in our subjectivity; our objectified reality and our capabilities are
our evidence of the substantive quality of knowledge. For example, Timeplex engineers do
come together, design and install telecommunication networks that perform customer
identifiable functions, and both parties may measure the performance of such networks
against agreed criteria, although without necessarily agreeing on the interpretation of
performance results.
The never ending assimilation of knowledge within and as socio-cognitive structures gives
structure and meaning to both our individual and collective biographies. Socio-cognitive
structures are not closed systems of interlocking artefacts of knowledge, orderly arranged;
there are also contradictions, discontinuities, human values and assumptions. However open
and incomplete these socio-cognitive structures, they nevertheless provide direction for both
present and future action. They guide our interpretation and expression of what constitutes
appropriate knowledge, capabilities, practices, and "which directions appear most promising,
[who] should be selected for prominent positions and [who] should be consigned to oblivion"
(Fleck L., 1979: 120). Academics joining the Open Business School do not go through any
formal induction or training in 'the OBS way of teaching', and some of them are not familiar
with distance learning. Indeed according to Henderson, Deputy Director of the OBS, some
new academics are very poor at writing distance learning material. Nevertheless Henderson
feels that the OU and OBS have a distinctive teaching style; a style that academics learn
through 'osmosis', working with more experienced writers, and being curious about the way
OBS teaching works (see 6.6.2).
Schutz's description of recipe knowledge captures much of the biographical and taken for
granted character of knowledge. Moreover, his notion of 'recipes' show the indeterminacy,
diversity, and subjectivity of knowledge that Campbell of BoS and Asch of OBS, along with
their colleagues, operate within as they concurrently discuss and take action in developing
their organisations. Although Schutz was writing about the individual's everyday practice,
his observation seems equally pertinent to collective strategy practice:
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[recipe knowledge comes] from heritage and education, from the manifold
influences of tradition, habits and previous reflection, [and] built up [from one's]
store of experiences. It embraces the most heterogeneous kinds of knowledge in a
very incoherent and confused state. Clear and distinct experiences are
intermingled with vague conjectures; suppositions and prejudices cross well-
proven evidences; motives, means and ends, as well as causes and effects, are
strung together without clear understanding of their real connections. There are
everywhere gaps, intermissions, discontinuities. Apparently there is a kind of
organization by habits, rules, and principles which we regularly apply with
success. But the origin of our habits is almost beyond our control; the rules we
apply are rules of thumb and their validity has never been verified (Schutz, 1964:
72).
It cannot be over stressed that while Campbell talks about exposing his colleagues'
"prejudices and subliminal strategies" (8.4.2) he is not doing so as an outsider. He shares
many of their professional prejudices and experiences, and has some of his own. Recipe
knowledge is distributed among managers, both as a vocabulary and as the exercise and
creation of taken for granted knowledge about what constitutes good banking practice.
9.2.3 Socio-economic legitimation of knowledge and capabilities
Fleck L. (1979) argues that knowledge acquires its status by being 'useful' to a scientific
community. Similarly, Barnes' (1974) assessment of scientific practice and the development
of science, highlights the role of social institutions in validating and rewarding scientific
knowledge claims. Mulkay gives the example where,
Pasteur's interpretation of fermentation came to be widely accepted, ... not due
simply to Pasteur's experimental skill or to the validity of his explanation. It was
also brought about by the influence of Pasteur's growing reputation by the
sponsorship of eminent academicians, and by the vigour with which Pasteur
undertook his campaign of persuasion (1972: 13).
These observations apply equally to the validation of capabilities in the communities of
banking, telecommunication services, and higher education. The Bank of Scotland's
successes in oil and gas financing was due in part to the oil industry recognising and
acknowledging BoS's expertise, eventually crediting it as the first 'oil bank' (see 8.3.1).
Again, Ascom, Timeplex's parent recognises the importance of legitimation, and so seeks to
"reinforce the group's reputation" in developing telecommunication networks by "continuing
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to invest a substantial proportion of its turnover in research and development" (Ascom: A
Company Profile).
During the early years of both BoS's International Division and the OBS they drew their
credibility from their relationship with the parent organisation. It is an indication of the value
of this credibility that although the OBS leadership often considered using a name that
distanced itself from the parent Open University, the general consensus among its staff
remains that there is more to be gained by exploiting the link with the parent. Indeed any
equivocation on the value of the relationship seems to have been swept aside recently. In
1995 OBS reinforced its belief in the value of that relationship by renaming itself as the
'Open University Business School' (OUBS), in preference to Open Business School.
Furthermore, like Pasteur, Thomson the OBS's first Dean exploited his and the Open
University's reputation to the full in his campaign to "locate the OBS institutionally",
according to one member of the Open University (see 6.2.2).
Without legitimation organisational capabilities would perish, and organisations have to work
hard at maintaining them. Through Timeplex's previous owner's (UNISYS) policy of
minimal R&D investment during the early 1980s Timeplex's expertise gradually
deteriorated. Subsequently potential customers and competitors increasingly regarded
Timeplex's products as "steam driven", a label that Timeplex is still fighting to shake off,
despite significant investment since the late 1980s by the new owners Ascom.
9.2.4 Trading capabilities
As noted earlier knowledge and capabilities exist within and as socio-cognitive structures. As
Fleck and Tiemey (1991) note, these structures are also differentiated political structures,
investing capabilities not just with social value but also economic value. Knowledge and
capabilities derive much of their legitimacy and usefulness by being tradable between the
individual and the organisation, and between the organisation and other institutions that share
its experiences and anticipations.
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Timeplex along with its competitors take for granted the high turnover of staff. As Fincham
et. al. observed in their study of the "tradability" of expertise in the financial services sector,
"if skilled practitioners know they can sell their expertise to another organisation, this gives
them a power base within their immediate places of work" (1994: 241). However, career
opportunities can be a double edged sword, because for Timeplex's executive it also provides
support for their 'hire and fire' philosophy since there is a ready supply of career opportunists
in and around the industry. In contrast to Timeplex, the OBS leadership see a different
problem: how to increase the turnover of its academic staff, and get some 'new blood' into
the Business School.
Timeplex's taken for granted practice of acquiring capabilities through market transactions
more than internal development is not confined to employment practices. Strategy practice
through market transactions (Williamson, 1975) rather than hierarchical control is the taken
for granted way of operating for Timeplex generally. Most of Timeplex UK's personnel,
administration, and accounting functions rely on contract labour and agencies. Even its core
activities of Sales and Customer Support depends on a proportion of third party arrangements
(see 4.3.3). In contrast the BoS makes very little use of market transactions, preferring to
grow its own capabilities. There is no question of its Management Services Division being
put into the market to compete for the Bank's services. It is regarded as a strategic asset, and
a source of many of the Bank's capabilities.
The Business School's teaching philosophy relies heavily on the quality of its written
material and on the competences of part-time tutors. The relationship with part-time tutors is
a mix of market transaction and hierarchy. Part-time tutors do not have the same employment
terms and conditions as full-time staff. Part-time tutors enter contracts to tutor specific
courses for particular student groups. Furthermore, managerial control over part-time tutors is
devolved to regional offices, where the relationship is more akin to dealing with a network of
voluntary workers. Part-time tutors give up a lot of their time to support students: being
available by telephone to give advice and encouragement, attending regional training days,
pursuing problems on behalf of students.
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Strategy in practice is not so much the result of detached a priori periodic economic
valuation of market transactions versus managerial control. Particular practices exist because
practitioners believe in them for a mixture of reasons, some economic others political.
Practitioners may believe for example that an in house IT division is strategic and above such
an evaluation. In contrast the cost of managing a hierarchy was often used by Timeplex's
executive to justify making redundancies. Indeed, as noted above strategy practice in
Timeplex seems to be based on an unstated preference for market transactions, but which is
always under slow erosion through incremental employment commitments by semi-
autonomous managers. From time to time Timeplex's executives would interpret their
unsatisfactory financial performance as being due to an over commitment to hierarchy,
remedying such over commitments by redundancies and reorganisation.
9.2.5 Guided practice, creativity, and taken for granted knowledge
The extent to which practitioners construct or accomplish reality through capabilities can be
further explored by examining the roles of rule following, creativity, and taken for
knowledge.
Guidedpractice
Individual biographies and those of communities, are structured by a number of orienting and
organising metaphors including: 'recipes' (Schutz, 1964), 'paradigms' (Kuhn, 1970),
'thought styles' (Fleck, 1979), 'norms and values', (Parsons, 1937), 'decision rules'
(Garfinkel, 1967). While these metaphors are loose and held together by ambiguities, they
help individuals and groups to make sense of their separate and collective biographies.
Practitioners of BoS, Timeplex, and OBS draw both their individual and collective sense of
worth and the meaning and value they attach to their capabilities (i.e. their identities) from
the meaning they invest in these metaphors.
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Implicit in these metaphors is the sense that everyday action is rule governed. Barnes
following Kuhn (1970) for example sees normal scientific practice as "concretely organised
about a number of exemplary models of procedure" (1974: 86). He regards rule governed
practice as non reflective action, behaviour that is so ingrained that it ceases to be
problematic for the practitioner, and "comes naturally" (Barnes, 1974: 86). It is within this
framework that he sees capabilities as unfolding; as "a number of routines, of acting and
thinking, which are capable of being applied in a limitless number of ways, depending upon
circumstances and how these circumstances are perceived" (Barnes, 1974: 84). This view of
capabilities as guided practice is widespread among writers on innovation and management,
for example Nelson and Winter's 'heuristics' (1977), and Grinyer and Spender's 'industry
recipes' (1979).
In trying to "flush out prejudices and subliminal strategies " of his colleagues (8.4.2),
Campbell seems to be in search of Barnes' 'ingrained behaviour'. Interpreting Barnes,
Campbell is looking for the Bank's rules that provide a strong guide to future practice. This
might imply some kind of programmed behaviour among the executive; a programme that
denies the possibility for such rules of behaviour to develop and change through challenges
from stakeholders like Campbell. These subliminal strategies are ingrained social
preferences, institutionalised social practices built up over decades if not centuries of banking
practice, and reinforced through social and economic legitimation. These preferences have
emerged and developed through a collective and temporally transmitted belief in what the
Bank stands for and how it does business; its 300 year existence is testimony to the social and
economic investment by the Bank's staff, past and present, and by the Scottish commercial
community.
Creativity and synthesis
Nevertheless, in a competitive economic context capabilities as 'rule following' do not
adequately account for innovation, as evidenced by the profound unpredictability of
innovation processes and outcomes. Something additional is required. Barnes similarly
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recognises rule following as a limiting description of normal science, noting that "routine
developments in scientific sub-cultures ... do not suffice to account for the overall pattern of
change in science" (1974: 86). He suggests two other processes at work:
one is the way in which patterns of culture may be combined and reordered by
social processes; routines and procedures may be transferred from one sub¬
culture to another, or differentiation may occur and establish new clusters of
normal practice. The other is the transformation of patterns of normal practice,
not by rearrangement, but by authentic creative activity (1974: 86).
In Barnes' view the former change process is one of "rearrangement" and he seems to regard
it as relatively less challenging than the latter process involving "authentic creative activity
... the product of effort and imagination" (1974: 86). In a similar way Schon (1963) in his
analysis of the use of metaphor and analogy in innovation processes distinguishes between
two metaphors of development, the 'radical function' and the 'conservative' function. In the
former bringing an old theory to a new situation transforms both the situation and the old
theory, while in the 'conservative function' only the new situation changes, leaving the old
theory unchanged.
In developing practice through 'rearrangement' and 'transformation' practitioners seem to go
beyond rule following. The value of this observation is not that Barnes and Schon offer
categories of change, but that they acknowledge a role for creativity in the development of
practice. As the new General Manager of the International Division Campbell is engaging his
colleagues in a new situation. In seeking new interpretations and expressions of the Bank's
competitive situation they are drawing on their collective and assimilated knowledge of
banking practice. Similarly Cecil as Timeplex's Manager of Multinational Programmes
routinely seeks out new ways of configuring Timeplex's technologies and capabilities to
meet or create new customer applications (see 4.6.2). Weick in writing on the social
psychology of organisation regards such a process as both evolutionary and creative:
evolutionary systems are creative systems, and creativity usually means putting
old things into new combinations and new things into old combinations. In either
case, novel relations between pairs of things are the essence of creativity (1979:
253).
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Labelling much of technological or organisational change as either rearrangement or
transformational is arbitrary. The process of exercising of capabilities may be guided
practice, but the process of interpreting and expressing recipes and routines can also be a
creative process. Numerous practitioners at various levels within the three organisations find
themselves in the same situation almost routinely. According to Henderson of OBS,
academics are driven by curiosity and creativity for its own sake (6.6.2). This is not so
different from managers and engineers of Timeplex. Cecil's function is the generation of new
income by looking for new situations to apply Timeplex products, which includes conceiving
of new configurations of Timeplex's capabilities.
In a competitive context even Barnes' 'rearrangement' demands creativity. Campbell of BoS
finds himself in a new 'sub-culture' having moved from Centrebank, and is expected to bring
his acquired expertise of developing Centrebank to a new context. Even if we regard the
Bank as a homogeneous culture, Campbell's task requires what Barnes calls "establish[ing]
new clusters of normal practice" for the International Division, and demands "effort and
imagination" (1974: 86). Over the coming years Campbell will both develop his division, and
elaborate the meaning of the Bank's conception of international banking.
This example also serves to highlight the difficulty of distinguishing 'rearrangement' and
'incremental' change from 'revolutionary' and 'transformational' change. However we label
these changes, we are for the most part talking about degrees of change, usually rational
reconstructions, with the form and severity of change being defined subjectively with respect
to the observer's location in space and time.
Creativity and guided practice are not divided according to whether change processes are
transformational or rearrangement. The inherent ambiguity of the inclusiveness between
social reality and practice facilitates the concurrent reinforcement and elaboration of practice
and social reality (see 7.2.3). Stewardship at BoS continues to be reinforced yet is also being
elaborated over the centuries. Hierarchy remains and has been elaborated by the addition of
the Management Board during the last decade, but quill pens have given way to computers
and electronic mail. Taken over the whole history of the Bank the concern for stewardship
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has not changed, but the meaning of that metaphor has been continuously and routinely
elaborated. Indeed over the whole 300 years of the Bank that metaphor has been transformed.
Kuhn suggests that a scientist facing a new situation is guided by practice, through
"ostension, the direct exposure to a series of [similar] situations" (1970b: 273). Schon argues
however that in the context of innovation 'similarity relations' are an 'after-the-fact view',
and proposes instead 'symbolic relations' where "new solutions - hypotheses or 'ideas' -
come out of our attempts to find projective equivalents for aspects of the old theory in the
new situation" (Schon, 1963: xi). He describes the process of finding projective equivalents
as guided by various factors:
the gifts of the various overlapping cultures involved, the metaphors underlying
the ready-made theories in terms of which the new situations are already partly
structured, and the demands of those new situations (1963: xi).
'Projective equivalents' are not labelled in the new situation waiting to be plucked out by the
practitioner. Rather practitioners subjectively engage with the new situation; they construct
and synthesise patterns from the material. Furthermore, there must be some overlap between
the patterns that practitioners are capable of imputing and the patterns that may be imputed to
the material.
In seeking to 'put OBS on the map' the Open University Senate selected Thomson as its first
Dean for his experience, social network in management education, professional legitimacy,
and ready made theories about how to grow a business school. Thomson's demise is partly
due to him not recognising or attaching significance to the collective expectation of staff that
the OBS's development is a shared creative process. Were he in Timeplex he might find a
'lead from the front' and individualistic approach to developing the company very much in
keeping with his peers' expectations. If subliminal strategies and prejudices carry any
interpretive flexibility, then the possibility that the Bank's executive are able to interpret and
express the Bank's own rules of behaviour creatively, and develop its capabilities in new
contexts, in socially and economically viable ways, is an innovative process. The socially
constructed nature of rules of behaviour makes them inherently open to interpretation,
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expression, and development, and Thomson's (OBS), Campbell's (BoS), or Cecil's
(Timeplex) challenges represent just three drivers of such revision.
We cannot say that should the executive reject Campbell's proposals for developing the
International Division, then there is no change in the Bank's development. Rather his action
of forcing them to think of, and accept or reject, new possibilities has shaped their
experience, and subsequent proposals from Campbell or others may benefit from that shaping
of experience. Similarly, although Thomson of OBS was not re-elected as Dean partly
because many thought that he over-stretched the OBS' resources - for example opening too
many study centres in Europe - his actions did expose the OBS to new and unanticipated
challenges and opportunities. Although Asch the new Dean, champions a more restrained
expansion, he and his colleagues draw on the OBS' earlier experiences under Thomson,
developing their capabilities in dealing with different markets, languages, media, and an
expanding support infrastructure.
Taken for granted knowledge
There are a few explicit guidelines that Campbell can draw on, but these guidelines
themselves carry the weight of interpretive flexibility. For example, one codified guideline
states that an acquisition should not be so big as to put at risk the Bank's survival if the
acquired company failed, nor should it be so small as to make no significant difference to the
Bank's income stream. The absence of specific financial criteria leaves a lot of scope for
defining suitable acquisition candidates. Attaching quantifiable financial hurdles to such a
guide paradoxically increases the arbitrariness of the guide. There are many interlinked
considerations surrounding any potential acquisition that have to be weighed against each
other, for example excluding a candidate on asset size in the face of other favourable factors.
Even explicit guidelines leave space for applying capabilities creatively. Garfinkel (1967)
suggests that we "accomplish" (construct, render intelligible) our every-day reality through
the application of taken for granted skills or competences, skills that draw on tacit and
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contingent knowledge and go beyond written guidelines.4 In interpreting the Bank's written
guidelines on acquisitions Campbell and his colleagues are drawing not just on their
collective rules of behaviour, but also on their individual and collective taken for granted
knowledge and expertise. In drawing out his colleagues' taken for granted knowledge
Campbell's aim in the coming months is:
to try and distil these views and point out the inconsistencies and look for the
consistencies, and say "unless I'm very much mistaken the way you want me to
go ahead is this, and we're concentrating on... (I don't want to prejudge the issue
but) we're concentrating on acquisitions, we're concentrating on English
speaking countries...
In a study of how jurors make legal judgements, Garfinkel (1967) shows that when Jurors
'decide' they construct rather than discover the 'facts'. They give meaning to evidence that is
often conflicting and incomplete, and their decision making is guided by inter subjective
rules that they create, within which the 'official line' is one small part. Similarly, in studies of
clinical practice Garfinkel found that no matter how codified or detailed the instructions, they
could never be sufficient to explain clinicians' actions without "ad hoc considerations", that
is without taken for granted skills (Garfinkel, 1967: 23).
Morgan in writing on organisation processes, draws on David Sudnow's observations on
aspects of the American criminal justice system. Morgan notes that:
even in the administration of justice, an area of human activity where action is
supposed to be determined by clearly defined rules, the application of a specific
law calls upon background knowledge on the part of the legal officer or judge
that goes well beyond what is stated in the law itself. Cases of child molesting or
burglary, for example, are typically assigned to legal categories on the basis of
images and judgements as to what constitutes a 'normal crime' in these areas. A
series of subjective decisions are thus made on the nature of the case before any
rule is applied. Lawyers and judges do not follow the rules. Rather, they invoke
rules as a means of making a particular activity or judgement sensible and
meaningful to themselves and others (1985: 129).
The sentiment of this example is caught by Davis, Timeplex UK Managing Director who in
arguing that he should head both Sales and Customer Support Divisions talk about the role of
management as having "the right to make arbitrary decisions" (see 4.5.5).
4 Garfinkel (1967: 77) uses 'competence' to describe the right to exercise skill in managing and communicating decisions of
meaning, fact, method, and causal texture without interference.
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9.2.6 Section conclusions
The application of capabilities are grounded in knowledge, and this knowledge exists both as
and within socio-cognitive structures. Knowledge is shaped by practitioners' subjectivity and
therefore remains provisional. Practitioners construct their social and material reality through
their interpretation and expression of knowledge; through their capabilities. Metaphors guide
the interpretation, expression, and unceasing development of capabilities. At the same time
the ambiguity of metaphors provide space for practitioners to reinforce and at the same time
elaborate their social reality through the exercise and development of organisational
capabilities. It is practitioners' creative interpretation of the exigencies of their reality,
whether anomalous or not, that shapes what rules of behaviour (routines, recipes, heuristics)
are invoked in ordering those experiences. In the process practitioners unconsciously draw on
their taken for granted knowledge, previous socialisation, and their expectations for the
future.
9.3 THE INTERPRETIVE FLEXIBILITY OF TECHNOLOGY-PRACTICE
While organisations accomplish their social and material reality through the exercise and
development of capabilities, the interpretive flexibility of technology or more broadly
technology-practice also plays a significant role in this process. This section explores the
inseparability of facts and values, the interplay of subjective and objective reality in realising
new configurations of technology-practice, and the temporal continuity of technology-
practice.
9.3.1 Bounding the 'technology' in innovation
As noted in chapter one technological innovation is widely seen as a key to competitive
advantage. Porter for example believes that technological change is "among the most
prominent" drivers of competition and advantage (1985: 164). Innovation in "technology
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based" or "technology-intensive" industries is recognised as "the basis for competition and as
the determinant of industry evolution" (Grant, 1995: 287).
Traditionally mainstream management teaching treats technology as a neutral instrument to
be controlled within the strategy process. Grant's (1995, 1991) texts on strategy treat
technological change as industry specific and revolving around new artefacts. From Grant's
perspective some industries are inherently more prone to disruption than others because of
the change of technology within those industries. Porter sees himself as opening up the
meaning of technology by what he regards as taking "a rather broad view of technology"
(1985: 165). He shows how technology pervades every corner of the organisation's "value
chain", not just those directly associated with the product.
These writers regard the direction of technological change as profoundly uncertain. They
treat technology as an artefact, as an instrumental input to the creation of competitive
advantage, something that is asocial and value free, whose meaning is taken for granted. This
view is widespread in management teaching and practice. The periodic tabloid discussions
about the impact of new technologies is testimony to the exogenous character invested in
technology: displacing jobs, creating the paperless office, giving us more leisure time, the
technology to manufacture life, the fear that robots will take over our lives.
The limitations of too narrow an interpretation of technology, or an uncritical use of the term
is highlighted by the three organisations studied. Deciding what the Business School's
technology is reveals a distinction between the technology of education and the technology in
education. According to Percival and Ellington (1988: 13) writing on the nature of
educational technology, it is "the 'gadgetry' of education and training, such as television,
language laboratories and the various projected media" that is commonly associated with
educational technology. They suggest that these artefacts are the technology in education.
Encompassing these artefacts is the technology of education which concerns:
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improving the efficiency of the process of learning, ... done on the basis of
research into the nature of the learning process, ... involving the design of
teaching/learning situations and the use of whatever methods and techniques are
judged to be appropriate in order to achieve one's desired objectives (Percival
and Ellington, 1988: 20-21).
Staff in both the Open University and the OBS spend a lot of time and energy thinking about
the technology o/education: what distance learning means in the 1990s and how it has
changed over the last 20-25 years; how to increase the quality of learning; how to develop in
students the ability to learn to leam. There are on-going debates about the relative strengths
of case study teaching, the placing of student centred 'activities' throughout teaching texts,
the value of face-to-face tuition. Some believe that the technology in education can deliver
the answer to some of these questions.
Those occupied with the technology in education have other concerns: what to do about the
burgeoning range of communication and computer technologies, like CD-ROM and Internet;
deciding how much of this new technology should be adopted; assessing how virtual reality
tutorials might make an effective contribution to student learning, and whether it is cost
effective; CD-ROM seems like a fast and effective way of delivering course material, but
then students will have to have CD-ROM drives to access the material sent to them. Many
are concerned that the technology in should not get in the way of, or lead pedagogic
development.
Percival and Ellington's proposition about the nature of educational technology seem to
apply equally to banking and telecommunication network management. The technology of
banking describes the methods, capabilities or repertoire of competences involved in
managing financial transactions, and the technology in banking is its Information Technology
resource (Management Services Division), containing yet other methods and capabilities. The
continuing development of remote banking draws on, and continues to develop capabilities
across a spectrum of technologies, in and of banking. For example, socially acceptable and
legal methods of conducting remote financial transactions, and more sophisticated equipment
to provide more features, including the apparently contradictory requirements of ease-of-use
and security.
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Timeplex uses wide area network (WAN) and local area network (LAN) telecommunication
technologies to support its business, the technology of managing global enterprise networks,
on behalf of financial trading houses. Timeplex staff continually blend methods, artefacts,
and work organisation routines to deliver their unique flavour of Enterprise Network
Management. In all three organisations artefacts derive their value and relevance from the
more encompassing technology of: education, banking, and telecommunication networks.
Clearly, as Bijker (1995: 231) has noted, deciding which technology is the right one depends
on the questions asked. Is the correct focus 'artefact', 'method', 'work organisation',
'technology in' or 'technology of, or some other concept? Many organisations invest in
particular technologies because they label them as 'strategic', and in deciding whether a
technology is strategic or not organisations are forced to take a broader view than technology
as artefact or technique. When the BoS executive revised their expectations of competition in
the future ATM technology became 'strategic' (see 5.3). This example also shows the
difficulty of, if not futility in, doing market research and cost/benefit analyses of an
unconstituted future. Could BoS ever hope to come up with meaningful answers to questions
about the shape of a future competitive dynamic whose shape would depend on what
strategic actions BoS took, along with other socially relevant groups, primarily competitors,
customers, regulators?
Distinguishing between artefacts, methods, work organisation, 'technology in', or
'technology of', 'strategic' and 'non strategic' can produce arbitrary outcomes, and masks the
importance of the social processes that give meaning to artefacts. As Bijker observes,
distinctions between artefacts, methods, and work organisation "seem to be rather spurious,
[and] where such distinctions hold they are the result of technologists' work rather than being
based upon intrinsic properties of the technologies themselves" (1995: 231). His account of
Dutch coastal engineering and dike building between the 1950s and 1980s show how a
diverse interpretation of technology gives meaning to, and derive meaning from, their
interrelationship in context. His example also shows that the interaction of these diverse
meanings of technology is an on-going source of innovation.
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An interpretation of technology that reflects a diversity of meanings would be more useful in
the quest to better understand the process of managing innovation. In the above examples, the
technologies are interdependent, one giving meaning to the other in context. Separating them
would distort understanding of technological change. Technology is an extricable part of
social processes, because as Rosenberg says "in a fundamental sense, the history of technical
progress is inseparable from the history of civilization itself, dealing as it does with human
efforts to raise productivity under an extremely diverse range of environmental conditions"
(1982: 3). Similarly Goransson in his examination of the success of new industries in
developing countries suggests that "no society could exist without applying at least a
minimum of technology" (1993: 4). A useful way of capturing the social dimension and
thereby the interpretive flexibility of technology is provided by Pacey's (1983) 'technology-
practice' .
9.3.2 Technology-practice
Pacey (1983) also considers such distinctions to be problematic, and offers a useful way of
organising our thinking about technology. In arguing that technology is not culturally neutral,
he suggests a distinction between 'technology' and 'technology-practice'. The former reflects
the narrow meaning, and includes knowledge, skills, technique, and resources including
people. The latter describes an interrelationship between two additional "aspects" of
technology: culture and organisation, though as discussed in 7.2.1 this thesis prefers 'social
reality' to 'culture'. Technology-practice is an inclusive concept in the same way that Hughes
sees large scale technological developments are being more meaningfully understood as
sociotechnical system (2.6.2). Pacey's distinction allows us to discuss the broadly similar yet
relatively distinct practices of technology in each organisation; all three organisations depend
on some form of information and communication technology, but in very different
competitive settings. In these broader terms technological change includes aspects of
organisation and culture.
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In support of 'technology-practice' as a useful concept, Pacey draws on the established
notion of 'medical practice', where the broader meaning allows "vigorous discussion to take
place about different ways of serving the community" (1983: 4). He gives examples where
artefacts (snowmobiles and water pumps) have to be modified to work effectively in different
environments. Such environments are not just physically different; they are different
communities with different social and economic values. Similarly in this analysis,
technology-practice allows us to examine how, as an integral part of strategy practice, its
interpretive flexibility contributes to differing socially constructed realities. The notion of
technology-practice also helps us to explore the different ways that strategy is shaped by, and
in turn shapes, technology-practice. Indeed this way of thinking about technology-practice
seems to resonate with the notion of 'fit', a concept at the heart of prescriptive strategic
management.5 Technology-practice, like 'fit', addresses the interdependence of values,
creative activity, economic activity, organisation, and productive relationships with other
relevant social groups like customers, collaborators, and regulators.
Relating strategy and technology-practice in this way, as overlapping processes, opens up the
danger of saying that the two are indistinguishable, and even that strategy is technology. For
the purposes of this analysis there is an important difference between the two. Whatever else
strategy may be, it is also a social process for the legitimate expression of preferences about
the organisation's development. Technology-practice and technological innovation are
largely a realisation of that expression. Strategy is a purposive process while technology is a
directed process. This is not to say that technology-practice is entirely plastic, being pushed
this way and that according to the whims of strategists. The relationship is socially
constructed, not unidirectional. Strategy leads but in ways that are at the same time shaped by
previously assimilated knowledge and technology-practice.
Miller and Duffy, two managers within the Bank of Scotland's Management Services
Division, suggest that internal IT strategy discussions about changing the Bank's information
5 Strategic management teaches the centrality of 'fit', telling managers to match their resources to the external
environment's opportunities and threats, and to seek a 'fit' internally between strategy, structure, and culture.
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processing architecture from centralised to distributed processing were being hampered by an
ingrained 'administrative philosophy', and long established capabilities based on centralised
processing (5.3.3). Miller's and Duffy's observations gives a glimpse of how the Bank's
history, culture, technological practices, and administrative philosophy have shaped, and
continue to shape thinking; a history that is embedded in the work organisation practice of
today. The sense of technology, organisation, and culture being interrelated in this way rings
of Pacey's (1983) 'technology-practice', rather than discrete components of banking
practices, organisation structure, and technological artefacts all bumping into each other.
How the Bank's IT strategy will develop over the coming years is already being influenced
by existing technology-practice.
The technology-practice of each organisation is in a state of flux, yet at the same time
remains as distinct sociotechnical systems of people, knowledge, things, processes, values,
ideas. For example, as noted earlier various committees within OBS are agonising over what
form their future technology-practice should take: what technology, how should they be
organised, whether their values and beliefs about progress are helping or hindering
technological development. Some departments, impatient with what they regard as the slow
and lumbering decision making machinery of the broader Open University structure, have
either committed to particular changes or started to experiment with different technologies.
Most of these excursions and developments are possible because the Open University exists
as a tension between administrative hierarchy and academic freedom.
The Technology Faculty has introduced its own small scale printing and copying facility and
loose leaf teaching material (6.6.4). They see a future where the demand for course variety is
greater, with each course consequently attracting fewer people. In addition, they see a
competitive advantage in being able to update course material as a continuous activity, rather
than infrequent major changes with everyone having to live with material becoming
progressively out of date. Such excursions, experiments, and independent actions represent
technology-practice in flux and development. At the same time the social reality of OBS and
the broader Open University remains supported by, and continues to support, a stable
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technology-practice. Courses continue to take almost two years to write, are delivered as
bound units, and because of the large investment in time and production, must have a life of
about five years or more. Some even suggest that as the Open University bureaucracy has
grown, course production time has also expanded. Some think that courses take longer to
produce today than say ten or fifteen years ago! In defence of the establishment, others argue
that the variety and quantity of courses on offer fifteen years ago is a fraction of what is
available today.
9.3.3 Interpretive flexibility of technology-practice
Clearly, social process is explicit in technology-practice. To press the argument further, there
has been broad agreement for some time among writers on the sociology of science and
technology, that the separation of technology and social process is inappropriate for the study
of technological innovation. In their study of the historical development of the bicycle, Pinch
and Bijker (1984) suggest that technology carries interpretive flexibility. People may have
alternative perspectives: the way they think, what they regard as facts, and how artefacts are
designed. Implicit in this view is that artefacts and technological development generally are
the outcome of competing or co-operative social processes. Indeed any given artefact is an
embodiment of particular social preferences, and in this sense there is no technologically
determined core.
Schwarz and Thompson (1990: 15), in their study of national technology policy development
practices, note three assumptions that underpin most studies on technological decision
making: that technology has a substantive core; that choice centres on the impacts that the
substantive quality of technology has on society; that technology is exogenous to social
processes. In their view this narrow interpretation of technology, as somehow inelastic and
exogenous to social processes, is undermined by at least three related factors. First,
technology-practice, like medical practice, reflects socio-cognitive commitments; 'facts' are
socially defined. Second, technological change also grows out of the convergence of
subjectively available capabilities and the exigencies of an enacted reality, both social and
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material. Third, technology-practice in the 'here and now' reflects historical commitments to
particular developmental directions, the currently perceived needs of the business, and
expectations for the future. These three areas warrant some detailed consideration.
9.3.4 The indeterminacy of facts and values
The distinction between technological facts and social values is indeterminate and arbitrary.
Where one begins and the other stops is impossible to define; it is slippery or "inchoate"
(Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 149). Thus facts are always incomplete, reflecting
evaluations involving knowledge claims, social and personal assumptions, and are always
open to multiple interpretations and revision. The indeterminacy of facts and values
discussed here is distinct from Simon's (1957) position. Whereas Simon argues that facts and
values are inseparability because of limits on time and information available, here their
inseparability rests on the idea that facts are necessarily value laden and socially defined. The
impossibility of separating facts from values is evident in that strategic choices about the
future do not leap out as self evident, as inescapable truths that practitioners read off. This
can be seen when practitioners try to assess the potential of a new market, or try to define the
technical difficulties of using an unfamiliar technology, or seek to estimate the cost and time
to generate the first production unit. BoS's actions over its ATM commitment presents this as
a strategic dilemma. The 'facts' in the form of a 'correct' decision stabilised for a while but
the BoS executive subsequently revised the value of those facts in light of competitive action.
As the ATM example shows, practitioners of BoS and the Royal Bank of Scotland can have
very different anticipations of the future, depending on what assumptions they make, what
information they use, and how they interpret it. Having different anticipations may seem
reasonable since the two banks are different organisations. However the same interpretive
flexibility of facts and values can be found within the same organisation. For example, it was
abundantly clear to Shaw, Timeplex's UK Sales Director, that their customers' future internal
financial transactions and information flows would require their telecommunication
installations to consist of thousands of low value modems. Further, in the scenario of Shaw
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and his sales colleagues, income streams would depend on Service with "the products tucked
in behind". He could not understand the continued commitment by his leaders in the USA, to
high value modems for low volume applications. Nor could he understand why they were
investing billions of dollars in new products, and relatively little in developing a Service
oriented infrastructure. The commitment of his leaders is rooted in different assumptions
about how the future will look, and about the best way to compete in that world. He did not
share those commitments.
9.3.5 Subjectively available capabilities and enacted reality
In addition to a particular organisation's technology-practice being embedded with particular
assumptions, such practice also carry implicit commitments to multiple developmental
options that transcend organisational boundaries. As noted above (9.3.2) all three
organisations studied use information and telecommunications technologies, but in
fundamentally different ways. Move one level down, so to speak, from this common base
line of telecommunication and computer technologies, and look within the Bank's existing
technology-practice. We find that the basis of a remote banking capability was in large part
laid down in the aftermath of BoS's decision during the 1970s to invest in ATM technology.
The Home Banking capability emerged and was given meaning by the juxtaposition of three
factors. First, anomalies in the competitive environment, in the form of the English banks
entering Scotland. Second, subjectively available technical and organisational elements that
could be reconfigured to constitute an appropriate technological response. Third, serendipity
or "accident and sagacity" (Remer, 1965); the Bank executives' judgement in successfully
marrying the first two factors.6 The Bank's success in its response can be measured as the
degree of usefulness that potential customers, other banks, and BoS itself derived from the
convergence of these three factors. Observers hailed Home Banking as an innovation. This
6 From the fairy tale 'The Three Princes of Serendip' "As their highnesses travelled they were always making discoveries by
accident and sagacity of things they were not in quest of'. Remer's (1965: 6) English translation.
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recognition lent legitimacy to BoS's response, and at the same time encouraged other
financial institutions to develop a remote banking capability.
In formulating a response to the threat to their home market, the Bank's executive remained
committed to 'stewardship', but they recognised that the banking industry's traditional recipe
for growth of increasing the Branch network, would be too costly, and would take too long.
Something had to be done. The General Manager of Centrebank said "when the English
banks came across the Scottish border, we scratched around to see how we could respond.
We could not afford to open Branches all over England, and we had most of the technology
lying around, so we decided to try it". This example suggests that the Bank's technology-
practice could be configured in many ways, depending on how the Bank's executive interpret
the exigencies of their reality. In dealing with a new competitive scenario, the success of the
Bank's strategy practice has been its ability to create relationships and meanings from its
technology-practice that did not exist before, and "to integrate and motivate [its resources and
capabilities] in order to exploit their inherent potential for innovation" (Grant, 1995: 288).7
Traditionally within Timeplex's technology-practice, many services are unintentionally
provided freely with the product, particularly technical advice. During the last decade, as part
of the fashion of 'downsizing', 'de-integration', and generally looking for ways to cut
overheads, many companies have been contracting suppliers like Timeplex to take over the
management of their telecommunication networks. Timeplex Customer Support recognises
this as an opportunity to expand its existing range of technical support capabilities, and to
charge for a broader range of services. In addition the Professional Services department was
emerging as a response to the possibility of taking over and charging for these services and
the creation of new ones, whether based on Timeplex's or other competitors' products.
In these examples the development of technology-practice is conditioned by the interplay of
an enacted reality of the 'here and now', and the collective's creativity in formulating and
applying new configurations of its technology-practice. The capabilities of technology-
n
Grant was describing the role of innovation in competitive advantage in technology-intensive industries.
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practice is not simply a box of pre determined technical choices based on accumulated
knowledge. These capabilities are composed of various "aspects" (Pacey, 1983: 6) of
practice: technical, economic (for example experience curve gains), and social commitments.
9.3.6 Heritage, exigencies, and expectations
Particular technology-practices also grow out of a combination of the ongoing assimilation of
collective experience (Fleck L., 1979) and capabilities, rather than being logical extensions of
some inherent qualities of artefacts, as may be implied by the notion of 'technological
trajectory', or an independent technological agenda (2.6.1). The Bank uses its Management
Services Division (MSD) to support its banking enterprise, and since strategy practice is
progressive, subsequent demands on MSD build on previously established banking expertise
and structures that reflect earlier developments of technology-practice: taken for granted
theories about what constitutes good banking practice, artefacts, methods, work organisation,
and control systems. While practice is being guided by heritage, the ongoing assimilation of
experience and capabilities keeps the development of practice open to new configurations.
For example, although Browning of BoS, maintains that the Bank remains committed to
centralised processing, others are exploring an open systems architecture (5.3.3). Although
Richardson, Deputy General Manager ofMSD, is adamant that MSD's role is to support
divisional business needs, some Operating Divisions want more control over their
information, because individually they see their Divisions competing in increasingly
divergent competitive environments, and feel that a centralised support system is often too
inflexible and costly. For example, they can buy some software off-the-shelfmore cheaply
than it would cost MSD to develop. As the cost of computer processing power continues to
fall, and individual Divisions develop in technologically diverse directions, meeting their
different expectations may increasingly become a constraint on their growth, or MSD may
play an increasingly diminished role within the Bank, or MSD's role may develop in
different and currently unanticipated ways.
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Nevertheless, current thinking among the Bank's executive is that allowing each division too
much autonomy could lead to duplication of IT resources and increased overhead cost for
those divisions that do use MSD. Furthermore the Bank's capabilities and structures in
centralised processing far outweighs its capabilities in distributed processing. The existing
work organisation, reporting and control methods, and repertoire of competences and tacit
knowledge are all rooted in centralised processing, and have been refined over decades. The
development of the Bank's technology-practice is being guided by historical commitments in
tension with differentiated divisional perspectives on today's and tomorrow's business needs,
rather than any logically determined consequences of hardware choices.
The technology-practice of OBS is inherited from the Open University. The socially
constructed reality of OBS is at the same time shared with, yet quite distinct from, that of the
Open University. An important difference is the OBS's sense of being market driven, as is
reflected in its marketing and sales organisation and competitive pricing of courses. The OBS
technology-practice is at the same time legitimised by the usefulness that the management
education sector attaches to its courses, and the existence of an enterprise culture that
supports management education and training. Evidence of the legitimacy of the OBS
approach is its claim to account for 40% of all UK distance learning programmes (6.2.1), and
the public appetite for new books, videos, television programmes, and executive courses on
all kinds of management topics seems to continue unabated.
Suggesting that technology-practice has interpretive flexibility does not mean that all
possible futures are obtainable. The development of technology-practice is shaped by:
constructed boundaries between facts and values; by the convergence of subjectively
available capabilities and the objectified exigencies of 'the here and now'; and by the
perceived needs of tomorrow's business environment in tension with heritage.
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9.3.7 Failure
Failure like anomalies is an unavoidable prospect and feature of the interpretive flexibility of
technology-practice. Failure may occur when stakeholders cannot agree on what the problem
is, what the facts are, and what method should be used to deal with it. Witness the continuing
conflict over British 'mad cow disease' within the European Union. Failure may be due to
technical, organisational or taken for granted theories of good practice. Timeplex's
'escalation log' exists as an organisational solution to a resource problem. This register of
installation problems exists because there are not enough engineers available to successfully
install all new systems as fast as the sales people are able to generate orders, an
organisational failure in itself. This solution fails from time to time as promises to customers
that their system will be 'up and running by next Tuesday' cannot be met for a variety of
reasons: engineers are committed to other projects; replacement products are not yet
available; even if products are available, major network bugs continue to frustrate engineers'
efforts. In addition, sometimes customer dissatisfaction forces Timeplex to rearrange the
priority of their work. These failures can be understood in terms of the company's shared
reality. In Timeplex engineers, sales people, and managers, all share a commitment to the
pursuit of novelty and interesting technical and commercial opportunities, more than
maintenance of the mundane. The escalation log represents mundane work compared to sales
opportunities or new technical fixes, and in Timeplex this log sits uncomfortably with their
shared sense of entrepreneurialism.
Sometimes failure in technology-practice is due to resistance to change, where the resistance
is rooted in taken for granted theories of good practice, but disguised as more practical
concerns (Pacey, 1983: 11). Traditionally there is a division of labour between writing and
editing courses (the author's job), and the formatting of text (the secretary's job). This
division of labour is supported through union and 'civil service rules'. The increasing
sophistication of computer software makes it possible for authors to write within prepared
formats, and for secretaries to manage some aspects of editing and develop a broader
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production management function. The advent of electronic mail also makes the production of
hard copies and disk copies during drafting an unnecessary administrative burden.
In light of these technical and organisational possibilities the continuance of the division of
labour between author and secretary looks increasingly spurious. However changes in
working practices are proving difficult because of ingrained practices. Many academics
express concern about giving any editorial function to secretarial and administrative staff,
and the latter voice their concern that their traditional roles are in danger of disappearing.
These are fears about loosing control of existing competences and responsibilities, and fears
about being able to develop new competences in a publishing context that is itself in a
developmental state. Theories of good practice are being rewritten, but no one is clear about
what the new rules should look like. Nevertheless, the OBS leadership is intent on reducing
the course production time, to which end the OBS leadership and union representatives
(administrative and academic) have for some time been negotiating a route through this
difficulty. In this negotiated process the OBS leadership seeks changes to existing working
practices, including the adoption of appropriate software and hardware, while protectors of
existing technology-practice aim to wring concessions from the proponents of the new
practice.
9.3.8 Section conclusions
A narrow interpretation of technology increases the possibilities of failure because it ignores
the 'seamless web' character of the sociotechnical (2.6.2). The broader definition of
technology-practice on the other hand goes some way toward anticipating the constellation of
opportunities and interesting dilemmas that underpin innovation processes. Technology-
practice when crystallised as particular artefacts or work organisation arrangements do shape
as well as reflect particular social and economic preferences. In designing the next iteration
of software and hardware, or in reshuffling the Customer Support organisation, practitioners
start from the sociotechnical commitments they have. Even when they decide to a make a
major leap (for example for BoS to embrace open systems networking, or for Timeplex to
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successfully develop their Advanced Technologies), they still start with substantive elements,
but a substantiveness that itself has interpretive flexibility.
More broadly, practitioners also create their social reality through the interpretive nature of
technology-practice, but there are limits. While each organisation has made technological
leaps, such as Home Banking, a switch from banking to telecommunications networking is
likely to require such a fundamental change of technology-practice that we might talk of a
switch of social realities. Chapter 10 explores how alternative social realities constrain as
well as provide the scope for innovative behaviour.
9.4 STRATEGIC INTENT
If practitioners construct their shared reality through practice, a reality that at the same time
guides practice, then within this context strategic intent and revealed performance are also
socially constructed. This section examines the nature of intent in terms of goal seeking or
goal setting behaviour, and the extent to which revealed performance is a logical and
computational consequence of strategic intent, or is socially shaped.
The notion of strategic intent ignores or masks a range of issues that undermine the very
essence of the rationality of choice, such as the presumption that decision is detached and
value free. Criticism of rationalistic strategy is widespread. Following Simon (1957), the
limitations and assumptions of rational choice are widely recognised. For example, they
show that individuals and groups work within limits of cognition, communication,
incomplete knowledge, and habits (see also 2.3.3). Moreover, in constructing social reality,
practitioners also 'bracket' the flow of their individual and collective experiences (James,
1950;Weick, 1979). They selectively organise and give meaning to the morass of data and
information that is part of their everyday experience.
People in organisations try to sort this chaos into items, events, and parts which
are then connected, threaded into sequences, serially ordered, and related. When
we create serial orders we often find relations that were never presented to the
senses at all (Weick, 1979: 148, 149).
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The construction of the analytical story of this thesis is a good example of bracketing;
deciding what is and is not relevant, and imposing connections on the empirical evidence.
The intended outcome seems to become more clear through attaching meaning to experiences
in the present, and many seemingly reasonable meanings may be imposed on the present. On
this basis and the foregoing analyses, it seems that strategic intent is open to negotiation.
'Emergent strategies' do not depose 'intended strategies' (Mintzberg, 1978a) because they
are better, but because of the scope for alternative interpretations and expressions of heritage,
the exigencies of the present, and anticipations of things to come. The process of bracketing
is itself an 'accomplishment' (Garfinkel, 1967), something involving taken for granted skills,
and probably contribute to the creation of new organising metaphors.
In bracketing and ordering their flow of experiences, the practitioners in this study seem to
orient their everyday reality around a mixture of intent and rules of thumb. The following
sub-section assesses the extent to which strategic intent is about goal seeking or goal setting,
and the role of heuristics therein.
9.4.1 Goal seeking, goal setting, and heuristics
Schwarz and Thompson reject "goal seeking" or rational maximisation theories of decision
making as being "too tidy [because they] ignore the dynamics and ambiguity involved in
policy processes" (1990: 50). They equally reject the 'garbage can' model of decision making
(March and Olsen, 1976) as being too relativistic, too anarchistic because it ignores the
political and economic imperatives that give strategy its purposive character. Organisations
do have to account for their actions, and since many do survive long enough to become
household names they must be having some success in justifying their continued existence.
Schwarz and Thompson (1990: 52) suggest a sort of mid-way model of 'constrained
relativism', which replaces 'goal seeking' with 'goal setting'. In this they are moving the
focus from evaluating performance in terms of degrees of maximisation achieved, to
evaluative criteria that measure more fuzzy variables: sharability, credibility, and
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accountability.8 These criteria are unlikely to cover the diversity of performance dimensions
of an organisation, but they do go some way toward reflecting the profoundly social nature of
strategy practice.
While 'goal setting' seems to account for political legitimation of strategy choice, it does not
account for the fundamental uncertainty and interpretive flexibility of technological change.9
There is a sense of rational selection from a range of alternatives, based on access to the
'facts', albeit politically legitimised. Goal setting (and certainly goal seeking) seems to ignore
the extent to which choice is intentionally or unintentionally delegated to elaborate
procedures and rules of thumb (Nelson and Winter, 1977). In this way uncertainty is by
default reduced to risk assessment, and scope for interpretive flexibility is closed down or
programmed out. This can be seen in the Open University's attempts to develop a 'resource
flow model' (6.5.3), and discussed below.
The organisations studied here evaluated their decisions in a variety of ways. The BoS
Divisions give more importance to goal setting (procedural rationality), with goal seeking
(substantive rationality) being regarded as achievable outcomes as long as continuous
attention to detail and stewardship is maintained. The OBS also seems to pay greater
attention to goal setting, something that is enshrined in its equal opportunities philosophy,
and open and distributed access to decision making. Against this position, goal seeking seems
to be a self imposed discipline, with revealed performance (including income generating
success and student registration numbers, research rating) used as symbols of the OBS's
independence of the parent Open University, and as evidence of being a major force in the
competitive environment.
Although BoS claims to have abandoned formal strategic planning many years ago, its social
reality carries many vestiges of those times of top down control; further evidence of the
8 Various criteria for evaluating strategy making exist: Johnson and Scholes' (1989) Suitability, Feasibility, Acceptability;
Rumelt's (Mintzberg et. al., 1995: 92) Consistency, Consonance, Advantage, Feasibility; the Civil Service 'four Es'
(efficiency, economy, effectiveness, equity).
9 MacKenzie (1992) suggests that uncertainty and 'interpretive flexibility' relate to similar concerns.
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temporal continuity of social reality discussed in 8.3 and 8.4. Divisional autonomy and
'opportunism' are commonly presented by Bank staff as unique characteristics of the Bank.
Despite this, Campbell of the International Division remains well aware of the importance of
legitimation from the Management Board as he considers his options for growing his
division. Also Browning's statement that the Bank remains committed to centralised data
processing, whatever divergent views individual divisions may have, is reminiscent of top
down strategic planning.
Heuristics are also an important and very visible aspect of BoS strategy practice. Projects
labelled as 'non-strategic' by the Management Board routinely pass through the Management
Services Division's elaborate and formal cost/benefit analysis procedure. The project
assessment and selection process is very sophisticated and it seems likely that the procedure
shapes strategy choice as much as choice shapes the procedure, as evidenced by the reversal
of the decision not to invest in ATM capabilities. More formally, a decision that is labelled
'strategic' in BoS acquires that status from the Bank's formal executive, the Management
Board. 'Strategic' labelling seems to involve judgements in advance of any rule following,
akin to Garfinkel's (1967) 'accomplishment' (9.2.5).
In OBS strategic actions may by proposed by its executive, but closing a decision rests on
getting consensus from the breadth of OBS and sometimes from the Open University's
Senate. Achieving this closure takes place formally and informally, with the latter being the
critical mechanism as individuals posture, bargain with the "movers and shakers" (in the
words of one member), coerce the politically weak, and co-operate with each other prior to
and after formal decisions. Whatever their differences, political legitimation seems to be a
very important element of goal setting for both BoS and OBS.
In Timeplex 'goal seeking' seems to be more prominent, with 'goal setting' being a luxury to
be accommodated during the good times. Timeplex managers and engineers are much more
focused on the colour of the 'bottom line', both in pursuit of individual hidden agendas and
in pursuit of company financial targets. These targets are often imposed on managers, and
may bear little relation to formal submissions of budgetary requirements and sales forecasts.
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How these targets are achieved are entirely at the discretion of the budget or forecast holder,
including firing staff at short notice or entering promising commercial deals without recourse
to senior executives.
While Timeplex may be characterised as 'goal seeking' and OBS as 'goal setting', in both
organisations, as with BoS, 'rules of thumb' are an integral part of strategic choice. The sense
that such heuristics do shape strategy choice is reflected in the OBS's growing dissatisfaction
with what they see as the arbitrariness and distorting effects in the parent organisation's
allocation of overheads (see 6.5.3). Indeed the basis of the allocation has been lost in history,
and many believe they have not been revised as the university has developed. The rules
governing travel expenses is one example of this: one may claim business travel costs from
the University's site in Milton Keynes to anywhere, but not from one's home address to the
same destination.
Like most large organisations Timeplex has many manuals of procedures. However, from a
strategy choice perspective probably the most influential heuristic is 'anything goes'.10 As
Hammond, Human Resources Manager of Timeplex says, there are a lot of "constituency
builders" in the company looking for an opportunity; people who are always looking for
alliances and who "thrive in [this] environment, they love this sort of environment because it
isn't structured" (see 4.5.2).
If strategy practice in BoS is likened to an old and well ordered metropolis, where
governance is underpinned by common and statute law, strategy practice in Timeplex is akin
to the wild west, populated with frontier people who make up the rules as they go. Having
discussed the nature of strategic intent goal seeking and goal setting, the next sub-section
assesses the extent to which revealed performance is driven by strategic intent in a
determinate sense.
10 Some might argue that 'any thing goes' is not a heuristic because it is not deliberate. The response to that challenge is
that, in the context of this organisation's social reality, 'anything goes' is a meaningful guide to action.
9.4.2 Revealed performance
Rational accounts of firm behaviour claim a direct link between strategic intent and revealed
performance. Corporate reports give details of annual financial performance, new product
introductions, growth in market share and assets. These 'facts and figures' are all provided as
evidence of the performance of strategic intent. Ascom, Timeplex's parent, for example,
describes its influence on the telecommunications market:
Ascom continues to invest a substantial proportion of its turnover in research and
development. This reinforces the group's reputation for high quality products and
service which have been built up over many years (Ascom: A company profile,
ref AUK/4/93).
The promotional literature goes on to describe how during the 1980s Ascom introduced a
new data transmission system for connection to the ISDN, and that British Telecomm bought
that system. It became the "backbone" of BT's KiloStream transmission system. In this
example, Ascom has collaborated with BT to shape part of the telecommunications
environment, which at the same time has shaped its own subjective view about the value of
its R&D investment.
Such accounts suggest the successful accomplishment of an intended strategy, but is it so?
The evidence is that this is a far from straightforward question. As discussed earlier, some
studies suggest that success comes from industry structure and competitive positioning, while
others suggest that superior profitability depends on how individual business use their
resources and capabilities (see 2.4 and 9.2.1). In concluding that practitioners' actions do
make a difference, Rumelt speculates that this might be due to "product-specific reputation,
team-specific learning, a variety of first-mover advantages, causal ambiguity that limits
effective imitation, and other special conditions" (1991: 180). Beyond Rumelt's speculation
there is little evidence that this success is due to strategic intent in any deterministic and
computational sense.
In support of Rumelt's suggestion there is evidence of learning and contingent adaptation.
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) longitudinal study of decision making in Volkswagen and the
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National Film Board of Canada shows that quite often different 'realised' strategies 'emerge'
regardless of intent. In a different context Fleck J. (1992), and Fleck et, al,. (1990) shows that
the implementation of CAM, robotics and other technologies involve a significant amount of
innovation to get them to work, rather than the unproblematic realisation of intent. However,
the following accounts show that revealed performance is more than learning and adapting to
an objective reality. Political processes, accounting practices, self-fulfilling prophecies, and
socio-cognitive commitments also shape practitioners' revealed performance and strategic
intent.
9.4.3 Constructing performance
As argued earlier political behaviour plays a significant role in shaping strategy (8.4.5).
Knights and Morgan argue that there is no correlation between strategy intent and outcomes
"except in the rationalised accounts of strategists whose identities as well as material
privileges are tied to an interpretation of the success of strategic management" (1990: 482).
Since those that are accountable for performance have a vested interest in showing a positive
correlation then conscious attempts to construct favourable stories are unavoidable. Senior
managers of Timeplex are adept at 'sand-bagging', moving budgets around in space and time
to achieve expected performances. It is also a competitive game. Some of Timeplex's senior
managers keep a critical eye on each other's financial forecasts. At least one senior manager
has laid claim to a colleague's job and department claiming that the colleague is 'sand¬
bagging' or submitting unrealistically low forecasts to make his quarterly financial
performance look good.
During the last two years the Open University's Faculties have been unable to agree on a
common method of accounting for income and expenses ('resource flow models' come and
go), because each possible model carries a package of differentiated costs and benefits for
each Faculty. All parties recognise that their future performance will be defined by the way
they configure the university's resource flow model today. The OBS wants a model that
reflects its financial contribution to the university, and wants more control over the use of its
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income. OBS also wants the current method of calculating overhead allocation to be
reviewed because it claims to be carrying a disproportionate share of the costs against actual
use. Some other Faculty representatives feel that the University as a whole is more important
than its individual parts, and perhaps overheads should be spread according to ability to
contribute or relative income levels between Faculties. Some others suggest that individual
Faculties should make a contribution for the exploitable value of the University's reputation;
a veiled reference to OBS' performance being due to its parent's reputation.
In this example and the 'cross charging' between Divisions within Timeplex (4.5.5),
practitioners are well aware that their value to the organisation depends to a greater or lesser
extent on how profit and costs are defined: Timeplex's Customer Support Division will
attract more resources (engineers, managers, investment) if they can show income growth
from their activities; OBS will look more or less profitable depending on whatever resource
flow model is developed; and the design of model will shape the scope for innovation across
the whole University. As MacKenzie shows, the meaning of profit changes with accounting
practice, and can "channel innovation" (1992: 37) toward reshaping revealed and
unsatisfactory cost structures. Where labour intensive operations are regarded as higher than
automated operations this is often seen as a reason to increase automation. In choosing a
resource flow model the Open University leadership cannot know in advance the
consequences of its decision, even with the most sophisticated scenario testing techniques.
Nevertheless, future strategic choices will be shaped by the design of resource flow model,
encouraging and discouraging particular innovation opportunities that cannot be determined
in advance.
9.4.4 Virtuous circles
Strategic intent is also often imputed to what is a virtuous circle (Knights and Morgan, 1990;
MacKenzie, 1992). For example, organisations may perceive the market developing in a new
way, and develop strategies to facilitate that perceived development. The market then reflects
that anticipation back to its suppliers.
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Timeplex has formed the view that a new technology (Advanced Technologies) based on a
synthesis of LAN and WAN is needed if they are to compete in the future. They are
developing new products and training staff to exploit this new technology, and telling
customers that this is the way ahead. Customers in turn are evaluating competing
telecommunication network suppliers on the basis of their progress in this new direction. In
other words, Timeplex and its competitors' intended strategy is part of a self-fulfilling loop
of anticipating certain market expectations, persuading customers and themselves that
Advanced Technologies is the next technological step, selecting confirmatory evidence,
refining strategy to meet those anticipated expectations that they helped create.
Timeplex's Advanced Technologies is not gathering momentum or following some
technological trajectory because of any inherent technical superiority but "because of the
interests that develop in its continuance and the belief that it will continue. Its continuance
becomes embedded in actors' frameworks of calculation and routine behaviour, and it
continues because it is thus embedded" (MacKenzie, 1992: 34). Nelson and Winter (1977:
57) suggests that where heuristics facilitate successful technological development, such
incremental learning reinforces the continued use of those heuristics. Like MacKenzie they
argue that it is technicians' beliefs about what is feasible that maintains their commitment to
a particular line of technological development. Relatedly, Rosenberg (1982) and David
(1975) in their studies of technical progress found that future choices are shaped by localised
learning-by-doing rather than by managers optimising from all possible options.
In suggesting that strategic intent exhibits self-fulfilling properties is not to say that
practitioners are deluding themselves. Social groups (buyers, suppliers, regulators,
competitors) define their relevance to, and contribute to the construction of, a particular
social reality by buying into the same presumption of logic. During the 1970s and 1980s
house prices in Britain rose at a progressively alarming rate. Home owners saw their home as
an investment opportunity, moving house every two or three years or less. Building Societies,
the main source of home loans, confirmed the rise in house prices through their monthly and
quarterly surveys. House prices continued to rise because buyers, loan providers, and estate
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agents believed they would rise. Similarly, the financial markets maintain their growth
through the same loop of anticipation, confirmation, and reinforced anticipation, crashing
when confidence in the continuance of that growth evaporates.
Self-fulfilling processes are not always virtuous circles. Sometimes they may be vicious
circles. In Timeplex Hammond's "constituency builders" actively and consciously seek to
manipulate the company's 'grapevine'. As described earlier one person had started a rumour
that others were about to be made redundant, saying that "rumours can become self-
fulfilling"(4.5.2)!
9.4.5 Section conclusions
Whether strategic intent takes the form of goal seeking or goal setting, it is bound up with
heuristics; 'rules of thumb' that shape choice, formally or informally, and give legitimacy to
strategic choice. Heuristics may be taken for granted, surviving unchanged over time,
whether or not an organisation has formally changed its way of working, as for example
strategic planning in BoS, or accounting practices in OBS.
The evidence suggests that there is no deterministic relationship from strategic intent to
revealed performance. While there is evidence that firms owe their success to how they use
their resources and capabilities, rather than it being at the whim of industry structure, there is
weak evidence that that success is due to determinate control of their destiny. Revealed
performance is as much a product of practitioners bracketing their flow of experiences, often
retrospectively, politics, self-fulfilling prophecies, and shared commitments and expectations
among competitors, customers, and other relevant social groups.
9.5 MAIN CONCLUSIONS
In conceiving of strategy as a resource for solving problems 'rational' practitioners get more
than they bargain for. Practitioners of OBS, BoS, and Timeplex, necessarily if unknowingly
accomplish not only their material reality but also their social reality through the creative
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exercise and development of their capabilities. In this process practitioners' judgements and
choices are unceasingly shaped by diverse streams of spatial and temporal resources that they
remain only dimly aware of. Individual and collective judgements are imbued with taken for
granted skills and practices, heritage, and their anticipation of 'things to come'; shared
meaning and at the same time differentiated social values, shared capabilities and
differentiated assessments of those capabilities.
Capabilities shape social and material reality through various factors including: the creation
and assimilation of knowledge that is rooted in social values; knowledge that grows out of
the interaction between our subjectivity and an enacted reality; the openness of socio-
cognitive structures to interpretation and expression; the interpretive flexibility of technology
and technology-practice. These considerations are not defined by the formal organisational
boundary, but bound up with the tradability of capabilities, managerial socio-economic
preferences, and institutionalised relationships, both formal and informal, between a range of
sectoral stakeholders, including managers, shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers,
and regulators.
Debates about whether trajectories reflect institutional commitments or technological or
economic imperatives, obscure the extent to which social, economic, and technological
factors are inseparable. Practitioners construct boundaries between facts and values;
boundaries that shape knowledge creation, and the crystallisation of that knowledge as socio-
cognitive structures and heuristics. Growth, whether corporate or sectoral, evaporates for the
same reason that it is maintained: through increasingly differentiated economic and
technological assessments of situations and events, and a wavering of socio-cognitive
commitments to 'the way we do things around here', rather than through some technical veto
or the obvious clarity of facts. Revealed performance can be accounted for more by these
complex processes than by the imputed computational force of strategic intent.
There is evidence in this analysis that the three organisations approach the practice of
strategy differently. For example, differences in trading capabilities (9.2.4), the expected
practice for the creative development of the organisation (9.2.5), and the different
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assumptions about strategic intent (9.4.1). Chapter 10 explores these differences, comparing





Chapters 8 and 9 show that for all three organisations strategy practice constructs and reflects
a shared reality about how to co-operate and compete; a reality that while stable always
remains provisional because of the interplay of a host of socio-cognitive processes (ch. 8).
The influence of these processes transcends practitioners' attempts to order and systematise
strategy temporally into the elements of analysis, evaluation of possible options, followed by
implementation. Indeed for this reason strategic choice is better described as 'social choice'.
Making sense of social choice means understanding the social reality that gives meaning to
choice.
Fieldwork evidence suggests that social reality is constructed differently in each organisation.
A sense of this difference has surfaced in various places: strategy practice in the Bank of
Scotland seems to have a lot in common with the 'determinate' metaphor of strategy, while
the 'managed chaos' metaphor seems a more appropriate description of practice in Timeplex
(see 4.7 and 5.7); practitioners in the Bank of Scotland were found to share a belief in
stewardship, seeing themselves as caretakers of the Bank, while those in Timeplex share a
more territorial and individualistic outlook (see 8.4.1); strategic intent in the Bank of
Scotland seems to be concerned with refining routines and procedures in pursuit of efficiency
gains, against a tendency in the Open Business School to seek broad consensus in strategy
making and implementation (see 9.4.2). Indeed the social reality of each organisation appears
to have distinctive and discernible characteristics, just as Benedict's primitive communities
make sense of their reality in fundamentally different ways (see 7.2.2). This chapter offers a
systematic exploration of these differences, providing a comparative analysis of the three
organisations' social reality.
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As argued in chapters 7 and 8 the practice of strategy in an organisation is the embodiment of
a way of life for its practitioners; practitioners' sense of value and relevance comes from their
shared reality. Understanding why the practice of strategy is the way it is, why it seems
determinate or managed chaos, requires understanding the way of life that practitioners take
for granted. The general framework used to analyse these differences in social reality
emerged while looking for ways to organise my thinking about how practitioners in the three
organisations seemed to interpret and use the concepts of strategy and innovation differently.
Bloor's 'Wittgenstein: A social theory ofknowledge' offered a way forward, in particular his
analysis of Wittgenstein's 'language games' and 'forms of life', using Douglas' group/grid
framework to show that scientific knowledge creation is shaped by different ways of seeing
the world. From this I explored Douglas' work further, harnessing and adapting it to the
following analysis because it seems to offer ways of making sense of the differences in the
three organisations' social reality.
The chapter is organised as four parts. First an analytical framework for comparing
organisational social reality is introduced. Second, a few other themes that seem to lend
support to the analytical framework are introduced. Then, the behaviour of each
organisation's membership is discusses in terms of this framework. This is followed by a
comparative discussion of practitioner behaviour, drawing on the preceding analysis.
10.2 CHOICE AND SOCIAL REALITY
10.2.1 A typology of social realities
Many writers have developed descriptive frameworks to offer comparative accounts of
various societies and communities, for example cultures (Douglas, 1982a, 1982b), and
political regimes (Swanson, 1967).1 Douglas, a social anthropologist, developed her
'group/grid' construct to describe and compare cultures of entire communities. Her ideas are
1 Ostrander (1982) has usefully tried to collapse many of these accounts into one framework, although some would argue
that the resulting generalisation does some violence to the nuances of individual accounts.
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based on many years of studying the cultures of societies, both 'primitive' and industrial, and
her work has been very influential in a number of different contexts, and at different levels of
aggregation. For example as a tool for assessing the experiences of research scientists moving
from academia to industry (Bloor and Bloor, 1982), and for explaining the rationalities and
conflicts engaged in macro technological policy development (Schwarz and Thompson;
1990: 7).
The analytical framework below (Fig. 10.1) draws on the work of Douglas (1982b). Her
'group/grid' construct provides the basis for comparing organisational social reality. It is a
useful structure because it accommodates the sense that people construct their reality through
the way they work together, their taken for granted practices, and through adherence to
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Fig. 10.1. Social choice: a typology ofsocial realities
The degree to which people may legitimately work alone or whose contribution to their
organisation depends on working collectively, influences the form of an organisation's social
reality. This dimension is labelled 'social commitment'. Juxtaposed with these ways of




together, rules of behaviour that the organisation's members are only dimly aware of and are
taken for granted. This dimension is labelled 'social control'. These considerations produce
four discernible archetypal social realities: Individualist, Egalitarian, Hierarchy, Atomistic.
10.2.2 Social commitment
This defines the importance of group membership and the extent to which group boundaries
represent constraints to the free movement of individuals in and out of a group. It describes
the degree of commitment that individuals give to a group, such as their functional
department or the whole organisation. It is about the balance between the calculated
acceptance of practices, and the internalisation of social values, norms and rules. The
individual's guiding of their own actions to comply with a perceived expectation of others;
the transactional process between individual and organisation.
The rules of admission to a group, and its continued support of its members, may be strong or
weak, explicit and implicit, making membership more or less exclusive. Group commitment
can be rooted in a variety of common concerns. The Bank's group commitment can be
assessed in terms of a common pride in its ancient lineage and the common view that
'stewardship' is needed to ensure the continuity of that heritage. Staff of the Business School
share an almost evangelical commitment to providing open access to education, and equal
opportunity to all comers. It is the norm that staff give some of their time freely or at very
low financial cost. In contrast, Timeplex's employee commitment seems ephemeral, to 'the
bottom line', this months sales of budget performance, and looking after 'number one'. New
people are selected on the basis of their claims to particular expertise and appropriate 'track-
record'. New staff do not have to 'buy in' to Timeplex's mission or philosophy as a condition
for getting the job.
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10.2.3 Social control
This defines the extent of prescriptive behaviour and social control, regulation and formal
controls, both within and outwith the group. Some of these 'dos and don'ts' are abstract,
others more definite rules. Choice over one's actions range from 'freedom of choice'
(civilian) to highly regulated behaviour (military or prison). At one end of the spectrum
relationships and compliance are negotiable, while at the other end everyone knows their
place in the institutional order. The degree of influence or power exerted by the
organisation's socialised membership to ensure that members use their knowledge and
expertise, and fulfil their commitments to the organisation.
10.2.4 Individualist
Low group commitment and low social control means that individuals are free to pursue self
interest, to cross group boundaries in pursuit of establishing and taking part in social
networks. They have a great deal of freedom to negotiate contracts, as is individual mobility
to pursue whatever is currently in fashion for gaining influence and prestige within their
informal network, among peers within and outwith the organisation. Individuals come
together primarily to discuss topics that serve individual or very narrow group interests.
There is much scope for individual entrepreneurial activity and competitiveness characterises
relationships between groups and individuals, within and across the organisational boundary.
Information and knowledge flows follow informal and social networks more than formal
reporting structures. Such flows are minimally inhibited by the formal organisation/ external
environment boundary.
10.2.5 Egalitarian
Whereas the Individualist social reality describes a loose 'association' of 'elements' or
individuals, an Egalitarian social reality is more an association of groups or semi-autonomous
constituencies (Swanson, 1969). Individual independence depends on membership of a
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constituency. Commitment to a group is strong, and is more driven by that commitment than
regulatory Social Control. Internal intra-group boundaries are blurred compared with the
organisation/external environment boundary. While commitment to a constituency
legitimates individual action, individual status is also quite ambiguous and negotiable.
10.2.6 Hierarchy
Commitment to the organisation's values and traditions is strong, with strong social control.
Loyalty is prized and rewarded, hierarchy is respected. Individuals are bound securely by
roles and ascribed authority. Judicial and legislative functions are exercised by one or a few
executives with ascribed authority.
The constraining effect of a highly regulated work environment and strong group control
produces many formal layers of managerial control, and strong internal group boundaries.
The resulting internal compartments channel (some would say 'interfere' with) the flow of
knowledge between compartments and between the organisation as a whole and its external
environment. Social networks are much more stratified than either the Egalitarian or
Individualist reality. The decision makers of this organisation seek ways of improving its
links with the external environment by trying to extend control, using ordered mechanisms.
As Douglas says
some important functions can be discharged by entrepreneurial brokers of
information who are not full members of the central group but who are trusted
representatives, honoured for their successes in pioneering work or delicate
negotiations with outsiders (1982b: 8).
10.2.7 Atomistic
Here the social framework is fully regulated. Like those in a Hierarchical society, people here
do as they are told, and individuals have little or no group affiliation. This might be life as a
manual worker in a 'sweat shop' manufacturing enterprise where union influence is nil, or
life in an HRM Prison. A reality of social domination seems very appropriate here.
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Attempts to manage prisons as a form of private enterprise is an innovation. One may
speculate that the attempt also produces a clash of realities, resulting in anomalies whose
resolution is a common learning experience for both realities. The problems of Group-4 and
its contract with the Government to manage various aspects of the prison service comes to
mind.
10.3 RESONANCE BETWEEN THIS FRAMEWORK AND OTHER THEMES
There is a sense of resonance between these exemplars, and ideas that have developed quite
independently in different intellectual disciplines. Schwarz and Thompson (1990) has
attempted a very useful correlation between these exemplars and various separate streams of
ideas. Some of these reinforce or help to shed additional light on the analysis.
10.3.1 Economic transactions
Some writers have studied the economic transactional relationships between the organisation
and the outside world. Williamson's (1975) markets and hierarchies, and Ouchi's (1980)
'clans' support the main thrust of each social reality. Transactions based on markets support
an Individualist reality, a preference for internal transactions over markets supports a
Hierarchist reality, and the notion of 'clans' supports the thrust of Egalitarian reality.
Although Ouchi (1980) offers a coherent framework to account for the three types of
economic transaction, not surprisingly his chosen variables do not map directly unto the
social choice framework above. Care is essential in interpreting the correlation between these
ideas, and further work is needed to relate the two ideas, but there is at least an
impressionistic correlation between the two.
10.3.2 Rationality
Rationality is generally used to describe work organisation, typically to justify its formal
structure, and decision making in terms of its members' interests. Arguably, what is 'rational'
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has more to do with taken for granted ideas about how the world works than being a direct
result of work organisation. Rationality is a feature of social reality. Particular work
organisation configurations reflect and reinforce an ensemble of features of which rationality
is one.
Further, social realities are supported by distinctive 'styles' of rationality (Wettersten, 1995).
Weber's (1964) formal or procedural rationality and Allison's (1971) 'organisation process
paradigm', are consistent with the Hierarchist's overriding concern with rules and roles.
Following procedures will deliver acceptable outcomes. Substantive rationality (Allison's
'rational actor paradigm') puts outcomes first, 'the bottom line' matters above all else. How
'the bottom line' is achieved is of secondary importance. Schwarz and Thompson's critical
rationality describes the Egalitarian concern with "communal and voluntaristic co-operation"
(1990: 7). Both outcome and process are important. Here Allison's 'governmental politics'
describes the negotiated and political dimension of rational choice, and complements the 'co¬
operative' perspective of 'critical' rationality.
10.4 ALTERNATIVE SOCIAL REALITIES: THREE CASES
The preceding arguments suggest that the practice of strategy is characterised by socially
constructed commitments that individuals share. Understanding the practice of strategy
means understanding the institutional commitments of its practitioners. This section will
compare and contrast features that give a social reality its meaning and distinctiveness. It
describes how alternative realities coalesce as a result of the tension between the constraining
effect of a body of ideas, social prescriptions, and reconstructive effects of social interaction.
The aim here is to reinforce the ideas put forward in 10.2 and 10.3, by giving a detailed
account of each organisation studied.
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10.4.1 Timeplex
Timeplex is a twenty year old company, providing electronic networks (products and
services) to globally distributed businesses, mainly in the financial services industry. It is one
Division of a Swiss based parent, and along with the parent is experiencing financial
difficulty. Its products have been left behind in the competitive race, a position from which it
is striving to recover.
Legitimate decisions are routinely made among participants acting more out of individual
interest than as representatives of departments. Individuals are free to negotiate and enter
transactional relationships with anyone, within and outwith the company, even between an
individual and immediate superior. For example, Hurd talked about how he and his boss,
Richard, regularly discussed how they would leave the company to set up their own
networking company, how they would finance it, and that some of Timeplex's customers
would go with them. Their justification was that customers invested trust in them as
individuals, more than in Timeplex. There was a lot of money to be made in this business if
one worked hard, so why not claim it for themselves rather than the (ungrateful) company.
At another level, the USA Customer Support leadership entered into a contract with a video
conferencing system provider, involving world-wide technical support of up to five different
types of system. This deal was made with minimal UK involvement, who are responsible for
providing European and Middle Eastern Customer Support. Many UK staff were critical of
the agreement, wondering how they were going to support five different systems. For
example, who was going to pay for training the UK support engineers, and what spares
would be needed and who was going to finance that.
In this and other examples one can see how managers and engineers alike are more
committed to the 'exciting gamble for big prizes' (Douglas, 1982). This attitude is pervasive,
implicit in the practice of strategy, taken for granted. Richard had been head hunted to
conceive of, and implement, a grand plan for world-wide co-ordinated customer support.
Humphries, a senior manager, saw Richard's vision in terms of the career opportunities that
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he could see for himself, waiting to be opened up. He imagined himself turning that vision
into reality. Richard did not have to point the finger at anyone, and say "Fred will do this bit,
and Sarah will be responsible for this area". He defined the future, and it was up to the
audience to realise that future.
Internal competitiveness characterises individuals' belief in the scope to shape or carve out a
niche for themselves; through individual enterprise they would determine the order of things.
Davis could barely disguise his belief that he could do his boss' job more effectively. After
all, in his previous company he had held a more senior position than his current boss. He
often shared ideas with the President of the company on how he (Davis) could really make
this company grow.
The on-going tension between Sales and Customer Support is another example of this
competitiveness. Sales try to show Customer Support as ineffective; that Sales can satisfy
customers needs more comprehensively; that Sales would make more money for the
company if it had control of Customer Support. Customer Support in turn defends the
'acquisition' attempts by showing how well it manages its budget, and how they are
continually having to pick up the pieces after sales people have committed the company to
unrealistic promises. The carving up of the European Support Manager's function seems to
be one lost battle in the ongoing skirmishes. There is also tension between Sales and
Customer Support to control the embryonic Professional Services Department. Both groups
perceive it as a major business opportunity, even though after three years Professional
Services is still loss making.
Those few not committed to the pursuit of glory and gain for self, like Blewitt or Oattes,
complain that the organisation lacks strategy and direction. They criticise their superiors for
taking what they can get out of the company. Blewitt's perspective is very probably inherited
from his twenty years in the military, where he progressed in a programmed career structure.
These critics fail to see that in this organisation's reality strategy is what the individual makes
of it; that they are not being subjected to some form of organisational psychosis. They are apt
to see Timeplex's loose integration as anarchy.
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Respondents stressed the irregularities and instabilities of the telecomms competitive
environment rather than its order. The competitive environment is seen as responsive to the
special skills of individuals who pay attention to it. Managers and engineers move among
competitors almost at will. Stubbs talked about how the industry is rich with opportunities
because new products are always appearing, as well as chances of promotion in growing and
new companies. There is a constant turnover of staff in Timeplex, in common with many
firms in this sector. Managers and engineers justify this turnover in terms of career
opportunities within the sector, the 'hire and fire culture', and the need for new blood to
remain competitive. The risk of redundancy is constant, and is one of the more unpleasant
aspects of working at Timeplex, but that's how things are. Anyway, the attractions of
entrepreneurialism seems to overshadow such fears, in that staff are much more preoccupied
with creating and exploiting opportunities. Redundancy is just one expression of the risk and
uncertainty that characterises the environment.
Knowledge is traded through personal networks. It's about knowing how useful individuals
are to you, personal recognition and prestige are highly prized. Routine work is subordinate
to novelty. The marketability of novelty is more interesting, and tends to reflect much more
on the individual that the collective, and there is considerable scope for individual initiative.
Braidwood's Directory of Timeplex's global operations, and Stubbs' attempt to harmonise
the company's new-product introduction procedures were tasks that they identified as
needing to be done, and initiated them. No one allocated these projects to them. The
Directory took about nine months of part-time effort, while the harmonisation project is
likely to take much longer.
Timeplex seems oriented toward market economic transactions, where individuals freely
transact with the market rather than internally. That is, many of their services are bought in
via Contractors. Their management accounts, and the writing of technical and publicity
literature are carried out by contract workers. Management of their fleet of company cars is
done by an external agent. The purchase rather than internal development of a new
management information system to replace their existing system.
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There is minimal long term planning, and devices such as flow charts to order and sequence
activities. Such devices may have less to do with organising the future than recording history:
as a record of activities, therapy and communication, and public relations that everything is
under control (Langley, 1988). The 'escalation log' where problem installations are recorded
and progressed, is an example of this. Although there is a priority procedure, typically the
customer that has the greatest financial muscle, or shouts the loudest gets priority.
Projects with a clear beginning and ending, with time scales of months rather than years are
favoured, then move on to the next interesting problem. Cecil sees his job (Multinationals
Programmes Manager) as being about offering customers solutions by 'cherry picking'
technological and commercial solutions from anywhere within the company. He does this
work himself, through exploiting and extending his informal network. Once the solution has
been defined, he moves on, leaving his subordinate to sort out the details and administration.
Cecil organises his work so that this happens. His subordinate, an engineer, chides his boss
gently for not being interested in the detail, and for rushing hither and thither, but praises him
for being good at manipulating the system in getting new business.
The attraction of new opportunities and the relative disinterest in the routine is
institutionalised in the form of the company's 'escalation' framework. The escalation log is
essentially a basket full of tedium, and relegated to routine work. It receives no special
attention, ... until the unhappy customer (their new installation was still not working after
months) called the President of Timeplex to demand an immediate solution or else
Timeplex senior managers decided that it needed a named individual to police the status of
projects, to make sure that such eruptions are avoided in future. An Escalations Manager was
designated (Braidwood) reporting directly to the Director of Customer Support. Braidwood
was at the same time an engineer in Cecil's department.
The individual in Timeplex is expected to be dynamic, entrepreneurial, go getting. Contrast
this with the Bank of Scotland where managers and engineers are valued for their
conscientious endeavour, attention to cost and detail, where respect goes with good
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'stewardship'. The escalation problem produced a fast fix. Learning through mistakes is
natural here.
Bloor and Bloor (1982) studied the extent to which industrial scientists, in moving from
academia to industry, had selected their niche or had adapted to the culture that they found in
their organisation. In one organisation they found the scientist's commercial relationship with
his colleagues was one of not being afraid to experiment with technical solutions. The
important issue was to find a solution that worked and move on to the next deal or project.
Bloor and Bloor's assessment of their industrial scientists' attitudes to risk seem equally
applicable to Timeplex's managers and engineers: "it is beneficial to take risks [and] is a
waste of time to cover oneself too fully against the possibility of failure, for some failures are
inevitable" (1982: 97).
In Timeplex's world rewards are based on demonstrating competences in getting results,
whatever it takes, and being competitive. Formulas and privileges based on heritage, such as
seniority or age are minimal. When one ofDavis' administrators asked him what to do with a
returned modem, Davis offered him £400 if he could sell it.
While self interest reigns, the group is held together by a common belief in 'the bottom line',
and the notion of market forces. This commitment is shared by its competitors. Its motto
could be 'survival of the fittest', and the 'invisible hand of the market'. This is reinforced by
customers' eagerness to exercise their right to choose between competing alternatives, and to
demand value for money. Customers and competitors alike appear to support the principle of
minimal-interference in the market place. This is apparent by the vast array of technical
alternatives that come and go, the fierce price and service competition within most segments
of the telecommunications and computing industries, and the constant pressure from OFTEL
in Britain to break BT's hold on the British market.
Conspiracy theories abound and everyone is suspicious of threats, from within and without.
From within, senior managers in the USA try to confine within the formal reporting structure,
information flows about intended re-organisations. However, informal networks undermine
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such attempts. For example Customer Response Centre staff in the UK and USA routinely
share their knowledge and speculate about what changes are afoot, who is doing what with or
to whom, etc. Through networks like this sales staff and engineers heard that at least one of
their peers in the USA had received a 'confidential' phone call, offering him a position in the
re-organisation. The implication was that if you did not get such a call then you were
probably on the way out. Only time would tell.
Douglas would expect such conspiracy theories from an organisation with strong group
commitment and weak social control, for example OBS, rather than Timeplex. She would
probably argue that stronger group boundaries make passage into and out of the group more
difficult, encouraging differentiated knowledge flows and internal distrust. However, within
Timeplex there is a very strong boundary between Customer Support and Sales. So while the
commitment to unbridled entrepreneurialism is common to all staff, that division between
Customer Support and Sales breeds distrust and conspiracy theories.
In Timeplex there are very high levels of internal distrust, political manoeuvring and
negotiation. Some information flow is impeded by the UK/USA geographical boundary,
typically related to sales and technical issues, where 'strategic' decisions are taken in the
USA, and handed down to the UK executive. The Customer Support Division is not
structured in the same way, so that there is also differentiated information flows between
Sales and Support. The UK Sales Director and UK based Support engineers had very
different perspectives on what the current round of re-organisation was about. One thought
that it was internal to the Support Division, while the other though that the whole company
was being re-organised, starting with the Support Division. These boundary issues
encouraged speculation about what was really going on, so that conspiracy theories remain an
inherent feature in this Individualist reality.
Generally, group barriers are weak, as is group support. This is because informal networks,
and a shared commitment to individual freedom to contract, weakens barriers. People come
and go from Timeplex, redundancy and recruitment are regular and taken for granted. Within
Customer Support, individuals like Braidwood may have two or three different
314
responsibilities, cutting across functional barriers, thus defining individuals as 'a network
node' as much as an element in a hierarchy. The boundary around Customer Support itself is
seen as contestable. UK Sales leadership take any opportunity to chip away at the Customer
Support boundary, and they have had some success to-date. A European Support function
was broken up, with part going to Sales and part staying with Customer Support. One
respondent suggested that the reason for its break-up was 'political'.
Timeplex is dominated by an Individualist reality, with Hierarchy and some faint signs of
Egalitarianism in the background. When the unhappy customer roused the President, internal
protocol was observed, in that he used the chain of command to allocate the problem. Also,
Hierarchy exerts influence through the handing down of decisions, and the attempts to
control information flow from the USA to the UK, the 'hire and fire' philosophy, and the
centralisation of R&D. There is also an atmosphere of informality and a belief that Timeplex
is a meritocracy. Engineers and managers talk about everyone having an equal chance of
success, recalling how quickly many of them have progressed from raw engineer to manager,
or how some of them have acquired multiple responsibilities in just two or three years. At the
UK head office managers and engineers intermingle, moving freely between offices.
10.4.2 Bank of Scotland
The Bank of Scotland provides clearing bank services to the whole UK community, and
claims to be the first bank to offer remote banking services, and of being the first UK 'oil
bank'. In 1995 it celebrated 300 years of banking practice. It is comfortably profitable.
Staff are content to rely on the existing pattern of role allocation within a complex business.
They look for satisfactory hierarchical principles to guide decision making. In contrast with
Timeplex staff, in BoS there is little individual freedom to transact or negotiate without
reference to a higher authority. If a Divisional General Manager wanted to purchase an air
ticket, s/he must get written authorisation from the Bank's General Manager. The validity of
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the hierarchy principle is reflected in staff at various levels expressing the uniform view that
many strategies are 'bottom up'. The Hierarchy is taken for granted.
The Bank is a much more layered and compartmentalised society than Timeplex and OBS.
There are at least seven layers of managerial titles, and the degree of specialisation is partly
reflected in the Divisional structure. There is considerable interdependence between the
Management Services Division (MSD) and the Operating Divisions. Scope for disorder and
individual independent action is strongly circumscribed by the protocol of hierarchy, formal
rules of title, banking qualifications, and the pride of staff in upholding the Bank's traditions.
There is a strong belief that there are correct methods of work and if properly followed these
practices will automatically produce desired results. The Bank's concern with following
procedure is like a ritual to maintain purity, rather than a mechanical ritual. It is seen as
necessary for establishing a 'proper' relationship with its competitive environment, in terms
of its reliability, and financial prudence. As mentioned above, all overseas travel, including
that by senior managers, must be authorised by the Bank's General Manager. There are
procedures for project selection, lending procedures, procedures that guide financial
prudence. These procedures are pervasive, covering all activities, from routine administrative
to entrepreneurial initiatives. These formulae seek to ensure that all routines have been
meticulously followed.
Staff do not feel restricted or somehow circumscribed by the 'the way things are'. Indeed,
many describe the Bank's approach to strategy as 'opportunism', as a reference to their
dismissal of the rigid strictures of corporate planning. In fact at least one Division does
follow a detailed planning framework, including the publication of strategic plans.
'Opportunism' in their terms is not at odds with very regulated work practices, and group
unity. All opportunities are subject to the same project evaluation and selection framework.
'Opportunism' also means identifying and pursuing ways for improving the Bank's
efficiency and effectiveness. This can be seen in the Bank's preoccupation with the need for
continual cost control. In the Card Services Division, there are detailed instructions and
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scripts for guiding telephone conversations with customers, and formulas for measuring the
productivity of every call. In MSD the notice boards carry graphs of individual departments'
cost performance.
'Opportunism' must also be seen in the context of the Bank's attitude to risk. This Bank, in
common with most traditional banks, regulatory authorities, and user expectations, constructs
a reality where risk taking is generally rejected by the public with deposits in the Bank, and
this is reflected in the Bank's attitude to risk. The Bank's Corporate Statement (Report and
Accounts, 1994), restates its commitment to financial stability. Where risk is taken the Bank
must satisfy stakeholders, including regulatory forces, that it can afford to suffer a loss, that it
can absorb that risk. The Bank's concern with prudence and reliability explicitly recognises
that public trust depends on showing the exercise of strong control. The Bank's attitude to
risk means that accepting risk goes with giving up as little control as possible.
The Bank's preferred 'way of being' is to be opportunistic in an orderly fashion, to anticipate
outcomes. This means having a great deal of control. The Bank recently sent what Douglas
(1982) calls an 'entrepreneurial broker', Richardson (Deputy General Manager, MSD) to
spend nine months sharing knowledge with NCR, both as customer and supplier. This
initiative will now continue and extend to two way exchanges between NCR and The Bank.
Such regulated entrepreneurialism can be contrasted with its 'unbridled' cousin in the
Individualist reality of Timeplex.
The events that led to this initiative also show the stratification of the bank's social networks.
The Bank is NCR's banker, and one of the Bank's Directors is a non-executive Director on
NCR's Board. At one Board meeting the NCR Chief Executive suggested that the Bank
might send one of their senior people to spend time with NCR, to help NCR better
understand what the Bank, as its customer, wanted from NCR.
The pattern of innovation in the Bank is less likely to be revolutionary because it does not
depend on a balance of power among groups; the distribution of power is stable and not
negotiable, in contrast with Timeplex. When the Bank perceived a major environmental
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anomaly, such as the threat from the English banks or the Royal Bank's introduction of
ATMs, it accommodated those anomalies through a considered and orderly internal change
and response, with little disruption to the functioning of the company. Revolutionary change
is also less likely because institutional power relations within the banking sector is largely
stable and regulated. The government's initiatives during the 1980s to deregulate the sector
did produce a few significant anomalies, such as removing some of the barriers to
competition between building societies and banks, but even here the Bank accommodated
these anomalies through changes more akin to Barnes' (1974: 86) "rearrangement... of the
overall pattern of change in science" than any "transformation" of its banking practices.
In an organisation where the combination of strong social control and strong group
commitment is the norm, the pattern of innovation is more likely to be incremental,
extensions to existing practice. The 'entrepreneurial brooking' between the bank and NCR
will enrich rather than disrupt that process. The Bank's 300 year history is one of progressive
change. For this organisation, progressive change means having a relatively high expectation
that anticipated outcomes will be realised. There would be little tolerance here for Timeplex's
'trial and error' approach.
The creation of Computer Services as a Division of the bank in 1974 might suggest a radical
move by the Bank, taken over the bank's long history. However, it can also be seen more as
an incremental move, entirely consistent with a tradition of prudence. There is a useful
parallel between the Bank's progressive development, and the progress of 'normal science'.
Barnes notes that "major cultural change can be brought about not just by the accumulation
of many small deviations from routine, or extensions of routine, over a period of time, but
even by activity carried out in meticulous conformity of routine" (1982: 86). In presenting his
argument, Barnes feels that "perhaps Kuhn's own conviction of the necessity of revolutions
arises from an incorrect appraisal of what is possible under the rubric of normal science"
(1982: 86). Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility of major technological shifts.
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An example of a major shift, from the Bank's perspective, is Home Banking, introduced in
1984, becoming Home and Office Banking or HOBS one year later, and held up by the Bank
as an example of a major innovation. The Bank sought to accommodate or 'absorb' (Schwarz
and Thompson, 1990: 67) the unanticipated and undesirable situation of English banks
moving into Scotland. The Bank looked around for a way of retaliating, for a way of getting
into the English market quickly, where it had no branches. It carefully cobbled together its
available IT expertise and launched a remote telephone banking service, aimed at the English
market.
There was no major investment in infrastructure, and therefore low financial risk. Investment
followed on incrementally as the Bank learnt the technical and commercial implications of
providing a remote banking service. It nevertheless regarded the enterprise as a risk to its
reputation. The competitive threat of the English banks delivered a risk to the Bank. Doing
nothing presented a greater threat than accommodating that risk. The press at the time hailed
this as an innovation. From Richardson's (Deputy General Manager of MSD) perspective the
Bank took an innovation lead and were the first bank to offer a remote banking service, even
before First Direct, the main operator in that sector today.
Home Banking, and then HOBS represents an extension of existing technologies and
knowledge within the Bank, but involved little organisational change. Financially there is no
evidence that HOBS was ever a success. Its value is more symbolic than commercial, since
staff cling to this experience as evidence of the Bank's innovativeness, perhaps because it
supports the 'opportunism as strategy' view shared among senior staff and managers. This
does not devalue any claims that along the way it has been the first mover, in some new
banking service or internal process improvement. However, looking at the Bank's history any
competitive advantage that these innovations gave have been eroded, at times very quickly.
On the UK scale the Bank is still a small player in the competitive environment (in common
with the other Scottish banks), with more localised social network than the NatWest Bank
and Barclays Bank. This is reflected in the Bank being 'surprised' by the English banks
coming north in pursuit of oil related business. However, this environmental change did have
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a lasting effect on the Bank's work organisation, first through Home Banking, then the
development of remote banking as a major feature of the Bank's operations, the Centrebank
Division.
Abernathy and Clark's (1985) 'transilience map' describes different kinds of innovation,
based on the interaction between internal 'competences' and 'linkages' with the external
environment. Unfortunately, their 'internal' dimension dichotomises existing competences
into 'conserve/entrench' and 'disrupt/ obsolete'. In relation to the Bank this seems overly
simplistic. The Bank has been conserving some aspects of its banking know-how but
extending others, as far as new Financial Services legislation allow, and this has been going
on for most of its 300 years. The Bank's Home Banking innovation was a new technological
configuration wherein "new technological artefacts are shaped by and emerge from social
and organizational exigencies" (Fleck J., 1993: 27). It involved a 'rearrangement' (Barnes,
1974) of knowledge and its application to a new and constituted competitive situation. The
Home Banking innovation was technologically an increment to existing competences, but the
market considered it a radical innovation.
This innovation might have created a niche initially, but it has led to a whole new sector of
banking services with many competitors. How Home Banking is characterised today depends
on one's time frame and what rational re-construction is used. In Abernathy and Clark's
(1985) framework it could be 'regular' because it is now an established technology serving
an established market, or it might be 'architectural' because it has led to the development of a
new market sector where competitors have evolved particular and appropriate competences
for remote banking services.
Focusing on individual extensions to practice may imply that the Bank is not innovative,
because those extensions are (apparently) so insignificant. However, looking at the Bank's
extensions to practice over its history, it is clear that the practice of strategy has undergone
major change. It has shared with its competitors, suppliers, customers, and regulators, in the
development and exploitation of banking technologies. Rosenberg's historiography of
technical progress offers a strong historical precedent, showing most technical change as
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evolutionary rather than revolutionary. He found consensus among many writers that
technical progress consists less of Schumpeter's discontinuous change and more of "a steady
accretion of innumerable minor improvements and modifications, with only very infrequent
major innovations" (1982: 7).
The banking industry during the 1970s was very ordered and regulated, with banks operating
a cartel by virtue of government legislation. In these conditions anomalies were likely to be
few and memorable. Anomalous experiences, and thus potential sources of innovation
bloomed during the 1980s. During this period the divisions between banking, building
societies, and insurance providers were redrawn through legislation. Most financial
institutions introduced (or were forced through competitive pressures to introduce) new
products (savings plans, mortgages, even loans to foreign governments). To add to the
turmoil of the financial services industry there were opportunities afforded by private pension
legislation, privatisation programmes, and the relaxation of acquisition rules.
Many financial institutions found the financial burden of diversity too great, and began to
withdraw from traditionally unfamiliar territory such as domestic mortgages and estate
agency. At the same time many of them increased their investment in IT, in order to reduce
both the amount of paper and the cost of transactions. The Bank developed over the decades
a significant level of expertise in IT. This expertise grew out of the Bank's concern for
prudence, and constant search for ways of reducing cost. The majority of the Bank's
innovations are a result of seeing cost anomalies within the Bank's internal processes.
In general one may regard the regulated environment as an extension of the bank's concern
with internal order, and vice versa. The Bank, its competitors, and customers support the
principle of a regulated environment, in the right of the state to do so, in what Schwarz and
Thompson call "Leviathan governance" (1990: 67). While the financial services industry has
been 'deregulated', relative to Timeplex it is still highly regulated. The rate of interest that
banks may charge, the size of loans they may offer, and the relatively high level of liquidity
and secure assets they are required to maintain are not driven by 'market forces' but by direct
Government control through The Bank of England.
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10.4.3 Open Business School
The Open Business School provides distance learning management courses, and is perhaps
the first organisation to apply the Open University's distance learning innovation to the
management education field. Although market leader, the OBS now shares the distance
learning market with others. Perhaps more threatening is that other innovations in the
provision of education mean that OBS is competing with a wider range of options available
to the student. Its own definition of distance learning, which has for 30 years guided thinking
(both within and outwith the University) is being overtaken by an even broader definition.
There is for example the Southampton Institute 'MBA on the Internet', and the HeriotWatt
open ended distance learning MBA that leaves students not only to study at their own pace,
but also to take the exam whenever they are ready. These challenges are being facilitated by
regulatory changes in the provision of higher education that encourages greater competition.
An assessment of OBS's social reality demands more than a passing reference to its parent,
the Open University, because of the bond between the two. The Open University was a
Labour Government sponsored innovation. It was an assault on privilege and class that in
Douglas' terms sought "to reject pointless rituals and to preach direct to men's [sic] hearts"
(1987:7). From its beginnings in the early 1980s, OBS has had to pay its way. It shares most
of the high ideals of its parent, except that it charges market rates for its courses, and this
reflects the pragmatic demands of operating in a competitive environment.
The Open University, like the Bank of Scotland, is characterised by procedures. Unlike the
Bank many of these procedures uphold the egalitarian spirit and factionalism, rather than
extending ascribed hierarchy. For example, the equal opportunity principle is enshrined in
formal selection procedures, and written and audio visual guidance information for staff and
students. This continuous output of information and prescriptions is institutionalised and
manifests itself as part of the structure of the Open University, and includes the 'Equal
Opportunities Unit' and 'Faculty Equal Opportunities groups'. These groups may be seen as
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forming part of the Open University's "strategic rationale" (Fincham et. al., 1994: 133),
reflected in the 'Open University's Equal Opportunities Strategic Action Plan'.
Team effort is highly regarded. Although the Open University has formal procedures for
everything, these prescriptions are generally subordinate to group action. There is a high
tolerance of deviant behaviour among the academic community. Individual freedom is
negotiable and determined much more by group commitments than any regulatory
mechanisms. For example, at least one Faculty has 'gone its own way' on alternative ways of
producing course material, rather than wait for the Open University's senior managers 'to
sort themselves out'.
While deviance from prescription is tolerated, there is less tolerance of deviance from group
norms. Thus the first Director of the embryonic Business School, and his successor the first
Dean, Thomson, arguably contributed to their own demise through failing to recognise that
negotiable freedom does not mean unfettered freedom, but a freedom given by colleagues
through consensual decision making.
The current Dean's popularity has more to do with staff, peers, and the University
'Godfathers' perceiving him as a team player, than any claims to a distinguished academic
career. His social network is probably less connected with funding and validating bodies than
Thomson's, nor is he a Professor. However, the University collective seem to feel that the
Open Business School's credibility is secured, through the efforts of his predecessors, and
that they want a return to consensual decision making.
Asch, the current Dean, has invested a lot of time telling staff about his strategy of
consolidation. This creates a feeling of direction and so far they remember it. The creation of
more formal committees and 'Centres' of excellence are meant to circumscribe the freedom
of future Deans.2 This represents a strengthening of internal group boundaries, and was a
reaction to what many academics saw as Thompson's individualistic and favour ridden
2 'Centres' are career development homes for groups of like minded academics and administrators. Centres would be a
forum for developing personal or collective agendas, and for discussing personal development with the 'Centre Head'.
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approach. Although Asch's election manifesto promised to establish such a mechanism,
many staff initially resisted joining a 'Centre', seeing it as a layer of managerial control.
Compartmentalisation as a way of strengthening group support was acceptable, but not as a
way of greater regulatory control. In Bloor's (1982: 142) terms these 'Centres' are
"secondary elaborations" to enhance the protection of the Open University's Egalitarian
reality.
This new pattern is sufficiently distinct from Thomson's to satisfy staff that here is a strategy.
Only history will tell whether staff eventually substitute 'stagnation' for 'consolidation' and
again complain about the lack of strategy. Will pockets of dissent grow into a revolution that
will remove Asch? The University has a social prescription in the form of 'Dean by open
election'; the Dean's post is an elected one, and lasts for five years. This mechanism supports
group commitment, and has the effect of defusing much of the destructive force of a
revolution.
Douglas (1982b) suggests that an Egalitarian culture carries with it some scapegoating. For
example, Thomson was criticised for his management style and for overexposing OBS, and a
slowing of growth. He lost the leadership election to Asch. Although the right to 'study
leave' is enshrined in the Open University's terms and conditions - in other words it is part of
the University's social prescription - individual academics feel a strong tension between
taking their study leave and showing commitment to writing for course teams. Those taking
the study leave risk being marked as not being team spirited and unsupportive. At the same
time the School's research standing depends on the sum of individual publishing records.
Many academics do not want to do research, and may cite heavy course teaching and writing
workload as a reason for not taking study leave, and also question the commitment of others
who do so. It is as if they are jealous of each other's preparedness to take study leave.
There are also strong compartmental lines drawn (not hierarchy) in terms of secretaries and
administrators, Course Managers, Academics. Within these groups pay scales, benefits and
titles, although clearly defined are often argued over. Unlike the Bank of Scotland, decision
making is not based on Hierarchy, but on the interdependence of groups, expressed as a
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myriad of committees and teams. Staff are very conscious of a group identity, a sense of
shared expertise, and a keen appreciation of the OBS and University's boundary with the
external environment.
Strong boundaries are suggested where a differential of expertise claims and practice exists,
between the outside and the inside, even within the same industry. The Chair of one of the
Business School's courses, talked about being 'trapped' by the peculiar characteristics of the
Open University system, compared with a conventional university. Another senior academic
remembered being told by a member of staff that it takes about twelve years to be considered
an established member of the organisation. He had only been in three years at the time. The
concerns expressed by the Chair, and the experience of the senior academic reflects the
feeling of most staff, that of a strong sense of identity, a strong differentiating boundary
between the outside world and the Open University.
While procedures and formulae reach every facet of working life in the Bank of Scotland,
staff in the Business School enjoy significant freedom within the very broad parameters of
the School's declared research and teaching interests. In contrast with the Bank of Scotland,
there is no comprehensive analytical mechanism for screening and selecting new projects. A
group of academics can band together to develop a course around a subject that they consider
to be interesting, and lobby individuals and the School Board to support the new course idea.
Under Thomson, looking in from the outside, there was an impression that creative output
was booming. For those inside the Business School it was problematic in that resources were
being spread increasingly thinly, and could not keep up with the creative output.
While all courses reflect academic interest, there are many that do not make economic sense,
and for OBS this is essential. Courses that generate income is a feature that distinguishes the
Business School from the Open University. Despite arguments about market forces and
appeals from the Dean (Asch), many of these uneconomic courses still exist. This freedom to
create, the plasticity of obstacles, and the relative subordination of rules to group
commitments controlling all aspects of behaviour, is shared with Timeplex.
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The practice for new academics joining OBS, including Teaching Associates, is that they find
their own niches. Although Teaching Associates have mentors, what directions they develop
in, or which courses they contribute writing for, is their decision. A new academic will
certainly have been recruited because of their achievements and interests, but they exercise
considerable control over their own assimilation as they adjust to what they find, and existing
groups following particular interests adjust where there seems to be some common ground
with the newcomer. In contrast, staff joining the Bank do so to fulfil a predefined and largely
circumscribed role. Timeplex staff join to fulfil a particular function, but once in has
considerable scope to shape their role.
There is also a differential between the Business School and points of contact with its parent.
Relations between OBS's executive decision making body and other groups within the
University seems to have generated feelings of inequality in terms of financial transactions
and the flow of knowledge and ideas, that one side was gaining at the expense of the other.
For example, some regional offices complain that the Business School is making
unreasonable demands on their resources, while the Business School's central staff suspect
some regions of being obstructive. The Business School cannot agree with the University on
a common 'resource flow model' that describes the Business School's financial contribution,
nor on how to measure the School's overhead allocation from the University. These tensions,
while they may produce some heated and defensive discussion, also force the parties to re¬
think practice. The University Senate regards the Business School as a valuable source of
learning, albeit a deviant. Equally, the Business School, with one eye on the direction it
wants to go in, and the other eye on its knowledge of how its parent works, pulls the
University in unfamiliar directions.
In his sociological analysis of 'patterns of life' and how each pattern deals with anomalies,
Bloor suggests that an Egalitarian social life cannot support diversity of world view.3
3 In his attempt to elaborate on Wittgenstein's notion of 'language games' and 'patterns of life', Bloor (1983) adapted
Douglas' 'group/grid' scheme to link distinct 'patterns of life' with particular strategies for dealing with anomalies.
Although Bloor seems to be focused on the sociology of scientific knowledge, it is written in an 'open' style that allows
interpretation in other disciplines.
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The same themes will be reiterated and the same ideas applied time after time.
Accepted pieces of culture will become surrounded by a high wall of protective
definitions and secondary elaborations. The result will be that all parts of the
cosmology of such groups will resemble all other parts, resonating with one
another and reinforcing the sense of unity (1983: 142).
Bloor's observation seems true, to a degree, with respect to the Business School. A good
example of this is the foundations on which the Open University stands. The University has
always expressed a commitment to open access education through distance teaching
technologies, and an equal opportunities philosophy. In more recent years the equal
opportunity pillar has been elaborated, partly due to changing societal attitudes and partly
due to a desire to push back its own frontiers. As mentioned above there is a small team of
staff dedicated to the generation ofmaterial; memos, standing orders, case studies and
guidance notes, leaflets.
While a few staff (typically part-time) feel that the expression of this commitment is 'over
the top', without exception all staff subscribe to the University's commitment. The
University's recruitment and promotional literature present this educational philosophy as a
distinguishing feature. Disabled job applicants can receive application information on audio
cassette, large print, or computer disk. Summer School locations are selected partly on their
facilities for disabled students. Part of the welcoming address given to students attending
Summer School is a warning about discrimination and harassment of any kind.
However, "secondary elaborations" do not necessarily support all parts of the Egalitarian
social world equally. The actions described above support equal opportunity, while the
creation of 'Centres' discussed earlier, will strengthen academic research and teaching. In
any contest for resources these two elaborations may come into conflict. There are other
areas where the sense of unity is being strained. The Business School charges market rates
for its courses, rather than supporting courses through tax payer subsidy. The Business
School recognises the notion of 'paying customers', and this creates a search for appropriate
behaviour within the Business School. Practices within the University, including those shared
with the Business School, do not recognise the subtle difference between the existing
practices of administering students' needs and that demanded for supporting 'paying
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customers'. The unity of view is fragmenting. Interestingly, The University's social reality
contributes to and adjusts to, such fragmentation. In an important sense, and contrary to
Bloor's (1983) view, Egalitarianism supports diversity.
The pattern of innovation in an organisation dominated by an Egalitarian reality is predicted
to be periods of normal strategy interrupted by revolutionary discontinuity (Bloor, 1983).
Increasingly during the last two years staff have viewed developments in the external
environment as threatening the supremacy of its distance teaching technologies. Internally
this has generated much heated debate and division. An increasingly fragmented range of
views are emerging about the nature of the threat, and how the University should deal with it.
A Senate Committee, cross-faculty and 'within-faculty' committees have invested
considerable time and energy, gathering information, disseminating it, and making proposals
for action. At the same time at least one Faculty has been experimenting and implementing
their own responses, distrustful of the University's ability to move as quickly as it feels is
necessary.
Some see no need for any significant change, which seems to mean that the University
should seriously look at adding CD-ROM capabilities. Others are suggesting the need for
radical change, putting forward ideas that many conservatives do not understand and even
feel threatened by. Many would like to see the University develop its technology of
education, like developing explicit methodologies to deliver 'learning to learn' rather than
'distance teaching or learning'.
According to Bloor, these external threats leading to internal disorder can be understood as
responses to anomalies (1983: 142). Such anomalies will accumulate and may lead to crisis.
Revolution will depend on the balance of power between the relevant groups. Bloor predicts
that "the revolutionaries might win and sweep away the old guard. They will proclaim a
wonderful new beginning and, for a while, all will be well. Then the whole pattern will repeat
itself' (1983: 142). While Bloor sees homogeneity as a central feature of an Egalitarian
scientific social life, the Open University's social life is better characterised as
heterogeneous. Furthermore, the defining limits of revolution is problematic at least in the
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case of the Open University or the Open Business School. Such definition depends on the
choice of time scale and what substantive changes count as revolutionary. In addition, there
seems scope to conceive of different kinds of revolution, for example those within the social
reality, and those from one social reality to another.
The power balance has tipped in favour of the University central planning function. It has
allocated £10M to support INSTILL (Integrating New Systems and Technologies in Life¬
long Learning). "The Open University is taking on 33 new staff in one of its largest
recruitment drives since it was set up just over 25 years ago" (Times Higher Education
Supplement, May 19, 1995: 2). It is not clear how INSTILL came into being. For example, to
what extent it reflects the views and findings of all those committees, and how conflicting
directions were resolved. The initials of the acronym do suggest a very broad church, that
there is something here for everyone. In this respect it seems unfair to talk about a balance of
power. Rather, preferences have been expressed. Some ideal standard has not been applied,
nor have groups fragmented to the point of everyone doing their own thing.
While a longitudinal study of the University's development might shed more light on Bloor's
proposition about revolutionary change, it is clear that there has been internal disorder over
the future of the University. In an important sense the OBS evidence suggests that this
'disorder' is an inherent feature of the Egalitarian social reality. This social reality is
sustained by the tension between order and disorder, between the fluidity of Individualism
and the orderliness of Hierarchy.
Nevertheless, there is increasing tension between a pull toward Individualism from OBS,
against a pull toward Hierarchy from the Open University. Within the Business School
academic freedom to create seems to be under increasing scrutiny, and administrators are
increasingly under pressure to ensure that academics work within budget. It is also a tension
between a justification based on respect for history and elaborated social prescriptions and
procedures, and a justification based on the freedom to generate new knowledge and teaching
practices. The first can regulate creativity and bring status differentials, while the second can
dissipate resources through extreme factionalism.
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There are various tensions in the education sector, but one characterisation revolves around
freedom of institutional choice against regulatory governance. For example, the current
government would like to see Higher Education (HE) institutions become financially
independent while achieving measurable academic standards. Traditionally the institutions
wanted funding and the right to set their own academic standards. The government's
programme is redefining 'the way things are'. Many institutions are keen to generate their
own income, and to have their academic quality compared with others.
While the government has initiated the change, leaders in the H E community have played
key roles in the shape of the new environment. For example, the two independent quality
assessment bodies have reduced to one. The environment continues to be shaped by the
different interests of government and the H E community, and the learning that usually
accompanies an evolving situation. The amount and process of debate (sometimes heated),
highlights an Egalitarian spirit in the H E sector generally. There is a shared concern with
quality, a fear of creeping inequalities between institutions, in terms of knowledge, wealth,
and status. Its principles are more in tune with what Schwarz and Thompson (1990) call
'Jeffersonian governance' (ideal socialism, or parliamentary or referendum democracy).
Disagreements between the H E community and the Government are rooted in a failure to
agree on what the goals of HE should be, and what the problems are, and what is an
appropriate framework for moving forward. The Government's notion of 'consultation' may
fall outwith the HE expectation of 'Jeffersonian governance', so that a clash of realities
remain.
10.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION: DRAWING COMPARISONS
10.5.1 Introduction
The framework provides a means for systematically comparing different kinds of strategy
practice and patterns of innovative behaviour as socially constructed realities. These realities
yield alternative guiding principles and assumptions for sanctioned behaviour "that are also
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used forjudging others and justifying [oneself] against others" (Douglas, 1982b: 5). They
describe the assumptions that tend to underline "the natural order, and yet which, since we
distinguish four kinds of natural order, are not at all natural but strictly a product of social
interaction" (Douglas, 1982b: 5). These natural orders are stable. Individual organisations are
not a jumble of choices and preferences, moving freely and collectively from one reality to
another. All decisions are framed by the existing practice of strategy, which in turn reflects a
commitment to a package of assumptions and social prescriptions about how to behave in the
organisation's environment.
A number of more specific observations may be drawn from the foregoing analysis,
regarding differences in the practice of strategy: forms of collective control; taken for granted
strategic rationality, the nature and scope for change; boundary management within the
organisation; individual mobility and social reality. These differences are not exhaustive;
they highlight that various features of strategy practice are discernible rather than definitive;
they give a sense that social reality is plastic and developmental, while at the same time
shaping choice and reinforcing existing practice.
10.5.2 Collective control
Organisations to the right of the framework (the Open Business School and the Bank of
Scotland) tend to have strong control over the behaviour of its members, demanding
conformity on pain of expulsion. Those toward the top of the framework, such as BoS and
Prison, are least able to perceive alternatives. For them "the situation of being closely
controlled and insulated from free social intercourse stabilises a perception of having no
options" (Douglas, 1982b: 6).
Increasing or relaxing the criteria for entry to the organisation results in more or less distinct
compartments. The flow of ideas and knowledge may depend on personal networks, as in
Timeplex; or a mixture of personal networks and group sanction, such as OBS; or be highly
regulated, as in BoS. When the Bank's 'top management' 'empower' (the Bank's term) their
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staff but still retain control, they are reinforcing and extending hierarchy through 'responsible
autonomy' rather than 'empowerment'. While many ideas are 'bottom up', in the interests of
being efficient and prudent, higher authority must be given before any commitment or
contract can be entertained. As Douglas says, "to open small gates on control desensitizes the
control centres to flood warnings. Hierarchy once installed develops self-reinforcing moral
arguments that enable more unequal steps in status to be tolerated" (1982b: 6).
Decisions to give up control of both content and process results in separation, a loosening of
the regulatory chains that hold the organisation together. This tension between more or less
control describes the relationship between OBS and its parent the Open University. Many in
the Open University would see OBS as pulling toward Individualism, while those in OBS
would see the Open University as pulling them toward Hierarchy.
The Individualism of Timeplex and the Egalitarianism of OBS, have in common the right of
individuals to pursue their particular interests. They differ in the form of socialisation
necessary for doing so: loose integration of individuals or individual autonomy granted by
group sanction. The reality of both OBS and BoS share an intolerance for Timeplex's
unbridled Individualism as a basis for choosing alternatives. They differ in the degree to
which the force of regulatory mechanisms guide choice.
10.5.3 Strategic rationality
Strategic rationality refers to both the interpretation and expression of problem-solution
judgements. As Fincham et. al. noted in their study of IT development and implementation in
the financial services sector,
strategic rationality is not just a way of interpreting problems .... If an expert
group is to sustain claims to control an area of work, it must be able to
substantiate its diagnosis of the problem with solutions which make sense to an
audience of powerful groups within and outside the organization - solutions
which, in some agreed sense, actually work (1994: 146).
The strategic rationality of each social reality comprises an inexhaustible ensemble of issues,
including: attitudes to risk and uncertainty, preferred way of organising, attitudes to learning,
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ideas about what constitutes fairness, preferred form of economic transaction, preferred form
of governance.
The attitudes to risk and uncertainty of the three organisations differ, seeming akin to
Schwarz and Thompson's proposed categories for explaining how policy makers, like
government bodies, deal with technological risk: anticipatory, opportunism, resilience (1990:
105). In this respect the Bank may be characterised as 'anticipatory'. Its members like to
prepare for every eventuality, and this is built into all of its methods and work organisation.
The mainframe computer in MSD (the heart of the bank's centralised processing network), is
fully backed up, in a bomb proof room. In designing its IT facilities, managers considered the
possibility of a bomb dropping on the building and the damage such an event would do to its
capabilities!
In contrast, Timeplex is characterised as 'opportunistic'. Cecil, Humphries, Hurd, Davis, and
most of their colleagues always keep an eye open for the unexpected. Sticking their necks out
makes the adrenaline flow and is often rewarded. The Business School's members were more
critical or 'resilient' in their risk taking attitudes. They do not go out of their way to "court
danger" (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 105), but equally, prescriptive social control applies
minimal constraints on the evaluation of options.
Anomalies present risks and opportunities for innovation, and each organisation handles
them differently (see 8.4.7). Timeplex staff seize them eagerly as opportunities to
demonstrate substantive outcomes, wherein trial and error with its attendant risk of failure are
taken for granted. The Bank through its ordered way of life sought to anticipate anomalies,
and seemed to put a premium on accommodating or absorbing those anomalies within its
existing order. Anticipating external anomalies remain feasible through the professional
banking social network, co-operative relationships with some competitors (such as between
the Bank of Scotland's VISA and Barclays Bank VISA), social relations with financial
regulators, and the formal role on the Boards of many customers.
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The OBS membership seem to engage in prolonged debate and consideration of its options,
including evaluations and implications of different future scenarios; what Schwarz and
Thompson might call the "trial without error" of "critical rationality" (1990: 66). Examples
include the myriad of advisory groups, committees, sub-committees, and working groups that
spent about two years investigating the University's options leading up to INSTILL (see
6.6.5), and the central place of future scenario building during the Business School's annual
'away days' strategy meetings (see 6.5.2).
Division of labour, or specialisation is a differentiating mechanism that increases the scope
for innovation, and paradoxically, increases the scope for routinisation of tasks.
Specialisation also puts a greater burden on the need for integrating the resulting diversity.
The Bank is the most stratified and compartmentalised of the three organisations, and it uses
a number of discrete mechanisms that could be described as integrative: 'entrepreneurial
broking', annual non-decision making senior executive get-togethers to discuss fashionable
areas, and monthly management meetings. Burns and Stalker's (1961) 'mechanistic'
organisation seems to captures the sense that the Bank enjoys an ordered relationship with its
competitive environment.
Specialisation among the academic community of the Business School rests with the
individuals who are expert in their particular field of interest. The administrative and
managerial members are more 'interchangeable' but tend to work with particular academic
teams because there is a general acknowledgement that this maintains continuity of social
relations and administrative knowledge bases. Informal networks and committee forums are
critical to the development, transmission and exploration of innovative problem-solution
configurations.
Timeplex's division of labour seems much more fluid in comparison to the other two
organisations. Customer Support engineers and managers, for example, are encouraged to
move from one responsibility to another, or take on multiple roles, on the basis of both
demonstrated technical and commercial competences, and a willingness to be enterprising.
Timeplex's approach to dealing with the fiercely competitive and technologically dynamic
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telecommunications environment adds new meaning to Burns and Stalker's (1961) 'organic'
form of organisation. Davis had no hesitation in offering one of his administrative staff £400
if he could sell a returned modem. Strategy practice comprises significant individual
autonomy and reliance on informal networks within and outwith Timeplex to express and
interpret innovation opportunities.
Strategic development is not guided by 'make or buy' decisions. Rather, while such
considerations do inform strategy practice, it is the 'thought collective's' preferred style of
economic transaction that guides practice (Fleck L., 1979). Timeplex's broad commitment to
market transactions in both the labour market and in its own competitive relations; or the
Bank of Scotland's commitment to the in-house development of IT technologies, is not the
result of managerial dispassionate economic evaluations of 'make or buy' strategic
alternatives (see 9.2.4).
10.5.4 Plural realities and strategic change
As outlined in this chapter, there are a discernible and limited number of social realities. Each
socially constructed reality features a distinctive style of reasoning, based on an inexhaustive
and largely complementary range of taken for granted ideas. Each alternative reality, taken as
a whole, appears to be incommensurate with others, in that their features cannot be measured
against some common standard, and these features have meaning only as part of a particular
reality. For example, they do not have more or less of 'rationality' relative to each other.
Rather, embedded in these social realities are alternative 'styles of rationality' (Wettersten,
1995). Wettersten argues that we should accept the possibility of different rationality styles
and seek to integrate them, rather than try to evaluate alternative rationalities as being more
or less developed. Different styles of reasoning produce "new interesting problems and
permits reconciling differences better than [trying to banish alternatives to] the absent unique
standard" (1995: 87, 89).
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While these social realities appear incommensurable, it does not mean that an organisation
cannot be host to more than one at the same time, or that there is no scope for particular
features of a social reality to develop in particular directions. This plasticity can be seen in
the on-going tensions between a growing Business School and its much more mature and
stable parent, the Open University. While they differ in important ways, they are held
together by a common commitment of providing open access to higher education. Staff
working in these two organisations, engaged in conventional activities, are unconsciously
committed to a common social reality. There is little chance in the two becoming alien to
each other while they have this common commitment.
However for an organisation to substitute one social reality, taken as a whole collection of
features, for another archetype involves a 'revolutionary' transformation (Kuhn, 1970) or
'alternation' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 176). Its membership must give up all that is
taken for granted for another set of values, norms, beliefs, expectations, It is like
changing from a taken-for-granted National Health Service (NHS) as a commonly owned
resource insulated from financial considerations, to becoming an organisation that must
justify its existence against market testing and financial performance criteria.
Moving from one group of generalised expectations to another, (switching social reality) is
also a source of innovation. Fundamental changes to the NHS are throwing up many
interesting problems from which the private sector is learning. NHS managers and clinicians
are also interpreting private sector recipes in new ways. How the transition unfolds may be
anything from incremental to revolutionary, and its nature will depend on the on going
interaction between the constructed unfolding of users' understanding of what they want,
what is perceived as achievable with any given human and financial resources, the interests
of competing providers, and whether existing technologies afford multiple developmental
directions. This strategic change from one reality to another is not the same as change within
a given reality. Strategic change, whether revolutionary or incremental, does not necessitate a
switch of social reality, from one 'metaphysical paradigm' to another (Masterman, 1972).
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The Business School has experienced at least one revolution, reflected in the change of Dean
from Thomson to Asch. The possibility for such change is institutional in that the Dean holds
an elected office and change can to some extent be anticipated. The new Dean was elected on
a promise of sweeping changes to work organisation, decision making, a new emphasis on
research in opposition to the previous emphasis on teaching, and the introduction of a
'consolidation' strategy for OBS in place of the previous aggressive market development
strategy. The change was immediate, with the outgoing Dean accepting a new role in a
committee studying Information Systems and Information Technology strategy, one
committee in the Open University's archipelago of committees. There were now different
people in key positions, and 'practice and discourse' changed accordingly. There was "a
rupture in the subjective biography of the individual" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 179) so
that individuals would reflect on their experiences during Thomson's reign as if it were the
bad old days. For example, they would say that "then there was confusion, but now we have
order". Over the long term these changes of leadership and all that goes with them may look
insignificant, as small steps or incremental changes in OBS's history.
Timeplex has experienced strategic change that is both revolutionary and incremental,
depending on one's perspective. The change was incremental in that their acquisition by
UNISYS and subsequent sale, was akin to the experience of a predator slowly but
systematically sucking the life out of its prey and leaving it for dead. Investment in new
product development was stopped and productivity of the existing business was maximised.
Change was at the same time revolutionary in that before the acquisition Timeplex was a
significant competitor in its sector, and after the experience with UNISYS which lasted about
five years, it was struggling to survive. Timeplex went from being the major part of the
enacted reality of its sector to being incidental to that sector's development. The amount of
erosion of its legitimacy among customers is reflected in the label 'steam driven products'
still being applied by customers (see 4.2.4). There is no evidence that Timeplex was ever
anything else other than an Individualistic social reality.
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Even obvious upheavals do not mean that social reality is being reformulated. Rather it
shows the plasticity of, and scope for innovation within a given reality. The Business School
feels that it is at a cross roads in the development of distance education, and as noted above
has spent the last couple of years researching and evaluating different scenarios. Consistent
with its strategic rationality, OBS has now started implementing an approach that seems
designed to encompass as much of their technology's interpretive flexibility as they can
conceive of, by recruiting expertise to cover a broad range of possibilities. Timeplex is
hurrying from 'steam driven' modems to Advanced Technologies (AT), 'trying to come from
behind to being in front' within eighteen months. It is trying to do this as fast as possible,
recruiting and firing staff, further re-organising, and promising both themselves and
customers overly optimistic availability. Change within Timeplex is so incessant that new
work organisation schemes overtake preceding ones before they are completed. The Bank has
been moving from counter based to remote financial transactions, and turning counter
services into sales operations. Compared to Timeplex, its transition is relatively smooth,
ordered, and incremental. Of the three organisations, the Bank is moving incrementally,
Timeplex is trying to change in a hurry, and the Business School is trying to move forward in
such a way as to accommodate any potential revolution.
10.5.5 Boundary management
Political arguments may be about whether group boundaries should be tightened or relaxed,
and about the need or not for more rules. These discussions and arguments are justified in
terms of perceived demands of the external environment. Many of the Bank's Divisions are
in a constant argument about the extent to which they should control their own Management
Information Systems (MIS), and about centralised versus distributed data processing. They
argue that being customer responsive means having control of these resources. Some
Divisional managers would like the right to choose between the internal MIS - provided by
Management Services Division (MSD) - and external competitors of MSD. Others accept the
veto on such choices as necessary to support an internal MSD. However, there is some
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flexibility in the veto. One Division has bought in software because MSD cannot offer a cost
effective equivalent.
Timeplex Customer Support and Sales are constantly arguing about redrawing the boundary
between them, as if it were something that is negotiable. The protagonists claim to be better
placed to serve the customer; from their opposing positions each side feels that they hold the
'natural' vantage point. Arguments rage among the Open University's Faculties about how
income and expenses for teaching and research can be separated; arguments that are framed
within the resource flow model debate. The Business School points to its own performance in
the market place as evidence that it should have greater control over the distribution of its
own income within the Open University. There are wider debates about how to support
innovation: a tax on Faculties, or central control of funds distribution, or more autonomy for
Faculties, or ...?
These arguments about where group boundaries should be drawn are attempts to effect
competing interpretations and expressions of strategic change. In the process practitioners
construct an innovation space, whether or not the argument is resolved. The constant threat to
each group's competitive scope and political legitimacy creates space for innovative
problem-solution configurations. Innovation (of which projects are a crystallisation) are thus
constituted, and build on Fincham et. al. 's, observation of innovation projects in the financial
services sector:
innovation provides a critical juncture for the negotiation and reconstruction of
the sector, whereby preconceptions and alliances may be challenged, and new
avenues of knowledge deployment and occupational mobility opened up (1994:
133).
In this reconstruction each argument is presented as a "strategic rationale",
comprising assumptions about outcomes, benefits, and drawbacks, and is the
basis for economic and technical justification. It reflects the mobilization of
arguments about the significance and utility of special knowledge for the success
of an organization as a whole - that is, the adoption of a discourse about strategy
(Fincham et. al., 1994: 133).
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The outcome of some of these arguments have short-term consequences, while others have
more long-term implications. While the Bank's reality may drift a little by relaxing or
tightening group commitment, or regulation, it will remain fundamentally Hierarchical in
outlook. Resolution of the Bank's MIS and IT challenges, or the Customer Support versus
Sales issue in Timeplex, does not undermine the stability of the underlying natural order. The
justifying arguments and ideas that characterise Timeplex as operating in an essentially
Individualist reality are not challenged by internal arguments about where the group
boundaries should be drawn.
10.5.6 Individual mobility and social reality
For the Bank and the Business School to swap realities, their respective membership must
adopt in its entirety the other's social constructions, for what they want to achieve.
Meanwhile, the continuity of the existing natural order is maintained by reference to the
principles that support the present social construction. As Douglas says,
while there are always short-term shifts of opinion, there are certain social
choices which have long run effects because they afford tangible rewards and
enlist intellectually convincing moral arguments. People who have banded
together under a certain rubric or constitution will tend to coerce one another
increasingly to develop the full implications for that style of life, or go to all the
trouble of mustering support for an alternative (1982b: 5).
Further evidence of a collective drive for continuity of the existing natural order can be seen
in the selection of new staff. In most organisations selectors look for evidence that the
individual is like minded or can become so. Continued employment with the organisation
depends on committing one's way of thinking to harmonise with that of the organisation's
membership. The penalty for abandoning that commitment is accusations of failure and being
encouraged to leave the organisation.
For both the individual and the organisation, the theory suggests that different "intellectual
strategies are useful for survival in ... particular patterns of social relations" (Douglas,
1982b: 7). At the individual level, the competition inherent in the Individualist environment
is not to everyone's liking. Those who stay may find themselves pushed into a 'siding',
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where options and scope for individual initiative are restricted, perhaps a minor internal
administrative function. In effect into Atomistic subordination.
Others, finding the internal competitive relations overbearing, may leave to find a home
where scope for individual entrepreneurial activity is still high, but where group commitment
provides support. They may be attracted to the Egalitarian way of life. Equally some
individuals may find the group commitment demanded of the Egalitarian environment
stifling, and be attracted to the unrestrained individual freedom offered by the Individualist
world. Those moving from a Hierarchical reality to the Individualist world are likely to feel
frustrated at the lack of order, and absence of overarching strategy. Then there is the new
leader who brings their Individualist baggage to an Egalitarian group. This group is also
likely to feel frustrated, and complain about a lack of strategy, but this time that frustration is
about the inability to influence strategy because of the Individualist overlay.
Complaints about the lack of strategy and direction were voiced by a minority in both
Timeplex and the Open Business School. In the former this was expressed by individuals
who wanted more structured and visible decision making. One such is Blewitt, who had spent
the previous twenty years in the Armed Forces. In the latter case it meant a plea for less
Individualistic leadership from the Dean. These concerns are also about the extent to which
group commitment should be strengthened or relaxed.
10.6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has shown that while organisations are economic units, they are at the same time
social units. Each social unit is host to a cocktail of social realities, although one tends to be
dominant. Social reality is not bounded by any formal organisational boundary, but is
constituted of social relations that include customers, suppliers, competitors, regulators, and
other stakeholders, much like L. Fleck's (1979) 'thought collective'. The dominant social
reality is different in each organisation studied, and is not a product of organisational design.
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It is as Barnes observed of 'normal' scientific practice: "alternative modes of conventional
activity and judgements are not determined by independent authority" (1982: 64).
Each social reality describes a bundle of features that separately mean little, but together give
meaning to the way individuals behave. Individuals are not lone atoms, but socialised beings,
with a commitment to one or other social institution. Individuals carry a piece of a social
jigsaw, and strategy practice, while purposive, involves many decisions being routinely and
unconsciously made through a taken for granted strategic rationality. Conflict within
organisations may be the result of different institutional commitments bumping into each
other, like the tensions between OBS and the Open University, or between the outward
facing Operating Divisions of BoS and their internal relationship with the inward focused
Management Services Division, or the arguments currently raging over 'mad cow disease'.
The 'social choice' framework presents a qualitative and useful way of comparing and
contrasting the practice of strategy across the three organisations. This is not accidental. The
framework was adopted because of its explanatory value in social anthropological settings
that, while different from organisational settings, share the sense that the inclusiveness of
practice and social reality do vary in distinctive ways. This distinctiveness exists in the
practices and beliefs of Benedict's and Douglas' primitive communities, and the knowledge
claims within Fleck's and Kuhn's scientific communities (see ch. 7). The framework
highlights the complexity and sociality of 'choice', and give a flavour of its inaccessibility to
practitioners. It is as Douglas suggests:
[In examining] the principles of individual choice and conflict of rights we have
no way of considering the effect of institutional forms upon moral perception.
Yet something about institutional forms is generated by elementary choices and
the resultant institutions incorporate judgements which reciprocally influence
further perceptions of choice. Once any of these elementary choices has been
made, it entails a package of intricately related preferences and secondary moral
judgementsf 1982b: 6).
The notion of a socially constructed reality describes individuals and their relationships with
and within a relevant community. The concept shows that when practitioners appeal to
commonsense and rational judgements as the basis for action, they are invoking a
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constellation of knowledge claims, rooted in taken for granted expectations and beliefs,
heritage, and experiences in the 'here and now'. Kuhn's (1970) practitioners never get nearer
to some universal truth. When there are too many exceptions to the rule, they leap from one
set of socially constructed rational judgements to another that seem to offer a better account
of material reality.
The evidence shows that there are multiple and equally valid interpretations of the truth,
supported by different styles of reasoning. These different styles go beyond the attributes of
'rational' and 'non rational' judgements, showing that such labels are grounded in a taken for
granted reality. There is also evidence that strategic change labelled as 'incremental' or
'revolutionary' are 'after the fact' social constructions that vary with the observer's
perspective (see also 9.2.5). Significant strategic change may take place within a given social
reality, without upsetting its fundamental nature, or an organisation may switch social
realities although this is likely to be a more traumatic experience for those involved.
Incremental change measured over centuries, such as experienced by BoS, may be labelled as
significant or transformational when looked at over the whole of its history.
It seems likely, though not certain, that the social choice framework can explain variation
between a broad range of organisations, and at different levels of focus. All three in this study
exist in what appears to be a largely individualistic Anglo-American socio-economic setting,
yet the three are sufficiently different to suggest that national culture does not blur
differences. Even within the same industry it is possible that the same differences in social
reality can be shown. For example, it is conceivable for BT, Britain's largest
telecommunication services provider, to have a hierarchical profile in contrast to Timeplex's
individualism. Business units within BT need not be homogeneous; some could be
individualistic, while others - perhaps the research oriented units - be more egalitarian. The
framework's explanatory power in some settings are much more unclear. For example,
family owned businesses may be hierarchical, yet differentiated in different ways other than
those used in this analysis. Also, whether the framework would throw light on organisations
in different socio-economic settings, such as companies in Japan or Korea, is unknown.
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These and other possible areas for research are noted in chapter 11. The main findings of this





The research presented in this thesis aims to further our understanding of the practice of
strategy and how it engenders scope for innovation. In particular it has explored how practice
shapes strategic choice, and how that shaping process determines the scope for innovation.
The research design adopted was a phenomenological study of three organisations. This
allowed me to compare different practitioners' understanding of strategy and innovation
within their own organisation, and contrast these findings across the three different
organisational settings. To maximise the opportunity for comparison and contrast, the
organisations chosen for this study all regard innovation as critical to their continued
development, but operate in broadly unrelated sectors: banking, telecommunications network
management, and distance learning management education. Through in-depth interviews
with practitioners in each organisation, I studied the different meanings they attribute to
strategy and innovation; what they regard as their technology; how they organise work and
interact with each other; how they choose between strategic options and examples of what
they consider to be strategic; how they go about developing and implementing strategy; what
they consider to be examples of innovation, and why; how they make sense of their
competitive environment. Through attempting to understand practitioners' views on these
issues and continuous reading on various topics - innovation, strategy, research methodology,
sociology, social psychology - the initial research questions and my assumptions about the
nature of strategy were challenged such that the five concerns raised in my 'thesis
introduction' took on a new significance (see 1.1). This chapter assesses that change of
perspective; it pulls together the main findings of the study, and reflects on the mainstream
literature reviewed in chapter two; it also revisits the concerns raised in chapter one and
discusses implications for practice and teaching.
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11.2 DEVIATIONS FROM THE INITIAL INTENTIONS
This thesis started as a journey with a route map of research questions and directions to
follow. The journey has deviated from the original route, taking unexpected turns and
drawing on ideas not initially anticipated. In chapter 1 five topics reflecting my personal
experience were outlined as the basis for the research questions for this thesis. As discussed
in 3.5.1, these questions proved to be only a starting point. The most significant development
that was not anticipated by the original research focus has been my engagement with the
social constructivist perspective.
Three observations spring from this experience. First, that a literature review and research
questions can never comprehensively define the research space. Remaining open, suspending
judgement and interpretation, provides much scope for creating new contours within any
previously defined area of research. Second, that the empirical evidence presented in this
thesis is a construction shaped by the discussions between the researcher and staff of the
researched organisations. Third, if a thesis represents a journey of discovery, then it seems
reasonable to expect some change in researcher perspective over the journey. One may draw
a crude parallel between the research process and the practice of strategy: whatever the
strategic intent, innovative behaviour and novel artefacts often unexpectedly crystallise out of
practice.
Revisiting the literature review after almost three years, was like being a visitor in a familiar
yet foreign land (see ch. 2). Where now I see strategy practice bound up with a constructed
social reality, one constituting the other, then I saw practitioners acting on a reality that was
'out there'; I regarded organisational culture as the lens through which practitioners see
reality. Over the research period I have switched paradigms and this is reflected in the
contrast between chapter 2 and chapters 7 to 10. One could argue that the empirical evidence
spoke to the researcher, but doing so would deny Ludwik Fleck's (1979) observation and that
of Pasteur (Remer, 1965) before him, that there must also be a readiness on the part of the
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researcher to see evidence in new ways. My continued engagement with various literature, in
parallel with the fieldwork, contributed to that readiness.
11.3 MAIN FINDINGS
This thesis offers a structured approach to making judgements about organisations and
suggests why we should not look for universal prescriptions for the management of
innovation. There is more to choice than rationalistic strategy metaphors acknowledge.
The study shows both an important similarity and differences in the practice of strategy. In all
three organisations the practice of strategy is socially constructed by practitioners; practice is
the embodiment of a 'taken for granted' and shared reality, a social reality; through practice
practitioners reinforce and develop their social reality; they reinforce and develop their
shared reality through creatively exercising their capabilities, and through their interpretation
and expression of technology and technology-practice. In contrast, the study also shows that
practitioners working together in one organisation may construct a different shared reality to
practitioners of another organisation; each constructed reality is distinctive, discernible yet
indeterminate. There seems to be a limited number of such constructed realities. Normal
practice in each constructed reality is imbued with different interpretations of rationality,
governance, preferred forms of economic transaction, attitudes to risk, and many other
factors.
11.3.1 Realism or relativism?
This thesis presents a view of reality that is best described as constrained relativism. From the
relativistic side there is no ultimate truth and all observation claims, including appeals to
commonsense, are theory dependent. There is no ultimately best form of organisation or
strategy that supports or gives rise to more innovative behaviour by practitioners. Similarly
judgements about the effectiveness or appropriateness of strategic aims have meaning only in
relation to a particular social reality. Technological change in higher education carries a
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different sense of urgency and harbours different social and economic values than
technological change in the banking or telecommunication sectors.
This relativism is constrained in various ways. Although practitioners construct their reality
their choices are constrained by the material and social reality they construct. Firms develop
novel products and services in anticipation of some unspecified opportunity, but their actions
may influence aspects of their reality in unexpected ways. No matter what the innovator's
intentions, potential customers may or may not buy the new product or service;
environmental groups may object to any number of aspects of the innovative offering;
competitors may successfully imitate the novel product; new competitors may emerge
through unanticipated technological change, possibly making one's competitive advantage
redundant.
Strategic choice is further constrained because the innovating organisation exists as part of a
wider social reality of capitalist economics, where competition and the failure to innovate
often leads to an organisation's demise; innovation is not an option but a necessity for
survival. This constrained relativism is developmental: it is shaped through the 'invisible
hand' of recipes and routines; the openness or looseness of knowledge bases and recipes; the
heterogeneity of resources and capabilities across organisations, sectors, and whole
economies.
11.3.2 The construction of social reality through strategy practice
Strategy practice is a continual process of practitioners interpreting and expressing meaning,
and is the product of daily interactions among themselves and with customers, competitors,
and other stakeholders (see ch. 8). These interactions are shaped by practitioners' everyday
interpretation of a shared reality. In the language of social constructivism, practitioners
construct their material and social environment through practice and discourse, a reality
which they interpret as objectively real.
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Practice is both stable, guided, and at the same time always provisional. It is guided through
heritage, shared meaning, shared expectations of 'things to come', and the application of
recipes of how to compete and co-operate. However, it also remains provisional through
practitioners' political behaviour; differentiated assessments of situations and events; their
construction of unanticipated anomalies. Practice constituted through the interaction of these
socio-cognitive processes provides scope for innovative behaviour and novelty.
Innovation then is inherent to the construction of social reality. Further, practitioners
reinforce and extend their shared reality through creatively exercising their capabilities (see
9.2). To some extent the expression of these capabilities is guided by recipes for success and
'taken for granted' routines, but there is more than rule following involved. The
indeterminacy of recipes mean that practitioners are necessarily creative in interpreting their
shared reality, such as deciding what constitutes an anomalous situation or event and how to
deal with it, and are necessarily creative in exercising their capabilities in ways that seem
meaningful to them. Similarly, the inseparability of facts and values and the interpretive
flexibility of technology-practice means that although practitioners' choices are guided (by
heritage, shared meaning, recipes), they are necessarily creative in how they interpret and
express commercial opportunities, and in how they design competitive artefacts, processes,
and services (see 9.3).
In presenting the management of strategy as discrete elements of analysis, formulation of
choice, and implementation, and in seeing the organisation as adapting to its external
environment, the mainstream literature on strategy fails to acknowledge that practice is less
about sub-systems coherently locked together and more about the crystallisation of a range of
interacting socio-cognitive processes. Treating political behaviour as an abhorrent by-product
to be contained is to misunderstand its pervasiveness, and entanglement with shared
meaning, heritage, and other factors, in shaping practice. Further, by conceiving of the
knowledge generated from strategic analysis as being an approximation to some truth, these
rationalistic metaphors fail, fundamentally, to acknowledge the subjectivity of knowledge,
the inseparability of facts and values, and the interpretive flexibility of the technological
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agenda (see 2.6). Although the mainstream literature on strategy recognises recipes, their
meaning is located within Simon's 'bounded rationality' suggesting that practitioners operate
with a simplified model of their world. Practitioners may operate with a simplified
conception of their competitive world, but more than that, their conception is socially
constructed; they selectively bracket and sequence situations and events from the morass of
their everyday experiences, giving relevance and value to their constructions; recipe
knowledge is the product of human subjectivity (see 9.2 and 9.4).
The heterogeneity among firms as highlighted by the evolutionary metaphor adds
explanatory value to the social constructivist perspective because it reinforces the idea of
differentiated knowledge between organisations, and their differing assessments of situations
and events, without contradicting the conforming influence of industry recipes (see 2.6.4).
However, the hegemony invested by the evolutionary metaphor in a Darwinian selection
environment seems akin to a deterministic objective reality. Such a notion seems to grossly
understate the deliberate behaviour behind the variety and frequency of socio-economic
relations between organisations, for example the influence of local networks on knowledge
flows and the co-development of novel artefacts and services. Such socio-economic networks
shape the competitive environment.
The idea of a trajectory does capture the observable tendency for technologies to evolve in
predictable directions, but this trajectory is not determined by the technology. Trajectories
exist because practitioners collectively attach relevance and value (social and economic) to
their knowledge base and its development in particular ways. That shared commitment
crystallises as exemplars and heuristics for measuring performance and progress, and it is a
wavering of that commitment in light of increasingly differentiated assessments of situations
and events that undermine trajectories (see 9.4). Such wavering may result from the
emergence of alternative exemplars, or an increasingly shared belief that the limits of the
achievable are being reached. Such limits may be defined as a composite of the technically
possible, the economically viable, and the socially desirable.
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11.3.3 The inclusiveness of practice and social reality
Mintzberg suggests that strategy may be any combination of five 'Ps': plan, position, pattern,
ploy, and perspective (see 2.2.2). These findings suggest that 'perspective' is a better
description of practice than the other 'Ps'. The relationship between practice and social
reality is inclusive rather than directional (see 7.2.3). Practice embodies shared beliefs and
theories about how to compete and co-operate, and a rational post hoc reconstruction of an
organisation's practice will often show a 'pattern'. At the same time that practitioners are
reinforcing and extending their social reality through strategy practice, that reality imbues
practice as socio-cognitive commitments shared by the membership (see chs. 8 and 10).
Inclusiveness also comes from the subjectivity of knowledge and its distribution as and
within socio-cognitive structures (9.2.2), and the inseparability of facts and values (9.3.5).
The seamless web character attributed to sociotechnical systems further contributes to this
inclusiveness by showing that organisational development depends on the interrelationship
between artefacts, practice, heritage, and shared expectations among stakeholder institutions
(see 2.6.2). For an example from the Bank of Scotland see 5.6.2.
The Bank of Scotland's everyday practice of pursuing efficiency gains reflects a shared belief
among the Bank's managers that they are custodians of the Bank's heritage, its standing
today, and its future direction. The Bank's behaviour is reinforced by its customers'
expectation that it should exercise prudence, backed up by various regulatory mechanisms.
Timeplex's individualist shared reality is articulated as managers and engineers'
entrepreneurial and territorial practices. Timeplex competes in an environment where
constant and noticeable technological change and entrepreneurial behaviour are expected by
customers and competitors alike. The Open Business School's philosophy of open access and
equal opportunity manifests itself as a collective sense of mission to provide higher education
to the populace (especially the educationally disenfranchised), and the exercising among staff
of a universal right to influence the Business School's strategy making.
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In seeking to fit the organisation to its external environment, many mainstream strategy
thinkers invoke the language of systems, machines, and organisms, with feedback learning
loops, internal coherence of structures, and Lamarckian adaptation. These metaphors fail to
recognise that learning does not involve tracking some real truth, rather the attachment of
meaning and economic value to situations and events. Further, there are ambiguities,
inconsistencies, and differentiated assessments of reality everywhere. As noted above,
practitioners are necessarily creative in making sense of their relationships and their
competitive environment (see 11.3.2). In seeking to apply order to all that is provisional
about practice (ch. 8), or in applying categories to their technologies and capabilities (2.6.2),
systems strategists are (unknowingly) engaging in the process of social construction.
Through invoking a constellation of beliefs, recipes, shared meaning, a sense of identity, and
economic value they attach to accomplishments and expectations, they are engaging in
making practice and shared reality inclusive.
11.3.4 There are a limited number of discernible social realities
Social reality is not infinitely variable; there are a limited number of possibilities. It can be
understood as the product of two variables: socially prescribed rules of behaviour, and how
practitioners commit to work together. Although we may identify a limited number of
possibilities, everyday reality is discernible, and at the same time, indeterminate. There may
be discernible features, such as shared meaning, preferred forms of economic transaction and
managerial control, attitudes to risk and uncertainty, but these are indicative not definitive.
There are various reasons for this elusiveness. First, while an organisation may be
characterised in terms of a particular form of everyday reality, there are others in the
background, interacting with the dominant reality to provide variation and plasticity. For
example, Timeplex's individualism is constrained by aspects of an hierarchical reality, and
there are tensions of hierarchy and individualism in the Open Business School (see 10.4.1
and 10.4.3). Second, because of these tensions and the ambiguities and inconsistencies of
inclusiveness practice and shared reality is not static but developmental. Managers at the
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Bank believe that stewardship and prudence has always been the guiding principle of their
predecessors, and over the centuries the quill pen and ledger have given way to the computer
without upsetting that principle.
Third, a particular social reality may reflect, say, certain attitudes to risk and uncertainty, or
styles of rationality, but the nature of the link between shared reality and the particular
features of practice is not certain due to the ambiguity of the inclusive relationship and the
developmental quality of practice and shared reality noted above. Two examples were found
where the relationship between social reality and practice was found to differ from that
expected: while Douglas would regard conspiracy as consistent with an egalitarian
community, I found stronger evidence of this in the individualist reality of Timeplex (see
10.4.1). Similarly, Bloor does not regard an egalitarian society as supportive of diversity of
world view, yet there is evidence to the contrary in the Open Business School (see 10.4.3).
Fourth, building on the first three points, while the labelling of categories is an important aid
to understanding, social reality is not defined simply by the notion of constituent features or
categories that can be checked off inventory style. Practitioners' shared reality is maintained
by the relevance and value they attach to a constellation of categories as a whole; they draw
their identity from the interrelationship of categories, that are held together by consistencies
and inconsistencies. Through the interrelationship of these categories, each shared reality
gives rise to, and reflects, different kinds of strategy practice, and patterns of innovative
behaviour. Some of these patterns have been discussed in 10.5 by way of differences in
collective control, strategic rationality, strategic change, boundary management, and
individual mobility.
Consider the implications for strategic change. The possibility of plural realities mean that
the prevailing view that organisations normally experience incremental change interspersed
with periodic revolutionary change needs some revision (see 10.5.4). Two kinds of upheaval
seem possible. Organisations can transform themselves without appearing to leave their home
reality. They may also leap from one reality to another but this is likely to be a much more
traumatic experience for the stakeholders concerned. Evidence the difficulties surrounding
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the privatisation of Britain's health service, rail franchise, and utilities. It also seems likely
that although the social construction of practitioners' reality includes its elaboration, this
elaboration does not provide incremental steps from one social reality to another. For this
type of incremental change to happen practitioners would have to be only loosely connected
to their social reality, but as previously noted practitioners routinely and largely
unconsciously reinforce their social reality. It is indeed their source of identity.
Although the typology presented in chapter 10 and Harrison's 'organisation ideologies' do
not share a common heritage, there is some overlap (see 7.2.2). For example his 'power' and
'temple' cultures have some features in common with the individualist and hierarchical social
realities. Further, while social reality incorporates the creation and application of knowledge,
Harrison's organisation ideologies do not. Harrison's explanation of his categories appear to
be entirely based on common sense observations and impressionistic descriptions. Indeed
there is something tautologous about his classification: organisations have these ideologies
because of their beliefs and values, but where do these beliefs and values come from? In
contrast the typology in chapter 10 shows how and why alternative social realities are
distinctive: the interplay of social commitment and social control.
11.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND MANAGEMENT TEACHING
These findings carry implications for the 'personal encounters' in chapter one (1.1), and more
broadly for practice and teaching. These encounters are those of a practitioner and it seems
appropriate to frame the following discussion around them.
11.4.1 Constrained relativism
Practitioners experience their environment as objective, as having an ontological status
independent of them, and subjectivity is viewed as a human frailty, a view that, although not
stated, underpins all five personal concerns in chapter one. While I regarded the status of
reality as an interesting philosophical issue, it seemed remote from the 'real' everyday
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concerns of strategic management; a view that I imagine most practitioners share. This study
shows this to be an overly simplistic view of the world. So much so that the analyses in
chapters 7 to 10 stress the central interdependence of the subjective and the objective,
because from the perspective of a practitioner (in contrast to a sociologist) the suggestion that
reality is constructed in this way is far from obvious.
The implications for practice are profound. Practitioners need to be much more self reflexive
about the status of their understanding of what constitutes a competitive environment; their
relationship with it; and their relationship with each other. The implications for management
teaching are no less profound, because it requires that teachers be willing and able to question
the basis of the knowledge that they take for granted, and be able to develop this capability in
their practitioner-students. The ability to recognise epistemological assumptions is important
because as Knights argues teachers and students alike tend to internalise prescriptions for
effective practice; prescriptions that invariably assume an objective reality (see 7.1.1).
Reflexive practice is important because while many organisations are successful, many more
fail, and for similar reasons: practitioners impute technical rationality to their successes and
failures (see 7.1.1). Practitioners are not aware that the reality they take for granted is not
give but socially constructed. When they analyse their competitive environment using
Porter's 'five forces' (1980) or analyse their internal resources using the Boston Matrix or
Porter's 'value chain' (1985), or even when they use 'commonsense', practitioners are at the
same time implementing a host of practical consequences that go with the, often tacit,
intellectual frameworks, metaphors, and recipes of their shared reality. For example, when
managers talk about pursuing an 'added value' strategy, they are probably drawing on the
'value chain' metaphor (this link having been internalised), with its discrete components of
purchasing, production, marketing, and sales joined together like beads on a string. In this
process a little value is added to the product at each stage as it passes through the sausage
machine. Practitioners often translate the value chain into a list of operational processes,
checking off against each item how their organisation adds value for the customer. Were they
to analyse their resources and capabilities in terms of, say, a knowledge base with its socio-
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cognitive structure and distribution of expertise they would generate a different
understanding of how their organisation is adding value. Where practitioners are able to
confront their epistemology of practice, they increase the scope for effective and innovative
practice. By translating intellectual constructs into taken for granted recipes and problem
solving grids (forcing data into boxes and producing checklists), practitioners empty these
constructs of their looseness, ambiguity, and instability. Rather than being able to elaborate
or transform their intellectual constructs, practitioners' thinking becomes imprisoned by the
rationality and objectivity they invest in their models.
There are other areas where practitioners need to be able to identify their own recipes and
suspend judgement rather than look for checklists. In seeking ways to be competitive
practitioners draw on precedents and exemplars, for example successful competitors, and fast
growing firms in other industries. More than trying to emulate successful organisations,
practitioners might also study the failures. Further, they might try to analyse the socially
constructed processes that constitute successful and unsuccessful organisations including:
shared assumptions, socio-economic values, metaphors in use, rationality styles, attitudes to
uncertainty, approaches to creativity, and preferred forms of governance. They should also
look for competing interpretations of these other organisations' behaviour; juxtapose
different thinking styles, and shared metaphors and exemplars of good and bad practice; and
seek to understand how and why effective and innovative processes vary with different
interpretations of good and bad competitive performance. Practitioners should develop an
ability to be always ambivalent and enquiring about their successes and failures. Firms have
R&D and market research functions. The foregoing suggests a place for a socio-cognitive
researcher and agent provocateur, a facilitator-practitioner who is engaged in practice and at
the same time facilitating ambivalent and enquiring behaviour among colleagues. Perhaps the
'knowledge managers' that are becoming fashionable could take this role. Rather than
seeking to audit and produce an inventory of the firm's expertise, and more than trying to
make explicit the tacit knowledge that exists within the organisation (valuable as this task is),
the knowledge manager might engage colleagues in ways that help them to confront their
epistemology of practice.
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11.4.2 Accounting for personal encounters
My first, second, third, and fifth concerns in chapter one highlighted: the differentiated
meaning of strategy; the existence of conflict, compromise and contradiction; resistance to
heterogeneity within the organisation; the importance of politics and informal networks to
strategy. These four concerns are grouped together because the analyses confirm the
prevalence of these phenomena, and more importantly show that they are interrelated and an
inherent part of the social construction of strategy practice. The stable yet provisional nature
of practice suggests a range of factors that provide practitioners with both a stable experience
and different assessments of situations and events (ch. 8). In addition, the subjectivity of
knowledge and the interpretive flexibility of technology-practice creates the opportunity for
differentiated meaning, contradiction, and political behaviour (ch. 9). The existence of plural
realities within the organisation further contributes to the maintenance of these phenomena
(ch. 10).
Chapter 8 does not amount to an exhaustive framework, but it does provide practitioners and
teachers with a method for assessing how practitioners construct the practice of strategy, and
for assessing their organisation's relationship with the 'external' environment. Importantly,
these factors show that practitioners are not detached overseers of strategy. Whatever rational
gloss practitioners put on strategy (2.2, 2.3, and 2.4), it is the interaction of stable and
provisional socio-cognitive processes among practitioners that shapes practice. Rather than
treating differences, contradictions, and resistance as dysfunctional, practitioners might better
understand their own frustrations, their organisation's frailties and distinctive capabilities,
and the critical role of their shared social context, by drawing on the ideas presented in
chapters 7 to 10.
Part of my third concern was that practitioners, observers, and mainstream teaching on
strategy imply or overstate the extent to which the process of strategy is rational, yet 'rules of
thumb' and post hoc justification of outcomes seem commonplace. Practitioners do set goals
(4.4.1, 5.4.1 and 6.4.1), but the evidence also supports Weick, MacKenzie and other writers
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who suggest that rationality is imputed (9.4). Moreover, justifications are not randomly
applied but form part of a collectively ordered flow of experiences (ch. 8), such ordered
experiences coalescing in particular ways (ch. 10). The evidence suggests that asking whether
goals drive, or reflect, outcomes is inappropriate because it seeks to establish a cause and
effect link in an inclusive relationship between shared reality and practice. The imputation of
intent is an unavoidable consequence of the on-going interaction between the subjective and
objective, and further illustrates the need for practitioners to be much more critical in how
they assess the relationship between their competitive performance and strategic intent.
My fourth concern was that practitioners assume the objectivity of their knowledge, and
further that such knowledge seemed tacit and poorly understood. The evidence on exercising
capabilities and interpreting technology-practice, supports the analyses of Bloor, Pinch and
Bijker, and others who show that knowledge claims in science and technology are subjective,
that facts and values are inseparable (ch. 9). Just as Collins has noted the centrality of tacit
knowledge to scientific research, and Senker has noted its importance to innovation, this
study finds tacit and taken for granted knowledge to be fundamental to the practice of
strategy. In making strategic judgements of any kind (technological and commercial),
practitioners should try to develop a sensitivity to the subjective dimension of those
judgements. By recognising and remaining open to the subjective and taken for granted
nature of their knowledge, practitioners increase their scope for conceiving of novel, useful,
and more effective ways of configuring their resources and capabilities.
11,4.3 Designing social reality
These findings underline the profound difficulty of trying to design practice by manipulating
social reality. As noted above and in 10.5, alternative social realities invoke and support
different taken for granted strategy practices and patterns of innovative behaviour. For
example, each social reality reflects distinctive and shared attitudes to how work should be
organised, and what constitutes risk and rationality. These findings help explain my third
concern about the insensitivity to heterogeneity within organisations, because they show that
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'anything goes' is defined by the shared reality; once you internalise the rules you can be
very creative.
Practitioners and consultants who try to evaluate the appropriateness of an organisation's
social reality, say for being more innovative, risk making arbitrary judgements. The internal
consultant's view is coloured to the extent that they share the same socio-cognitive
commitments, and are mindful of the range of behaviour that the organisation sanctions. The
outside consultant is no more 'objective'. Rather they bring their own recipes for success, and
work to find, or put them, into the target organisation. The patchy success rate of ailing
organisations seeking to turnaround their fortunes by changing their chief executive, further
highlights the difficulty of remoulding a shared reality. This is not to suggest that leadership
styles are an entity divorced from social reality. Consultative or authoritarian styles help to
shape social reality, but equally an egalitarian social reality for example is likely to exert
pressure for a consultative leadership style.
In seeking to develop innovative behaviour, artefacts, or work processes, practitioners might
better appreciate the strategic consequences of their actions if they focus on technology-
practice, more than the more narrow artefactual technology, as a unit of analysis because
such an approach brings to the fore the interrelationship between artefacts, work organisation,
shared assumptions and beliefs (9.3). They might find that they do not need to change what
they have in order to enhance innovative behaviour, rather that their understanding of their
existing assumptions, attitudes to uncertainty, ways of working, and creative resources and
capabilities might be the inhibiting factor. Indeed without a better understanding of practice,
strategic change is likely to remain hit and miss.
Practitioners need to recognise a strong interdependence between the environment and the
organisation. Environments are patterned according to schemes imposed by organisations,
often reflecting the same internal order or disorder. Organisations seeking to shape the
environment in competition with others get a competitive environment. Those seeking an
ordered environment get a regulated one.
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11.5 FURTHER RESEARCH
The findings and ideas presented in chapters 7 to 10 invite further research. Existing forms of
business process analysis rely heavily on an ontologically concrete competitive world. The
findings here suggest a need for the development of appropriate management tools to help
practitioners appreciate the extent to which their practice shapes and reflects social reality.
The prescription that practitioners should seek a 'fit' between their organisation and the
environment, and the determinate metaphor, does not account for practice, but where such
prescriptions are heeded and acted upon this action contributes to the evolving locus of
competition. Once upon a time meeting customer needs was a source of advantage, now it is
essential. Once in-house R&D was key for some industries, now some see the route to
success as swinging to inter-organisational networks (Rothwell, 1992). These movements
reflect social shaping processes and further highlights the need for forms of analysis that
retain some scope for reflexive learning. There is a fundamental problem here in that where
we better understand a social process, the action of exploiting that understanding causes that
process to evaporate. Mindful of this phenomenon, there is a need to conceive of self-
reflexive analytical approaches that remain sensitive to the evolving locus of competition,
and the mutual elaboration and transformation of strategy practice and shared reality.
Further research is needed to test the robustness and applicability of the main findings, in
other forms of organisation. For example The Health Service, public service agencies,
government departments, the legal system, and organisations in other countries and cultural
settings. Research in these areas may not only shed light on the nature of strategy practice in
those organisations, but may also help the development of analytical ideas presented in
chapters 7 to 10. In particular what other factors contribute to the stable yet provisional
nature of strategy practice (ch. 8). What are the consequences of adding another dimension,
such as 'rationality styles', to the group/grid framework in chapter 10? A more complex
framework may highlight important variations of social reality and practice.
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The nature of socio-cognitive schemes or collective thinking styles and their expression as
practice needs further development. For example: there are questions about the validity of
using the individual psychology as a metaphor for group processes. Also, how useful is it to
talk of a collective consciousness? While the sociology of scientific knowledge provides
much insight to the analysis, its combination with a study of the sociology of language may
be equally fruitful in making sense of differentiated meaning. To this end can Wittgenstein's
'language games' and 'forms of life' be operationalised?
Related to the previous point on language is the role of metaphor and analogy. Schon (1963:
199) in his study of the role of metaphor in facilitating the emergence of novelty, suggests
that more work is needed to understand the nature of the "accommodation" between an old
theory and a new situation. He offers the notion of 'intimation', but this still smacks of the
mystique that he was critical of in other theories. This thesis suggests that as a starting point
the nature of that accommodation is socially constructed, but more research is needed here.
For example, how does creativity and recipe knowledge combine to generate both new
artefacts and metaphors?
The links between the alternative configurations of social reality and theories of economic
transactions and rationality need more investigation and explanation. For example how
would economic transaction models change if they accommodate social preferences? Any
given social reality may not necessarily define, or reflect, a particular collection of factors,
for example a particular form of rationality. The interrelationship between a constellation of
factors seems equally important. How can this relational dimension be characterised?
Whipp and Clark (1986) observed the mutual shaping between the firm's capabilities and
innovations, and the competitive structure of its sector. Further, many studies show that the
firm shares a large part of its reality with others of its sector or industry (Grinyer and
Spender, 1979; Huff, 1982; Child and Smith, 1990). While organisations within the sector
share relationships and expertise (Fincham et. al., 1994), they probably still have distinctive
thinking styles. How do these organisational differences and similarities shape the sector, and
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can we make sense of the different ways that individual organisations interpret and express
industry recipes?
There are similar questions about the influence of national or wider socio-economic settings
on organisational strategy practice. Much research has been done comparing decision making
styles, for example distinguishing Japanese, European, and American firm behaviour as being
culturally rooted (Ouchi, 1981). Whittington (1993) also cites a number of such studies.
There are also various on-going government sponsored initiatives around the world - the
British concern was noted in chapter one - to find ways of improving national innovative
performance. There seems to be room for comparing these national programmes on several
dimensions: to what extent they incorporate the role of broad cultural dimensions in shaping
technological change, and how such change is reinforcing and elaborating cultures; factors
considered important in designing these research programmes, and why; comparing the
outcomes and recommendations of these programmes, asking why differences and
similarities surface.
This thesis shows that in the pursuit of rational strategy practitioners working together invoke
a shared reality; a reality that reflects and at the same time shapes what counts as right and
wrong ways to co-operate and compete. This reality, and therefore practice, is stable yet
remains provisional because of the subjectivity of knowledge. Having spent the last four
years researching the nature of strategy, in particular the processes that shape choice and the
scope for innovative behaviour, my understanding of the practice of strategy has been
transformed. I have become deeply aware of the plasticity of practice, and its embodiment of
a shared reality. More generally practitioners might enrich their own lives, and that of




Schedule of interview questions
Differentiated meaning
1 What do you understand by strategy?
2 What is your organisation's strategy?
3 What is your department's strategy?
4 What do you understand by innovation?
5 What, if any, is the relationship between strategy and innovation?
6 How do you go about understanding the future competitive environment?
7 How do you organise in anticipation of the future. What factors are taken into account:
markets, technologies, expertise, socio-economic, etc.?
8 How do you try to keep open to the possibility of different futures?
9 How do you assess the potential for influencing the competitive environment?
10 Can you describe your strategy making processes? How intended v. how it seems.
11 How do you know that the strategic process is effective and reliable?
12 How do you see your competitors?
13 How do you view the innovation contribution/role/performance of other groups?
14 How do other groups view your innovation contribution/role/performance?
Paradoxes
15 How do you decide between spending on things which generate cash in the short-term and
things which generate revenue over the long-term?
16 How do you choose between actions which lead to improvements in competitive
performance and actions which lead to sustainable competitive advantage?




18 Do you have manuals of standard operating procedures?
19 Do you follow any practices which are not covered by the written procedures?
20 What are the generally accepted ways of beating the competition in this business?
21 Describe any links between business strategy and technical strategy?
22 Do you conceive of different technologies according to any form of
strategic significance, eg., core, critical, enabling, strategic?
Knowledge creation
23 Are there specific times when you make a conscious decision to create new knowledge?
When?, Why?
24 What do you understand by 'know-how' and 'expertise'?
25 What if any is the relationship between know-how and: (a) strategy?; (b) informal
contacts?
26 How do you go about acquiring and organising new knowledge?
27 What is the expertise of this organisation?
28 How do you distinguish between different kinds of knowledge, such as strategic and
operational, or restricted and 'need to know'?
29 If knowledge is a source of competitive advantage: (a) how do you know what you have?;
(b) how do you decide that your current knowledge base is good for the long-term?
Informal networks
30 Describe your links with other departments and external bodies, such as suppliers,
customers, research organisations, personal contacts? Formal/informal, frequency, meetings
location, who meets whom, purpose served.
31 What is the corporate view of informal networks and contacts?
32 Who are the networkers here?
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Appendix 6
Open University Mission Statement
The Open University is:
open as to people andwill play a leading role in the transition to mass higher education by
serving an increasingly large and diverse student body;
open as to places and will contribute to a widening of educational opportunities by
making its programmes, courses and services available throughout the UK and more
widely in Europe and the world;
open as to methods and will use distance-teaching methods and new learning technologies
and teaching techniques to serve home-based and work-based students;
open as to ideas and will be a vibrant academic community dedicated to the expansion,
refinement and sharing of knowledge.
The University's mission will be achieved by:
the operation of an open entry policy in which there are no impediments to access and
every assistance is given to students' progress;
the provision of open-leaming courses of outstanding quality which satisfy the lifelong
learning needs of adult students;
the development of local provision, centrally supported, throughout the EC and beyond;
the advancement and dissemination of knowledge through the pursuit of scholarship and
research;
the promotion of OU teaching materials and the sharing of expertise in systems and
technologies for distance education throughout the world;
the development, with other national and international bodies, of frameworks of education
and training that effectively meet the needs of students and the community at large.
The University also identified a number of priorities for development over the period for 1993-
1997 and, again, these are established below as they have a bearing on some of the priorities
within the School.
1 Expansion
To increase numbers of students on existing courses where places are fully financed, and
particularly, in areas of high demand.
Source: 'School of Management School Plan 1994-98' (OBS)
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2 Efficiency
To improve organizational efficiency and reduce unit costs annually while maintaining
quality.
3 Resilience
To increase entrepreneurial and net income and to build up reserves.
4 Quality
To improve the quality of students' learning experience, and to improve quality assurance
processes.
5 Research
To review the University's research policy and strengthen research activity.
6 Admission and Retention
To broaden access, improve the preparedness of new students for OU study and increase
the retention of students once admitted.
7 Curriculum Enhancement
To development additional courses and programmes in existing and new subject areas of
high demand.
8 Qualifications
To introduce new assessment and accreditation arrangements that are compatible with
developing national systems.
To support the mission outlined above and the priorities for development, the Plans for Change
document outlined a set of new directions which recognise that, in addition to priority setting,
the University as a whole needed to re-examine its working practices and start to initiate the
organization-wide changes that will enable staff at all levels to play a full part in the
achievement of the University's strategic objectives. These are set out below and are supported
by a University-wide programme whereby information is shared in a variety of ways in order to
raise the awareness of individuals and to develop appropriate staff development activities to
support the new directions.
From Long to Short Response Times
To improve timeliness and responsiveness in key academic, operational and administrative
processes in order to improve the quality of service and to adapt to changing
circumstances.
From Complexity to Simplicity
To simplify the University's operations and seek conformity to agreed standard models in
order to reap economies of scale and improve efficiency.
From Provider-led to Customer-centred Provision
To understand, define and act to meet the needs and expectations of all customers
(students, clients, etc.) and to assess performance in relation to customers' satisfaction.
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From an Expenditure to an Income Culture
To recognise that the University now has a greater ability than hitherto to determine its
own income and that all units and individuals have the potential to contribute to the
generation of net income to sustain and enhance current activities and support new
developments.
From Centralism to Subsidiary
To devolve greater executive and managerial authority to the carious loci of activity within
the University whenever itwill improve the quality of decision-making and the
effectiveness of local action.
From Quality Control to Quality Assurance
To place greater reliance on quality assurance processes as a means of empowering
individuals and reducing management overheads while making explicit quality standards
and objectives.
School ofManagementMission Statement
To be the leading UK business school in terms of improving the quality of management, by
building on the Open University's recognised excellence in distance teaching by:
Providing high quality management education and development experiences to large
numbers, of managers;
Providing high quality student and sponsor support;
Advancing the body of knowledge about management by research and scholarship;





1EXPANSION Toincreasenumbersofst dentsnexistingcou swher placesarfullyfinanc d,dp rti ularlyiareasofh gh demand. 2EFFICIENCY Toimpr veorganizationalefficie cyandr ducucosts annuallywhilemaintainingqu li y. 3RESILIENCE Toincreaseent epreneuriala dtinc mdtbuild reserves. 4QUALITY Toimprovethequalityfstudents'learningexperience,dt improvequalityass ranceprocesses. 5RESEARCH ToreviewthUniversity'sres archpolicyandst gthen researchactivity. 6ADMISSIONNDRETENTION Tobroadenacc ss,improvetheprep re nessfn wstudents forOUstudyandincreasetheret tionfstudentsonc admitted. 7CURRICULUMENHANCEMENT Todevelopadditionalcoursesandpr gramm sinexis i gan newsubjectar asofhighdemand. 8QUALIFICATIONS Tointroducenewassessmentndccr itatioarra gements thatarecomp tiblewithdevelopingnationalsystems. Theserank-order dprioriti sinte dedguidevery n intheconstructionfdevel pmentplans,thalloc ionof resourcesandthedeterminationofbal ncew en activities.Rank-orderingthislevel,hi sl mi s:c n provideonlybr aguid nce.Inpractitherealinks betweenthitemsabove,nddev lopm ntnparall lwi l oftenbenec ssaryaslongresourcesravailabl . Thefirstthreeprioriti ss uldprov dtres u c s necessarytoachi vehacademicobje tivess tui priorities4t8.
Appendix7
NEWDIRECTIONS1993-1997
TheOUneedsotonlyts ti sprioriti sbualtre¬ examineitsworkingpracticesandtoin tiatethorganiz tion- widechangesth twillenablealst fftopl yfup rtinth achievementofthUniversity'sstrategicobjectives.Th followingbriefstatementsoutlines mimp tantdimen io s, andforeachnegivthedirectio . □FROMLONGTSH RTRESPONSETIME Toimpr vetimelinessandresponsive essink yac d mic, operationalanddministr veproces esinortimprove thequalityofserviceandtadapttcha gingcir um t nces. □FROMCOMPLEXITYTOSIMPLICITY TosimplifytheUniversity'sop rat onsandse kconfor ityt agreedstandarmodelsinordertreapeconomi sofscale andimproveefficie cy. □FROMPROVIDER-LEDTCUSTOMER-CENTRED PROVISION Tounderstand,defia dcttomeethn edsan expectationsofallcustomers(stud n s,clientsetc.)andt assessperformanceinrel tiotocustomers'satisfacti n. □FROMANEXPENDITURETOAINCOMECULTUR TorecognizethateUniversityowhasgreat rabilitythan hithertoodeterminei sowinco eandt atllunitsa d individualsha ethepotenti lcontributethge erationof netincometsustainandenhancecurrentactivitiesa d supportnewdevelopments. □FROMCENTRALISTSUBSIDIARITY Todevolvegreaterexecuti eandmanagerialauth ritytoh variouslociofactivitywith ntheUnive sitywhen v ri ll improvethequalityofdec sion-makinga dtheeffectivenessof localaction. □FROMQUALITYCONTROLTOQUALITYASSURANCE Toplacegreaterre i ncqu lityass anceproc sses meansofe poweringindividualsandred ci gmanagem nt overheadswhilemakingexplicitqu itystand dsa d objectives. Thefullbenefitotheschang sfapproachwillbac i ved throughaprocessofawareness-raising,st fdevelopm ntand managementactiontinstitutionalandu itleveliwhichll staffhavenopportunitytparticip t .M yfthe en w directionsoverlapint ractandunitswilletde ermin whetherth yintendoaddr ssth mseparatelocoll ctively.
9
PLANSFOR CHANGE VISION
TheOpenUniversity'sklealsa dImpacthave capturedtheImaginationofthetwentieth-c n ury world.ItsIdeasandInnova ionswillwlead highereducationIntotwenty-firstce tury.• Academicvitalityandqu litytea hingwillharness evolvingInformati ntechnologytprovide convenienta dcost-effectivecoursesth t willempoweranIncr asingdiversityofpeoplt leadfullerlives.
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MISSION
TheOpenUniv rsityis: □openastpeoplendwillplayle di grinh transitionomasshighereduca nbyservi gan increasinglyla geanddiversstudentbody; □openastplac sndwillcontributeideningf educationalopportunitiesbym kingitsprogr mmes, coursesandservic svailablethroughouteUKdm re widelyinEuropandtherld; □openastmethodsnwillusdistanc -teaching methodsann wlear ingtechnologiesdt c i techniquesoservhome-baseda dwork-bas dstudent ; □openastideasndwillbvibr ntacademic communitydedicatedthexp nsio ,refinem nta d sharingofknowledge. TheUniversity'smis ionwillbac iev d: □theoperationfanenen rypol cinw ichtherar impedimentstoaccessndev ryassistanceigivet students'progress; □theprovisionofpen-l arningcours sfoutstandi g qualitywhichsatisfthelifelongearnineedofd lt students; □thedevelopm ntflocalprovision,centrallysup orted, throughoutheECandbeyond; □theadvancementddisseminationofknowledgthrough thepursuitofscholarshipandresearch; □thepromotionofOUteachi gm terialsandths ar ngf expertiseinsyst msandtechnologiefordist nceeducation throughouteworld; □thedevelopmentwithoth rnationalandinter ional bodiesfframeworksfeducationandtr in gtha effectivelym etthne dsofstud ntancommunityt large.
STRATEGICAIMS
Theprincipala msoftUniver ityrsfoll ws: STUDENTS
1Toplayale dingro einthexpansionofhig erand continuingeducationintheUKandofEnglish-language distancete chinginEurope. 2Toincreaseaccesstndsuccessfulparti ipationihigh r andco tinuingeducation,p rticularlyamo gthosewh havetraditionallybeenunder-represe t d. COURSES 3Todevelopawide-ranging,high-quality,multimedia,open- learningcurriculum,designedtome tac d micnd vocationalneedsasfullypossib e. 4Tooperateatheforefr ntfeducatio alandtechnological developmentsrelevatlarg -scaledistanceducation. 5Toprovidestudentswithteac ingandssessme tth ti appropriatethecours ,responsivettheineed ,anof recognizedquality. 6Toofferacademically,professionallyandvo ti nal recognizedawardsth tco respontotherrecognized systemsofassess ent,certificationandrecor sof achievement. RESEARCHANDSCHOLARSHIP 7Tomakeapositivndvigorouscontributionta dem c researchandscholarshipbothn ti nallyandinternationally. INTERNATIONALROLES 8Toincreaseworld-wideaccessteducationantr in g opportunitiesthroughepromotiooftO en University'sopenanddistanc -l arningmaterialsa d expertise.
Theunderlyingobjectivesirelationtst ffa dsourcr
asfollow : STAFF








CREATING 33 NEW ACADEMIC POSTS ACROSS THE UNIVERSITY
Since its foundation in 1969 the Open University has become by far the largest univer¬
sity in the UK, teaching well over 200,000 people every year. It continues to grow and
is expanding its activities throughout Europe and beyond. Its materials are used by
other institutions in many parts of the world. Open University courses are intended
mainly for adults studying part-time in their homes or workplaces, using multi-media
learning materials and supported by locally based tutors and counsellors.
THE OPEN UNIVERSITY - OPEN AS TO PEOPLE, PLACES, METHODS AND IDEAS
The University is rising to the challenge of technological change in many ways. Our mission statement dedares
thatwe will maintain an openness as to methods, ana will harness evolving technologies to enhance the auality of
our teaching. Our strategic aims indude a commitment to operate at the forefrontofeducational and technologi¬
cal developments.
The University has approved a new programme of development to be known as INSTILL - Integrating New
Systems and Technologies Into lifelong Learning. Six of the key areas for investment in this programme are -
• An Institute for R&D in Knowledge Media • Technological innovation in course materials eg CD-ROM
• A New Technology recruitment initiative • Harnessing the Internet for academic purposes
• A satellite broadcasting project • A laboratory to show-case OU technologies
The University now seeks to recruit academic staff who can contribute to these developments. Applicants for all
posts should nave demonstrable expertise in the application of new technology and a commitment to the educational
philosophy of theOpen University. Application may be made to one of the following units, or for a joint appointment.
Faculty of Arts School of Management
Faculty of Mathematics and Computing Centre for Modem Languages
Faculty of Science Institute of Educational Technology
Faculty of Social Sciences The OU Library
Faculty of Technology Academic Computing Service
School of Education Regional Academic Services
School of Health and Social Welfare The Knowledge Media Institute
As port of the New Technology Recruitment Initiative we plan to
appoint an additional 33 staff who can combine a high level of
academic potential with demonstrated competence in the application of new
technology to learning. Most appointments will bemode to academic Faculties,
Schools and Institutes, but a number will be to academic service units.
Appointments will be made at one of three levels -
Lecturer Grade A/B starting salary £l4,756-£20,953 p.a.(under review) -
to conceive and develop quality teaching materials or student support systems
using diverse media, and undertake innovative research.
Research FeAowGrade 1A salary scale £13,941 -£20,953 p.a.(under review)
- to undertake leading edge research relevant to all new technologies which
could support open learning.
ProtectOfficer/Software Designer Academic-related Grade 1/2 salary scale
£13,941 -£20,953 p.a. (under review) - to bring advanced software, network
or multi-media skills to support learning systems development.
Appointments will be made for a period ofat least five years, andsomewill
be permanent. Most posts will be tenable at the Universit/s headquarters in
Milton Keynes, but there may be opportunities for appointment to be based
at one of our 13 regional centres, in London, Edinburgh, Cardiff, Belfast,
Oxford, Bristol, Binningham, Nottingham, Cambridge, Leeds, Manchester,
Newcastle, East Grinstead.
Application forms, access details for disabled applicants, and further
particulars for all posts (including contacts in each unit) are available from
the Personnel Officer (Recruitment), TheOpen University, Milton Keynes MK7
6AA, by telephone to 01908 654901/654902 or by e-mail to
a.kicalukOopen.oc.uk. More information about the OU may be found on
http://www.open.ac.uk/. The closing dale for applications is 9 June 1995.
Disabled applicants whose skills and experience meet the requirements of
the job will be interviewed. Please let us know ifyou needyour copy of the
further particulars in large print, on computer disk, or on audio or cassette
tape. Equrd Opportunity is University Policy.
University education and trwrvng open la al aduks.
HE ECONOMIST MAT 20TH 1995 129
Source: The Economist May 20, 1995: 129
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